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ABSTRACT 
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A WOMAN’S COALITION IN TURKEY 
 
 
Öykü Uluçay 
Political Science, PhD, 2012 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Ayhan Akman 
Spring 2012,  xii + 273 pages 
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This dissertation is based on the analysis of a women‟s coalition in Turkey called 
“Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz”. The coalition is composed of women who are pitted against 
each other in popular depictions, namely feminists and religious women. This coalition is the 
first attempt to bridge different factions within the larger women‟s movement.   
The dissertation aims to answer three interrelated questions with respect to this 
coalition. The first task is to answer how women with different views on gender relations 
arrive at a consensus on the topic. The second task is to answer how coalitions can be 
sustainable in the absence of a common unifying identity. The third task is on how coalitions 
can alter social orientations of actors. Through a careful analysis of internal deliberations of 
the coalition and in-depth interviews with coalition members, dynamics of this interaction as 
well as points of consensus and disagreement are depicted.  
The analyses reveal that as long as the coalition defines its motivation as questioning 
male privileges in society, it is able to function cohesively. The analyses also reveal that in 
the absence of a unifying identity, the coalition became more reliant on acts of reciprocity 
that demonstrated a willingness to embrace others‟ life style concerns. Lastly, by facilitating 
a debate between different enclave women, the coalition altered conceptions of its members 
on discrimination and disadvantage which in turn modified their social orientations vis-à-vis 
other groups. The dissertation evaluates the importance of these findings for multiculturalism, 
civil society and gender studies. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
ÇEŞİTLİLİK, KARŞILIKLILIK VE SİVİLLİĞİN MÜZAKERESİ: TÜRKİYE’DEKİ 
BİR KADIN KOALİSYONUNDAN ÖRNEK 
 
 
Öykü Uluçay 
Siyaset Bilimi, Doktora, 2012 
DanıĢman: Yar. Doç. Ayhan Akman 
Bahar 2012, vii + 273 sayfa 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: karĢılıklılık, sivillik, toplumsal cinsiyet, anklav, çokkültürcülük 
 
 
 
Bu tez Türkiye‟de bir kadın koalisyonu olan “Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz”‟un 
analizine dayanmaktadır. Koalisyon popüler tasvirlerde birbirine zıt olarak gösterilen feminist 
ve dindar kadınlardan oluĢmuĢtur. Bu koalisyon geniĢ kadın hareketi içindeki farklı 
fraksiyonları biraraya getirmenin ilk çabasıdır.  
Bu tez, bu koalisyonla ilgili olarak birbiri ile bağlantılı üç soruyu yanıtlamaya 
çalıĢmaktadır. Birinci amaç toplumsal cinsiyet iliĢkileri ile ilgili birbirinden farklı görüĢlere 
sahip kadınların nasıl bir uzlaĢıya vardığını cevaplamaktır. Ġkinci amaç ortak ve birleĢtirici 
bir kimlik olmadan bir koalisyonun nasıl sürdürülebilir olabileceğini cevaplamaktır. Üçüncü 
amaç koalisyonların aktörlerin sosyal yönelimlerini nasıl değiĢtirebileceği ile ilgilidir. 
Koalisyonun kendi içindeki müzakerelerini analiz etmek ve koalisyon üyeleri ile 
derinlemesine görüĢmeler yapmak yoluyla bu etkileĢimin dinamikleri ve uzlaĢı ve 
anlaĢmazlık noktaları tasvir edilmektedir. 
Analizler göstermektedir ki koalisyon motivasyonunu erkek ayrıcalıklarını sorgulamak 
olarak belirlediğinde uyumlu bir Ģekilde çalıĢmaktadır. Analizler ayrıca göstermektedir ki 
koalisyon, ortak bir kimliğin eksikliğinde, baĢkalarının hayat tarzlarını kucaklayabilmenin 
göstergesi olarak görülen mütekabiliyeti vurgulayan eylemlere ihtiyaç duymaya baĢlamıĢtır. 
Son olarak, değiĢik anklavlara mensup kadınların kendi aralarında münazara etmesini 
sağlayarak, koalisyon onların ayrımcılık ve dezavantajlılık ile ilgili bakıĢ açılarını 
değiĢtirmiĢ; bu da onların baĢka gruplara karĢı olan sosyal yönelimlerini dönüĢtürmüĢtür. 
Tez, bu buluntuların çokkültürcülük, sivil toplum ve toplumsal cinsiyet çalıĢmaları açısından 
önemini irdelemiĢtir. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is based on the analysis of a women‟s coalition called “Birbirimize 
Sahip Çıkıyoruz” that was set up by women with very different backgrounds. The 
coalition was set up in 2008 initially to show solidarity with veiled women in their fight 
against veil ban in universities which was still very much in force at the time. 
Gradually, the coalition attempted unifying different factions within the larger women‟s 
movement with the purpose of showing that women activists in Turkey can show 
solidarity with each other in areas spanning from regulation of female body to 
improving the capabilities of women in the public sphere, despite having different life 
styles and world views. The peculiarity of the coalition stems from the fact that this was 
the first woman‟s coalition in Turkey that brings together women activists who are 
pitted against each other in popular depictions.  
Most of the analyses on women‟s movement in Turkey focuses on the activism of 
one segment of activist population, which is usually the secular, pro-Western, (upper) 
middle class Turkish women. Although women‟s movement gained strength especially 
as it became liberated from the leftist struggle after the 1980 coup, it had been speaking 
with a rather unitary voice. This situation has only gradually changed with the rise of 
religious women to the scene of political activism. Starting with 1990s, Turkish public 
has witnessed the entry of the veil issue to political circulation. The entry of veil ban 
into political discussions magnified the division lines within the women‟s movement 
even more. While veiled women were using idioms such as right to education and right 
to work, feminist movement was mute about how such demands can be conceptualized 
from a feminist framework. It was such ideological divisions which prevented us from 
talking about a women‟s movement that could handle diversity. 
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One of the primary motivations behind the analysis of this coalition is to see how 
the diversity of claims within the wider women‟s movement can be reconciled. This has 
particular importance in the Turkish context where the separate struggles of different 
groups of women have not intersected or provided support to each other. Having a good 
account of what worked or did not work in this coalition will be illuminating about the 
longer term potential of such coalitions to bring about more concerted action in the 
women‟s movement. The fact that this coalition produced more rhetoric than action is 
not seen as a discouraging sign for the possibility of future collaborations because joint 
civic activism necessitates a common language to begin with. For this reason, the focal 
point of my analysis has been the frames produced within the coalition. These frames 
hold the key to understanding which mental switches are necessary in order to align 
different civic struggles under a common umbrella. 
What distinguishes framing analysis in this study from many others is that unlike 
the traditional use of framing to analyze the public face of a coalition, this thesis 
focuses on how meaning making evolves out of discussions behind the scenes. By 
virtue of being a heterogeneous coalition that has multiple groups in its rankings, the 
coalition is a rich laboratory setting to test how common reference points emerge in the 
absence of a single identity. While framing analyses have largely focused on 
instrumental aspects of a movement such as efficiency and effectiveness, my focus has 
been on how the dialogue between competing visions on gender relations, recognition 
of identities and inter-group relations produces more fine-grained perspectives on these 
topics. In that sense, by staying in the kitchen of frame production and by observing the 
iterative process through which frames are crafted, I gained insights into the frame 
making process that is largely absent from conventional ways of analyzing coalitional 
rhetoric.  
The deliberations analyzed here are more about consensus building internally, 
rather than collective action externally. This is because of the nature of the group. 
Having started out as a campaign to end the veil ban in universities, in subsequent 
discussions the platform turned into a forum to increase the reflexivity of participants 
on inter-group relations and identity. In this sense it is more of an opinion making 
forum than an activist platform. However, this does not decrease the value of their 
efforts. On the basis of my literature review on Turkey, I have clear confidence to say 
that this is the only platform in Turkey that has brought diverse segments of the larger 
women‟s movement together for a critical scrutiny of their ideological premises and the 
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urgency/relativity of their claims on discrimination. As such, it holds a potential- if not 
in this case, for subsequent alliances- for transforming relations of identity categories 
which are pitted against each other in popular depictions. 
With respect to gender relations, despite holding very different opinions on 
private/public distinction and gender equality, the coalition members arrive at important 
points of consensus related to regulation of female bodies. By way of differentiating 
self-regulation (i.e. veiling) from male regulation of female bodies (i.e. harassment), the 
coalition aligned the perspectives of women who exert different levels of control on 
their bodies. The same consensus is evident with respect to the discussion on how male 
dominance operates through various ideologies. Members are in agreement as to how 
various political ideologies are used in a way to serve male interests. As an example, 
from the perspective of religious and non-religious members alike, conservatism as it is 
understood in Turkey today is utilized by men to increase their wealth and opportunities 
all the while suppressing the life choices of women. In sum, by arguing how political 
ideologies are in reality male ideologies that work to the disadvantage of women, the 
coalition achieves a more critical re-reading of political tools of propaganda. What 
comes to the fore in such discussions is the selective appropriation of fruits of 
modernity and privileges in society by men who use such ideologies to further their 
control on the life choices of women.  
What emerges from all the above points of consensus on gender relations is that as 
long as the discussions can be turned into a discussion of what enhances the public 
presence and capabilities (i.e. work, education) of women, the members are able to 
align their frames. 
Having stated some of the major frame alignments with respect to women‟s 
empowerment, it has to be stated that a thorough analysis of this coalition has relevance 
beyond the context of Turkish women‟s movement and gender studies.  
The ability of various social movements to come to terms with and handle their 
internal diversity is becoming a highly relevant topic especially with respect to 
discussions on multicultural democracy. Multicultural democracy theorists argue that 
mediating various struggles through the prism of multiple intersecting identities and 
linking of various social movements is the necessary step to achieve an inclusive and 
plural definition of citizenship.  
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To arrive at this inclusive definition however, social movements need a decisive 
shift in the ways they strategize, do activism but above all think about social relations 
between groups. They should come to terms with their internal diversity or possible 
points of convergence with other movements. They should be able to attest to 
intersectionalities of identities and possibilities for regroupings across movements. 
Through the analysis of this coalition, I tried to answer how this actually plays out 
in a real life setting. How the dynamics of identity negotiation take place in 
heterogeneous environments where activists with different backgrounds have to interact 
with each other is the focal point of my analysis. Any attempt at identity negotiation or 
cross-fertilization across social divides necessitates a coming to terms with one‟s 
position in the social hierarchy. In order to do this, I paid attention to the internal 
deliberations of the group rather than how it presented itself to the public. The internal 
deliberations within the group provide a more fertile ground to see the how group 
positions are evaluated or modified. It is this internal deliberation that has a potential to 
modify norms of reciprocity and civility that makes mutual recognition and cross-
fertilization possible.  
If we think of coalitions primarily as sites of self-reflection and mutual 
accommodation rather than sites of strategic cooperation, we will have to be attentive to 
the ways in which this accommodation can take place without requiring coalition 
members to conform to a unitary identity. How do coalitions where diverse identities 
have to exist side by side actually guarantee that all these constituent identities are 
actually accommodated? In other words, are identity differences within coalitions 
bridgeable and if so how are such differences reconciled?    
My main finding emerging from this case study is that despite setting common 
targets pertaining to women‟s interests this coalition still had to formulate a way to 
handle its inner diversity.  Even when coalitions show the parallel ways in which 
various groups are discriminated, this in no way guarantees that the constituent 
elements of the coalition cherish each other‟s identity or life style. This very problem 
also surfaced in the internal deliberations of the coalition I am analyzing. As 
deliberations continued, it became certain that at least some of the members expected 
various performances from others for proving their life-style or identity was accepted 
by others. For these members, the performative yardstick was participating to daily 
activities or civic/political performances of others who were different from themselves. 
Based on the disagreements and reactions this type of a demand received in the 
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coalition, I made a classification of the types of reciprocity that can be performed in a 
coalition and the possible problems or openings this type of reciprocity brings to the 
group. 
On the basis of my observations with respect to this coalition and other studies on 
coalition building, my conclusion is that more personalized forms of reciprocity could 
have worked in this coalition. What is meant by personalized reciprocity can acquire 
two forms: one is to acknowledge intersectional identities and hybridity which would 
rule out pitting identities against each other. This is because admitting intersectionality 
enables one to envision cohabitation of different identity traits within the same 
individual which would rule out making rigid assumptions or talk with an exclusive 
rhetoric about one‟s civic counterpart. If individual identities are acknowledged to be 
multivalent rather than uni-dimensional, there is always room to accommodate those 
who are presumably different than oneself. The other route to personalized reciprocity 
is to admit the fluidity of identities themselves and to let each person define one‟s 
identity through his/her prism. To give an example, if the juxtaposition of the categories 
of men/women is dissolved, there would be an opening for a more fluid definition of 
sexual orientation which can ease the tension on both feminists by not locking them 
into prescribed role definitions. This is the reason why queer activism is seen as 
emancipatory as it lifts the burden of defining masculinity/femininity from the 
shoulders of civic activists.  
These conclusions carry special importance for multicultural democracy theories 
as they speak to the heart of the matter with respect to whether identity politics is 
necessarily divisive or whether there is a potential to craft multi-stakeholder coalitions 
that both speak for multiple groups and that value the distinctive identities of those 
groups at the same time. 
Another angle through which this thesis makes a contribution to multicultural 
democracy theories is its appraisal of inter-group relations. Multicultural democracy 
theorists underline the importance of drawing on different experiences of social groups 
to claim a more inclusive definition of citizenship however how this can be done if 
those social groups do not consider their inter-relations as one of equals is left 
unanswered. The analysis of the internal deliberations within this coalition can provide 
an answer to this debate by way of showing how norms of engagement with other 
groups can successfully be altered if there is a diverse enough coalition to cross-check 
the excesses of dominant discourses in society. 
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What civility requires is an understanding on the part of a relatively privileged 
group of its own standing in that society and the likely effects of that position on other 
groups in society. If social actors see social relations based not on opposition but 
relationality, they would be in a better position to come to terms with the distribution of 
privilege and discrimination in society. In other words, if they know that the fate of one 
group is not independent of another‟s but involves a negotiation and bargaining on the 
distribution of status and cultural value than they would be in a better position to 
acknowledge their own responsibility or stake in this negotiation.  
I argued throughout the thesis that civility is only enhanced meaningfully when 
this relational aspect is grasped. The value of heterogeneous publics is important due to 
precisely this reason. In the absence of countervailing rhetoric, it is very hard for a 
group to discover its own situatedness and privilege. For this reason, spheres where 
diverse actors can talk with each other gain extra importance. This coalition by way of 
bringing diverse actors under its umbrella provides a setting to test whether my 
assumptions on civility actually hold.  
Theorists on deliberation underline the importance of giving marginal groups a 
space to air their grievances and concerns without fear of being suppressed by the views 
of dominant groups in society. However, whether being shielded from the views of 
dominant groups gives marginal groups an ability to speak with a less extreme voice is 
uncertain.  
Checking the excesses of one dominant discourse can best be done in 
heterogeneous settings where there is enough diversity so that each group‟s voice is 
balanced by the other. This coalition by way of bringing women who have been 
marginalized in their own civic circles provides such a setting where each woman 
brings her unique counter-rhetoric to the dominant (and usually masculine) rhetoric of 
the public sphere. Hence another contribution of this study is its elaboration of how 
formulations on inter-group relations are shaped by who takes part in discussions. 
Depending on how an individual/group is positioned vis-a-vis dominant groups in 
society, the definition of discrimination/disadvantage is crafted in a different fashion. 
Later in the analysis section, I will argue that norms of civic engagement (which I will 
call civility) are highly dependent on who takes part in public deliberations.  
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1.1. Outline of The Thesis 
 
 
 
Following this introduction, second chapter will be a literature review that is 
composed of two sections. Section 2.1 will be a discussion of the theoretical tools used 
to analyze the case study of this dissertation. Coalitions as a special case in the study of 
social movement research will be introduced. The value of coalitions will be discussed 
from two theoretical viewpoints: one from the perspective of multicultural democracy 
theories, the other through the prism of theories of deliberation. Lastly I wil introduce 
the framing methodology as it is understood and used in this dissertation. Section 2.2 of 
the literature review will be the introduction of the background to this coalition, namely 
Turkish women‟s movement scene. I will introduce the ascendance of religious women 
to the scene of civil society and larger women‟s movement as well as the trajectory 
followed by feminists since 1980s.  
Chapter 3 will be composed of two sections. Section 3.1 introduces the particular 
coalition that I am analyzing in this dissertation. Member profile, major activities, 
topics discussed as well as major controversies are all parts of this introduction. In the 
following section 3.2, I introduce the main methods utilized in the thesis. I make a brief 
introduction to the novelty of online etnograhpy methods and how I made use of this 
method in my research. I also explain the mixed methodology adopted in the 
dissertation in the form of in-depth interviews, textual analysis and participant 
observation where it was possible to use them.   
Chaptes 4, 5 and 6 introduce the main findings of my research. These findings are 
organized on the basis of three sections that tackle three inter-related questions.  
Chapter 4 is on Framing Gender Relations and is focused on how members can 
build consensus on gender relations despite holding different opinions on the topic.  
This chapter is dedicated to explaining the ways in which the coalition members arrive 
at a consensus on gender relations without necessarily aligning every member with 
feminist principles. In other words, this chapter explains in which ways women with 
diverse identities are able to align their gender specific demands by way of constructing 
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common strategic targets. These strategic targets are moving targets. In some cases the 
target turns out to be the state “as a field of contest for brave men”. In other cases, it is 
the societal conventions that permit men to regulate women‟s dress codes and life 
choices in the public sphere.  
The important thing to be remembered in all these points of consensus is that 
members actively seek a way to accommodate each other‟s differing perspectives on 
gender relations that reflect their particular background. This shows coalitions can 
accommodate diversity through framing if they can set their targets appropriately. It 
also shows that there can be solidarity within the wider women‟s movement in Turkey 
despite deep ideological (left-right) and life-style (religious-secular) differences. This 
runs contrary to previous observations which depict a more bleak picture about the 
solidarity of women who feel allegiance to different –isms in Turkey. 
Chapter 5 on Framing Group Diversity and Identity, taking the issue from another 
angle, questions how coalitions can be sustainable in the absence of a single unifying 
identity. Coalitions are usually depicted as having very instrumental reasons for being 
formed. Defining and fighting strategic adversaries is depicted as the bread and butter 
of coalitions. However, there are other aspects of coalition building which are equally 
vital for their sustainability. How coalitions promote and accommodate internal 
diversity is an important aspect of any maintenance work.  
What guarantees that coalitions do not disintegrate or become obsolete when it 
comes to dealing with internal diversity? This section deals with this question in more 
detail. Here, identities other than womanhood and how they are negotiated within the 
coalition gain prominence. Negotiations that take place within the coalition with respect 
to how platform members try to create solidarity without undermining the distinct 
identities of its members takes the center stage of my analysis. I show that acts of 
reciprocity become the primary vehicle through which solidarity can be manifested. 
Activists know they are not of the same identity or they do not share similar lifestyles 
but they consider acts of reciprocity as compensatory mechanisms. The important 
question for this coalition and many similar coalitions that do not exhibit one single 
unifying and tight solidarity among its participants is: What is the right type of 
reciprocity for maintaining a coalition of this sort? I will have preliminary answers to 
this question in this second chapter. 
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Chapter 6 on Framing Inter-Group Relations and Civility is about how 
heterogeneous coalitions can alter the social orientations of actors. If we think of 
coalitions as unique fora to bring different group perspectives into contact with each 
other, this encounter can help members acquire a different take on how to visualize 
inter-group relations. Whereas in Chapter 5, the emphasis was on how to accommodate 
different identities and life-styles within the same coalitional framework, here the 
emphasis is on how to approach the grievances and demands of groups in the wider 
civil society. Juxtaposing the grievances of different groups to draw similarities may 
prove fruitful in the short run but will surely fall short of streamlining the aspirations 
and expectations of groups from each other. Coalitions are the unique fora to streamline 
different groups‟ perspectives on discrimination and disadvantage. They also provide 
civil society actors with a unique chance to come in contact with groups which may 
hold an alternative explanation to their version of marginalization and discrimination in 
society. This encounter, which would not have taken place if members only talked with 
like-minded individuals has an influence on their social orientations vis-à-vis other 
groups.  
The analyses in Chapter 6 centers on how the social orientations of the actors 
change in ongoing discussions towards a more self-critical and self-reflexive appraisal 
of the situatedness of identity and the structure of privilege in society. Here, I call this 
specific instance of reflexivity as civility. This is because if social actors can admit their 
own situatedness and the myriad of privileges they do/may acquire from the 
discriminations of other groups in society, their social orientations will become more 
altruistic and based on mutual care and respect. In fact, here I make reference to 
multicultural democracy theorists who believe that a hardening of identity is a 
degeneration of civility. Multicultural citizenship requires a willingness to believe that 
when people are acting citizens, they care about, or should care about, the fates of 
diverse identity groups at the same time. (Lichteman, 1999:134) 
In all three chapters, through the narratives utilized by platform members, I will 
try to depict the changes in framing in ongoing discussions and their implications for 
civil society, civility, recognition, multicultural democracy and self-identity building. 
The dissertation ends with a conclusion chapter which is a general appraisal of the 
significance of this work for social movement and civil society research  
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is based on the case study of a coalition of women activists called 
Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz (BSÇ from now on). The members who make up this 
coalition are coming from very different trajectories of civic activism. While a group of 
members have emerged initially out of leftist movement in Turkey, they later evolved 
into the feminist movement especially after the coup of 1980. Another group has 
emerged out of the religious movement but acquired its distinctive character due to the 
veil ban and the ensuing rights struggles of veiled women. It would not be accurate to 
argue that each member joined this coalition in order to represent a particular group. 
However, it is safe to argue that each woman had a personal trajectory anchored in the 
history of a particular movement.  
Feminist movement in Turkey although rooted in the leftist movement of 1960s 
and 1970s went through an emancipation after the coup of 1980 and established itself 
more firmly in the social movements scene. It went through certain transformations 
which made coalition building with other movements an integral part of its strategy. 
The same is true for the struggle of veiled women. Although coming from a totally 
different tradition and having different sensibilities, they also went through a transition 
that made them more sensible to other rights struggles. If we are to understand the 
alliance building that is the case study of this thesis, we have to know the background 
of this rapprochement. 
The second part of the literature review will introduce the reader to the specific 
case study of the thesis. Since the coalition under study is a women‟s platform, this part 
will elaborate the factors and historical transitions that brought different segments of 
women‟s movement to engage in networked and coordinated activism. This second part 
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will be useful in understanding the particular historical trajectories of the different 
women‟s movements that made this coalition possible.   
BSÇ because of the participation of women coming from different histories and 
networks of collective activism can be called a coalition. Unlike monolithic and vertical 
organizations that characterize the collective activism of class based models, a coalition 
is made up of loose connections that can accommodate a more diverse set of positions 
and perceptions. The downside of relying on loose connections on the other hand is that 
there is less commitment to a stable identity and the alliance may have difficulties in 
sustaining a coherent message.  
Arguably, there has to be certain advantages in taking part in coalitions that 
represent a more diverse spectrum of ideologies and value systems. There must be clear 
advantages that outweigh the disadvantages of diverging viewpoints and priorities. For 
this reason, the first part of this chapter which is the theoretical section of my literature 
review will start with elaborating on why and how coalitions emerge in social 
movements. What type of activism are they engaged in? What are the types of 
grievance they raise? Answering these questions would entail digging deeper into social 
movement literature. Whether such coalitions are endemic to New Social Movements 
will be given a special emphasis.  
There are two important angles through which coalitions will be analyzed. One is 
through the prism of multicultural democracy theories. Multicultural democracy 
theorists consider cross fertilization among movements as an expansion of the liberty 
space for all groups in society. They believe in the possibility of joint initiatives that 
bring together different identities under a banner. Can groups with different 
backgrounds unite solely on the basis of a common goal or a strategic adversary? How 
sustainable would such a coalition be? Under which conditions different identities 
become less of a burden and more of an asset for a coalition?  
These observations about what multiculturalism entails have high relevance for 
my case study as well.  Instead of arguing which groups of women in this coalition are 
more vulnerable or are in need of special treatment, coalition members engage in a 
more fruitful discussion on how to reconcile differences. They debate on how to craft a 
political solidarity that does not ignore difference and that is based on relying on and 
drawing strength from the diversity of claims within the wider women‟s movement. 
These discussions provide me with ample resource to tackle the basic premises of 
multicultural democracy theorists. 
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The other angle through which I want to approach this case study has to do with 
how the internal talk within a coalition can change the social orientations of its actors. 
What is meant by social orientations is the quality of the interactions between 
individuals and groups in society. The nature of interactions can be based on mutual 
trust, respect, recognition or it could also be based on hatred or suspicion. While social 
orientations of actors may have certain identifiable ideological or sociological 
backgrounds, there are reasons to believe these are subject to change under certain 
circumstances. Depending on whom one talks to in the larger public sphere and the 
heterogeneity of the debating publics involved, attitudes and orientations of actors will 
take a different shape.  
I am interested in this literature mainly because this coalition has a potential to 
modify the perceptions of its members on the relations between groups in society. The 
potential of this coalition stems from the fact that it represents groups which were 
marginalized from mainstream public sphere as well as from their ideological 
backyards be it the leftist movement or the Islamist movement. By bringing the voice of 
groups, which are less tainted by the dominant discourses of hegemonic public forms, 
together the coalition gives us an opportunity to test our assumptions about how 
counter-public spheres can create new imaginaries for the groups and issues they 
represent and how these representations offer an alternative account on inter-group 
relations in society. This will become the topic of my analysis chapter on framing inter-
group relations and civility. 
While making my analysis about these questions, I paid particular attention to the 
frames put into circulation in the inner deliberations of the coalition and how these 
frames were modified in ongoing conversations. A focus on frames is necessary if we 
want to understand how identities and inter-group relations are conceptualized and re-
defined in coalitions. For a long time, only the narratives social movements provided to 
the outside world, to the public, has been analyzed and discussed under the rubric of 
framing. However, coalitions do not just engage in narrative construction vis-à-vis 
outside publics, they also engage in an intense internal persuasion and creation of new 
imaginaries for the groups and issues they want to represent. For this reason, the 
theoretical part of my literature review will end with a critical discussion of framing 
literature in a way that will take into account the internal deliberations of coalition 
members into account. 
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2.1. Theoretical Background 
 
 
 
2.1.1.   Coalitions in Social Movement Research 
 
 
Coalitions are becoming more widespread in the current organizational structure 
of collective action (Beutz Land, 2009, Schlosberg, 1999; Diani and Bison, 2004; 
Carruthers, 1996; Underwood, 2009, Diani, 1995). They mostly refer to loose 
alliances/networks of activists that may be maintained together by a common purpose 
but that are not bound singularly by one movement, who are dispersed spatially, and 
that do not operate within highly formal organizational structures. This is a departure 
from old modalities of movement organization such as professional associations or 
trade unions where there is an explicit hierarchy, a single purpose and formal tactics of 
social activism. The reduction in barriers to communication, (i.e. the rise of online 
communities) facilitates the emergence of such loose coalitions. 
Scholars argue that it has become the rule rather than the exception to talk about 
social movements as networks. (Diani, 1996, p. xiii; Gerlach and Hines, 1970; Bullard 
,1993; Schlosberg, 1999) Schlosberg (1999) argues this fact was first observed and 
mentioned by Gerlach and Hines (1970) on the loose, dispersed networks of social 
movements in the 1960s. 
Among the reasons cited for such a change in organizational structure, we could 
first cite the disillusionment by big, monolithic and mainstream organizations which 
have become ineffective in campaigning and controlled by major funding organizations 
rather than membership, which promote hierarchy and centralization and 
professionalization of the movement that impede accountability to the membership and 
local communities (Schlosberg, 1999, p. 122). 
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In addition, movements when they turn into highly hierarchical and professional 
organizations, also carry the potential of becoming insensitive to the demands of low 
income or minority groups in its rankings. Lack of attention to diversity becomes a 
major problem in such movements. 
For some students of social movements, horizontal and vertical linkages, 
networks, coalitions and other forms of alliance are a manifestation of a thickening civil 
society (Carruthers, 1996; Fuentes and Günter Frank, 1989). There are numerous 
examples in social movement literature that point towards alliance building around 
common purposes and recruiting activists from diverse networks for this purpose. 
A good example is the environmental justice movement which according to 
Bullard (1993) works through a network of civil rights, social justice and environmental 
groups. According to Capek (1993) as they work through a coalition of organizations, 
environmental justice groups incorporate ideas and themes from the groups joining this 
coalition. “In the various organizations and networks that make up the environmental 
justice movement, there is no insistence on one singular point of view, one policy that 
will solve all problems, or one tactic to be used in all battles. There is no one 
„environmental justice,‟ „minority‟, or „grassroots‟ view of the environment” (Capek 
quoted in Schlosberg, 1999, p.124). According to a report of Environmental Careers 
Organization (1992, p.391), there are varied motivations for organizing and a basic 
belief in the heterogeneous nature of the movement. While the concerns within the 
movement are more or less the same, “the particular experiences of these issues, and the 
formulation of understandings and responses, differ according to place. Rather than one 
particular frame, there is a coexistence of multiple beliefs as to the causes, situation of, 
and possible solutions for issues of environmental justice. The movement is constructed 
from differences such as these and revels in that fact.” (Schlosberg, 1999, p.124) 
Another observation with respect to the networked movement of environmental 
justice is that people are recruited into the movement through pre-existing movements, 
be it churches, neighborhood support groups and the like. The movement is successful 
to the extent that it is able to recruit from other social justice groups. Networking with 
other groups means networking with their issues. Schlosberg in his account of 
networking in environmental justice movement explains how the issue linkage evolves: 
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   Activists battling computer chip plants often have to deal not only with 
issues of contamination, but also with the politics of public subsidies of 
private corporations. Organizers working on health problems of strawberry 
pickers in California arc inevitably brought into the contested terrain of 
immigration law (Schlosberg, 1999:127). 
 
This quote reveals the dynamism of a networked social movement and how it 
differs from a conventional understanding of political mobilization that relies on a 
common goal, a common identity and common narrative. In fact, networked 
movements do not imply uniformity by any means. Networks and alliances rely as 
much on differences and autonomy as they do on unity. In the words of Schlosberg:  
 
   In the formation of networks of solidarity, there is not necessarily one 
single unifying commonality, a single glue or mortar. Instead a network 
holds itself together along the common edges of its pieces. The resulting 
mosaic itself-the movement-becomes the major commonality. Within a 
network there remains both multiplicity and commonality. Some networks 
and alliances are very much conscious of this issue.  Groups that share 
environmental concerns may still have radical differences. Yet, the 
commonality of environmental concerns serves as the mortar even when 
there are differences in culture, style, ideology or tactics (Schlosberg, 1999, 
p.128). 
 
Another example of this is from Mexico where environmental movement merged 
with indigenous movement. In fact, there are important overlaps between indigenous 
movements and environmental movements all over Latin America, especially in regions 
rich in bio-diversity which are also important for the livelihoods of many indigenous 
cultures. In such places, preservation of bio-diversity coincides with the preservation of 
living space of indigenous cultures. Such cultures are as engendered as the wild life 
around the Amazon. There are numerous examples of this overlap of struggles in 
countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia.1 
In the case of Mexico we observe that, “new environmental groups, largely urban, 
educated and middle class, have found a convergence of interests with indigenous 
                                                          
1 The term used by Carruthers for the environmental and indigenous 
movements that work together is “indigenous ecology” which refers to the alliances 
between environmental and indigenous social movement organizations- These 
linkages have taken root in a shared hope that traditional knowledge, embedded in 
indigenous and peasant culture and practice, might provide a living model of 
sustainability (1996:1007). 
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organizations, representing the poorest and most marginalized segment of Mexico‟s 
rural peasantry.” (Carruthers, 1996, p.1007) Not only are there links between grassroots 
indigenous organizations with intermediary organizations located in big cities, hence 
creating the rural-urban linkage, there are also linkages with global environmental 
coalitions to make the case of indigenous cultures heard in the entire world and bring 
global support.    
At this point, we have to dwell on whether all types of networked activism should 
be considered “social movements”. Social movements do not exhaust the whole picture 
called collective activism and they should be treated as a sub-field within the broader 
collective action literature. I will rely on the classification developed by Diani and 
Bison (2004) where they treat social movements and coalitions as different and specific 
instances of networked activism. Their definition of a social movement is “networks of 
informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, 
engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity.” 
There are three types of criteria they use to differentiate social movements from 
other types of collective action. These are: 
 
•presence or absence of conflictual orientations to clearly identified 
opponents; 
•dense or sparse informal exchanges between individuals or organizations 
engaged in collective projects; 
• Strong or weak collective identity between members of those networks 
(Diani and Bison, 2004, p.283) 
 
For Diani and Bison (2004, p.283), social movement processes are instances of 
collective action, characterized by clear conflictual orientations to specific social and 
political opponents, conducted within dense inter-organizational networking and which 
links social actors through a shared identity and solidarity.  
They identify two other forms of collective activism which are important for the 
purposes of this thesis: coalitional processes and organizational processes.  To illustrate 
their classification they come up with a typology of collective action (Diani, Bison 
2004: 284). 
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Table 1: Typology of collective action 
Dense vs. sparse 
networks Network identity Type of collective action 
Dense  Strong Social movement 
Dense  Weak Coalitional processes 
Sparse Weak Organizational alliances 
 
For Diani and Bison (2004), in coalitions (or alliances) “collective actors are 
densely connected to each other in terms of alliances, and may identify opponents 
explicitly, but those alliances are not backed by strong identity links. The networks 
among actors mobilizing on a common goal take a purely instrumental nature” (p. 285). 
Their prediction is that once the actors have achieved their aims or once it becomes 
clear there is no way to achieve that aim, the coalition terminates. 
How do such loose coalitions maintain their networks and sustain their activism? 
Many would argue that such loose connections would destroy an emerging movement 
rather than strengthen it. There are various arguments in support of this thesis. 
Firstly, coalitions are mobile arrangements. They may easily dissolve after a loss, 
a victory or a major disagreement. Without sustained resistance, successful pressuring 
of public authorities is rare. Schlosberg (1999) argues that “governmental agencies and 
corporations are influenced by longevity; while they can often wait out sporadic 
protests, they have a much more difficult time ignoring community organizations and 
networks that have become established and coordinated” (p.140). Having said this 
however, such networks also exhibit an advantage in this sense. Even when they 
dissipate, they remain dormant and can be ready for getting mobilized anew. 
Second difficulty is with respect to keeping relations intact. Some participants of a 
particular network may come to see themselves as part of a larger movement, while 
others may think the pressing issue that the networked group deals with is the only 
concern of the group. Solidarity is understood differently by group members. This 
means, a network can become an “amalgamation of numerous decentered struggles, 
incapable of dealing with big issues of power” 
Contrary to this particular critique, Schlosberg (1999) believes, multiple, localized 
oppositions are what sustains coalitions in the contemporary era. He applies this 
thinking to environmental coalitions in the US where the targets of the movement are 
diverse which makes the movement decentered and multiple.   The issues and abuses 
that form the motivations of the movement need to be targeted at the local level in the 
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multiplicity of places where it emerges. Hence, “the multiplicity of experiences, issues, 
and resistances that have developed in the environmental justice movement call for and 
exemplify diverse approaches to change in varied venues. The basis of the movement is 
this composite character and the plurality of levels of attack” (p.141) 
For him, the plurality of a movement, its diverse tactics, and its numerous 
resources are understood as strategic advantages in organizing (p.142). The distinctive 
feature of a coalition is its ability to own multiple issues and to speak for multiple 
constituencies. For this, it has to forge narratives that capture the state and desires of 
these multiple constituencies. Coalitions, by virtue of representing more dispersed 
constituencies are more fluid and disorganized. For this reason, they may be short-lived 
or dormant at various periods of their activism. Coalitions also have to rely on non-
conventional methods of organization of space as they have to recruit activists from 
multiple places, groups and identities. Online communities are a response to this space 
barrier. Currently, most of the networked movements rely on the extensive use of online 
media to stay connected. This fact will be explained in more detail in the methodology 
chapter with a discussion on the rise of online communities and the advantages and 
challenges posed to social science research by this new medium.  
Another feature of the coalitions is that by virtue of connecting formerly 
disconnected groups around issues of common concern, they also start catering to 
multiple needs and issues. This is mostly because as the participants to the coalition get 
more diverse in purpose and background, the alliance also starts adapting to this 
diversity. For this reason unlike traditional social movements, most coalitions are also 
multiple-issue alliances. The women making part of this study also belong to multiple 
networks and maintain their solidarity through these diffuse networks rather than tight 
and unitary organizational structures. By being part of such diffuse networks they also 
bring the diverse issues in various other platforms to BSÇ for further discussion. In this 
fashion, not only are they expanding the issue ownership of the coalition, they are also 
linking issues to each other in new and novel ways.  
Although this introduction gives a comprehensive overview of coalitional 
attributes, strengths and weaknesses and various tactics and strategies that bring 
success, it still does not address the importance of coalitional politics in the current era. 
What are the conditions that make coalitions important and prevalent today? It is the 
aim of this thesis to have a reflection on coalitions in a new light. There are two 
important reasons why a closer study of coalitions will bear important results: 
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Coalitions as Sites For Critical Multivalent Identity Talk: Multicultural 
democracy theorists put a strong emphasis on forms of civic engagement that bring a 
variety of groups into its orbit, that speak for and across multiple intersecting identities. 
Instead of stressing the instrumental aspects of coalitions such as fighting certain 
strategic targets, such theorization prioritizes the investigation of how identities are 
negotiated in coalitions. Such analyses are less outcome oriented and more process 
oriented. This means the primary aim of such analyses is not to find out what type of 
campaigns or slogans come to fruition and prove effective. The aim is rather to find out 
how different identity claims are accomodated, given value and weight in discussions, 
how the particularities of constituent members of coalitions are respected and 
reconciled. If we are to argue that such coalitions have a potential to become 
multicultural public forms that recognize a plurality of different, equally valuable ways 
of being human, we should be able to pinpoint how recognition across identity groups 
takes place within a coalitional setting. This aspect of coalitions needs to be highlighted 
and it is one of the motivations of this dissertation to do so.   
 
Coalitions as Sites for Changing Social Orientations of Civic Actors:  
Coalitions are unique fore in that they bring different groups of individuals into their 
orbit. Each constituent element of the coalition brings his/her particular pre-conceptions 
of others in society. The way people view groups other than one‟s own reveals 
important information as to the social orientations of actors. A fine grained analysis of 
the quality of civil society is nothing other than the measurement of the social 
orientations of its actors. An important question in the study of coalitions is then: How 
are modes of civic engagement and social orientations of actors modified within 
coalitions? What guarantees that civic actors will alter their conceptualizations of 
relations between groups in a way that takes into account more marginal voices in 
society? What type of civic deliberation will produce this type of outcome? 
 
The remainder of the literature review will elaborate coalitions from these two 
angles. For this reason, the remainder is dedicated to the discussion of coalitions both 
from the perspective of multicultural democracy/identity politics as well as deliberation 
theories.  
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2.1.2.  Coalitions as Sites for Critical Multivalent Identity Talk:  
 
 
The study of coalitions has a potential to provide important extensions to the 
debate on identity politics and multicultural democracy. Many scholars think coalitional 
processes, unlike social movements, are not backed by significant identity links and are 
doomed to disintegrate sooner or later (Diani and Bison, 2004:281). These scholars also 
stress the contingent and instrumental nature of relations given the lack of a tight 
common bond. 
The study of coalitions can give convincing answers to the question of whether all 
forms of civic activism should be based on a common unitary identity. Since the attacks 
of critics of identity politics center on the exclusionary and monolithic nature of identity 
politics, coalitions provide us with an ideal setting to observe what happens in the 
absence of common identity bonds. What happens when groups making part of a 
coalition have to reconcile their competing identity claims? If civic groups can operate 
without the existence of a single bond, or if there are ways to reconcile clashing 
identities within a larger coalition we could potentially argue against the assumption 
that a single overarching identity is necessary to maintain bonds or engage in 
meaningful civic action.  
The study of coalitions would help us assess whether the promises of multicultural 
democracy can indeed be realized within the framework of new social movements 
(Fraser, 1997, p.181). In order to make the connection between coalitions and 
multicultural democracy theories clear, I will first start with new social movements and 
the various transformations identity struggles went through since the emergence of 
NSM. This overview will help the reader establish the connections between coalitions 
and the current aspirations of multicultural democracy. 
New Social Movements (NSM is used here in a generic sense, as a single 
phenomenon) is based on the idea that contemporary movements are struggles over the 
production of meaning and the constitution of new identities.  As has been put 
succinctly by Eduardo Canel (2004) “it stresses the expressive aspects of social 
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movements and places them exclusively in the terrain of civil society, as opposed to the 
state”. NSM theory is known for its attack on the economic reductionism of classical 
Marxism which argues all collective action is due to economic crisis, exploitation and 
class struggle. Most of the first examples of NSMs appeared in affluent Western 
countries which have a plural and democratic regime with a powerful civil society. To 
argue that these movements emerged because of a structural crisis or a suppressed 
grievance would be misplaced. Such movements involve a desire to redefine their 
collective identity and to become part of the public space with these newly acclaimed 
identities.   
For this reason, their terrain of battle is cultural rather than economic.2 NSM 
theories argue that struggles over the means of production have been replaced with 
control over the process of symbolic production and the redefinition of social roles. 
Habermas views the current social movements as defensive reactions seeking to retain 
or re-create endangered life-styles. They operate at the level of social integration and 
are less concerned with redistributional issues than with the grammar of forms of life 
(Habermas, 1981, p.33). 
Another distinctive feature of such movements is their emphasis on difference 
rather than equality. The old social movements had a yardstick- a certain bourgeoisie 
standard of life- that they wanted to reclaim for themselves. The class struggle involved 
an element of sharing the fruits of modernity on a par with the owners of the means of 
production. For this, the movement had an umbilical cord with labor parties that they 
saw as the primary means to achieve their demands for equality. Even the feminist 
movement that coincides with the peak of class struggle was more concerned with the 
equality with men and the reclamation of the same privileges with men than 
emphasizing female difference. 
The NSMs, in stark contrast to the above picture, does not define modernity in 
homogeneity, sameness or equality.  All the natural categories of modernity are under 
intense scrutiny by the NSMs such as environment, womanhood, religiosity etc...The 
terrain of this new meaning making is civil society rather than the state. The NSMs 
according to Touraine (1985) are more involved in redefinition of social relations and 
                                                          
2 Theorists such as Fraser (1992) and Young (1996, 2006) would find this account 
incomplete as they believe identity politics needs a strong social equality commitment 
and redistributionist agenda in order to claim complete equality of worth of social 
groups. 
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cultural forms within society. In this way, such movements question the established 
norms of normality. For Giddens (1991), NSMs represent the passage from 
emancipatory politics to the life politics. As explained above, emancipatory politics aim 
the acquisition of same rights and privileges with the group that establishes the norms, 
i.e. bourgeoisie, the Kemalist elite etc... However, the preoccupation of NSMs is usually 
how we should envision a society that goes beyond such ascriptive categories. This 
involves a process of thinking unto itself and reconstruction of identities (which usually 
involves a deconstruction of identities to begin with). The politics that is being waged is 
the recognition of such new identity claims. But unlike the politics of “equality in 
sameness” of the previous era, this new politics involves “equality in difference”, the 
right to exist as autonomous and different.   
However, identity politics that mark the essence of NSM also went through 
significant transformations. To take the example of feminism, we can see that in many 
Western countries it went through three distinct phases. While the first phase included a 
rigorous discussion of gender difference (and whether gender equity in the strictest 
sense is desirable), the second phase was focused on differences among women 
whereas in the last (current) phase, the attention shifted towards “multiple intersecting 
identities” (Fraser, 1997, p.175).  
In the first phase, the main discussion took place between feminists who argued 
that men and women should be equal in every sphere of life, and those who believe that 
men and women can be different but still possess their own peculiar value and make 
their own contribution to public life. Those are defined as equality feminists and 
difference feminists. This debate continued without a decisive victory for either side. 
While equality feminists were criticized for taking male behavior as the norm and 
project this onto the female, hence reproduce the androcentric conceptions of cultural 
standards, difference feminists were attacked for locking women into feminine roles 
that produced the same gender hierarchies that they were trying to eradicate.  
Before this debate was settled, the entire focus of the discussion shifted as the 
“marginals” of women‟s movement entered the scene. This shift is largely attributed to 
the work of lesbians and women of color (Fraser, 1997, p.178). For the first time, 
women started discussing the implications of other intersecting identities for the female 
experience. For the first time, women of color, minority women, working class women 
and others aired the view that what feminism defended so far was an Anglo-Saxon 
white middle class female aspiration. This was not feminism for all women.  By 
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repressing differences among women, the movement also suppressed an account of 
different ways in which marginalization plays out for women of color, of different 
sexual orientations, immigrant women, etc…Women with intersecting identities had 
multiple allegiances to other movements and this also complicated the picture of 
women‟s struggle. 
This was not only true for feminism. Many other NSMs also came to a point of 
awareness where it was impossible to essentialize identities and treat them as distinct 
phenomena amid the intersectionalities and hybridity that were so evident. NSM 
activism entered a new era with this realization. Many movements, including feminism, 
found cross-cutting commitments and shared problem areas with other movements. 
Lyndia Burns (2006) in her book called Feminist Alliances argues that feminist 
separatism has been on the decline as the movement had been in alliance with various 
other movements in the last few decades including gay rights, environmentalists, 
socialists and other left wing activists.  For her, there are two practical advantages in 
doing this. One is the advantages of unity with other groups. In her words: 
 
   Where a range of past gains are under threat (including abortion rights, 
equal pay and even human rights) obvious advantages exist in a regrouping 
and combining of resources. In fact, isolationism does not pay off. Second 
and more subtle reason is the recognition of difference by the movement, 
and the inadequacy of the assumption of some common ground such as the 
experience of a common oppression of all women. If feminist movement 
recognizes diversity, then it is likely to share common issues with groups of 
men. Perspectives on justice, power, and social oppression can also be 
aligned with other groups if no identifiable social situation shared by all 
women exists. Recognition of difference has led to such alliances (Burns, 
2006, p.1-2) 
 
Given the realization that different identity struggles are not self-contained but 
inter-connected, social movements needed a reorientation. Fraser thinks this is a must 
for feminist movement. She says: 
 
   Only if feminists were willing to abandon an exclusive focus on gender 
difference could we cease interpreting other difference claims as threats to 
the unity of women. Only if we were willing to grapple with axes of 
subordination other than gender could we theorize our relation to the other 
political struggles surrounding us (Burns, 1997, p.180).   
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Fraser argues that at least in the case of US, the realization of multiple intersecting 
identities and subsequent reorientation meant a decisive shift in the ways activism was 
carried out. What looked like turning inward (let us focus on differences between 
women) eventually meant turning outward (we should focus not on gender alone but 
other intersectional identity claims). Hence came feminist theorization of race, 
ethnicity, nationalism, sexuality etc. 
According to Fraser (1997, p.181), “radical democracy” today is being proposed 
as a rubric for mediating various struggles over “multiple intersecting identities” hence 
for linking various social movements (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Fraser, in line with 
Laclau and Mouffe uses radical democracy claims and multicultural democracy claims 
in an interchangeable manner. For her, both terms reject hegemonic understandings of 
democracy and the determination of cultural value on the basis of this hegemonic 
reading. They both became the rallying cry for a potential alliance of social movements. 
The goal of each is to promote multicultural public forms which recognize a plurality of 
different, equally valuable ways of being human (Fraser, 1997, p.184). 
There are different theorizations about how multiculturalism should be 
envisioned. Multiculturalism is usually depicted as a political principle that is based on 
envisioning a citizenship that is not abstracted from its cultural, ethnic and subnational 
components. It requires a willingness to recognize the cultural difference among 
citizens and the unique identity of the individual (Soutphommasane, 2005, p.403). 
However, the usual pre-occupation of multicultural democracy theorists had been 
mostly on how to envision minority and group differentiated rights. Radical versions of 
this model (Fraser, 1997; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) deal more with a differentiated 
citizenship model that reserves special rights for oppressed minority groups through 
measures such as affirmative action. Liberal versions of multiculturalism, on the other 
hand, try to mediate the relationship between the individual, identity groups and the 
state through a less rigid framework in the sense of leaving individuals the freedom to 
choose a meaningful life across the full range of human activities including social, 
educational, religious, recreational and economic life (Kymlicka, 1995:76). The liberal 
position calls for the protection of societal cultures in order to secure the „intelligible 
context of choice‟ for individuals (Kymlicka 1995: 150).  
While these models focus more on how a political system should handle the 
existence of different identity groups and how minority and group differentiated rights 
should be formulated, there are other theoretical contributions to multiculturalism that 
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try to frame the universal rights and obligations of citizenhip. Soutphommasane (2005) 
promotes a civic pluralist model of multiculturalism in which cultural difference is 
expressed within the limits of a common civic culture. He argues that:  
 
A civic pluralist model of multicultural citizenship must meet two tests; it 
must not only recognize cultural difference in the public sphere but must 
also provide a new basis for political belonging. This requires an „open‟ 
political culture or „deliberative democracy‟, in which political institutions 
and practices are exposed to scrutiny and re-interpretation, and a sense of 
belonging based less upon shared political values and more upon common 
membership of public debate within a political community 
(Soutphommasane,2005, p.401). 
 
In his formulation, multicultural citizenship is not possible if political institutions 
uphold a dominant public culture that puts diverse cultural groups under pressure to 
conform. In a sense, multicultural citizenship is based on a common civic culture that is 
based less on an allegiance to shared political values and more on the character 
(inclusiveness, non-domination etc.) of the public debate in a given polity (2005, p.413). 
He goes on to argue that: 
 
Multicultural citizenship offers a new basis of political belonging based on 
citizens‟ shared experience in negotiating difference. What all this seems to 
require is a form of deliberative democracy. Multicultural citizenship calls 
upon citizens to deliberate upon questions of difference and such 
deliberation, in turn, needs to find expression in the institutions of 
government and the associations of civil society (Soutphommasane, 2005, 
p.413). 
 
This is the basic reason why analyses of coalitions are especially important for 
questioning the assumptions of multicultural democracy theorists. We have to see 
whether the proposition that various social movements can and should work through 
multiple intersecting identities actually works on the ground. Whether coalitions 
actually provide a corrective to the splintering effects of identity politics and whether 
they have the necessary theoretical and practical richness to come up with a new 
synthesis across social movements is yet to be seen. Multicultural democracy theorists 
make a huge emphasis on promoting multicultural public forms, as depicted in the civic 
pluralist model of Soutphommasane, but it remains yet to be seen whether and how 
such public spheres do actually function.  
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Young thinks the most important question we have to answer on coalitions is 
whether we have to transcend difference in order to forge a successful coalition. She 
thinks attempting unity under a simple banner is misleading. 
For her, the only way to forge a successful coalition is to do this in the scope of a 
politics of difference. The preconditions for workable political coalitions require 
drawing on different experiences of oppressed groups such as single mothers, illegal 
immigrants, the unemployed, indigenous people, gays and lesbians etc (Young, 2006). 
However bringing them under a simple banner is not the solution here. Young (2006) 
thinks an inclusive movement cannot emerge from the common good but rather from a 
careful attention by each vulnerable social segment to the vulnerabilities of the others 
(p.12).  
Young (2006), in an attempt to respond to both leftist and conservative critics of 
identity politics who claim that the various civic movements since 1960s have only 
contributed to a hardening of boundaries between groups, argues that a careful reading 
of these movements would reveal an initial hardening of boundaries, followed by a 
reflexive questioning of those boundaries and then increasing interaction, fusion and 
exchange (p.12). Gender, race, ethnic and sexual preference movements arose in the 
late 1960s in the USA as people in the larger Leftist movement reflected on their 
specific experience of oppression. According to Young, the hardening of boundaries 
took place because of the more-oppressed-than-thou competition (Young, 2006, p.13). 
They needed separate organizational spaces to build their narratives, develop solidarity 
with one another. This was a time when movements were essentialist and exclusionary. 
According to Young, in the current period, such movements draw less rigid boundaries 
around themselves.  
Young argues the way to counteract divisive bickering is not as Leftist critics of 
identity politics claim “to transcend their differences of culture and social position and 
unite under the banner of people before profits”. To the contrary, the way to fight the 
assault of neo-liberalism requires a coalition that draws on particular experiences of 
each and every group making up the coalition so that we can construct an enlarged 
understanding of the depth of society‟s injustices and ways to address them (Young, 
2006, p.17). 
As an example, she talks about the common depiction of poor people as lazy, 
irresponsible, black, single mothers, whereas the real circumstances of poverty are 
always variable. Latino and Asian movements and groups can explain one face of 
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poverty, feminist analyses shows another, a rural perspective another, African-American 
or racist exclusion another, reservation Native American Indians another, older-working 
class white men in the former industrial heartland yet another. If each of these 
constituencies does not communicate its specific situations to the others, then the ruling 
powers can continue to co-opt one by using another as scapegoat (Young, 2006, p.18). 
In a discussion of Young‟s work, Fraser (1995) argues that we need to differentiate 
between differences that we wish to abolish because they are the result of oppression, 
differences which should be universalized because they are crucial and differences that 
should be enjoyed as expressions of diversity (p.158). Fraser (1995) calls her position 
post-socialism in an attempt to take into account contemporary concerns related to 
identity. Her view is that Young treats all differences as diversities that we should 
celebrate.3 She believes that working against the gendered division of labor and 
working against women‟s cultural oppression would be in conflict with each other 
because in one case, we are trying to abolish difference and in the other case we are 
celebrating it. Distinguishing between different differences appears like a necessary 
refinement of the politics of difference.  Fraser thinks we do not have to celebrate all 
qualities associated with oppressed groups but that we ought to recognize that different 
social groups have a unique contribution to make to public life (Fraser, 1995, p. 159). 
This differentiation process also reveals important clues as to the nature of 
alliance building within new social movements. Groups can work more easily on the 
basis of differences that should be abolished or differences that should be universalized 
than working on the differences that should be enjoyed as expressions of diversity. This 
may be because the urgency of remedying discrimination (differences that should be 
abolished) and/or securing entitlements (differences that should be universalized) 
almost always outweigh the value of diversity in and of itself. While analyzing the 
platforms and alliances theoretically and also practically on my case study, one should 
always bear in mind these nuances. This will later help readers understand why this 
coalition has been able to successfully wage a politics that is based on working against 
discrimination of different women (i.e. opposing the ban on headscarf in universities 
                                                          
3 Fraser (1992) also argues that women do not necessarily constitute a group in 
the sense of shared affinity. Young (1996) addresses this problem by arguing that we 
can think of women as a group without thinking of women as a homogeneous group 
since groups are partially formed by how they are seen by others or by a set of 
structural constraints.  
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and public institutions) but why it could not show the same level of commitment or 
success in defending the rights of different women to promote different life-styles (i.e. 
the right of lesbian women to wage gay politics).  
This can be attributed to the fact Diani and Bison (2004) explained about 
coalitional processes. Unlike social movements which are based on a shared sense of 
collective identity, coalitions rely on an amalgamation of groups that strive for a 
common objective that is unifying enough despite differences in allegiances and 
identities. This common goal usually takes the shape of a difference that needs to be 
abolished so that the different groups making part of this coalition can benefit from a 
universal scheme. The importance of differences that needs to be cherished may come 
secondary in such schemes.  
If that is the case however, we fall short of realizing the claims of multicultural 
democracy theorists. Because, according to their account, the promise of multicultural 
democracy stems from the fact that different identities can strive for common ends all 
the while respecting and cherishing the particularity and uniqueness of the cultural 
value of constituent groups of a society. A multicultural ideal can never be solely 
strategic in that sense. This discussion reveals that there are important drawbacks in 
relying too much on strategic adversaries but not relying enough on internal differences. 
Having strategic adversaries usually indicates that there is a common grievance that 
needs to be remedied, which corresponds to “differences that need to be abolished” 
according to Fraser‟s classification. Although such a goal can garner support from 
individuals with different backgrounds and identities, not having enough emphasis on 
differences that need to be cherished may cause the eventual disintegration of a 
coalition. This is because constituent elements of a coalition would want the elimination 
of a common grievance not solely to achieve a leveling of status with other groups but 
also and maybe more importantly to achieve a revaluation of their own identity. 
Remedies would signify that the group in question is valued in and of itself and that is 
why impediments in front of its self-realization should be removed. If this element is 
missing in coalitions, they tend to degenerate into pragmatic and short-sighted alliances 
that disregard the value of their constituent elements. 
This is the basic reason why analyses of coalitions have become especially 
important. If coalitions can craft common targets all the while being respectful to their 
constituent elements they would be longer lasting. One way in which diversity within a 
coalition can be more easily embraced is through discovering multiple intersecting 
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identities that is, the intersectional identities inherent in the backgrounds of constituent 
elements of the coalition. If coalition members come to admit that they do not exist as 
discrete identities but as a combination of different identities they may start to see the 
links in their own identity concerns and that of others. 
We have to see whether the proposition that various social movements can and 
should work through multiple intersecting identities actually works on the ground. 
Whether coalitions actually provide a corrective to the splintering effects of identity 
politics and whether they have the necessary theoretical and practical richness to come 
up with a new synthesis across social movements is yet to be seen. Both radical 
democracy and multicultural democracy theorists make a huge emphasis on promoting 
multicultural public forms but it remains yet to be seen whether and how such public 
spheres do actually function.  
 
 
 
2.1.3.  Coalitions as Sites for Changing Social Orientations of Actors 
 
 
Civil society literature has for a long time been mainly pre-occupied with the 
relations between discrete social movements and the state. The antagonisms between 
state and interest groups grabbed the attention of civil society theorists and issues with 
respect to the autonomy of civil society groups from state regulation were thought to be 
a more important measure of quality and vibrancy of civil society. Later studies, 
showed (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Fiorina, 1999; Kopecky, 2003; Bieber, 2003; 
Muddle, 2003; Casquete, 2005; Foley and Edwards, 1996) the quality of civil society 
depended more on the social orientations of the actors making up its space. Social 
orientations refer to the quality of the interactions and engagements of groups with each 
other. How social actors come to trust one another, how they develop attitudes about 
other groups in society and how they relate to one another are all part of this concept. 
To be more explicit, positive attitudes such as trust, tolerance, altruism or negative 
attitudes such as hatred, xenophobia are all types of social orientations groups may 
exhibit in their relations with one another.  
Social orientations of actors may change a great deal according to their degree of 
interaction with individuals and groups different than one‟s own. Network theorists 
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pioneer in studies showing how inter-personal trust changes as people move in and out 
of particular networks but their studies also seem insufficient to account for how the 
mental switch takes place in altering the social orientations of actors vis-à-vis other 
groups. A focus on processes, especially narrative processes, seems crucial to account 
for these modifications. 
A focus on narrative processes and deliberation necessitates discerning which 
groups‟ voice is heard or listened to more than others. In any given society, more 
hegemonic groups have the means and the ideological tools to make their own 
propaganda more efficiently. In the absence of countervailing rhetoric it is very easy for 
them to set the tone and the rules of the debate. This means any attempt to change the 
social orientations of groups in a way that will have a positive impact on marginal 
groups should first of all attempt to make public deliberation as inclusive as possible. 
Interactions between different minded groups are crucial to alter pre-conceptions and 
prejudices in inter-group deliberations. 
That is why a study of coalitions could potentially reveal the ways in which social 
actor‟s evaluations of one‟s position in social hierarchy and one‟s assumptions about the 
distribution of privilege can change significantly as actors interact with each other in 
ongoing negotiations. It helps us achieve a more fine grained perspective into the 
mechanisms through which actors may modify their conceptions and/or eliminate their 
misconceptions about other groups. Coalitions provide the researchers on civil society a 
rich laboratory to test their assumptions on how social orientations of actors may be 
altered. A focus on the processes of deliberation is necessary to uncover this 
modification however. In other words, an obsession with end results cannot show how 
actors change their attitudes about the self and other groups. It is the interactional 
deliberative processes that have a potential to have an effect on attitudes which may 
require a longer time span to analyze. The dialogical nature of interaction and the 
particular narratives that resonate or not resonate with different members of a coalition 
reveal points of consensus and antagonism. 
For this reason, an important task in front of any research focused on how 
coalitions can alter social orientations of actors would be to unearth the dynamic 
process of deliberation. The type of actors taking part in the deliberation, their distance 
to more mainstream or marginal voices within the wider public sphere, the level of 
reflexivity that is achieved within conversations would be revealing as to the potentials 
of coalitions in decreasing tensions and polarizations that may be prevalent within the 
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larger public.  The study of modes of deliberation and framing literature will help us 
make sense of this aspect of coalition building. The ability of coalitions to influence and 
modify social orientations of actors will be assessed through an analysis of ongoing 
discussions and deliberative processes.   
In discussing the goals of multicultural democracy, I have argued that the goal of 
each is to promote multicultural public forms which recognize a plurality of different, 
equally valuable ways of being human (Fraser, 1997, p.184). However what needs to be 
secured to turn this goal into reality is to prevent the formation of hegemonic public 
forms which may prevent more marginal public forms to speak for themselves.  
To clarify what I mean by the problem of hegemonic public forms, I have to get 
into the literature on public sphere and deliberation. This literature will clarify the ways 
in which more marginal identity struggles can be excluded from airing their concerns in 
the public sphere and what kind of remedies are suggested to create spaces of 
discussion for such groups.  
The concept of public sphere was first articulated by Habermas in his “Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere”. The concept refers to the spaces in which 
citizens can air their concerns about public (and private) affairs, deliberate on various 
solutions to problem areas; hence it is an institutionalized area of discursive interaction. 
This arena is conceptually distinct from the state and can in principle be critical of the 
state. It also provides a distinction from official economy which is not a space of 
deliberation of ideas but trading of goods. Hence, it helps us separate democratic 
associations from both state apparatus and economic markets (Fraser, 1997, p.70). 
Of course, since it‟s‟ first articulation, the concept while reclaiming fame and 
wide usage, also received various criticisms and correctives for very important reasons. 
Historians and political theorists rightfully pointed out that Habermas‟ public sphere as 
it is articulated for the case of Europe after the decline of absolutism refers to one form 
of public sphere: that of the bourgeoisie. Habermas‟ was also aware of this problem but 
he did not give a convincing answer as to how to counteract the exclusionary tendencies 
inherent in his usage of the term. The concept was referring to the emergence of spaces 
of public discussion that was clearly associated with the rise of a single class and was 
not addressing how the subsequent rise of the working class or women‟s movement or 
student movement could be accommodated. All in all, Habermas stopped short of 
articulating a post-bourgeoisie model of public sphere and never adequately 
problematized the assumptions of his liberal model.    
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The revisionist historiography made it clear the bourgeoisie public sphere had 
more trapping than Habermas accounted for. It functioned to legitimate a particular 
class interests to the expense of other emergent but marginal classes. That said other 
political theorists were quick to fill the vacuum with their alternative conceptualizations 
that would make the concept more inclusive and less lop-sided due to its liberal 
assumptions.  
I do not want to engage in an extensive discussion on public sphere but rather to 
point out how it relates to the deliberations in coalitions of the sort of I am analyzing. 
For this reason, I will just focus on the assumptions of the liberal public sphere concept 
that are problematic from the perspective of radical democracy coalitions and how the 
concept was modified to accommodate these new forms of articulation. 
I will refer to Fraser (1997, p.76) on which aspects are problematic from the 
perspective of such coalitions. Fraser thinks there are four important reasons why public 
sphere is a deficient and non-inclusive term of which three are very relevant for my 
research .These are: 
i. The assumption that it is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere 
to bracket status differentials and to deliberate “as if” they were 
social equals, the assumption that social equality is not a necessary 
condition for political democracy. 
 
ii. The assumption that the proliferation of a multiplicity of competing 
publics is necessarily a step away from, rather than toward, greater 
democracy, and that a single, comprehensive public sphere is always 
preferable to a nexus of multiple publics. 
 
iii. The assumption that discourse in public spheres should be restricted 
to deliberation about common good, and that the appearance of 
“private interests” and “private issues” is always undesirable. 
 
The first of these assumptions have been challenged on many occasions. Both 
empirical and theoretical studies point out to the ways in which informal impediments 
to participatory parity function to the detriment of less equal members of a polity. For 
example, many BSÇ participants admitted feeling alienated in NGOs or forums where 
men and women mingled. They felt excluded by a language they called “masculine 
language”. So, the appropriate remedy in public sphere is not to act as if we are all 
social equals but on the contrary, to un-bracket those inequalities and make them 
explicit.  
33 
 
 
But how does one make such social inequalities in the public sphere explicit if 
that public sphere functions to the advantage of dominant groups. Those voices which 
try to make the inequalities explicit will be suppressed. These effects will be 
exacerbated when there is a single dominant public sphere which is the essence of 
assumption 2. Members of more subordinated groups do need alternative spaces where 
they can articulate their concerns without fear that they will be silenced and absorbed 
into a false sense of collectivity (Fraser, 1997, p.81). Assumption 3 is also tied to the 
understanding of public sphere as a single entity since only this form of public space 
can generate common good as opposed to multiple publics that produce their own 
particular and opposing private interests.  
As opposed to this model, many theorists believe in the merits of multiple publics 
that can deliberate and promote their version of good life and that can articulate them 
without interference of a mainstream dominant group perspective. History shows that 
members of subordinated social groups, even during the times about which Habermas 
thought a single bourgeoisie public sphere was in operation, have constituted alternative 
publics. 
These alternative publics helped dominated groups secure a breathing space where 
they can stay united with like-minded individuals. Hence they secured the conditions of 
non-domination. This is what Nancy Fraser (1992) called sub-altern or counter-public 
spaces and what Mansbridge (1996) referred to as enclaves of resistance. The virtue of 
such places is that they help groups develop their arguments in a sheltered fashion 
before they enter the public stage of contestation. Secondly, such spaces promote 
political activism in a more rigorous way.  
Both Mansbridge‟s (1996) “enclave politics” and Nancy Fraser‟s (1992) “sub-
altern publics” involve an appreciation of the decentered public sphere and pluralistic 
civil society model that comes into being in such multi-issue platforms. Mansbridge 
(1996) argues:  
 
   For groups and social movements seeking to express diversity, the goals 
of such counter-publics would include understanding themselves better, 
forging bonds of solidarity, preserving the memories of past injustices, 
interpreting and re-interpreting the meaning of injustice, working out 
alternative conceptions of self, of community, of justice and 
universality…deciding what alliances to make both emotionally and 
34 
 
strategically, deliberating on ends and means, and deciding how to act, 
individually and collectively (p.58).  
The major drawback of enclave model of democratic deliberations is that 
members of enclave groups may only speak to one another.  They may not know how to 
put what they want to say in words that others may understand or may want to hear 
(Mansbridge, 1996, p.58). In Mansbridge‟s (1996) words: 
 
   The enclaves, which produce insights that less protected spaces would 
have prevented, also protect those insights from reasonable criticism. Yet, 
most people, and particularly those disadvantaged in the larger society, need 
some such protection in order to think more critically and carefully. We also 
need this protection to help us develop confidence in our ideas, marshal our 
forces and feel supported by others (p.58). 
  
The dilemma here is that while we need spaces where subordinated groups can 
articulate their opinions we also have to assure that those articulations do not 
degenerate into extreme viewpoints that can only be binding and reasonable for the 
groups in that particular enclave. What guarantees that such groups do not only 
articulate their very peculiar opinions but also that those opinions can enter into 
circulation of ideas. Here, we have to get into the specifics of deliberative processes in 
more detail.   
Contrary to idealization of deliberation by political theorists (Elster, 1998; 
Gutmann et al, 1996; Habermas, 1996) who believe deliberation helps individuals 
refine their own opinions, develop greater tolerance for different opinions and identify 
common ends and means, the success and sophistication of deliberation is greatly 
conditional on the network structure of the discussing group/groups (Lawrence, Sides 
and Farrell 2010, p.141). 
Even in the presence of a common objective, certain alliances are more likely to 
have a deliberative advantage over others. The setting of the deliberative space, the 
heterogeneity of the groups taking part in discussions, all have an effect on the 
likelihood of finding common arguments within coalitions.  
Problems of domination, argumentative paralysis, polarization within groups with 
diverse backgrounds could all arise. Which type of environment is more conducive to 
consensus building and which type of spaces fall prey to argumentative paralysis is 
important to distinguish if we want to see which alliances are more likely to succeed. 
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For giving a more theoretically succinct description of how such deliberation 
differs in different settings, I make use of the model developed by Klemp that explains 
the level of contestation and consensus building in different types of information 
spaces. The term Klemp (2009) uses to describe groups that only talk with themselves 
is “one-sided informational spaces”. These are contexts that allow a single political, 
religious or ethical perspective to prevail. For him, there are two major problems 
associated with one-sided informational spaces: one is the problem of one-sided 
persuasion; the other is the problem of rhetorical corruption. The first problem emerges 
due to the inability to hear the arguments of different perspectives, the second is related 
to unchecked dissemination of manipulative rhetoric due to lack of interaction with 
outside groups. 
In environments where groups speak within themselves rather than with outside 
audiences, the effects of deliberation do not always produce the desired outcome. In 
experiments made about the likely effects of deliberation, Cass Sunstein (2000) found 
out that members of groups ended up with more extreme positions after they spoke with 
one another. This study showed that deliberation within like-minded groups has 
polarizing effects (Sunstein, 2000, p.20). Such polarization is due to the unchecked 
adherence to conclusions which have not been tested by different reasoning or 
arguments. Bad informational outcomes are pushed to extremes and ossify in such 
spaces.  
The same applies to virtual space. In a research that tries to uncover the degree to 
which liberal and conservative bloggers are interacting with each other, it was 
discovered that of the 1400 blogs that were part of the study, 91 % of the links are to 
like-minded sites (Sunstein, 2006). The general conclusion is that blogosphere is 
divided into identifiable communities. Liberals and conservatives do not link to each 
other. They do not even discuss the same topics. While social media is considered a 
democratizing and liberal force, on the basis of above research, it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that many readers are obtaining one-sided information. 
Sunstein (2006) thinks information cocoons and echo chambers are a real problem 
for democracy because the blogosphere is a fertile ground for amplification of errors, 
hidden profiles, cascade effects, and polarization (p.191). In a similar fashion, two 
important studies of prominent political blogs conclude that bloggers exhibit 
homophily, the tendency to associate with others who are similar to them (Lawrence et. 
al, 2010, p.142). These empirical findings also feed into the general fear that increased 
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communication does not always lead to increased interaction between people with 
differing viewpoints.  
Habermas is equally pessimistic about internet communication arguing that 
“horizontal and informal networking of communication undermines the achievements 
of traditional publics in democratic regimes” and that “internet tends to fragment 
debate, giving rise to a huge number of isolated issue publics” (Sunstein, 2006, p.142). 
For Klemp (2009), the only way one sided-information spaces can be moderated 
is through engaging in discussions in “richly contestatory spaces” where a diversity of 
views are exchanged under conditions of fair competition. For him, this is the only way 
to enhance democracy. This helps one sided information spaces to adjust their 
arguments after having considered the rationale of other groups in society. This may 
help the emergence of morally legitimate forms of strategic and even manipulative 
speech. The manipulative rhetoric of different groups in society is balanced by the 
transparency of open deliberations. 
His model can be visualized in the following fashion (Klempt, 2009, p.33): 
 
Figure 1: Models of deliberation according to Klempt 
 
 
             Insulated                            Purely Contestatory              Partially Contestatory 
         Enclave Model                              Model                                      Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first model called the insulated enclave model is about very closed groups 
that rarely enter into public deliberation. It enables them to form strong narratives of 
resistance and to engage in political action. Examples could be groups such as Al 
Qaida, Hezbollah, Klu Klux Klan, the mafia etc… whose members only speak between 
themselves. Yet such isolation creates various social ills such as intolerance and 
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polarization. Robert Putnam (2000) referred to enclave model as an extreme version of 
bonding social capital.  These are inward looking networks that define social relations 
through in-group, out-group categories.  
The second model which is the purely contestatory model takes place when 
groups lose their distinctiveness and the public debate intrudes into the internal 
arguments of groups. The virtue of such spaces is that the contestatory nature of 
relations discourages manipulative forms of speech endemic to one sided information 
spaces. It promotes bridging ties rather than bonding ties. Such members are more 
prone to reaching out and tolerating alternative life views. However, public contestation 
is so well entrenched into the workings of such groups that it diminishes the coherence 
of the group and blocks group specific arguments and formulations. It immobilizes 
members for political action due to conflicting networks and lacks a clear message or 
has a message that becomes hallowed out due to having to speak for multiple groups at 
the same time.  
Klemp (2009) successfully shows the virtues and vices of one sided information 
spaces in his study. He does not believe in the unqualified democratic virtues of robust 
contestation for this reason. For him, in many cases contestation prevents one-sided 
persuasion and discourages manipulation. Yet, bringing contestation into the internal 
deliberations of groups and associations diminishes their ability to formulate counter-
narratives and resist domination by mainstream discourse. It also discourages their 
political participation.  
This shows there is the need for a third approach that balances the benefits of 
public deliberation with in-group interactions. In this model, the groups within society 
have a private space where they formulate their arguments but they also take part in the 
richly contestatory public spaces. This model promotes groups to engage with one 
another while also paying attention to the major points raised by significant rival 
groups. 
For this reason, Klemp (2009) argues that the right question is “when should we 
encourage robust contestation and when should we discourage one-sided information 
spaces?” His answer is that there should be a mix of the following sort: In the public 
arena of deliberation there should be robust contestation, in the internal deliberations of 
groups there should be a mixture of in-group deliberation in one-sided information 
spaces and out-group deliberation in more public contestatory spaces (p. 32). 
 
38 
 
Sunstein‟s argument for checking the excesses of enclave deliberation arrives at a 
very similar conclusion. He (2000) argues that in a world where the voice of the 
marginalized is most of the times brutally suppressed, the enclaves may represent the 
only alternative for such groups. But he goes on arguing that “even in such a nation, 
enclave deliberation is unlikely to produce change unless the members of different 
enclaves are eventually brought into contact with others. In democratic societies, the 
best response is to ensure that any such enclaves are not walled off from competing 
views, and that at certain points, there is an exchange of views between enclave 
members and who disagree with them. It is total or near-total self-insulation, rather than 
group deliberation as such, that carries with it the most serious dangers, often in the 
highly unfortunate combination of extremism with marginality (Sunstein, 2000, p.113). 
For this reason, it is of extreme importance to structure public debate in a way that 
will not wall off enclaves from hearing other points of view. This is actually the whole 
point of the term “public sphere”, a domain in which multiple views can be hear by 
people with multiple perspectives. 
The biggest argument of Sunstein (2000) is that deliberating groups tend to 
depolarize if they consist of equally opposed subgroups and if members have a degree 
of flexibility in their positions (p. 90). Depolarization also occurs when a group consists 
of individuals drawn from two extremes (Sunstein, 2000, p.93). Depolarization will 
occur in groups with equal subgroups having opposite tendencies provided that i) 
subgroup members do not have fixed positions ii) subgroup members do not think they 
are members of identifiable groups and do not also think their discussants are members 
of different identifiable groups (Sunstein, 2000, p.94). 
Mansbridge (1996) also suggests spending time both in an oppositional enclave 
and also outside world to weigh the lessons of each venue against the other. This would 
help enclave members to garner outside support but also to test their own arguments 
with the criticisms of outside opposition. She argues there may even be a division of 
labor where some of the enclave members immerse themselves into the full spectrum of 
viewpoints in the outside world while others stay in their enclaves. She (1996) thinks 
the danger is when enclave members only want to live in their own conceptual world, 
“reinforcing each other in their mutual folly” (p.58).4 
                                                          
4 However, the implications of operating through multiple networks for political 
activism reveals a pitfall: Studies on networks show that people with diverse social 
networks, by virtue of being part of more crosscutting ties and by being exposed to 
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Fraser (1997) also thinks that we should not think of subaltern counter publics as 
spaces of withdrawal. She thinks such spaces do militate against separatism in the long 
run, because they have a publicist agenda. This is because, no matter how limited a  
counter-publics potential sphere of influence in the larger public sphere,  members still 
understand themselves as part of a larger public at large that they will occasionally want 
to influence. While their enclave will function as spaces of withdrawal, from time to 
time they will use those enclaves as bases for agitational activities to shape public 
opinion (Fraser, 1997, p.82). 
If we apply the theory of deliberation explained above to this platform, I will call 
the type of deliberation between these different groups of women as enclave 
deliberation. Women of this coalition, irrespective of the type of background they 
possess, were marginalized in their own circles by men and were made an outcast in 
their ideological backyards. An added and very important reason why they should be 
seen as enclaves is that, feminists by collaborating with veiled women and veiled 
women by engaging with feminists and/or lesbian women are running against the 
presumptions and expectations of their “presumed” ideological backyards. This also 
adds to their enclave character. The particular trajectories of members of the coalition 
and how they were alienated from their previous social circles will be explained in the 
chapter on Coalition History. 
Unlike homogeneous enclaves where a single political view prevails, the 
deliberation in this platform represents deliberation between different types of enclaves. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
conflicting and oppositional views, are less likely to engage in political action 
compared to more isolated and homogeneous groups. (Diana Mutz, 2006: 111) This 
means the rigor with which a group propagates its views in the public arena is a direct 
result of being insulated from confusion that comes with contestation. Mutz argues that 
“political activists are likely to inhabit an informational environment full of like-
minded others who spur them on to additional political activity.”(2006:74) Academics 
base their arguments on the benefits of one sided information spaces on political 
activism on two foundations: One is the limited argument pools that are due having 
minimal contact with alternative views and having a strong confidence in their own 
belief systems (Sunstein, 2000) The second reason is reputational. When people are in 
multiple groups, an activism that conforms to the values of one group may be in 
conflict with those of another network, which paralyzes the individual. However, those 
in one sided public spaces rely on their reputation in one network, hence they have to 
show their fate in the movement by taking actions. In fact, not doing that could be 
considered a betrayal of the movement. (Mansbridge, 1986:181) 
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For this reason, I will call the activism of these women as “heterogeneous enclave 
deliberation”.5  
When I say enclave deliberation, I do not mean to imply that the participants to 
this platform aimed a total withdrawal from public deliberative arena for the sake of 
achieving a more cohesive narrative. It is true that they wanted to formulate their 
arguments in a sheltered fashion without the influence of dominant public sphere which 
they later wanted to put into circulation in the public sphere. The circumstances did not 
allow for a better public communications as the objective of achieving narrative 
coherence gained supremacy in the coalition. This is understandable, given the fact that 
different women within the coalition had reservations vis-à-vis each other and had a 
history of refraining from meaningful interaction for a very long time. However, this 
does not negate the fact that, this coalition has a clear “publicist” agenda a la Fraser, in 
that it aims to subvert the dominant forms of polarization and antagonism that exist in 
society which is seen as divisive and counter-productive for women‟s movement in 
Turkey by the participants of BSÇ. The degree to which they have been able to counter-
act that dominant discourse is entirely another matter and the topic of discussion in the 
analysis chapter. At this point it is safe to say that, the heterogeneous enclave 
deliberation in this coalition has a publicist agenda.  
The model developed by Klemp (2009) reveals the pitfalls and potentials this 
alliance has for creating bridges between alternative visions. If the groups deliberating 
with each other are completely engulfed by the public deliberative arena, then they risk 
losing touch with each other. If they engage in intense inner deliberations they may 
come up with plausible arguments that have inner consistency for the coalition but 
which may not resonate very well with the arguments in the public deliberative arena. If 
we are to use Klemp‟s terminology, I consider this alliance “a partially contestatory 
model” in general. This deliberation takes place in a rather secluded manner. However, 
the alliance is also eager to enter into public discussions; it makes certain declarations, 
attracts criticism and responds. In that sense, it is engaging in an interactive process 
with other opinion makers and groups in the public space.  
I have started this section arguing that the dominance of hegemonic public forms 
may prevent marginal voices to be heard which is the only way to modify groups‟ social 
orientations. For deliberations to have an impact on social orientations, diverse 
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marginal groups should be able to enter discussions with other groups without fear of 
interference or suppression. Only in this way, can we come to observe changes in 
attitudes and perceptions about other groups. This platform will provide us with a 
means to assess how this change in social orientations takes place.  
 
 
 
2.1.4.  How to Make Sense of Deliberative Processes in Coalitions: Framing 
 
 
So far, I have talked about the value of inclusive deliberation. Deliberation can 
change social orientations of actors by way of bringing enclaves‟ viewpoints to the 
attention of more mainstream groups or by way of trimming the extremist viewpoints of 
enclaves by putting them into discussion with other enclaves/groups in society. 
However, I have not dwelled on how to approach and analyze this deliberation. In order 
to claim that deliberation produces more inclusive outcomes or that enclaves can 
modify dominant views in the public sphere, one should have concrete evidence. 
Framing literature will help me fill this gap. 
Frames are constructed meaning schemas of social movement actors. Framing is 
an active, ongoing process that does not inevitably flow from the aims or values of the 
actors. Collective action frames are the work of evolving processes and they involve 
negotiation. It is the work of agency rather than ideologies or value systems and it 
evolves out of contentions (Benford and Snow, 2000). As has been stated by Gamson “a 
crucial feature that distinguishes collective action frames from schema and other related 
cognitive constructs is that "[c]collective action frames are not merely aggregations of 
individual attitudes and perceptions but also the outcome of negotiating shared 
meaning" (Gamson, 1992, p.111). 
Framing is not a direct reflection of either culture or ideology. Changes in the 
symbolism of a movement are neither derived from culture nor directly the product of 
ideology, but are the result of its strategic interactions in various settings (Tarrow, 1998, 
p.109). In this sense, it is a learning experience for activists who do the framing.   
Since frames are not the direct result of culture or ideology, they have a rhetorical 
quality (Kuypers, 1997, 2009). They arise according to the issues raised in the public 
sphere. Understanding frames in this fashion is very close to the “rhetorical public 
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sphere”, a term advanced by Hauser (1999). Hauser, unlike most of the claims of new 
social movement studies, proposes that public spheres are formed around the dialogue 
surrounding issues, rather than the identity of the population that is engaging in that 
discussion. He, in that sense, is emphasizing the rhetorical nature of the public sphere. 
Hauser considers that publics are formed by active members of society around issues. 
He says (1999): 
 
   Publics may be repressed, distorted, or responsible, but any evaluation of 
their actual state requires that we inspect the rhetorical environment as well 
as the rhetorical act out of which they evolved, for these are the conditions 
that constitute their individual character (p.81). 
 
People form rhetorical public spheres that are based in discourse, not necessarily 
orderly discourse but any interactions whereby the interested public engages each other. 
This interaction can take the form of institutional actors as well as the basic "street 
rhetoric" that "opens a dialogue between competing factions" (Hauser, 1999, p.81). The 
spheres themselves form around the issues that are being deliberated. The discussion 
reproduces itself across the spectrum of interested publics "even though they lack 
personal acquaintance with all but a few of its participants and are seldom in contexts 
where they directly interact, they join these exchanges because they are discussing the 
same matters. In order to communicate within the public sphere, those who enter any 
given arena must share a reference world for their discourse to produce awareness for 
shared interests and public opinions about them. This world consists of common 
meanings and cultural norms from which interaction can take place (Hauser, 1999, 
p.69). 
So, unlike network theory that makes a special reference to how well or diffusely 
connected individuals are, Hauser's theory bases participation on issues that matter to 
the public, no matter how disconnected they are from each other. The ability to discuss 
together rests more on how well an argument resonates well with other discussants than 
with sharing the same social class, identity or network.  
Hauser's extension to the theory is very liberating in the sense that it helps us 
understand the freedom with which different publics enter and exit discussions in the 
public sphere without having to be part of a solid or diffuse network. This is more 
convincing given the fact that most women's organizations usually do not have the 
resources or the connections more conventional and mainstream civic actors have in the 
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public sphere. In this sense, his theory speaks to such sites of participation in a 
convincing manner. There is an added reason why Hauser‟s theory fits this study in that 
most of the analyses with respect to the coalition I am analyzing pertain to the online 
community blog, another deliberative arena where members do not know each other 
well and have the liberty to enter or exit discussions at their wish. This is something 
they would not have been able to do if the coalition was based primarily on face-to-face 
interaction. The pros and cons of online communication will be deliberated in more 
detail in the methodology section. At this point it should suffice to say that the minimal 
barriers to entry to online world makes communication based on this medium more 
open to participation. However, it may be hard to claim identity differences would not 
be an issue just because participants do not know each other. The initial thrust of this 
communication is, as Hauser argued, finding shared interests, common meanings on 
which interaction is based. In that sense, these discursive interactions in online 
communities have a deliberative quality of their own that is beyond having a common 
identity. However, in time identity differences do become an issue as will be explained 
in the analysis chapters.  
Hauser‟s theory also makes an emphasis on the importance of crafting a common 
reference while entering public discourse. If actors can agree on the underlying 
assumptions, they do not have to have very tight networks or feel the same 
identifications, according to his theory.  This resembles what frames achieve in inter-
movement collaborations. In order to resonate with potential members, frames have to 
be modified in a fashion that will speak to the majority of new comers. 
A significant emphasis in framing analysis has been on how movements frame 
their public action. The ways in which movements engage with their adversaries and 
the language used while doing that has attracted the biggest attention. As Steinberg 
(2002) argues “challengers often create oppositional discourses by borrowing from the 
discourses of those they oppose: in protracted conflicts, both dominant and challenging 
discourses can mix together having unanticipated and contradictory results (p. 208). 
However, there is an important deficiency in limiting the study of frame analysis 
just to this relationship between the movement/coalition and the establishment being 
challenged (Cathcart, 1972, p.87). This focus on what is happening in front of the 
public prevents us from exploring what is happening in the kitchen of civic activism, 
while the coalition is being forged or frames are being aligned.  
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Stewart (1991, p.68) noted this deficiency when he stated that we know a great 
deal about the rhetoric of the streets when movements are at the heights of their power 
and visibility and are publicly challenging and confronting established institutions‟‟ and 
went on to argue that this emphasis meant getting only a partial picture of social 
movement activity as looking at “internal rhetoric” in addition to public rhetoric proves 
vital in understanding the inner workings of a movement (Stewart quoted in Chaves, 
2011, p.2).  
This lack of attention on the internal workings of a movement has some 
identifiable reasons. Despite a recent surge in interest in coalitions, much of social 
movement scholarship has focused on specific kinds of public action which can be 
defined as single-issue movements (Chaves, 2011). These analyses were usually 
interested in what these single issue movements brought to public attention and which 
types of their campaigns have become successful. Turning inward to see the inner 
workings of a single movement proved less useful, for a scholarship that was interested 
in the functions of frames for outside audiences.  
Except for the works of a few scholars (Bennett, 2006; Jackson and Miller, 2009; 
Chaves, 2011) the function of framing in generating coalitions has not been thoroughly 
studied. This could be understandable since much coalition building happens behind the 
scenes. This is especially true if we consider the fact that the enclaves which are 
protected spaces for marginalized publics are spaces of withdrawal so that they can 
develop their arguments without the influence of dominant discourses in society. This 
makes them less amenable to rigorous analysis. While the withdrawal of such groups 
makes them less amenable to research, it is precisely those factors that cause them to 
withdraw from mainstream public sphere that triggers their coalition building and reach 
out activities towards other marginalized groups. For this reason, what is happening 
behind the scenes gains importance as these bridging activities constitute the essence of 
the survival mechanisms of enclaves. Chaves (2011) argues that: 
 
   For activists who engage in coalition building on behalf of multiple or 
broad social justice and human rights causes, rhetoric functions in two 
primary ways within enclaves. First, activists interpret external rhetorical 
messages that are created about them, the constituencies they represent, or 
both. In the case of coalition-building, these meaning-making processes 
serve as the rationale to build bridges with allies. Second, activists use 
enclaves as the sites to invent rhetorical strategies to publicly challenge 
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oppressive rhetoric or to create new imaginaries for the groups and issues 
they represent and desire to bring into coalition (p.3). 
 
This desire to invent a new imaginary for the groups and issues the coalition aims 
to represent is the focal point of my research as well. The rhetorical strategies employed 
to speak in the name of all the diverse actors in the coalition, to speak about their 
common and at times different concerns and the ways in which different identity 
concerns and grievances are balanced within the coalition are important aspects of this 
coalition building.  
Whereas framing analysis in the traditional sense has shown how narratives in 
movements creates and sustains a single identity, the study of coalitions pushes past a 
preoccupation with either singular issues or identities toward what Carillo (2008, p.10), 
labeled „„coalitional subjectivity‟‟. The adoption of a coalitional subjectivity moves 
away from seeing one‟s self in singular terms or from seeing politics in terms of single 
issues toward a complicated intersectional political approach that refuses to view 
politics and identity as anything other than always and already coalitional (Chavez, 
2011, p.3). 
If framing analysis is done with the purpose of uncovering alliance building and 
the emergence of coalitional subjectivities, how are we to approach frames? What 
would a more fine grained framing analyses attempt at doing? Rather than analyzing 
frames as divided between discrete spheres of culture or ideology, we should be able to 
observe the dialogical nature of frame construction. 
Dialogical approach to frames is quite different from how frames have been 
handled in the literature so far. Frames, in their more mainstream analyses, have been 
depicted as internally cohesive packages of meaning readily passed from one actor to 
another. As frames are already well developed, the task for such analyses is to be able to 
sell it to adherents and sympathizers through alignment processes which are not real 
distortions in original frames but minor adjustments. (i.e. an environmentalist frame can 
easily make use of a leftist slogan without much distortion in its political message, in an 
effort to increase its support base among the leftists). Such analyses also assume that 
when actors use the same words, they mean the same things or they have the same 
assumptions in mind while using those words. This is also a very simplistic assumption.  
By ignoring the multivocality of social movement discourse, the ways in which 
words and phrases can be interpreted in different ways by different people, framing 
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studies often overlook the often dialectic and two-sided nature of culture (Steinberg, 
2002, p.210). Coming from different traditions and factions in the larger social 
movement spectrum, activists who do not necessarily share similar identities and world 
views would surely need a more open hearted and interactive attempt at narrative 
construction. This dissertation wants to fill this lacuna in framing literature by way of 
showing how the dialogical nature of framing processes in coalitions differs from 
accounts of frames as reflecting a particular position or world view of a single 
movement. 
How does our conceptualization of frames change if we think of discursive 
practices as involving relationality? If meaning arises between people in conversation, 
then a frame will have a double directionality, one involving both shared 
conceptualizations and tensions. Bakhtin (1986) is the father of dialogic theory. He 
argued that discursive practices paralleled the patterned nature of social life, which he 
called speech genres. Later conceptualization of speech genres by Burkitt (1988) draws 
attention to the “given sets of statements involving positions, world-views, ideologies 
and linguistic styles which usually find their expression in certain practices in the 
everyday world (p.164).  
What theorists call dialogic is in essence how well or under which conditions such 
speech genres can become congruent with each other. If a repertoire development is 
dialogic it relies on “the mutual appreciation of the applicability and interpretability of a 
genre for a conflict as well as a shared recognition of the actors capacity to use these 
genres” (Steinberg, 2002, p.212). 
Repertoire development depends on which genres can be combined to provide 
mutually interpretable meanings and how this combination can be accomplished in a 
given field.  For example in some cases, genres of religious sanctification might have 
mutual interpretability with genres of citizenship rights, but not in others (Steinberg, 
2002, p.212). 
According to Steinberg (2002), dialogism offers a more fully relational and 
contingent analysis of cultural practices than framing studies. Rather than looking for 
distinct frames or ideologies that challengers pit against dominant frames, dialogic 
analysis argues that much contention occurs within a discursive field heavily structured 
by the dominant genres. New genres can emerge through resistance but as a result of a 
process of ferment with dominant ones (p.213). 
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This thesis is based on the assumption that frames and dialogical analyses are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive and frames can be analyzed via a dialogical analysis. 
The important thing to keep in mind is which actors are involved in the negotiation, 
what kind of world views they represent, how the narratives are modified in ongoing 
discussions and what the exit points in the debate are.  
Heterogeneous groups pose interesting challenges to framing literature. By having 
multiple groups in its rankings each with a competing view on social reality, such 
groups provide us with a rich laboratory to test our assumptions about how common 
reference points are created in the absence of a single identity or world view. 
Heterogeneous groups, by virtue of this diversity, produce important alternatives and 
extensions to narratives that a single social movement can produce. By way of airing 
competing claims to social justice, recognition or civility, such encounters produce 
more fine-grained and sophisticated accounts as to how these concepts can be 
formulated and put into circulation. 
Heterogeneous groups have the potential to bring an important extension to 
framing literature as well. Framing analyses has largely focused on instrumental aspects 
of social movement narratives. For a long while the question of “which frames mobilize 
more adherents and maximize the influence of movements?” has received greater 
attention. Steinberg (2002) argues that most social movement analysts have focused on 
framing as multi-level strategic persuasive communication by which activists or social 
critics make an issue ideationally and empirically salient to potential supporters and 
bystanders (p.209). This thesis is based on an understanding of framing analysis that 
does not necessarily see frames as strategic constructs but rather as tools for the 
construction of a coalitional self that is congruent with the many multivalent identities 
within that coalition. Accomplishing this task necessitates adopting a dialogical model. 
This is because frames that are crafted within a heterogeneous setting should be the 
product of a dialogue that pays attention to the different needs of its constituent 
members.  
The case study of this thesis poses unique opportunities and challenges for 
initiating a framing analysis based on a dialogic model. While it points towards more 
fluid forms of narrative construction as will be exemplified in the numerous attempts of 
participants to leave their own stamp, hence their own world view on frames, it will 
also show how frames have a flexible form of existence as the participants to the debate 
are not hegemonic groups who can determine the course of the debate.  
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The importance of framing literature for this thesis stems from the fact that 
through ongoing discussions between different enclave members, we will be able to 
observe how heterogeneous enclaves can formulate more sophisticated arguments with 
respect to civility, identity construction, reciprocity and gender.  
So far, frames were always defined as fluid arrangements that are not the direct 
result of ideologies. However, the applications proved otherwise in that frames seemed 
like the manifestation of a particular world-view, identity or ideology. This thesis will 
attempt to show how frames evolve out of contentions and the shape they take in 
ongoing discussions. This study is one of the few attempts at showing how frames 
change shape after ongoing discussions. It is novel in showing the flow of 
argumentation and different exit points and the different potentials each exit point offers 
to civic actors. Hence, the end result is rich in implications and accommodates a 
diversity of potentials for collective activism. 
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2.2.  Case Study Background: Women’s Movement in Turkey  
 
 
 
2.2.1.  Diversity Within Women’s Movement in Turkey 
 
 
In order to understand the factors that made the emergence of this coalition 
possible, we have to know more about the particular trajectories of separate women‟s 
struggles in Turkey. This first part of the literature review will provide the reader with 
information as to the major transformations that separate wings of the women‟s 
movement went through in Turkey. It ends with a discussion of factors that made the 
current rapprochement possible.  
 
 
 
2.2.2.  Emergence of Veiled Women to the Stage of Civic Activism in Turkey 
 
 
The treatment of Islamist movements within the social movement literature has 
initially been skewed to the political opportunities model. This was because Islamist 
movements were for a long time depicted as a political strategy to capture the state. 
Such interpretations always involved an element of seeing the success of Islamist 
movements as a result of bad economic and political circumstances (Çayır, 2000, p.42). 
The cases of Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt always conform to this standard explanation.  The failure of the political system, 
economic hardships and instability in those countries are the prime reasons for the 
wide-spread popularity of such movements. Such interpretations almost always take 
women actors as secondary to the movement, as appendages that carry out the duties of 
their movement.   
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Unlike models that emphasize state failure and state capture developed mostly for 
the Middle East, Göle (2000, p.29-30) considers Islamist movements on a par with the 
NSMs that came about as a critique of the Enlightenment Modernity in the West, such 
as feminist, environmentalist and ethnic movements. Islamist movement just as any of 
these movements proposes an alternative to the universalist and exclusive definition of 
modernity. Just as feminism questions the category of the universalist and egalitarian 
human being and brings forward womanhood as a viable alternative, Islamists also 
criticize the Western civilization's universalist claims for being exclusionary towards 
other identities. Feminists think the universalist human being symbolizes nothing other 
than “men”, while Islamists think the universal human being is supposed to be mute 
with respect to showing signs of religiosity in the public sphere, which they consider 
highly restrictive. This is a non-apologetic position vis-a-vis modernity. This also 
means a re-appreciation of cultural practices of Muslims, such as marriage, family and 
dressing. Additionally, this non-apologetic position also meant bringing concepts such 
as belief, male-female relationships, privacy (mahrem) from the private sphere to 
discussions in the public sphere.  
This study also considers Islamist movements in Turkey can be understood from 
the prism of NSM school. An additional reason for evaluating the Islamist movement 
from an NSM perspective is that unlike the rise of Islamist movements in the Middle 
East that give a partial answer to state failure, i.e. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the 
movement in Turkey is more occupied with expressing and representing religious 
lifestyles in the public space.  
Arat (2001, p.33) argues that in the contemporary Turkey, just as the Islamist 
movement has never been one monolithic bloc but represented great diversity, the 
women within the Islamist circles cannot also be reduced down to one category based 
on institutional allegiance (political party vs. NGOs), their attitude towards gender 
equality (those who feel closer to feminism and those who do not), their loyalty to a 
traditional reading of Islam especially with regards to women‟s role in society and their 
relation with men (orthodox vs. reformist) and the diversity of their interests (single 
issue groups vs. multi-issue groups). In fact, one could find individuals that would fit 
the options in one or more of the dichotomies mentioned. For this reason, it would 
extremely reductionist to reduce women in this category single-handedly to headscarf 
issue or to the quest for an Islamist state. 
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There is a conceptual difficulty related to how to name such women. There are 
different terms with very different meanings and implications. Religious women, veiled 
women, Muslim women and Islamist women are some of the terms that both the 
interlocutors and the women themselves use to describe this group. The problem related 
to the use of such terms is that they have a tendency to essentialize and separate these 
women from others who could be feeling religious, but due to not sharing some of the 
attributes, may not be seen fit to be called with these terms. Not being veiled, being an 
Alevi or identifying with feminism are some of the reasons which could disqualify a 
woman from being called in these terms. 
When such terms are used, there is a stereotypical image in people‟s minds. A 
woman who is veiled, who is Sunni, who holds certain grievances due to not being part 
of education or labor force is fit for joining this category.6 In reality, however, there is a 
great diversity within this category. The most important diversity within this category is 
that some women refrain from explicitly associating themselves with women‟s 
movement, others do not hide the fact that they care about women‟s rights and 
amelioration of the situation of women above anything else in their activism. Some 
individuals who fall into this category do not even refrain from calling themselves 
Islamist feminists.7 
For this reason, when I use the word religious women in this thesis, it is not to 
imply they are totally a separate category of women or that other women are 
disqualified from calling themselves religious. It is rather used to refer to a particular 
type of identity struggle, one that wants to increase the visibility of such women in the 
public sphere and put their ideas into circulation just like other actors within the larger 
women‟s movement.  
                                                          
6 In this thesis I mostly use “religious women” as most of these women referred to 
themselves as “dindar kadınlar” in the interviews as well as online discussions. 
However, I am aware of the implications of using a single term to cover all that 
diversity. However, the same limitations exist for the term “feminism” as there are 
different feminisms with very different assumptions. The diversity within both 
movements will be part of my analysis in the Analysis Chapter.  
 
7 A foundational text for any Islamist feminist would be Hidayet ġefkatli Tuksal‟s 
“Kadın KarĢıtı Söylemin Ġslam Geleneğindeki ĠzdüĢümleri”.  
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The depiction of religious women has gone through significant transformations 
both among the academics and the larger public due to various reasons which will be 
explained shortly. 
The initial depiction of women in Islamist networks had been the devoted party 
worker type, such as the depiction by Arat (1999) of female Welfare Party supporters. 
Turam‟s (2010) depiction of the women in Gülen movement is similar in the sense of 
depicting women as subservient servants of the movement even at the sake of their own 
ideals and personal preferences. Gülen movement is also known for its arguments 
supporting unveiling during headscarf ban due to its concessionary attitude towards the 
state. Such stories portray women as highly subjugated by their political party or 
movement.8  
Saktanber (2002, p. 75) calls this trend as the symbolic feminization of the 
political right in Turkey, which basically refers to the recruitment policies of Welfare 
Party. It is true that most of these women idealized their role in the political party as the 
perseverant supporters of their husbands and brothers. Even Sibel Eraslan, who was to 
coin the term “Islamist women ghettos” (Çakır, 2000) to refer to the separation of 
political activities within the movement as that of women‟s and men‟s and as putting 
the former as an auxiliary and subordinate position to the latter, thinks this is not 
problematic. The reason for the cohesive relationship between men and women in the 
movement was that many female recruits of the party were getting a spiritual 
satisfaction from working for the party which they equated with working for the path of 
God (Arat, 1999, p.36). Jenny White makes similar observations with respect to the 
commitment of female party activists who enlarged the support base of their movement 
through informal ties of solidarity (White, 2000, p.197-199). 
When the Islamist movement started its ascendancy in the early 80s, Islamist men 
admitted women into the discussions on Islam and the role of women. This was 
necessary because of the legitimacy enhancing effects of including women into 
arguments that formulate the thesis that there is no gender issue in Islam and gender 
roles are cohesive and complementary if strictly implemented according to the maxims 
of Islam.  It is in fact true that despite the visibility of efforts of women, this period is 
depicted as one where women assumed and accepted their subordinate roles.  
                                                          
8 Sibel Eraslan calls the separate organization of Islamist women for the party as 
“Islamist women ghettos”.  
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However, as the prohibitions on the entry of veiled women to the public sphere 
intensified especially in the 1990s and leading up to the 28
th
 of February, religious 
women (most specifically veiled religious women) quickly turned into an object of 
political discussion (Çakır, 2000; AktaĢ, 2000). Nevertheless, despite objectification of 
veil issue by the Islamist men, this was the first time religious women were speaking 
and demanding just for themselves. This activist role puts the stereo-typical depiction of 
religious women as submissive agents especially in the Kemalist-secularist circles at 
odds with the reality as it unfolded (Aslan Akman, 2008). 
In fact, the most transformative experience for such women is claimed to be 28th 
of February. The religious/secular divide in Turkey which has become the most 
polarized in 1997 had hit the women hardest and (for some) exclusively (Çakır, 2000). 
Veiled women were both expelled from universities and work places. Many religious 
women for whom this meant being even more dependent on domestic realm, have 
started reflecting on their trauma and writing about this situation. There emerged many 
female writers in the media channels with Islamist leanings that gave accounts of what 
it feels like being a veiled woman in Turkey (Eraslan, 2004; Keskin, 2002). Göle‟s 
work on Modern Mahrem (1998) was the first attempt from an outsider perspective, to 
show how such women gained their consciousness and individuality. However this 
consciousness was still being waged from the perspective of the veiled, within the 
contours of the veil ban and for the veiled women. 
This was also the time when different factions and diversities among the religious 
women were becoming more apparent (Aslan Akman, 2008). These factions were 
roughly termed as orthodox Islamist women and reformist Islamist women (Acar, 1991; 
Sallan-Gül, 2000), The former category emphasized the feminine roles of a woman 
such as motherhood and domestic duties and was arguing against working in the labor 
market unless it is extremely necessary (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2005, p.114). The latter 
category supported the presence of women outside their homes and their public 
visibility and was arguing that the veil was what made the inclusion of women into the 
public life possible, hence in a way it was emancipatory for them. What united these 
women, despite differences in their conclusions was that they both thought Islam 
provided a unitary system and a flawless solution for the management of modern day 
problems which included but was not limited to the amelioration of gender relations in 
the public sphere.  
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Towards the end of 1990s, a group of religious female intellectuals who were not 
affiliated with a political party or association started sharing their reflections on the 
situation of Muslims under a secular state, the meaning of headscarf for the identity of a 
Muslim woman, and the perceptions of Islamist men about the position of religious 
women in public life (Aslan Akman, 2008). These women were critical about both the 
secular women who stigmatized religious women and ignored their individuality but 
also the attitude of Islamist-nationalist males who kept their patriarchal and alienating 
position when it comes to attesting the individuality of women (ġiĢman, 2004). By 
reducing such women to sisters, religious women were purposefully objectified and 
marginalized by such movements. The worst case scenario for AktaĢ (2005) is that 
women by virtue of being reduced to “bacı” only perceive their existence through the 
veil and become alienated to the issues and concerns that are shaping the public 
discussions other than the veil. 
For writers like AktaĢ (2005), Islamist women are waging a battle on two fronts. 
By waging a battle against the secular public sphere while claiming their rights to enter 
education and labor force with their veil, they are forcing feminists who were not very 
much preoccupied with demands of Islamist women to reconsider their position with 
respect to veil. They are also forcing the traditional Islamist movement to reconsider its 
position with respect to the role of women in society.  They are not only in defense of a 
particular life-view, that of women and their liberties in the public space, they are also 
demanding the expansion of such liberties to women disenfranchised by the women's 
movement itself, the veiled women. Their activism forces a re-evaluation of positions 
on both fronts, both the larger Islamist and women's movement. 
Whether these religious women intellectuals can be rightfully called movement 
members is a question to be answered. Unlike members of a brotherhood or large scale 
movement such as Gülen movement, Nurcu or Süleymancı movements, women who fit 
the above depiction show too much of a subjectivity to be rightfully called movement 
members. However, this, in no sense, demeans the importance of their rhetoric and 
political positions. Although their numbers are very few, they hold positions in media 
necessary to shape public opinion. Nevertheless, we have to attest to the fact that their 
numbers imply they are more of a group of influential writers and thinkers than a mass 
movement with a solid grassroots support such as in Iran where there is a solid based 
feminist movement among the religious women. In fact their most important 
transformative power does not stem from being the arms and legs of any particular 
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movement but from reaching wide audiences through works of literature, mass media 
and by virtue of being opinion makers.  
Çayır‟s work (2007) on the Islamic literature in Turkey reveals the transformative 
power such works of art has for religious women. Autobiographies show us the rupture 
from a radical tradition on what Islam dictates. What comes in its place is a critical 
reading of all the limitations of an essentialist reading of Islam for women. This 
transition is called “from epic to novel”.  The epic stage signifies the idealization of 
Islam and the comforts and privileges it offers to women. The roles of men and women 
are perfectly harmonious and complementary. The novel stage signifies a transition for 
female writers who critically engaged with the harmony and complementarity thesis 
and started questioning the double burden on religious women: one because of the 
exclusion from public sphere due to secularist prejudices, the other because of the 
insensitivity of religious men about the lack of opportunities for their female 
counterparts. This transition also signifies isolation from traditional Islamist circles and 
a move towards more individualist expressions of femininity for such women. This is 
also a period where female religious scholars start to engage critically with Islamic texts 
and question the sexist readings of Islam.  
What does this transformation signify for the potentials of collaboration between 
religious women and feminists? Çayır (2007, p.2-3) in his book on Islamist Literature 
argues that critical social science research should not divide the population into two 
homogeneous blocs of strictly religious and strictly secularist. As a proof, he argues that 
there is significant support to the rights of veiled women to enter universities and 
workforce from liberal and leftist circles. In the same vein, there is hybridization in 
mass media, in the sense that major newspapers and other media channels give a voice 
to Islamist writers and thinkers and liberals and leftists at the same time.   
Despite this fact, he points to the tendency in the mass media to portray a 
conception of Islam that is stripped from time and space. In that case, the discussion 
turns into a contest between those that see Islam in conflict with modernity and those 
who see Islam as the only panacea for the illnesses of modernity. Both perspectives 
have an essentialist reading of Islam. They refuse to acknowledge the importance of the 
actor and the potentials her praxis brings to a reformulation of Islamic practice and 
focus on Islam as a fixed set of beliefs based on scripture. Here an a priori conception 
of Islam determines the actions of the actor, which is reduced to a dependent variable.  
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Arguably, such a definition can never explain why for instance female Islamist 
writers are moving away from epic novels and moving towards individualist novels. A 
more sophisticated analysis would focus on not what Islam presumably says but what 
the actor does. This makes religious women the focal point of contemporary Islamic 
practice in Turkey precisely because their understanding of women‟s role and gender 
relations in society is significantly different than that of their male counterparts.  
To give a striking example, when Ali Bulaç, wrote a highly derogatory article on 
feminism in 1987 in Zaman, he met with unexpected criticism, not from feminists but 
from religious women writers. A series of writings by prominent female writers 
explained how the mentality of Bulaç and his likes refuse to acknowledge feminism 
because they do not want to lose their patriarchal gains and their tight grip on women‟s 
role in social life.  
These are the same female writers who have kept a certain distance to feminism 
although they also got inspiration from some of its theories. Although the exchanges 
between feminists and religious women were very few, some of religious women 
writers were portrayed as Islamist feminists. Most of these women reject this 
juxtaposition as they are critical of the positions taken by feminists on family and body. 
However, these same women also want to reflect on the secondary role of women in 
Muslim societies and bring a perspective that prioritizes the needs of women in modern 
day societies. Patriarchy is a very pressing problem for such women who are portrayed 
as Islamist feminists. Most of these women believe the problem of patriarchy can be 
addressed while being loyal to Islam. The rationalizations on eradicating poverty are 
based on one of two assumptions: 
i. There is a problem of patriarchy in current Islamic practices. However, this 
is not about the essence of Islam, it is about how Islam is actually practiced 
in those societies. The essence of Islam is compatible with the equality of 
sexes and a true reading of Islam will guarantee that. 
ii. There is no essence of Islam but there are historical readings of it. The 
practices of a historical period can be abandoned for better ones. Our goal 
should be to achieve that. 
Both of these assumptions necessitate a closer look at the readings on Islam and 
Islamic societies and their practices. However, the limited access of religious women to 
Ġlahiyat and male hierarchy in that institution as well as Diyanet does not permit much 
flexibility for such women. 
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Nevertheless, Islamist female writers also have a few advantages that have to 
stated. One is that, unlike many parts of the Muslim world, Turkey did not go through a 
colonial tradition. Post-colonial feminism has to deal with all the repercussions of 
colonial understandings of women‟s place in oriental cultures and has to give an answer 
to such misperceptions. This also creates experiential antagonism between Islamist 
women and Western feminism. This is not the case in Turkey. There can be objections 
to this on the grounds that Kemalist project very much resembles the colonial style in 
that it also had attributes reminiscent of a white (wo)men‟s burden.  It also possessed a 
willingness to teach backward and ignorant women the value of upholding secularism 
in public life. However, it still has one important contribution to the struggles between 
reformist Islamist women. The women‟s movement in the Middle East has to deal with 
Sharia law and come up with interpretations of it that is more gender balanced 
especially with respect to civil code that is the foundation of gender relations in Muslim 
societies. Reformist Islamist women in Turkey do not have to deal with this situation 
because of the secular civil code. In fact there are many cases where such women 
collaborate with feminists in removing the patriarchal implementations of the civil 
code, i.e. honor crimes.  
Since the mid-1990s, there is another striking trend among religious women. Until 
that time period, the only institutional setting that such women were depicted in was the 
women branches of political parties or cemaat. For the first time there emerged women 
associations that were independent of any political affiliation. Most of these 
associations do not have legal nature and operate as platforms, initiatives and fora. 
However, this gives them more flexibility and creativity as they are not bound by rigid 
organizational rules. These associations represent the face of urban, educated and 
employed religious women. Some of these platforms, after receiving enough publicity, 
membership base and networks opted for formal registration which is a sign of maturity 
and tradition (Çayır, 2000; AkĢit, 2004). 
Another important novelty of these platforms is the diversity of topics discussed 
in these associations. When Göle wrote Modern Mahrem she was referring to the 
process through which veiled women acquired their individuality and reflexivity. 
However this consciousness was still being waged from the perspective of the veiled, 
within the contours of the veil ban and for the veiled women. What we have witnessed 
in the last decade has been an expansion of concerns and claims made by veiled women 
on many fronts. In the current period, we are witnessing a new breed of veiled women 
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having higher public visibility and actually using that visibility for arguing for causes 
beyond their own immediate concerns. These associations work as efficient 
mechanisms through which such women collaborate with other movements and 
organizations, engage in discussions and build coalitions. 
This additionally puts them at a more distinctive position within the larger 
Islamist movement. By bridging their own demands for more liberties with those of 
other groups they are bringing their alternative vision of civil society. Having given this 
background on religious women, let us have a look at the trajectory of feminist 
movement in Turkey and subsequently where and when the two movements intersect.  
 
 
 
2.2.3. Feminist Movement in Turkey 
 
 
While such new developments were happening in Islamist circles that indicated a 
new direction or a departure point for more autonomous female writers and thinkers, 
the feminist movement was also experiencing an awakening. In order to understand 
how both groups of women started interacting, let us get into the specifics of the 
transitions and turns the feminist movement went through in Turkey. This will put the 
platform under study into better perspective. 
The women‟s movement in Turkey had a protracted history. It also went through 
periods of decline followed by periods of rejuvenation. State guidance also played a 
crucial role on the aims and targets of the movement as well as its autonomy. 
The first period extends back to Ottoman times. This epoch was largely absent 
from feminist literature until the 1990s arguably because of a state policy to portray the 
image that promotion of women‟s rights coincides with the establishment of Kemalist 
state, not before. However during 1990s we see feminist researchers unearthing what 
has taken place in late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century in Ottoman Empire (Çakır, 1996; 
Demirbirek, 1993; Zihnioğlu, 2003). That period is now called the first wave of 
feminism in Turkey, as it was primarily occupied with the mobilization of women 
around suffrage rights, the right to education as well as demands to limit polygamy. 
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As can be predicted, at the time women‟s sexuality or the patriarchal limitations 
on women were non-issues. Instead, activism revolved around basic legal and 
citizenship rights and targeted the state rather than society or men. However, this 
activism came to a halt as the Turkish Republic has already conceded to women what 
most of the first wave feminism had demanded from the Ottoman Empire. Tekeli argues 
that “this phase of earning their rights from the single party regime created an 
illusionary feeling of success in women and resulted in their retreat from the public 
arena (Tekeli, 1998, p.338).  
Granting of rights from above without having to invest in substantial rights 
struggles created a false illusion that state was the sole protector of rights hence what 
women needed the most was subservience to the state. For this reason, by way of 
claiming to represent the sole protector and grantor of women‟s rights, the new regime 
reduced the women‟s movement into auxiliary arms of state propaganda. 
The appropriation of the gender issue by the Kemalist regime limited the ability of 
women‟s movement to wage an autonomous struggle. What is more, by targeting only 
the urban/bureaucratic elite women, it limited the ability of women‟s movement to 
become more grassroots (Kandiyoti, 1982). Despite the fact that the litmus test of 
modernization was the status of women in the eyes of the Republican elite, this status 
was very much subservient to the interests of male breadwinners of the house. Women 
were defined according to their duty to further the ideals of the Turkish revolution 
which was to be the guardians of national interests by way of being the social and 
biological carriers of the community (Arat, 1989; Kandiyoti, 1982). 
Scholars such as Cindoğlu (1997) point out topics such as sexuality, virginity, 
chastity and morality were as vital as any other patriarchal system. Women, at that time, 
were encouraged to participate in the public sphere of life only if they obeyed certain 
moral and behavioral codes as well as displayed modesty in their attire. That is, they 
needed to preserve the „respectability‟ and „honor‟ of their families and nation through 
their chastity (Ellialtı, 2008). Many writers emphasize that this great patriotic burden on 
women reduced them to minor figures in the public sphere (DurakbaĢa, 1987, 1998; 
Berktay, 2003; Kadıoğlu, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1997; Sirman, 2000).  
This period, which was portrayed by state authorities as emancipatory for Turkish 
women, was later interpreted as being quite regressive. This is because their social and 
political role was reduced to their reproductive role. Many scholars point out to the 
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gendered nature of citizenship in Turkey due to this reason (Arat, 1989; Kandiyoti, 
1991). 
Because of the state centric understanding of women‟s issues, the period between 
1930s and 1980s were not very productive for feminist movement (Tekeli, 1998). The 
emergence of an independent women‟s movement coincides with the coup of 1980. The 
suppression and trial of leftists after the coup meant a political opening for leftist 
women who also had a feminist consciousness. By way of organizing their gatherings 
as rather amicable meetings, they were able to break the barriers in front of collective 
action that came as a result of the restrictive constitution of 1981. By working through 
friendship networks, they were able to maintain their collective spirit and regain their 
motivation. YeĢim Arat considers the women‟s movement as the only autonomous 
movement after the coup when all other political action was prohibited (Arat, 1994).  
This partially explains why women‟s movement should primarily be analyzed 
through the prism of enclave deliberation as explained in the theoretical chapter. The 
atmosphere of post 1980 as well as having seen their comrades put in jail necessitated 
that these women adopt a more insulated conversation among themselves first to regain 
their strength and motivation that was near to depletion and to shield themselves from 
political prosecution by the militaristic regime. For this reason, during the 1980s, 
women with a feminist consciousness organized in small groups to discuss the issues of 
importance mostly in intimate surroundings such as the homes of participants. As they 
started developing their arguments more clearly, they were able to leave the comfort of 
their homes and organize mass campaigns and petitions. They opened feminism to 
discussion first under the auspices of YAZKO (Publication and Production Cooperative 
of Writers and Translators). This initiated mushrooming of feminist journals such as 
Somut and Kaktüs. 
One of the initial and most important mass campaigns was a petition signed by 
7000 women for the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This campaign was important because 
here was a mass movement that was not satisfied with the adoption of CEDAW and was 
determined to monitor how government is actually doing in terms of the realization of 
this treaty. This campaign became the antecedent of many other initiatives that 
specifically called for the adoption of certain legislations or the amelioration of the 
standards of implementation of women specific legislation. Some of the most important 
demonstrations in this tradition were campaigns against the battering of women in 
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Solidarity Against Battering Campaign, on May 17, 1987, against sexual harassment in 
the Purple Needle Campaign in 1989, against the Article 438 of Turkish Criminal Code 
in 1990 (Savran, 2005). 
What distinguishes this period from prior periods for women‟s activism is not 
their intense political involvement. Women were very active in leftist organizations 
during 60s and 70s. However, their activism was more geared towards being the sisters 
or wives of leftist men. They were not doing activism for themselves. Additionally, the 
distorted understanding in the leftist tradition impeded the emergence of an autonomous 
women‟s movement because it was believed that the benefits of socialism would 
eventually trickle down to women, so all they had to do was to work for socialist cause 
first (Aytaç, 2008; Çakır, 2005). So the distinguishing characteristic of 1980s was the 
fact that women left behind doing activism for male causes and decided to work only 
for women (Sirman, 1989; Arat, 2008).  
This second wave feminism was not only working just for women, it was also 
focusing on issues not dealt before. As it is general for feminist movements around the 
world, the first type of demands that gain prominence whenever women‟s issues are at 
stake is suffrage and legal rights. It takes time for women‟s movement to reach maturity 
and start questioning the personal aspects of gender inequality that perpetuate it in a 
more subtle manner. The challenge of breaking the public/private dichotomy is 
important if feminist movements want to make a meaningful change in securing gender 
equality. The second wave of feminism in Turkey, by predominantly focusing on the 
private aspects of gender relations and by making them a topic of public discussion 
moved in that direction. Of course, the center piece of making the personal political was 
the prevention of violence against women. Women‟s solidarity centers and shelter 
houses became the focal demands of the women‟s movement. Such centers and shelter 
houses also point towards a demand for institutionalization of women‟s struggle.  
For a movement that started out from informal friendship networks, the demand 
for institutionalization is a sign of a level of maturity (Arat, 1999). The pioneers of such 
institutions were Mor Çatı in Istanbul and Ankara DayanıĢma Merkezi. 
Arat argues that this is a creative way to channel feminist demands for individual 
autonomy into institution building. She underlines that women successfully created 
their own institutions by “acting as women for women” rather than something that was 
granted to them by the state (Arat, 1997, p.106).  
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The state responded to demands of institutionalization by opening up a separate 
directorate for status of women under the Ministry of Women. The Directorate of Social 
Services started operating women‟s guest and shelter houses. Women‟s Status Units 
were opened in various provinces. The women‟s movement has also been successful in 
the institutionalization of gender equality institutions in public administration starting 
with the Gender Equality Commission of Turkish Grand National Assembly which was 
set-up in 2010. There followed equality commissions in local governments and other 
public bodies. These institutions are a direct result of lobbying by women‟s NGOs and 
international and national donors such as UNDP and UN Women. 
One important difference of the women‟s movement of 1990s from the prior era is 
its ability to link other areas of concern with the concerns of women‟s movement. For 
example 1990s is the time period when the military campaigns against PKK gained 
prominence in Turkish politics. This struggle which is exclusively a struggle between 
the army and PKK gained a special meaning for many feminist organizations. This time 
period is the beginning of the realization among women‟s organizations that continued 
war and violence feed into militarism which they believed is another form of patriarchy. 
In other words, this is the period in which militarism was rejected on the basis of being 
a different face of patriarchy. Scholars of women‟s studies will be cognizant of the fact 
that this idea was already well developed by scholars such as Cynthia Cockburn (2007) 
who calls patriarchy, nationalism and militarism as brother ideologies. In her words: 
 
   “Patriarchy, nationalism and militarism are a kind of mutual admiration 
society. Nationalism is in love with patriarchy because patriarchy offers it 
women who will breed true little patriots. Militarism is in love with 
patriarchy because its women offer up their sons to be soldiers. Patriarchy is 
in love with nationalism and militarism because they produce 
unambiguously masculine men.” 9  
 
For scholars like Cockburn, violence reinforced through military values is a 
highly effective way to keep gender inequality in place. Nevertheless, this realization 
also meant firm steps could be taken by the women‟s movement to counter this trend. 
There are numerous examples of women‟s NGOs or alliances working on this specific 
link of militarism and patriarchy. In the same vein, KAMER, a women‟s NGO, was set 
                                                          
9 Retrieved from http://cynthiacockburn.typepad.com//Blogfemantimilitarism.pdf 
on 06.06.2011 
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up in the midst of violence in Diyarbakır to minimize the effects of patriarchal attitudes 
on women of the region which were reinforced by militarism and violence. 
In the following decade, the same trend continued within the women‟s movement 
to stop unjust military interventions. Platforms such as “BarıĢ Ġçin Kadın Platformu” 
became popular fora for women who wanted to oppose military operations. Since 
Turkey‟s neighborhood has become the focal point for various military incursions such 
as the invasion of Iraq by USA or the operations of Israel in Gaza in 2000s, such fora 
became the meeting ground for various women activists who saw clear connections 
between militarism, violence and gender inequality. This is also a period when women 
from different backgrounds started talking to each other for this common cause. For 
instance, almost all of the women in the platform I am analyzing refer to “BarıĢ Ġçin 
Kadın Platformu” as the place where they had their first encounters with other groups 
of women. 
Creating linkages between militarism, nationalism and patriarchy is an important 
step for women‟s movement for various reasons. Firstly, having objections to militarism 
and nationalism helped women‟s movement put a certain distance to the foundational 
ideology of the state which relied on total subservience to national interests which made 
the concerns of women secondary. The gendered nature of citizenship at the 
establishment of the Republic was testimony to the fact that an independent women‟s 
movement that excludes national pride and focuses on gender concerns alone would not 
be approved. This was the basic reason why women‟s movement at the establishment of 
the Republic was weak and elitist. With the turn of events that made women‟s 
movement realize the logical connections between militarism, nationalism and 
patriarchy, allegiance to an official ideology was impossible for an autonomous feminist 
movement. Of course, this realization was mainly instigated by 1980s coup which 
showed the real face of militarism for many feminists who primarily came from leftist 
movements and paid the price dearly for their leftist activism. 
This transition is particularly important in order to understand how feminist 
movement had a rapprochement with other movements or women activists of different 
backgrounds. For instance, as the victims of 28
th
 of February, veiled women now had a 
similar objection to the militarist culture as it unleashes its punitive force only on 
women but not on religious men. This also served as a wake up call for a group of 
feminists who only dealt with problems of women from a rather unitary perspective. It 
became clear that tragedies of militarism can hit any type of women, religious or not. 
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Currently, we see three dominant types of feminism in Turkey. One is Kemalist 
feminism, which is more statist and middle class. It excludes struggles of both religious 
women as well as minority women. For this reason, Kemalist heritage meant being 
statist and leaving aside the radical elements in feminism. Turam (2010) sees great 
similarities between the role of women in Kemalism and Islam, “veiled women” and 
“modern women” were all needed images of a new political vision.  
Socialist feminism still preserves the leftist streak in their vision and prioritize a 
materialist conception of relations between sexes just as they prioritized class issues 
during 1960s and 1970s. It is hard to claim they have a special sensitivity to issues 
related to the case of religious women, as their material conception of life sees 
religiosity an impediment in front of the true liberation of women.  
There is a third wing of feminism in Turkey which is not as politically aligned as 
Kemalist or socialist feminism in Turkey. This type of feminism prioritizes the concerns 
of women above other ideological concerns. For this reason, this civil feminism is more 
inclined to admit different types of women‟s concerns into its agenda. This more civic 
form of feminism, although an offshoot of leftist women of the 70s, is a product of 
significant transformations. For this reason, the women's movement after the coup of 
1980 exhibits a peculiarity.  
In fact following the coup, the women's movement which was a spin-off from 
leftist movements of the 1970s established its autonomy and acted as an initiator of 
more inclusive rights struggles due to changes in political opportunity structures. The 
women of the post 1980s era were more capable of linking their marginality within the 
larger leftist or pro-liberties movements of the prior era with the current marginality of 
other segments of society such as the veiled women. Although we cannot say that the 
Kemalist or socialist wings of the feminist movement was as outspoken about this 
problem as some of the more radical wings of the women's movement, it is safe to say 
that a wing of women's movement was able to engage in issue linkage to an extent 
which other movements refrained from doing. What motivates such women to link 
issues that seem disparate to the actors waging those struggles is to be understood 
within the context of the strategies employed by feminist women to make their voices 
heard. 
Bodur (2005) claims that although feminist women represent a narrow segment of 
a society's women, they help expand the public discourse and they help the creation of a 
more comprehensive and inclusive representation. The inclusiveness of the language of 
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feminist women stem from their marginal position within society and within the 
movements that make rights claims. Any move to open a public space for themselves 
necessitates adopting a more inclusive language that will open up new spaces for 
negotiation of the rights of the most marginal. For this reason, their language is the 
most liberal and most extreme in rights claims. For instance, such women can put the 
demands of gays/lesbians and veiled women as two sides of the same coin which could 
be considered outrageous by Islamist movement. However, this is a direct result of their 
desire to expand the public space for alternative life worlds that would also give them 
their own breathing space. This is the basic reason they can be considered as a counter-
public site. Within social movements they are the ones to say the most unthinkable, to 
claim the rights of those most at odds at the same time and to be situated at the most 
non-aligned position possible to preserve their neutrality to different rights-claimers.   
What we see is a radical feminism that tries to create ties for the first time with 
gays, lesbians, anti-military groups and at times reformist Islamist women. This type of 
feminism can be considered post-Kemalist feminism, owing its critical edge and rigor 
to its opposition to the restrictionist policies of the state.  
Given this background information on NSM in general and the women‟s 
movement in Turkey in particular, what propels the women under study to join such 
multiple issue coalitions? Why did veiled women start to engage in activism beyond the 
veil issue? Why did feminist women start to talk more about the rights of gays and 
lesbians than before? Betting for other groups has very much to do with how much of 
an affinity is drawn between one‟s state and other‟s conditions. To the extent that this 
affinity can be drawn, women can start talking about issues that are not primarily 
related to their initial concerns.  
Embracing other identity struggles by women has very much to do with what 
Gouz described for the case of women‟s movement after 1980s. She was arguing that:  
 
   The marginalized status of women in the leftist movement in 1970s kept 
them away from arrest during the 1980s coup and that provided the unique 
opportunity to organize separately after the coup. The military intervention, 
while temporarily disabling access to political arena provided new 
opportunities for women and created a space for women to frame their 
demands in a way that transcends other movement struggles of class and 
ethnicity that were being dominated by men  (Bodur, 2005, p.177). 
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The same opportunities seem to have emerged for Islamist women under a 
different guise. Their partial isolation from male dominated Islamist movements and 
their disillusionment about the priority of veiled women‟s demands within Islamist 
politics forced them to seek refuge in other networks and solidarities. This brought 
them closer to both women‟s issues in general, i.e. harassment, violence, honor killings 
and other issues such as peace, minority issues etc…To the extent that they found a 
refuge in such networks and issue groups, they started to produce arguments and 
messages for different audiences as well. 
 
 
 
2.2.4.  First Encounters  
 
 
As argued above, 1980s brought about a resurgence of feminist movement. Çakır 
(2000) in “DireniĢ ve Ġtaat” describes the three wings of the feminist movement in early 
1980s as 1) Statist feminism with a prominent Kemalist tone 2) Socialist feminists 3) 
Civil feminism in the tradition of NSM 
Despite all the differences between these three currents, Çakır argues that the 
strongest streak was coming from the socialist/revolutionary feminism of the 
generations of 1968 and 1978.  All these currents were similar in their appraisal of 
religious movements as something to be fought against if we are to talk about the 
liberation of women. Kemalist feminists, while arguing they were not against Islam, 
were saying that they were fighting against fundamentalism. Socialist feminists were 
favoring a materialist and at times an atheist perspective on life, despite the fact that 
they were for freedom of conscience. Civil feminists, according to Çakır (2000), were 
mostly confused so they remained neutral (p.43). 
Çakır (2000) through a series of interviews with prominent Muslim female writers 
tries to uncover how the feminist movement tried to accommodate the perspectives of 
religious women. In an interview with Mualla Kavuncu, the interviewee explains how 
feminists were more orientalist than their European counterparts in terms of seeing 
religion and specifically Islam as an impediment in front of women‟s liberation (Çakır, 
2000, p.47). 
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Despite amicable interactions between the two groups of women especially after 
the reactions given by religious women to Ali Bulaç, the relations came to a halt as 
feminists started arguing that Islam and women‟s movement cannot go hand in hand. 
This was also the period when feminists were turning a blind eye to the cause of veil. In 
the words of Yıldız Ramazanoğlu: 
 
   Veiled women could never see the feminists on their side during their 
struggles in 1980s. While the discourse of Islamist men who invited women 
to stay at their homes and the discourse of Kemalists who said “If you want 
to put a veil, stay at your home” were intersecting in an ironic way, 
feminists did not see a problem in participating to this conservative 
discourse (Çakır, 2000, p.152).10 
 
The interactions turned sour as religious women essayed an article titled The 
Attitude of “For the Women, Despite the Women” (Kadınlar için Kadınlara Rağmen 
tavrı) in the socialist feminist magazine “Kaktüs” (December 1988) where they 
criticized the jacobin, monolithic and ultra-secularist attitudes of feminists.11 
Despite these bitter encounters certain events made a break-through in the 
language of both of these women. The post-modern coup of 28
th
 of February and the 
ensuing unequal punishment of veiled women compared to religious men caused certain 
feminist activists to re-consider their position. Of course this reconsideration came 
much as a result of veiled women‟s determination to discuss this problem in venues 
where feminists are also present.12 Peace movements that were set up to protest foreign 
occupations such as the one in Iraq also decreased the distance between these two 
groups of women.   
 
                                                          
10 1980‟li yıllarda tesettürlü kadınlar verdikleri mücadelede feminist kadınları 
hiçbir aĢamada yanlarında bulmadılar. O dönemde Ġslami değerleri ileri sürerek kadını 
eve çağıran erkeklerle, “örtünecekseniz evinize” diyen Kemalist yazarların yolları garip 
bir tecelliyle çakıĢırken durumu görmezden gelen feministler bu ortak tutucu söyleme 
katılmakta, rüzgarlarını onlarla birleĢtirmekte bir mahzur görmemiĢlerdir” (2000:152) 
 
11 By socialist they refer to the fact that they only accept a materialist conception 
of history and reject religious interpretations on gender roles. 
 
12 One such venue was CEDAW, where NGOs such as Ak-der were able to 
include a shadow report on veil ban and its implications for women‟s education and 
work opportunities. 
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Another area in which these two groups of women cooperated was the changing 
of Civil Code where women lobbied together for legislation that would ensure gender 
equality. Another important cooperation took place with respect to increasing the 
number of female politicians. One of the signs that there is a rapprochement between 
the two groups is that for the first time an NGO that is known to be secular (KADER) 
included a veiled women‟s image into its campaigns which promotes candidacy of 
women in politics during 2011 general election campaigns.  
This is not to say that there is still significant tension and gaps between these two 
groups as exemplified in the meetings of CEDAW where veiled women prepare shadow 
reports that try to prove veil ban as a kind of gender inequality. At this point we have to 
underline the fact that veil ban as a kind of gender equality never got the attention and 
support needed from women‟s movement in CEDAW meetings other than the efforts of 
religious women (Aslan Akman, 2008). 
Nevertheless, all the above encounters and joint activism is an attestation to the 
fact that we might have entered a phase in women‟s movement where religious women 
are not exclusively focused on veil issue and feminists are not solely pre-occupied with 
the concerns of a particular life-style. The diversity within both camps opens up a space 
that is ripe for cross-fertilization, inspiration and coalition building. 
The section on group history will also unearth additional factors as to why these 
two groups of women started frequenting each other and other groups‟ rights struggles. 
What is important for the purposes of this study and other studies on civil society is that 
such cross fertilization holds the potential for increasing tolerance and trust among 
heterogeneous groups in the wider public. An analysis of BSÇ will reveal whether this 
potential is real and promising. 
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Chapter 3.  Coalition History and Methodology 
 
 
 
 
3.1.  Coalition History of Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz 
 
 
 
This short section is to provide the reader with background information on 
Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz (BSÇ from now on). In this section, I introduce the reader 
to the member profile and the type of activists who join this coalition. In order to be 
able to substantiate that this coalition constitutes deliberation between different 
enclaves, I pay attention to what makes the members of this platform different from 
mainstream social activists. I try to show what differentiates a religious member of the 
movement from a more mainstream actor in the Islamist women or a feminist woman 
from a more mainstream member of a leftist movement. The types of organizations they 
become part of, the activist history of the most prominent members of the platform will 
be illustrative to give a more accurate picture of the coalition. 
I will also discuss the major declarations and demonstrations of the platform, the 
major topics that were discussed within the coalition as well as major controversies that 
arose during discussions. Since this platform represents deliberation between different 
enclaves of women, the topics that were debated and the agreements and disagreements 
about those topics constitute the main focus of my analysis.  
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3.1.1.  Background to the Coalition 
 
 
As was argued in the literature review, I consider the women making up this 
coalition as enclaves. Their enclave position stems from their critical distance to more 
mainstream movements they were/are associated with. During my interviews, members 
explained their gradual marginalization and alienation from larger movements they 
were once/or are still part of. Consequently they have become keen actors to say their 
own words in their own ways, without feeling as appendages to any mass movement.  
I consider the veiled women taking part in this platform as an enclave within the 
larger Islamist movement for various reasons. Although carrying some of the 
fundamental sensibilities of Islamist circles on the protection of family values, display 
of body in the public space, Gaza blockade and positions taken vis-à-vis gays/lesbians, 
veiled women of this alliance also share certain other sensibilities that put them at a 
rather distinct, or even marginal, position in the larger Islamist movement.  
First, these women are the first to take swift and decisive action against Islamist 
circles when they see their action as contrary to their convictions. These women are the 
only Islamist group to protest against newspaper Vakit for protecting a writer alleged to 
harass a minor. They also vehemently opposed its anti-Semitic stance.  
The women of the platform are also the most critical of ruling party because they 
consider it is paying lip service to their cause (lifting the veil ban) but not taking 
decisive action because of political calculations. They are aware of the fact that, despite 
having ideological proximity with the Islamist movement, they have to work for 
themselves to reclaim and get their rights. In the words of I.K (a pseudonym): 
 
   If we feel like a victim all the time, cry and talk about how oppressed we 
are, if we let the men protect us, speak in our place, interrupt or even silence 
us for our sake, then we are very respectable women. However, when we act 
independently showing we are neither AKP‟s backyard, we are women who 
can vote for CHP if they have a veiled candidate, or independent candidates 
for that matter. Our power is very evident. So when they sense this power, 
they want to divide it. 
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We always had a battle on two fronts. On one front, a battle against the 
jacobin, elitist people who have orchestrated all these bans and the social 
structure that is based on hierarchy and the privileges of them. A battle to 
craft a living where the rights and freedoms of every citizen are maintained 
in an equal manner. On another front, a battle against an understanding that 
tells women their place is in the family, that a women‟s job is to become a 
mother and not talking about what fatherhood requires at all. This is a grave 
picture (interview, 27.04.2011).13  
 
Another peculiarity of such women is that they have a wider network than a 
purely Islamist background would suggest. They move in and out of different types of 
activisms and meet and mingle with people from different backgrounds. The types of 
networks they are keen to be part of are mostly liberal networks that are opposing 
militarism, nationalism and that ask for a more minimalist state. 
The feminists in this study are those who can be delineated from a Kemalist 
interpretation of feminism in the sense of cooperating with other women‟s groups 
irrespective of their political leanings.14 Additionally, these feminists are involved in a 
larger network of social movements where they also support minority causes of Kurds, 
Armenians, Alevis and gays/lesbians. They do have certain affinities with leftist groups 
and liberals on the basis of being pro-liberties, but they do not fit nicely within any 
                                                          
13 “Biz devamlı mağdur olursak, sürekli gözyaĢı dökersek, sürekli ezildiğimizden 
bahsedersek, birtakım erkekler de çıkıp bizi koruyup kollamak, sözümüzü ağzımızdan 
alıp söylemek isterse, sözümüzü kesmelerine, bizi susturmalarına izin verirsek, o 
zaman biz muteber ve iyi kadınlarız.  Ama ne zaman ki biz bağımsız, biz ne Ak 
Parti‟nin arka bahçesiyiz, eğer baĢörtülü bir vekile ilk sıralardan yer verecek olursa biz 
CHP‟ye de oy verecek kadınlarız; bağımsız adaylar çıkarıp onların hepsini 
destekleyebilecek kadınlarız.  Bu gücümüz çok ortada. Dolayısı ile bu güç fark edildiği 
anda, bertaraf edilmek isteniyor.  
 
Bu her zaman böyleydi. Çünkü biz her zaman iki cephede mücadele verdik.  Bir 
yandan bütün bu yasakları örgütleyen, tepeden inmeci, elitiz insanlarla mücadele, 
onların bu eĢitlikçi olmayan yaklaĢımları, sürekli bir ast üst iliĢkisi, imtiyazlar ve 
ayrıcalıklar olan bir toplumsal yapı. EĢit, özgür, demokrat, herkesin hakkını 
hukukunun, yurttaĢlık bilinci içerisinde teslim edildiği bir Ģey arzusu, orada mücadele, 
bir yandan da Ġslam‟da kadının yeri budur, sürekli haddini bildirme, kalın çizgilerle 
senin görevin Ģu, seni bir annelik içine hapsetmek, ve babalık diye bireyin hiç 
olmaması,  gibi Ģeyler, bunlarla mücadele ediyorsunuz. Aslında çok açık bir Ģekilde, 
ağır bir tablo diyebilirim.” 
 
14 One exception to this would be the case of fascists. Most members expressed 
they would refrain from collaborating if these groups in question are fascists. However, 
they have not specified what being fascist would entail. 
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category as they are adamant supporters of equality between men and women and 
homosexuals which other groups refrain from supporting to the full extent.  
To give a more accurate picture of the full gamut of networks and relationships, I 
map out the affiliations of some of the most networked members of the alliance. The 
reason for analyzing the most networked and most prominent members is because 90 % 
of the time the discussions are initiated and continued by these members. They are also 
prominent civic activists in their own organizations or movements, so they are quite 
representative of what the platform is trying to achieve: to make different enclaves talk 
and transform each other. 
In the below diagram, you can see four activists of the platform with very diffuse 
networks. These are some of the most active members of the platform in terms of the 
number comments they made in the online community. Each circle represents an 
activist member of the platform and her memberships to multiple groups and 
information sources (yahoo groups, blog spots and website memberships). The upper 
circle on the left hand side represents a feminist member who is also a gay/lesbian 
activist. The lower circle on the left hand side represents a feminist who is a leftist and a 
member of green party in Turkey. Her leftism is more dominant than her other identities 
given the distribution of her networks. 
The upper circle on the right hand side is a veiled woman activist who has 
membership to multiple networks on issues ranging from veil ban to anti-military 
campaigns and to Gaza issue. The lower circle on the right hand side represents a veiled 
woman activist who has membership to networks not necessarily associated with those 
of veiled women such as “Baskı Altındayız” or “Gazze Ġçin” but also those more leftist 
ones such as “Özgürlükçü Sol”, “Irkçılığa ve Milliyetçiliğe Dur De GiriĢimi”, “Küresel 
Bak and Ġnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu”. 
An important caveat here is that I have identified these networks as “primarily 
leftist” or “primarily Islamist” according to the self-definition of the members who 
represent those circles. In other words, those circles do not rigidly represent the 
networks a leftist or Islamist person would want to be affiliated with under all 
circumstances. There can be individuals who identify themselves as Islamists and who 
would not see a contradiction in being part of feminist networks. In that sense, my 
figure does not claim to exhaust social reality. It rather gives an idea about the types of 
networks frequented by prominent members of the coalition in an attempt to show the 
types of issues that are of concern for the members of this coalition other than BSÇ.   
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Figure 2: Classification of networks of most active members 
 
 
BSÇ stands out as distinctive among all these coalitions and networks for one 
basic reason: It is an alliance by and for women with very different world views and life 
styles. One can observe that the other platforms and coalitions that bring leftist and 
Islamist women together are mostly on issues other than womanhood, i.e. racism, 
nationalism, civilianization. This is not to say that there are a few exceptions such as 
“Pınar Selek‟le DayanıĢıyoruz” which brings both feminists and Islamist women 
together. 
Most of the networks and platforms in this figure are about single issue campaigns 
with very specific targets. This is more true for issue coalitions such as “Darbeye KarĢı 
70 Milyon Adım” and “Pınar Selek: Hala Tanığız” with very specific and identifiable 
targets. This is less evident in the case of BSÇ, which started out from solidarity around 
veil issue but got more complicated and comprehensive in attitude in time. 
If one takes a closer look at around which issues the women of the alliance have 
worked before, one sees that they are mostly on racism, nationalism, peace movement 
and anti-military campaigns. Such exercises do give the women of this alliance a 
preparation on working for women‟s issues later. This also shows that the 
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rapprochement of different wings of the larger women‟s movement depended on 
establishing networks in other areas of social activism. In other words, the networks 
built in the initial stages of social activism can later adapt to other types of activism. 
However, there is a clear difference between peace coalitions and BSÇ. In the first, the 
aim of the coalition does not necessitate a reshuffling of identities or positions, as peace 
is a target that has very justifiable premises irrespective of the ideological positioning of 
different elements of the coalition. However BSÇ is more ambitious in that sense, since 
it aims to put womanhood and woman‟s subjectivity above other convictions and 
ideological positions. In that sense BSÇ aims a reshuffling of priorities which is harder 
to achieve. 
Before getting into the specifics of the BSÇ, it would be important to emphasize 
the dynamics of the rapprochement between a more “Muslim” audience and more 
liberal pool of activists. Encounters in groups like “Genç Siviller, Darbeye KarĢı 70 
Milyon Adım Koalisyonu, Ġnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu, Irkçılığa ve Milliyetçiliğe 
Dur De GiriĢimi, Küresel BarıĢ ve Adalet Koalisyonu” could be considered exercises 
for different counter-hegemonic spheres to craft a common language around certain 
issues. For this reason, the arguments used in such networks and platforms may have an 
effect on the formulation of frames by women activists of BSÇ. Such spill-over effects 
should always be kept in mind. When we deal with issues such as nationalism, the role 
of military, war and conflict or racism against minorities, experiences in these other 
platforms should also be taken into account. 
The diversity of networks and previous collaborations are evident from the above 
diagram. But what was the foundational moment for mainstream feminists and veiled 
women? How such women made the first encounters is of importance for understanding 
cross-movement dynamics. Most of the women I interviewed, when asked what their 
first encounter with their counterparts in BSÇ, made reference to the movement called 
“BarıĢ Ġçin Sürekli Kadın Platformu”.15  That platform was made of women's groups 
that worked against the rise in global violence after September 11. The role of women's 
groups in Peace movements is not new, however the novelty of this movement in 
Turkey was that this was the first movement in Turkey that brought groups as diverse as 
KAOS GL, AK Parti and BaĢkent Kadın Platformu together. There were also feminist 
                                                          
15http://www.ihd.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1066:-
baris-icin-surekli-kadin-platformu-cagri-metni&catid=30:ortak-baslamalar&Itemid=80  
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groups such as Uçan Süpürge and Bağımsız Feministler as well as leftist women's 
groups such as Emekçi Kadınlar. When such cross-movement alliances are forged, there 
is an expansion in social networks that facilitate further movement activity and new 
alliances. However, the importance of this movement from the perspective of more 
marginal players like KAOS GL was summed up nicely in the words of a prominent 
figure in the gay/lesbian movement, H.I, who also is part of this case study: 
 
   I have observed that they have maintained the same distance from us 
(lesbians) and them (veiled women). I have seen that they also feel very 
sorry when we are not listened to. I had a supportive talk about the veil issue 
in one of those encounters. Kaos GL also supported me in my effort. We 
may not have had formal collaboration but that incident created empathy. 
We are women who do not fit those pre-given frameworks. They are too. 
Leftist women did not give me the same sense of solidarity (interview, 
02.10.2010).16 
 
These comments show that feeling marginal brings previously uncooperative 
groups together. Irrespective of the issue content or issue positions, empathy emerges 
due to being at the outskirts of larger movements. 
This initial encounter culminated in the creation of the platform that makes the 
basis of this study. The roots of the platform go back to Amargi17 Conversation 
Workshops (Amargi Muhabbet Atölyesi) where different ways of being woman in 
Turkey were discussed. The discussions aimed a larger spectrum of women including 
those who did not identify with feminism. The discussions in this workshop led to the 
creation of the platform under study. H.I stresses the importance of “muhabbet” as a 
good basis to initiate dialogue and mutual understanding and how it has a 
transformative power on political positions as well: 
 
                                                          
16 BaĢörtülü kadınlara ve bize aynı mesafeyi koyduklarını gördüm. Onların biz 
ayrımcılığa uğradığımızda canımızın yandığını hissettiğini gözlerinden anlıyordum. 
Orada baĢörtüsü ile ilgili tepkili bir çıkıĢ olmuĢtu. KAOS GL olarak onlara destek 
olduk. Oturup dayanıĢmadık ondan sonra ama aramızda bir empati oluĢtu. Biz orada 
çizilen çerçeveye uymayan insanlardık. Onlar da. Soldaki kadınlar bende o hissi 
uyandırmadı. 
 
17 Amargi is a feminist NGO based in Istanbul. For more information check: 
www.amargi.org.tr  
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   The foundations of BSÇ were laid in Amargi Conversation Studio. We 
came together as women who had a sort of inspiration from a feminist 
framework to discuss different ways of womanhood. The individual 
experiences have a chance of being converted into political capital because 
what is individual is actually political. If there is empathy involved no one 
would stay silent in the face of a situation like this (referencing physical 
attacks on a gay person). If there was no chance to speak in an informal 
manner, there would be no BSÇ (interview, 2.10.2010).18 
 
The same interviewee also stresses the importance of creating a language that is 
not dichotomizing and separating and argues that the aim of BSÇ was to create a 
language beyond those binary oppositions: 
 
   “The position of BSÇ was like this: Can we live together while other 
people see us as poles? The rhetoric of the state is not important for us at all. 
We were after crafting a language that would become popular in society. We 
were a formation that was rejecting dichotomies coded in people‟s minds 
such as Muslim vs. feminist, Muslim vs. homosexual.”19 
 
 
 
3.1.2.  Member Profile 
 
 
The women making up this coalition come from very different backgrounds. 
There are those who started as extreme leftists, have witnessed the process of the 
disintegration of leftism during 1980s, especially after the coup and who turned into 
anti-militarist feminists. There are those who started their activism during the university 
years due to veil bans and joined other networks once they were energized by this initial 
                                                          
18 BSC‟nin temelleri Amargi Muhabbet Atölyesine dayanmaktadır. Farklı kadınlık 
hallerini konuĢmak için feminist çerçeveye bulaĢmıĢ kadınlar olarak bir araya geldik. 
KiĢisel deneyimlerin politik bir sermayeye dönüĢme Ģansı var. Çünkü öncelikle kiĢisel 
olan politiktir. Empati kurduktan sonra bir daha böyle bir Ģey daha yaĢanırsa (bir 
eĢcinsele saldırıyı kastediyor) sessiz kalmayacağını düĢünüyorum. Eğer karĢılıklı 
sohbet etme Ģansımız olmasaydı BSC de kurulmazdı.  
 
19 BSC‟nin duruĢu Ģöyleydi: Biz bir arada yaĢayabiliriz, insanlar bizi birer kutup 
olarak görürken biz bir arada yaĢayabiliriz. Devlet söylemi burada bizim için hiç 
önemli değildi. Biz toplumsal olarak egemen olacak bir söylem yaratmak peĢindeydik. 
Müslüman vs feminist, Müslüman vs eĢcinsel olarak kodlayan bir dünyada bu 
kategorilere karĢı çıkmak ve varlığını sürdürmeye çalıĢan bir yapıydı. 
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threat. There are also those who followed an intellectual/academic route and joined this 
alliance because of their intellectual convictions. In this sense, it is hard to say all the 
women of the platform exhibit similar trajectories. Having said this, there are similar 
processes of transformation and shifts in mentality among platform participants which 
deserves mentioning. There are also similar experiences among groups of women in the 
platform. For instance, leftists turned into anti-militarist feminists in similar fashions 
and veiled women joined multiple networks and became quite autonomous within the 
Islamist movement through similar thought processes. These need to be elaborated if 
we want to understand the foundation of their alliance. 
The most important element common to most of the interviewees was their 
aversion towards highly institutionalized forms of civic activism which they consider to 
be crushing their personality. Another reason why they do not enjoy such activism is the 
subtle patriarchy involved in most of civic organizations. Because women are 
downplayed in such organizations, most decided to follow a more independent, non-
aligned activism that works through passive networks. They also express a desire to 
stay away from the disciplinarian aspects of such organizations, meaning that 
organizations crush the personalities of members and hence become too suffocating. In 
the words of D.E:  
 
   I cannot feel that happy in Özgür-der. Why? First of all, they are so 
extremist. I expressed to them that I do not look at religion in that fashion. 
Beyond that, even if I had the same views, I would not want to be with 
people who hold views similar to mine. No way. I think there is the need for 
cross-fertilization. No good work would come out if you do not have a 
humane outlook (interview, 23.03.2011).20 
 
Here is another interviewee who expresses her dislike of tight organizational 
membership that confines individuals to pre-determined forms of speech and conduct. 
She also expresses that despite the motivation in the platform to create a new form of 
                                                          
20
 Ben tutup da kendimi Özgür-der‟de kendimi çok çok rahat hissedemem. 
Neden? Birincisi çok marjinal bir topluluk, ben dine bakıĢ olarak da orada 
olamayacağımı ifade ettim. Bundan öte, aynı görüĢte olsam bile, sürekli benim gibi 
düĢünen insanlarla beraber siyaset yapamam. Mümkün değil. OrtaklaĢma, bir dirsek 
teması olması gerektiğini düĢünüyorum. Tabi insani bir bakıĢ açısı olmadan ortaya bir 
eser çıkarılmıyor.  
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solidarity that surpasses former allegiances; their grip on members joining the platform 
is still evident for her. L.M explains her disappointment in the following words:  
 
   Even the idea of being part of an organization disturbs me. I feel like one 
cannot be himself/herself if she stays within a group. There are still no 
groups in Turkey where you can freely express yourself. We cannot call 
BSÇ an organization in that sense; we can call it a formation. Even though it 
is not an organization, I have come across certain hierarchies there. I have 
seen that when I write something it can remain unanswered. But what 
disturbed me the most was people saying they want to go to their own 
backyard at the sight of first disagreement. This made me think a lot. I 
realized I do not have my own backyard. I felt so isolated. I have no 
residence it seems, I thought. If everybody can talk about going back to 
their own backyard, then everyone came here temporarily. I had no 
backyard (interview, 16.03.2011).21  
 
F.G admits finding a safe haven in multi-issue coalitions at an early age where 
they were admitted to engage in politics regardless of their political background:  
 
   I have been at the management of “Genç Siviller”. In other NGOs, women 
tend to stay out of politics. This is because the veil is seen as a political 
symbol. For this reason, veiled women tend to think we should stay out of 
politics. I, on the other hand, wanted to be in a formation where I could 
openly talk about politics, be part of a political movement. The slogan 
“Genç Siviller are disturbed” really caught my attention. We protested 
against national days. What kept me there? I wanted to be part of a political 
union incorporating my identity as a Muslim. My sensitivities were also 
taken into account. No one was disturbed by my presence. We had a 
demonstration called: Let‟s become Kurdish…it was about having 
education in the Kurdish language. We had a meeting after the 
memorandum of 27th of April. We had a headscarf event: Against the 
argument that our grandma‟s did not veil themselves like we do today, we 
                                                          
21 Ama bir örgütün içinde olma fikri bile Ģu anda beni çok rahatsız eder. Bir 
grubun içinde olunca kendin olamıyormuĢ gibisin geliyor bana. Halen Türkiye‟de 
kendini rahatça ifade edebileceğin bir grup oluĢmuyor. BSÇ‟ye bu noktada bir örgüt 
denemez, bir oluĢum denebilir. Bir oluĢum olmasına rağmen, ben orada da bir takım 
hiyerarĢiler gördüm. Bir akademisyenin ağırlığı ile benim ağırlığımın aynı olmadığını 
gördüm. Ben ortaya bir Ģey yazdığımda, cevapsız kalabildiğini gördüm. Ama beni 
rahatsız eden, daha ilk çatıĢmada ben mahalleme dönüyorum denmesi. Bu beni çok 
düĢündürdü. Benim mahallem yok diye düĢündüm. Ġlk defa kendimi çok mahallesiz 
hissettim. Ġkametgahım yokmuĢ, dedim, ortada kalmıĢ hissettim. Herkes mahalleme 
dönüyorum dediğine göre, herkes buraya geçici olarak gelmiĢ, herkesin bir mahallesi 
varmıĢ. Ama benim mahallem yoktu. 
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had the slogan of “No, it should be my grandma‟s way (interview, 
10.03.2011).22 
 
The above remark reveals that for veiled women, these new venues of 
participation were a way to express themselves and feel part of politics which they were 
excluded from by virtue of being veiled and not being admitted to the public space. 
The second pattern that emerges among coalition members is their disillusionment 
with their prior movement history. This emerges in various forms among platform 
members. For example, some of the leftists criticize the way they have acted during the 
soft coup of February 28th as well as their approach to the Kemalist heritage especially 
prior to 1980s. They are also critical of the way they interpreted secularism and its 
exclusionary form implemented in Turkey. G.H says:  
 
   After I became an atheist, my curiosity about Muslims began. I have seen 
it with my own eyes how veiled women were downgraded and patronized 
after the 28th of February. Veiled women kept distant from us as well. 
Before, most of us were Kemalists. Not like CHP though. Not a statist 
Kemalism. It is more about Kemalist principles. Then we had the coup of 12 
September. I looked at the socialism that we had; hierarchies and all that... 
When I went in (to the prison) I realized so many things about it. It was not 
humanist enough. It was a hegemonic, industrializing, progressive ideology. 
When I decided to abandon socialism, my horizons expanded. I 
deconstructed myself. I decided saying: I am not a socialist, I am a feminist. 
I found so many important questions once I gave up being reductionist. If I 
continued behaving in the old socialist logic, I was going to understand 
neither heterosexism nor the veil issue. 
 
I have become a member of ÖDP. I became a member of an independent 
women‟s collective, a platform where there were Kurdish, Armenian, 
socialist and homosexual women. We prepared brochures for Konca. I 
started thinking a lot then. I was not that different from the Republican clan 
at the time. I started thinking more after the Konca KuriĢ incident. We are 
                                                          
22 Genç Siviller‟in yönetiminde bulundum. Bizim STK‟lardaki kadınlarda siyaset 
dıĢında kalma eğilimi görülür. BaĢörtülüler siyasal simge olarak görüldüğü için olur bu. 
BaĢörtülüler de bu sebepten “Biz siyaset dıĢıyız” diye düĢünmek isterler. Ben açık açık 
siyaset konuĢabileceğim, siyasal bir sürecin içinde olabileceğim bir oluĢum içinde 
olmak istiyordum. “Genç Siviller Rahatsız” mesajı çok hoĢuma gitti. Milli bayramları 
protesto ettik. Beni orada tutan ne idi? Müslüman kimliğimle yer alabileceğim bir 
siyasal birliktelikti. Benim de hassasiyetlerim göz önünde bulunduruluyordu. 
Varlığımdan rahatsız olunmuyordu. “Biraz da biz KürtleĢelim”, diye bir eylem yaptık 
mesela..Kürtçe eğitim üzerine….27 nisan Muhtırası‟nın ardından Taksim‟de toplandık. 
BaĢörtüsü toplantısı yaptık: babaannelerimizin baĢörtüsü siyasi değildi argümanına 
karĢılık “Hayır benim babaannem gibi olsun” diye sloganlar attık. 
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calling ourselves oppressed; I have seen that they could also be oppressed. 
Whoever objects is crushed. Konca is a good example of this. I learned 
more about oppression from Kurdish women there. I kept a distance from 
women for a long time because of the hierarchical leftist organizations. The 
independent women‟s initiative was very good for me. I learned a lot and 
started changing myself fundamentally (interview, 14.03.2011).23 
 
 
 
3.1.3.  Generational Dimension 
 
 
Although, one cannot make generalizations out of a small sample, I observed 
certain differences between interviewees that can be attributed to differences in age. 
The representatives of older and younger generations in this study have different 
interpretations on politics, gender and social relations. For example, patriarchy is more 
readily discredited by older generation since some have experienced divorce, or had 
more encounters with the opposite sex. Secondly, older generation had been in and out 
                                                          
23 Ateist olmamla Müslümanlara ilgim baĢladı. 28 ġubat sonrası gözlerimle tanık 
oldum baĢörtülü kadınları aĢağılamayı, laf atıldığını. BaĢörtülü kadınlar da bizden uzak 
durdular. Eskiden çoğumuz Kemalist idik. CHP gibi değildik. Devletçi Kemalizm 
değil, Kemalist ilkeler. 12 Eylül oldu. Sosyalizm denen Ģeye baktım. HiyerarĢiler vs. 
Ġçeri girip uzaklaĢınca bir yığın Ģeyi farkettim. Ġnsan merkezli bulmadım. Egemen bir 
ideoloji, ilerlemeci, sanayileĢmeci bir ideoloji. Sosyalist olmaktan vazgeçince, o zaman 
ufkum çok açıldı. Yapı bozumuna gittim. Kendimi bozdum. Sosyalist değil feminist 
demeye baĢladım. Ġndirgemeci yerden bakmayı bırakınca birçok yeni sorun keĢfettim. 
Eski sosyalist mantıkla hareket etseydim heteroseksizmi de baĢörtüsü sorununu da 
anlayamayacaktım. 
 
Ġktidar meselelerine kafa yormasaydım baĢörtülü kadınların halini anlayamazdım. 
Ama onlar için 28 ġubat‟ta hiçbirĢey yapmadım. Hiç iliĢkimiz olmadı. O sınavı çok iyi 
vermemiĢtik. Baskılara karĢı hiçbirĢey yapmadık. Sonra Konca KuriĢ sayesinde 
düĢünmeye baĢladım. 
 
Ġstanbulda ÖDP‟li oldum. Ġstanbulda Bağımsız Kadın Ġnisiyatifi. Kürt, Ermeni, 
sosyalist kadınların ve eĢcinsel kadınların olduğu bir platforma girdim.  Konca ile ilgili 
afiĢler yaptık. Çok düĢünmeye baĢladım o zaman. Cumhuriyet klanının çok farkında 
değildim o zaman. Orada Konca KuriĢ sonrası daha fazla düĢünmeye baĢladım. Biz 
kendimizi mağdur diyoruz ya, onların da mağdur olabildiğini gördüm. Kim karĢı 
çıkıyorsa ezilir, Konca bunun iyi bir örneğidir. Orada Kürt kadınlardan da çok Ģey 
öğrendim ezilmek konusunda. Ben uzun süre kadınlardan uzak durdum, hiyerarĢik sol 
yapılardan. Bağımsız Kadın Ġnisiyatifi çok iyi geldi. Çok Ģey öğrendim, takır takır 
değiĢtirdim kendimi.” 
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of more diverse networks, spanning from ultra-nationalism to brotherhoods, which 
shows they had a less idealistic vision of Islam. In the words of E.F:  
 
   I find the younger generation more fundamentalist. We have started from 
elsewhere, we started from Ülkücü movement. I did not come from other 
Islamic groups or brotherhoods. I made myself a Muslim through my own 
readings. They are born into these things; that is why they have a more 
holistic view. 
 
Is it about being the younger generation? 
 
There is the effect of Iranian evolution on them. Their portrayal of religion 
is more political and more this worldly. There is also an additional factor 
about their attitude towards feminism or about being a woman: “being 
young”. You can have a consensus with older women about these issues 
because they have lived through a lot. Younger ones are more perfectionists. 
Difference in experience, in other words (interview, 24.03.2011).24 
 
The views of the younger generation on the other hand complement this picture in 
a different way. L.M thinks:  
 
   When Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu died, there were very strong disagreements. 
There were people who expressed their condolences while others called him 
a killer. We had such divisions. I told to the middle aged women in our 
group that their generation and our (younger) generation do not think alike. 
There is a generational issue here. For me, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu does not have 
the meaning he has for religious women, the meaning that middle aged 
generation attaches to him. They think of him as a good Muslim who was 
oppressed. When you look at his history, you see a man who was used by 
the state. I do not consider him as a hero. That generation was more tough, 
divisions were sharp (interview, 16.03.2011).25 
                                                          
24 Yeni kuĢağı daha tutucu buluyorum. Ya çünkü, biz baĢka bir yerden girdik ya, 
ülkücü hareketten girmiĢ olmak sebebiyle. Ben, hiç Ġslamcı grupların, tarikatların 
içinden gelmedim. Kendi okumalarımla kendimi Müslüman yaptım. Onlar bu Ģeyin 
içine doğuyorlar ve daha bütüncül bakıyorlar.  
 
Bu yeni kuĢak olmakla mı alakalı baĢka bir Ģeyle mi alakalı? 
 
Bir de onlarda Ģeyin etkisi var, Ġran Devrimi‟nin. Daha siyasi, din anlayıĢları daha 
dünyevi. Bir de Ģeyle alakalı galiba, feminizme bakıĢları, ya da kadın olmakla alakalı, 
gençlikleri ile alakalı. Halktan daha yaĢlı kadınlarla daha rahat bu konuları konuĢup, 
uzlaĢıyorsunuz. Çünkü hayatında yaĢadığı Ģeyler var. Gençler daha mükemmeliyetçi 
oluyor. Deneyim farkı yani.” 
 
25 Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu‟nun ölmesinde sert tartıĢmalar oldu. “ Allah rahmet eylesin” 
dendiğinde, “O bir katildir” diyenler oldu. ĠĢte öyle ayrıĢmalar oluyordu.  Orta yaĢ 
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While the older generation considers being part of a wider network in one‟s 
lifetime as a sign of flexibility and tolerance, the younger generation considers this as 
ideological confusion or compromise.  
However, the value of having been part of loose and diverse networks is a value in 
itself for this coalition. If, women making part of this platform could identify 
themselves with a more monolithic bloc they would not have tried to ally with women 
from different backgrounds. Loose networks also have an advantage; participants do 
not have to commit themselves to the fullest, they can be in and out of these networks.   
 
 
 
3.1.4.  Coming from a Leftist Tradition Versus Right Wing Tradition 
 
 
There are studies which show that activists coming from a left-wing tradition are 
more readily and easily mobilized. For example, a study by Lawrence, Sides and Farrell 
(2010) point out that there are different agendas of left wing and right wing bloggers. In 
their study, left wing bloggers often focus on political mobilization, identifying 
progressive candidates and encouraging them to donate and work for them whereas 
right wing bloggers often serve as forums of commentary (p.150).  They also point out 
to a similar study by Wallstein (2007) where he finds left wing blogs mobilize twice as 
much as right wing blogs.  
The ability of women coming from the leftist tradition to organize and mobilize 
faster was mentioned both by feminists coming from the leftist tradition and those who 
were not. F.G attributes this to the perceptions about the state among the leftists:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
grubuna, “sizin nesil ile bizim nesil aynı düĢünmüyor” demiĢtim. Bu konuda nesiller 
arası fark var. Benim için Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, dindar kadınların yüklediği anlama sahip 
değil. O yaĢ grubunun yüklediği anlamı yok. Onlar çok daha mazlum, iyi bir 
Müslüman diye düĢünüyordur. Sürece bakınca devlet tarafından kullanılmıĢ bir insan 
portresi çıkıyor, ben ona bir kahraman gözüyle bakmam. O kuĢak daha sertti, taraflar 
daha keskindi. O yüzden biz diğer grupla biraradayız, diye bakıyorlar. Eskiden sağcı 
solcu Ģimdi dindar gayri dindar ayrımlar. Mesela dindarların çoğu aynı zamanda 
ülkücü; halbuki babam dindar olmasına rağmen en nefret ettiği Ģey de ülkücülüktü.  
Eski nesilde ağır basıyordu Osmanlıyı dindar kabul etme. 
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   The attitudes of the left and religious groups about the state differ. 
Religious groups are not that skeptical about the state. They think military 
might have been a wrong doer but police is one of us (interview, 
10.03.2011).26 
 
The same interviewee also admits that Islamists were not as excluded from 
mainstream politics as the leftists and that is the reason why leftists can mobilize more 
easily against the state: 
 
   Islamic groups were thought of as oppositional groups since the 
establishment of Republic but as a group making up the majority of this 
country, they are marked but included in the political system. There is a 
perception like, this state is ours, and we are the constituent members of this 
state. There is no such attitude among the left. There is no way they can be 
included into the political system because they are in conflict with the state. 
People say, Milli GörüĢ is the most marginalized of the right. But you have 
seen in the funeral of Erbakan. You have seen that the political system 
includes them through the funeral procession: a funeral with flags, a hero of 
this nation. Islamic groups would never be marginalized like the left.27 
 
G.H, a leftist woman, tries to explain this situation with respect to the ontological 
difference between the left, which is always more anti-statist than the rest of ideologies. 
She also thinks leftist women have been able to insulate themselves from male 
dominance in their organizations by stepping to feminist movement while most of the 
religious women still consider working for conservative political parties and stay within 
mixed groups which decrease their mobilizational ability:  
 
   The reflexes and organization of women coming from a leftist tradition is 
firmer. Left means action, protest, when it comes to reacting. Where does 
this difference come from? It comes from different modalities of opposition. 
Muslim women do not have an independent means of organization apart 
                                                          
26 Solcu kesimle dindar kesimin devlet algısı: dindar kesim polise o kadar negatif 
bakmayabilir. Asker dindar kesime kötü davranmıĢtır ama polis daha halktan biridir.  
 
27 Ġslami gruplar TC‟nin kuruluĢundan beri muhalif olup dıĢladığı bir grup ama 
çoğunluk olduğu için bir grup içleyerek etiketleyerek dıĢladığı. Bu devlet bizim biz bu 
devletin asli unsurlarız bakıĢı var. Solda öyle bir duruĢ yoktur. Devletle çatıĢma halinde 
olduğu için içlenmesi mümkün değildir. En çok dıĢlanan Milli GörüĢ denir. Ama 
Erbakan‟ın cenazesini gördünüz. Cenazesi ile içlendiğini görüyoruz: bayraklı cenaze, 
vatan kahramanı muamelesi. Ġslami kesim sol gibi dıĢlanmaz hiçbir zaman.”   
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from the political party. That is why Muslim women are more at ease in 
hybrid environments (interview, 14.03.2011).28 
 
Another peculiarity of members who are coming from a leftist tradition is their 
aversion to being called civil society actors. For them, civil society has a misleading 
effect on actors whose aim is to have a political impact. This can be largely attributed to 
the revolutionary ideal of leftists and their desire to overhaul the political system from 
its foundations. Here is what C.D said:  
 
   Do you see yourself as a civil society actor? 
 
No, I don‟t. I am doing politics. What you call civil society is a rather 
passive thing that tries to understand life rather than try to change it. And it 
is really not independent, it is affiliated with somewhere else or 
ideologically dependent. It is, in italics, a thing that wants to promote 
“goodness “and to understand life. As a person who is also a socialist 
Marxist, what is important for me is, as Marx said, not only to understand 
reality but also to change it. If we are to talk about these terms 
straightforward, then I am not a civic actor, I do politics. 
 
Are you against the term activist then? 
 
No, I like the term activist, the word militant as well. I am not against terms 
that evoke action. I think these terms determine lots of things (interview, 
05.08.2011).29 
                                                          
28 Sol gelenekten gelen kadınların refleksleri, örgütlenmesi daha sağlam. Solculuk 
demek eylem direniĢ demek, harekete geçmek noktasında. Bu fark nereden geliyor? 
Farklı muhalefet etme biçimlerinden geliyor bu. Siyasi parti dıĢında Müslüman 
kadınların örgütlenme Ģansı olmuyor zaten. Karma muhalif yapıların içinde daha rahat 
rol aldı Müslüman kadınlar. 
 
29 Kendini sivil toplum aktörü olarak görüyor musun? 
 
Görmüyorum. Ben siyaset yapıyorum. Sivil toplum örgütü dediğimiz Ģey biraz 
daha pasif olan hayatı değiĢtirmek yerine anlamaya çalıĢan sadece bir oluĢum. Ve 
mutlaka hiç bağımsız değil, baĢka bir yerlere bağımlı, ya da bir ideolojiye yakın ya da 
bağımlı daha çok iyilik (tırnak içinde iyilik) yapmaya anlamaya çalıĢan görmeye 
çalıĢan bir Ģey. Ben aynı zamanda Sosyalist Marksist biri olarak da Marx‟ın dediği gibi 
benim için önemli olan hayatı anlamak değildir sadece, hayatı anladıktan sonra 
değiĢtirmeye çalıĢmaktır. O yüzden ben sivil toplumdan, gerçek anlamda bahsetmek 
istiyorsak çünkü bu kavramlar çok karıĢtı… o yüzden sivil toplumculuğu değil 
siyasetçi biri olarak görüyorum.  
 
Aktivist kelimesine karĢı mısınız? 
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  G.H who is coming from a leftist tradition also refuses to call herself a civil 
society actor. It is interesting to observe that she refuses to be acknowledged to operate 
in the same terrain of battle where militarists or nationalists are also operating. For her, 
civil society is a perfect place to conflate terms and actors which are in reality perfectly 
opposed to each other:  
 
   What is civil? It is such an elusive term. What you call civil is civil 
hegemony. It means nothing. The beginning and end are not clear. What do 
we mean? Is it anti-militarism, anti-statism? But those terms lump employer 
associations and feminists together. I am against putting these into the same 
basket. We will never stand next to TĠSK, ever. I do not believe in calling 
political opposition as “civil society”. It is not clear what it is trying to say. I 
am an anti-militarist feminist. 
 
I am not saying activist either. When there are so many differences, this 
term melts all those differences in the same pot. How can I be next to an 
association affiliated with MHP? Opposition is something else. Opposition 
is being against hegemony. What do you mean by hegemonic? Hegemony 
of the state, hegemony of men, those who want war, heterosexist violence, 
military these are all hegemonic, including heterosexism (interview, 
14.03.2011).30 
 
A re-reading of her comments also confirms why calling such initiatives 
“enclaves” is appropriate. The commentator thinks the civic actors which are not 
opposing dominant and mainstream ideologies may feel at home within the contours of 
civil society, but as her engagement refuses any allegiance to such ideologies, she is 
placed outside of civil society. I interpret her comments as an attestation to the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Hayır, aktivist kelimesini severim. Militan kelimesini de. Eylemci kelimesine 
karĢı değilim. Bunların belirleyici olduğunu düĢünüyorum. 
 
30 Sivil nedir? Ġpe sapa gelmez bir kavram. Sivil dediğiniz sivil iktidardır. Hiçbir 
Ģey ifade etmiyor. Ucu bucağı belli değil o yüzden bana bir neyi kastediyoruz: askeriye 
karĢıtlığı, devlet dıĢılık mı? O terimde iĢveren sendikası da dahil, feministler de dahil, 
bunların harmanlamasına karĢıyım. Benim için TĠSK ile hiçbir zaman yan yana 
gelemeyeceğiz. Muhalefetin sivil kavramı ile ifadesini kabul etmiyorum. Ne ifade ettiği 
belli değil. Ben bir anti-militarist feministim. 
 
Aktivist de demiyorum: bir sürü ayrılık varken o ayrılıkları bir potada 
eritiyorsunuz. Ben MHP‟li bir dernekle nasıl yanyana anılabilirim? Muhalefet baĢka bir 
Ģey. Muhalefet demek egemen olana muhalif olmaktır. Egemenden kastınız nedir? 
Devlet egemenliği, erkek egemenliği, savaĢ isteyen mihraklar, heteroseksist Ģiddet, 
askeriye hepsi egemen. Heteroseksizm de dahil. 
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there is a dominant public sphere which such enclaves are opposed and the latter do not 
see themselves as part and parcel of this public sphere. That is exactly what makes them 
enclaves. This is not to say that such enclaves are totally occupied with their own vision 
and their imaginary world. They surely have an ideal that they are fighting for and they 
are trying to influence this dominant public sphere. However, they refuse to do this in 
conventional ways and as part and parcel of mainstream civil society. In clear contrast 
to this vision, there are others who use the term “civil society” in a less critical way. For 
example, F.G, a veiled woman, thinks civil society is the only place where they can 
engage in politics and their rights struggles:  
 
   The struggle for rights and putting political pressure happens inevitably in 
civil society. My entry into civil society was out of a necessity. I was not 
able to wage politics because I was not able to work in public institutions. 
We cannot take part in local or national parliaments. I am forced into civil 
society in a way. Civil society is the only plane I can operate. We can give 
the services we want to give through this route as well. Recently they set up 
an association named “The Rights of Patients”. These friends give services 
through this channel because they cannot give those services via public 
institutions. Lawyers are preparing their files in these associations because 
they cannot participate in lawsuits. This is the reason why veiled women are 
active in civil society. It is a realm we have been forcefully directed to 
(interview, 10.03.2011).31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Siyaset yapma ve hak mücadelesi alanları mecburen sivil toplumda oluyor. 
Benim sivil toplumda olmam mecburendir. Resmi kurumlarda çalıĢamadığım için 
siyaset yapamıyorum. Meclise ya da yerel yönetimlerde, rol alamıyoruz. Sivil topluma 
itilmiĢ oluyorum. Sivil toplum bizim için tek alan. Kamuda verilecek hizmetleri de bu 
alanda yapabiliyoruz. Daha yeni hasta hakları aktivistleri derneği kuruldu. Bu 
arkadaĢlar, kamuda rol alamadıkları için buradan hizmet veriyorlar. Avukatlar davalara 
giremedikleri için burada dosyaları hazırlıyorlar. BaĢörtülü kadınlar bunun için aktif 
sivil toplumda. Sivil toplum zoraki yönlendirilen bir alan oldu. 
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3.1.5.  Major Activities and Declarations of the Platform 
 
  
Unlike other social movements or alliances that are mostly occupied with joint 
mobilization and less with sorting out identity differences, this particular alliance 
started out with joint declarations and a few demonstrations but later turned its attention 
more towards an internal deliberation on civility, recognition and identity differences. 
For this reason, we observe less action in the spotlight and more talking in the enclave. 
Due to this, most of the framing analysis revolves around the interpretation of this inner 
deliberation than what is spoken out loud in the public deliberative arena. However, it is 
still useful to consider what was collectively produced and shared in the public sphere 
to get a sense of the motivations of the coalition.  
The alliance was formally set up in September 2008 after a wave of university 
expulsions of veiled students. The launch of the platform relies on the following 
declaration. This declaration also explains the purpose of this particular collaboration: 
The title of the kick-off declaration is “A public sphere that we cannot walk arm in 
arm is not our public sphere”.32 The opening paragraph clarifies who the women of the 
alliance consist of: 
 
   “We, as women who are believers and non-believers, veiled or not-veiled, 
those who act within the frame of women's rights and liberties and thus who 
do not claim “if you are here, then I ain't” are against the following.”33 
 
As can be understood from the title and the opening remarks, the platform 
attempts to define an all-inclusive collaboration of women. The inclusivity of the 
coalition stems from the fact that it considers and mentions the marginalization of 
different women in collective imagery and mentions them as legitimate partners in this 
collaboration: 
                                                          
32http://groups.yahoo.com/group/birbirimizesahipcikiyoruz/  
 
33 Bizler inançlı- inançsız, örtünmeyen-örtünen, kadın hak ve özgürlükleri anlayıĢı 
içinde "sen varsan ben yokum" demeyen kadınlar olarak; 
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   “We oppose the racist subjection of veiled women as Islamist robots by 
such adjectives as ignorant, bigoted, mischievous, and disingenuous, 
opportunist, and fuddy-duddy. We oppose the sexist consideration of non-
veiled women as if they are sexual commodities, exhibitionists, seducers. 
We know that the oppression and exploitation of women are facilitated by 
the divisions created among them.”34  
 
This initial manifesto is not very explicit about whether it is the state policies or 
the general sexist attitudes within society which is considered as the biggest enemy 
although there is a formal emphasis on the role of state in shaping general public 
opinion on womanhood and the consequences of this for women: 
 
   “We, the women who are against all kinds of discrimination and injustice, 
reject all types of prohibitions and oppressions of the state as “a field of 
contest for brave men” which ignores our existence by relying on the 
understanding that the place of woman is by her husband's foot, which 
makes discrimination by the regulations of public morality, which aims at 
delimiting women's liberties. We, the women reject the control over our 
bodies in the name of secularism, republic, religion, tradition, custom, 
morality, honor or freedom. We, the women are not suspicious of each other, 
we bet for one another!35 
 
The alliance made three important declarations that form the backbone of their 
collaboration. One is the initial declaration that explains the purpose of collaboration. 
The other is the declaration made by the movement for protesting the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court on veiling in universities. The third is the declaration on sexual 
                                                          
34 BaĢörtülü kadınların; cahil, yobaz, fesat, takiyyeci, fırsatçı, örümcek kafalı gibi 
sıfatlarla bir "islami robot" imajıyla değerlendirilerek, ırkçı yaklaĢımlarla Ģiddete maruz 
bırakılmalarına karĢı çıkıyoruz. BaĢörtüsüz kadınların; cinsel meta, teĢhirci ya da bir 
tahrik mekanizması gibi cinsiyetçi yaklaĢımlarla değerlendirilmesine karĢı çıkıyoruz. 
Kadınlar arasında yaratılan uçurumların kadınların ezilmesini ve sömürülmesini 
kolaylaĢtırdığını biliyoruz. 
 
35 Biz her türlü ayrımcılığın ve adaletsizliğin karĢısında olan kadınlar, “kadının 
yeri kocasının dizinin dibi” anlayıĢıyla bizleri yok sayan, “genel ahlak” düzenlemesiyle 
ayrımcılık yapan, kadın özgürlüğüne sınırlar getirmek isteyen bir "er meydanı" olarak 
devletin kadınlara yönelik her türlü yasağını ve baskısını reddediyoruz. Biz kadınlar; 
birilerinin bedenimizi modernite, laiklik, cumhuriyet, din, gelenek, görenek, ahlak, 
namus ya da özgürlük adına denetlemesini istemiyoruz. Biz kadınlar birbirimizden 
kuĢku duymuyor; birbirimize sahip çıkıyoruz! Çünkü biz kadınlar, farkında 
olduklarımızla yan yanayız 
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violence against women that came after the ruling on a harassment case committed by a 
prominent Islamist writer. 
The second declaration was made on the veil ban in universities and the 
declaration was accompanied by demonstrations in certain universities. The symbolic 
language of the declaration defines the root of the problem as “totalitarian secularism”: 
 
   “We Bet for One Another Until All of Us is Free 
 
The school term starts again and we see the same scenes all over again. 
 
A group of women, while staying at the outer side of the wall, feel the 
anxiety of not being able to enter the schoolyard that their friends can freely 
go, feel the torture of being pointed at by the officials at a very young age, 
and carry the shaming weight of a system that puts the most basic human 
rights such as freedom to education and work out of their reach. Beyond 
everything else, these women who are barely in their early 20s are having a 
hard time standing upright in a freedom battle.  
 
Those who have implemented this discrimination that comes close to racism 
in this country, just because these women want to live a life without 
hypocrisy, should know this: 
 
We are supporting them as women coming from different beliefs, world 
views and life styles 
 
We feel ashamed in your place for putting them into the shape they have to 
be in at school. 
 
We feel ashamed in your place for forcing us to wear the hair of your 
totalitarian secularism such as wigs, hats and berets.” 
 
We reject those pledges that say “I am guilty for having wanted an 
education. I know this and sign it.” 
 
None of us is free, where one of us is a hostage 
None of us is happy with what she has, while one of us is feeling deprived 
None of us has any dignity, while one of us is being insulted 
In this test of resistance, we the veiled and non-veiled women will walk 
together 
Until all of us are free 
We bet for one another.”36 
                                                          
36 Hep Birlikte Özgür Oluncaya Kadar Birbirimize Sahip Çıkacağız  
 
Yine okullar açılıyor, yine aynı görüntülere Ģahit oluyoruz.  
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Some of the non-veiled women found the term “hair of your totalitarian 
secularism” as a blanket term that put themselves into same category of pro-ban citizens 
which they consider inaccurate and unjust. However, no one was against the making of 
this declaration as everyone considered the ban on veil as a pressing problem.   
The other declaration was prepared in protest of the decision by forensic medicine 
that a small girl was not mentally affected in a high profile sexual harassment case. The 
declaration titled “Do not kill our soul” was written to protest the patriarchal mentality 
behind most of the court rulings involving sexual violence against women. The 
declaration identifies patriarchy as the prime force behind sexual offenses as well as the 
nature of court rulings and findings of forensic medicine. It first identifies the 
following: 
 
   “None of the harassments or rapes is coincidental and isolated; they are all 
a form of male violence. 
 
The mentality that gave a 5 months sentence to the woman fishing on the 
bridge on the basis of “public morality” for wearing inappropriate dress is 
the same mentality that gives the forensic report that a child who was 
sexually molested was not mentally affected by this incident. 
 
Male hegemony considers any form of violence on women appropriate and 
this violence is reinforced and legitimized by the law and the implementers 
of it. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Bir grup kadın duvarın berisinde arkadaĢlarının serbestçe girip çıktığı okula 
girememenin sıkıntısını; gencecik bir yaĢta yetkili parmaklarca iĢaret edilmenin 
eziyetini; kalabalıklar içerisinde yalnız kalmanın hüznünü; eğitim, aĢ, iĢ gibi en temel 
insan haklarını kendisi için ulaĢılmaz kılan sistemin utanç verici ağırlığını yaĢıyor. Ve 
her Ģeyin ötesinde, daha belki yaĢları yirmilere henüz varmıĢ genç kadınlar bir özgürlük 
mücadelesinde ayakta kalmaya zorlanıyor. Kadın oldukları için, inandıkları gibi riyasız 
yaĢamak istedikleri için, onlara yıllardır bu ırkçılığa varan ayırımcılığı yaĢatanlar 
bilmeliler ki: Farklı inanç, düĢünce ve yaĢam pratiğinin içinden gelen kadınlar olarak 
biz onların yanındayız. Her gün bir kapıdan geçerken onları "olması gereken" kılıklara 
sokan ayırımcılığınızdan siz değil biz utanıyoruz! Peruk, Ģapka, kapüĢon gibi totaliter 
laikliğin saçlarını dayatma hakkını kendinizde görmenizden siz değil biz hicap 
duyuyoruz! Önlerine sürdüğünüz "eğitim almak istediğim için suçluyum, bunu biliyor 
ve imzalıyorum" vesikalarını vicdanlarımız önünde biz reddediyoruz! 
 
Birimizin tutsak olduğu yerde hiçbirimiz özgür değiliz. 
Birimizin mahrum olduğu yerde hiçbirimiz sahip olduklarımızla mutlu değiliz. 
Birimizin hakaret gördüğü yerde hiçbirimiz itibar sahibi değiliz. 
Bu direnç ve özgürlük sınavında baĢörtülü-baĢörtüsüz kadınlar yan yana yürüyeceğiz. 
Ta ki hepimiz özgür oluncaya kadar. Birbirimize sahip çıkıyoruz! 
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Harassment and rape are male crimes which cannot be hidden behind 
explanations such as mental disturbance or evil. Violence against women 
does not end because the courts, forensic medicine and police which are 
supposed to prevent this are ignoring the problem. Women cannot make the 
violence against them public. Media is not doing its responsibility either. 
Violence against women stays as a third page story and usually made tabloid 
news. 
 
The declaration ends with the following testament:  
 
We will not keep silent against the male hegemony on our bodies in the form of 
harassment, rape, beating, virginity control and juvenile marriages!37 
 
There were certain defections from this declaration on the basis of the assumed 
man-hating attitude involved in some of the statements. A few of the religious women 
were supportive of the declaration but did not take part in it as they did not consider 
such sexual violence as male violence per se. 
Such minor disputes as exemplified in the disputes over the terms “hair of 
totalitarian secularism” or “male violence” show some of the division lines between 
                                                          
37 “Ruhumuzu Öldürmeyin Basın Açıklaması 
Tacizlerin tecavüzlerin hiçbiri tesadüf ya da münferit değildir; bir erkek Ģiddetidir. 
Köprüde balık tutan kadına "genel ahlak" bahanesiyle uygunsuz kıyafetli 
denilerek 5 ay ceza verenle cinsel istismara uğrayan çocuğa ruh ve beden sağlığı 
yerinde raporu veren ve bu rapor nedeniyle tecavüzcüyü serbest bırakan zihniyet ayni 
zihniyettir.  
 
Erkek egemenliği kadınlara her türlü Ģiddeti reva görürken erkekleri koruyan 
yasalar ve uygulayıcılar eliyle bu Ģiddet güçlenerek, meĢrulaĢarak artmakta. 
 
Tecavüz ve taciz ruh hastalığının, Ģeytanın ardına gizlenemez bir erkek suçudur. 
Mahkeme, adli tıp, emniyet gibi kadına yönelik Ģiddeti engellemekle sorumlu olan tüm 
kurumların, görevlilerinin yaĢanan Ģiddete göz yummaları nedeniyle, kadınlara yönelik 
Ģiddet bitmiyor. Kadınlar yaĢadıkları Ģiddeti açığa çıkaramıyor. Medya da kadınlara 
yönelik Ģiddet konusunda üstüne düĢeni yapmıyor. ġiddet üçüncü sayfa haberi olarak 
yer alıyor ve çoğu zaman magazinleĢtiriliyor. 
 
Kadınların yıllar yılı verdikleri mücadeleler sonucunda elde ettikleri kazanımların 
yok sayılmasına izin vermeyeceğiz. Bizler bedenlerimiz üzerinde erkek egemen 
sistemin denetimine, taciz ve tecavüze, dayağa, bekâret kontrolüne, küçük yaĢta 
evlendirilmeye karĢı susmayacağız! 
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veiled and non-veiled women, although the lack of complete consensus over the terms 
did not impede the making of this declaration. 
Generally speaking the cross-movement collaboration agrees on combatting 
sexual and domestic violence as well as veil ban. Despite certain disputes over the 
terms used to make these declarations, the movement was nevertheless able to come up 
with a joint statement and action. 
Although the movement is not in complete agreement on the nature of male 
hegemony, there is more or less a consensus to work for the empowerment of women in 
the public space, veiled or not. This is a common ground they are able to work on. 
 
 
 
3.1.6.  Discussion Topics 
 
 
Although the members of this platform came together primarily to defend the 
rights of the veiled women in opposition to bans on headscarf in universities around the 
Fall of 2008 and later became a collaboration on women‟s rights in general, there was 
no limit to the range of topics discussed during the internal deliberations of the group. 
For illustrative purposes, I provide the reader with a list of topics discussed in 2008, the 
peak year for the platform in terms of the frequency and the variety of discussions. One 
can see that the interests of the platform cover a wide variety of topics and touches 
upon most of the right‟s struggles of civil society activists in Turkey. For this reason, 
the platform exhibits a rich source for analyzing enclave deliberation in heterogeneous 
settings where members come from very different backgrounds.  
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                      Table 2: Classification of topics discussed in 2008 
Masculinity 7 
class struggle/ worker's issues 5 
minority issues 5 
a. Kurdish 2 
b. Armenian 1 
c. Sexual min. 2 
femininity/sexuality/body 10 
Conservatism 3 
headscarf issue 24 
harassment/domestic violence 5 
Militarism 3 
Secularism 3 
 
What this classification reveals is that BSÇ does not only talk about womanhood. 
Other concerns related to minorities, militarism and secularism serve as a common 
ground from which they can forge their solidarity. For example, as these women 
develop common arguments related to the treatment of minorities in Turkey, they 
establish a basis from which they can do joint activism for other causes. Hence their 
joint position in these other domains implies reconciliation and consensus building for 
their subsequent activism in other issue domains. For example by way of building a 
consensus on militarism and nationalism, they are more at ease in attacking patriarchy 
or the rights of minorities. The richness and diversity of topics discussed, although 
giving the researcher a hard time to pin down common patterns and themes, eventually 
helps us see important connections and issue linkages that facilitated the emergence of 
this coalition to begin with.  Discussions reveal that most platform members try to find 
commonalities and intersectionalities between others‟ misfortune and theirs and start 
constructing a narrative of nationalism, militarism or patriarchy on the basis of careful 
analyses of all these experiences. 
This shows that Fraser and Young were right in arguing that the route to 
multicultural democracy goes through building coalitions. They represent a passage 
from highlighting a crude dichotomy of “difference vs. equality” to intersectionalities 
and similarity in fate. 
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3.1.7.  Controversies 
 
 
In order to understand the fracture lines in enclave deliberation, case analysis 
becomes very illustrative. Immersion into the most important controversies of the 
platform will provide the reader with a perspective as to what divides the alliance. 
There were various important controversies that caused significant fracture within the 
platform. I will only mention two of them as they will become part of the analysis in the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Withdrawal of signatures of KAOS GL from a petition prepared by veiled 
women: Another conflict arose when an NGO that fights for the rights of veiled 
women and whose members are also part of this alliance, has published a 
statement protesting the ban on veil in universities. Another NGO that fights for 
the rights of gay/lesbians signed this declaration as well. The NGO that issued the 
statement was then put under intense pressure by some Islamist circles as the 
name of the gay/lesbian NGO appears on the declaration. The NGO finally gave 
up and kindly requested the removal of the name of this NGO, but opted for 
putting the individual signatories along with their institutional affiliations. This 
provoked another round of arguments within our alliance. 
 
Controversy over Meeting place: Platform members usually meet in places 
where alcohol is not served so that veiled women can also come. When the issue 
of where to meet for the next meeting was being discussed; one platform member 
suggested meeting for iftar (breaking the fast). However, other members reacted 
by saying that the willingness to meet for iftar should be reciprocated by being 
able to meet at a place where alcohol is served. This was taken as an attempt to 
embrace different life styles, including those who consume alcohol. 
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Criticism was made by other members who argued that the schism between 
religious women and women who drink alcohol is too reductionist and dichotomizing.  
There are too many different preferences and life styles that cannot be reduced to this 
dichotomy.  
Despite such arguments, the symbolic meaning of the choice of the meeting place 
seems to be decisive for many of the women who consume alcohol. Whether veiled 
women could meet in places where other members can drink alcohol is seen as a level 
of maturity needed to claim this coalition is really a working one. 
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3.2.  Methodology 
 
 
 
3.2.1.  Online Communities as a New Site of Research 
 
 
This dissertation is about a group which was mostly active in an online 
community although occasionally the members had face-to-face meetings as well as 
joint political activism. The study of online communities is a relatively new topic in 
qualitative work. The virtual sites, due to the changes in the urban lifestyles have come 
to constitute an important venue for participation and counseling. Researchers working 
on online communities usually study the interaction patterns between participants, be it 
the linguistic cues or the importance of emotional support. The actual content of 
messages serves as the primary unit of analysis in such research (Pfeil and Zaphiris, 
2010, p.2). The characteristics of computer mediated interactions, the lack of visual 
cues and the importance of anonymity are important elements that need to be 
considered in online community research.  
Some researchers claim, the lack of non-verbal cues disguises the real intentions 
of senders or impairs the understanding of receivers which causes conflict. However, 
there are other scholars who believe there may be positive value in having mediated 
conversations than face-to-face conversations. They also believe, people make up for 
ways to compensate for the lack of such cues in other novel ways such as emoticons. 
(Pfeil and Zaphiris, 2010, p.2) 
Another peculiarity associated with online research is the anonymity.  The fact 
that people may not know one‟s identity for sure may reduce the anxiety of respondents 
about social approval and allow them to speak more freely. People can also escape 
uncomfortable situations more easily by simply logging off.  The feeling of anonymity 
in conversations is also a special advantage in conducting my field work. Since people 
believe they can be shielded from the scrutiny of the public space, they give more 
natural reactions to the events, while in in-depth interviews there is always an element 
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of appealing to the researcher. Some of the answers I got during interviews did not 
match with how people reacted in the online setting due to this reason. 
In the literature review section, we have observed that online communications has 
become the breeding ground for new forms of deliberation, alliance building and 
political participation. Although there is a surge in interest in social media and the 
potentials of online communication as exemplified in the latest Arab Spring and other 
demonstrations under repressive regimes, empirical political scientists have become 
rather skeptical about the potentials of this new medium. 
It is true that online communication has opened the way for freer forms of 
interaction. It is arguably very different from print media in that it provides the 
technological ability for networking with a more diverse public. Print media on the 
other hand held the key for more homogenizing projects such as developing a sense of 
nationhood. Anderson (1983) makes reference to the power of print media in creating 
the sense of “imagined communities” (O‟Connor and MacKeogh, 2007, p.97).  
Some scholars think online communication has created a reverse pattern in that 
“horizontal and informal networking of online communication undermines the 
achievements of traditional publics in democratic regimes” and that “internet tends to 
fragment debate, giving rise to a huge number of isolated issue publics” (Habermas, 
2006, p.142). 
Sunstein (2006) thinks information cocoons and echo chambers are a real problem 
for democracy because the blogosphere is a fertile ground for amplification of errors, 
hidden profiles, cascade effects, and polarization (p.191). 
Certain studies have pointed out to the polarizing effects of online platforms. 
Lawrence, Sides and Farrell (2010, p.141) find out that political blog readers gravitate 
towards blogs that accord with their political beliefs. They are more polarized than 
either non-blog readers or consumers of various television news programs, and roughly 
as polarized as US senators. These empirical findings also feed into the general fear that 
increased communication does not always lead to increased interaction between people 
with differing viewpoints.  
The above studies constitute a strand of online research that measures the effects 
of deliberation with like-minded people versus diverse people. Another strand in online 
research investigates how identity, both individual and collective are formed and 
maintained in online venues. The underlying question in this strand of research is 
whether online media can constitute alternative fora for identity formation.  
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There are conflicting explanations with respect to how identity formation is 
facilitated in online communities. There are researchers who argue that “identity is 
often times more fluid and ephemeral online than offline (Antaki, Ardèvol, Nùñez, and 
Vayreda, 2005; Cornetto and Nowak, 2006).  
Earlier investigations of online identity were often framed within post-modern 
conceptions of the self as a fractured entity, no longer strongly bounded and often times 
difficult for both the individual and others to discern (Underwood, 2009, p.34). This is 
because despite the polarizing effects of online communication, it also provides 
participants with a degree of anonymity to mask aspects of their identity such as gender, 
age, ethnicity etc. and to become authors of themselves (Turkle, 1995; Markham, 1998 
quoted in O Connor, MacKeogh, 2007, p.99). 
As a result of this approach, much of this early investigation focused upon the 
construction of identity online and celebrated the online realm as a place where 
individuals had limitless freedom to construct any identity desired and as a space in 
which individuals could play with and subvert dominant definitions of gender, race, and 
sexuality (Rybas and Gajjala, 2007 quoted in Underwood, 2009, p.34). 
Arguably, this is a very post-modern definition of self, highly interactive and 
fragmentary (Sand, 2007). This also leaves the question of whether individuals prefer to 
pick and choose as they wish to build their online identities while maintaining their true 
offline identities. Scholars like Sand who believe in the transformative powers of 
identity construction in the online world come to think that online identities are highly 
experimental and often divorced from an individual‟s offline identity. Further research 
shows this is not necessarily true. Online identities do not generally exhibit a total break 
from offline identities, in fact online identities can be an extension or idealized version 
of a person‟s offline self (Ellison, Heino and Gibbs, 2006). 
As research continued, this initial excitement over the potentials of online 
communication faded as it became clear that people often brought existing, dominant 
definitions of acceptable and desired identities with them from offline settings applying 
them to the online world and using them to shape their online selves (Schiano, 1999). 
Despite the revolutionary potential of online settings, actual online interaction often 
reproduces offline power structures and dominant norms (Crowe and Bradford, 2006).  
For example, Burkhalter (1999) showed how race and ethnicity are expressed 
online, and how identity becomes an important badge of belonging, and similarly how 
diasporic groups maintain their connections (Miller and Slater, 2000; Hiller and Franz, 
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2004). The commonality in such research is that it is not so easy to fabricate identity 
online and that building trust in a virtual space is often bound up in the performance of 
authenticity of embodied identity. With this realization, scholars began to shift focus 
away from the potential of online interaction and toward empirical observation and 
study of actual interaction in online settings (O‟Connor and Mackeogh, 2007). 
 
 
 
3.2.2.  What Use is an Online Community? 
 
 
With respect to the discussion about whether online communications can really 
create the communities of the sort we see in the offline world, Bakardjieva (2003) has a 
different answer: 
 
   'There has been no consensually accepted definition of its meaning' 
(online communities) and different actors have interpreted the concept in 
line with their own goals and interests. The association often made between 
face-to-face communication and 'genuine' community is misplaced and we 
should accept that most communities today are, in fact, mediated. Virtual 
communities cannot be declared inferior to real-life communities simply 
because they lack face-to-face materiality'. Neither, can they be 'celebrated 
as liberating or empowering by nature as people bring to them stocks of 
knowledge and systems of relevance generated throughout their unalterable 
personal histories and social experience. Our main research purpose, 
therefore, should be to establish what specific kinds of community, users are 
creating through their Internet practice (p.292-294). 
 
Bakardjieva (2007, p.294) prefers the concept of 'virtual togetherness' (of which 
community is one form) to describe the new social forms of 'being and acting together' 
which are enabled by Internet technology. In this participatory mode of 'virtual 
togetherness' users produce something of value to others - content, space, relationship 
and/or culture. She contrasts this mode with the use of the Internet for a 'narrowly 
private existence' and specifically the 'isolated consumption of digitized goods and 
services'. She suggests that we might regard Internet use as forming a continuum 
between the 'consumption' and 'community' poles.  
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Maintaining existing identities or constituting new identities serve as an important 
drive for online communities. Some online communities may serve as vehicles for 
preserving offline identities and strengthening them (Zhang, 2008) while other online 
communities may help forging of new identities.  
There is a wide reference to some social movements such as the environmentalist 
groups‟ adoption of online communications technologies in a way that enriches their 
existing strategies and repertoires of action. Pickerill argues that these groups do not 
abandon their offline activities; they rather use the internet to better coordinate these 
activities (Pickerill, 2001). Other research also confirms these findings (Kahn and 
Kellner, 2006; Rolfe, 2005; Underwood, 2009). However, there could be cases in the 
opposite direction, where groups form in the virtual world then spread their activities 
into offline world gradually. The platform that is the case study of this dissertation 
conforms to this second model. How the online dynamics play out and how they are 
translated into real life settings is a point of inquiry if we want to understand what 
novelty online communities bring to social movement research.  
In a similar fashion to Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz (BSÇ), O‟Connor and 
Mackeogh (2007) examined an online women‟s forum that served as a general 
discussion forum for a wide variety of issues from a woman‟s perspective. They found 
that the forum served primarily as a space for the performance of identity. “They noted 
that a stable definition of group identity was an important project on which the women 
worked. A key aspect of group identity was the construction of a gendered identity 
through discursive practices; particularly those revolving around the performance of 
gender” (O'Connor and Mackeogh, 2007).  
 
 
 
3.2.3.  Sites of Participation 
 
 
The alliance I have analyzed in this study had an online community.38 One of the 
basic difficulties of working on an online community is specifying the location of 
activism. This specification gets more complicated if the nature of the online 
                                                          
38 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/birbirimizesahipcikiyoruz/  
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community is more about deliberation than doing activism per se. In fact, the majority 
of the discussions in this community are more about establishing rules of reciprocity 
and a common language than doing activism. For this reason, the community serves as 
a site of deliberation rather than social activism. 
Before using the terms community site or alliance space, it is important to specify 
this terminology in more detail. Hine (2000, p.64) notes that if it is not self-evident 
where an alliance is located spatially one should focus on the flow and connectivity 
rather than the location of virtual space. She also warns ethnographers to assume 
boundaries a priori but to explore them as the research unfolds. 
It would have been a narrow an assumption to think that the online community 
was the only place members gathered in my case study. The persons who penned down 
the initial declaration were part of an Amargi (a feminist NGO in Turkey) orchestrated 
event called Amargi Muhabbet Atölyesi which involved meaningful face-to-face 
interaction and experience sharing between the initiators of this platform. Secondly, 
although most important deliberations took place within the online community, there 
were a number of important meetings and gatherings of the alliance, especially when 
the members felt there was an important impasse in their online involvement. Thirdly, 
most of the members of this alliance are part of specific NGOs with identifiable 
purposes.39 Some have access to media and write weekly or occasional columns, while 
others are academics. When analyzing this online community, I also paid attention to 
the products of members in these other sites and venues. The online community gets 
continuous feeds from such other sites; members post each other‟s‟ writings in 
newspapers to get feedbacks from others.  
Another trait of these activists is their rapid mobilization capacity in the face of 
new events. Within the life span of this alliance, the same activists created many other 
loose platforms or issue coalitions such as “Sınır Tanımayan Feministler, Feministler 
Uyumuyor, Henüz Özgür Olmadık, Baskı Altındayız” etc…These coalitions are short 
lived, single issue campaigns that aim to capture media attention for a short period of 
time. With the help of their diverse networks and access to media, these women receive 
wider media coverage than their numbers would suggest. For this reason, as a 
researcher I paid visit to the NGOs where they spend their time and I was exposed to 
                                                          
39 The most important of these are AKDER, Kaos GL, BaĢkent Kadın Platformu, 
AMARGĠ etc. 
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their events and reports. However, the units of analysis in this study are the individuals 
making up this alliance rather than NGOs they are members of. This is because, the 
alliance was formed on the basis of the signatures of individuals rather than NGOs and 
the online community reflects all the diversity of opinions among women making up 
the platform. It would have been inappropriate to call this alliance “an alliance of 
NGOs” in that sense. 
 
 
 
3.2.4.  Participation History of Members 
 
 
I joined the online community quite late in its life, on May 2010. I first 
approached the two administrators who helped me join the group. Both of them knew 
my intentions as to why I joined the platform. While analyzing and classifying the 
postings, I contacted those participants who attended discussions the most. I approached 
them telling the aim of my research and my intentions. Almost all of them were keen to 
talk and share with me their experiences. The in-depth interviews were complementary 
to discussions in the online community. What came out during those in-depth 
interviews was that, although the memory of this or that particular discussion was 
forgotten by most of the members, they remembered the basic points of disagreement 
and the major fault lines within the alliance.  
There are still occasional exchanges of information and postings but the type of 
discussions that animated the online community no longer take place, although the 
members keep their amicable relations. For this reason, I did not find the opportunity to 
participate into the online discussions since the platform had become a dormant entity 
by then. I do not consider this as a major impediment to the quality of analysis in this 
research. This is because the archives of the platform give me the opportunity to 
observe this community in the most efficient manner. 
The members of this alliance are very prominent activists in Turkey. Some are 
running important NGOs, some are important journalists, and others are leading 
academics. With this profile, one can say that they represent a minority of women in 
Turkey, but arguably a powerful one with the chance to influence public opinion on 
issues concerning gender relations. There are women from regular professions that do 
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not necessarily have an intellectual background, but one can confidently say they are all 
self-made women with heightened sensitivities with respect to the rights and liberties of 
women and minorities. The qualitative work on such a profile of intellectuals and 
prominent figures poses certain challenges to the researcher. 
Not all members have been equally important for this research. This is mostly 
because of the 90-9-1 rule in internet participation research.40 This rule follows that:  
 
 90% of users are lurkers (i.e., read or observe, but don't contribute).  
 9% of users contribute from time to time, but other priorities dominate their 
time.  
 1% of users participate a lot and account for most contributions: it can seem 
as if they don't have separate lives because they often post just minutes after whatever 
event they're commenting on occurs.  
 
This rule, although the percentages may vary holds true in our case as well. 
Although the membership of the alliance floated around 215-235 members, there is a 
core group of contributors who really initiate discussions, answer, give feedback, 
provoke thoughts and give life to the online community. Their number does not exceed 
25 persons which correspond roughly to 11 % of the online community membership. 
This number is more or less on a part with the total of occasional contributors and 
heavy contributors (1 % + 9 %) in the internet participation research. These are also the 
more prominent figures within the women‟s movement and intellectual life of the 
country.  
 
 
 
3.2.5.   Ethical Issues 
 
 
As in all research that relies on field work that retrieves information from private 
subjects, ethical issues arise. There are three important topics that have to be considered 
in dealing with ethical issues in studying an online community according to Pfeil and 
                                                          
40 http://www.useit.com/alertbox/participation_inequality.html  
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Zaphiris (2010, p.4-5): these are the distinction between public and private citizens, 
anonymity of the respondents and informed consent.  
The need for informed consent arises when the space that is used as the site of 
field work is considered a public space or a private space. If we consider the site to be 
public, there is no need for informed consent. The ProjectH Research Group which 
worked on ethical issues for internet research came up with the following declaration: 
 
   “We believe the issue of informed consent of authors, moderators and/or 
archiving institutions does not apply to the ProjectH quantitative content 
analysis, as we intend to analyze only publicly available text. We believe 
public posts are public and their use is governed by professional and 
academic guidelines.  
 
In the quantitative content analysis data collection process, the ProjectH 
group as a whole will observe the following policy: 
 
  Informed consent will not be sought in advance for the quantitative content 
analysis of publicly available messages. 
  
  No individual writer will be identified by name in either data collection or 
data set, unless that writer has been contacted, and her/his consent was 
obtained in writing. 
 
  Except for short excerpts of 1 or 2 sentences, no messages will be quoted, 
in any data set, paper or publication, unless the author of the message was 
contacted and her/his approval was obtained in writing. 
  
  Statements and findings about groups of contributors will avoid identifying 
individuals.  
 
We will take all measures necessary to separate names of authors and 
groups from any data collected, measured, or assessed. Individual authors 
will be identified only by a number. The association of person and 
identifying number will be kept confidential.”41 
 
This declaration also serves as a basis for my content analysis. In my analysis, the 
participants are disassociated from their postings. There is no mentioning of names. For 
each quote given, I have informed my interviewees and acquired formal approval. 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 http://www.it.murdoch.edu.au/~sudweeks/papers/techrep.html  
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3.2.6.  Methods Employed 
 
 
Conventionally when a researcher analyzes a platform or a coalition, what is 
considered as an output includes official declarations, slogans, pamphlets, leaflets 
and/or brochures produced during demonstrations and/or meetings etc… 
Whatever happened during the internal deliberations of such groups is usually 
skipped. However, since I am interested in framing conflicts and the way frames are 
negotiated, I have to consider the internal debates that lead to the creation of 
declarations or that simply break down without achieving a common narrative. I also 
consider the individual outputs of members as important since most of the discussions 
are initiated within the group thanks to the writings of individual members on various 
issues. These are mostly published in daily newspapers or magazines. The important 
caveat here is that I am more interested in the coalition rather than individuals that 
constitute it. So individuals are analyzed or interviewed to get a better picture of the 
coalition. They are not an end in themselves; however their thinking and writings 
contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of the coalition.  
I consider the joint declarations as the outputs of the coalition. Conversations 
between platform members reveal the interactions and the dynamics of deliberation. 
Interviews with platform members serve as the reflections on those conversations. This 
gives the researcher an ability to pinpoint moments of break-down, despair or solidarity 
and how they are connected to the forging of frames. The study adopts a multi-source 
perspective with each source filling a gap in the argumentation of the research. None of 
the sources are enough on their own to make certain assumptions but their collective 
use gives the researcher an ability to make claims as to what increases the likelihood of 
success in framing in a multi-issue alliance. 
The use of multiple sources necessitates using multiple methods. Using multiple 
methods is usually considered more reliable and this applies to our case as well, but 
there are also reasons that rule out the use of a single method. The research cannot rely 
on participant observation because the alliance is very much dormant at the moment 
although the members still come together for various occasions and maintain their 
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friendship. The analysis of the messages of the online platform of the alliance is the 
biggest source of evidence, however as the members are real individuals with different 
experiences within the alliance it is always better to reinforce the arguments advanced 
on the basis of archival research with an open minded discussion with members of the 
alliance. Textual analysis of declarations and newspaper articles help the researcher 
identify what kind of public face the members want to demonstrate to outside audiences 
while the internal messages within the online community demonstrate the framing 
battles going on within the movement that determine the fate of the alliance. That way 
one can also identify how well the frames adopted and publicized to other audiences 
really resonate with members of the alliance.   
 
The methods used for this thesis can be grouped into four categories: 
 
I. content analysis: analysis of messages of the online platform 
II. in-depth interviews with prominent figures of the alliance 
III. textual analysis of declarations, newspaper articles (of members) and 
press releases 
IV. participation to meetings (participant observation) 
 
 
 
3.2.7.  Content Analysis of Messages of the Online Platform 
 
 
The principal method used in this study has been content analysis. Content 
analysis is the most utilized method in online community research. This can be done in 
two ways: qualitative and quantitative. Both approaches try to reduce every identifiable 
message into distinct codes. However, how such codes are handled is different in 
quantitative and qualitative analysis.  
Quantitative content analysis involves statistical analysis of data that is reduced 
down into numbers and frequencies. Qualitative analysis involves the categorization of 
content into distinct themes and topics and the resultant relations of meaning between 
these primary categories.  
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I believe that reducing the texts of the sort I am dealing, those that are imbued 
with deep meanings and subtleties, into countable categories and frequencies means to 
miss the essence of the narratives under study. Thomsen (1998) argues that “the 
rigorous nature of quantitative content analysis does not account for meanings of the 
text that can be extracted by looking at the conversation as a whole”. The qualitative 
method is the most suitable methodology in this field work since it is the only way to 
capture the richness and complexity of social life that might not be captured with 
surveys or interviews (Tuutti, 2010, p.35; Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995). Since the 
goal here is to understand the ways in which people interpret their issue positions and 
the ways they frame them, a qualitative frame analysis is the only means to achieve this.  
Many researchers use virtual ethnography while making research on online 
communities. Hine (2000), Fernback (1999) and Ward (1999) believe in the merits of 
this method because of its superiority in acquiring a reflexive understanding of what it 
is like to be part of the virtual world. The application of traditional ethnographic 
techniques to communities in online settings, also known as “cyber-ethnography” (Fay, 
2007) is an emerging field within qualitative research used by those studying online 
social interaction. For conducting ethnography I would have had to engage in the 
community as a participant, longitudinally. Since that was not possible for this work, I 
have selected to use qualitative methods drawing influence from ethnographic studies 
(Tuutti, 2010, p.35). 
Ethnographic research involves describing the world as it is and from the 
viewpoint of the participants themselves. This requires the immersion of researcher into 
the life setting of a particular community. However, where is the community site in a 
virtual ethnography? Is it the same thing as the field work of an offline community? In 
virtual ethnography, the researcher does not share the lives of participants as it is 
possible in an offline community. Most of the immersion takes place at the desk and the 
data can be retrieved in an easy manner. In fact, the biggest advantage of conducting 
ethnographic research in an online setting is that as online communication often 
consists of written messages, the researcher has access to a verbatim transcript of each 
instance of communication among group members (Fay, 2007). In many cases, this 
record of communication is stored indefinitely on the host‟s server.  
Another added advantage of cyber-ethnography has to do with the lack of time 
limitations on the researcher. One of the biggest challenges in traditional ethnography is 
the accurate recording of field notes necessary to document the experiences, thoughts, 
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and feelings of the researcher (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995). However, the social 
setting in which these observations are made may not let the researcher devote adequate 
time to both observation and the ideas provoked by those observations. This may 
largely be due to time constraints. The durable nature of online sites lets the researcher 
record her reflections as the record of interactions is already there (Underwood, 2009). 
The researcher has all the flexibility to slow down and re-read the records according to 
her own pace.  
An added advantage of cyber-ethnography is that the researcher can easily 
eliminate the influence of her observation from the setting. Minimizing the impact of 
one‟s own presence on a research setting has long been an important goal of 
ethnographic researchers (Lofland et al, 2006). It is well established that human 
subjects may behave differently when they are aware that they are being observed. This 
effect is magnified when human subjects are aware of the true purpose of the 
observation (Lofland et al, 2006). Due to the anonymous nature of online interaction, 
impact of the presence of the researcher is eliminated. In fact, some of the answers I got 
during in-depth interviews were less reliable than what was said in the online 
community, as respondents can always try to sound nice to the interviewer which 
happened in this case as well. 
Cyber-ethnography also carries certain pitfalls. Since, identity can be easily 
masked in online communication; it is hard to discern the identities of participants. 
Underwood (2009) and Nip (2004) argue that impersonation and identity theft may 
inhibit a more fine grained analysis of the effect of identities on online activism. In the 
case of BSÇ however, this was not a real threat, as the coalition had meetings in the 
offline world from time to time and those who were most active in the platform were 
already part of various civil society networks which reveal their identity. 
Some scholars think it is not enough to be immersed with the online archives and 
one has to take part in the online activities of the members of an online community. 
However, there are others who think that immersion of the researcher into the online 
community can only take place by observing what is going on than actively taking part 
in discussions (Maloney-Krichmar and Preece, 2005) There are two important reasons 
why my ethnographic work also took this second direction. First is for reasons of 
feasibility, meaning the community is dormant and there is no way to animate 
discussions. Secondly, I want to analyze the interactions unhampered by the 
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manipulations of the researcher, in its natural course which I consider to be a more 
objective research style than intervening in those discussions.  
 
 
 
3.2.8.  Basic Statistics About Online Activism 
 
 
The online community is more or less dormant, receiving occasional messages 
and exchange of opinions, but the most heated discussions took place between May 
2008 and May 2010. May 2010 is the time when I started collecting the online material. 
The following charts represent the longevity and diversity of discussions. In the first 
chart, you can see the total number of posts by each individual member (irrespective of 
the topic) for each month since the alliance was formed in April 2008 to present. As can 
be seen from the numbers, there is a significant decrease in postings after June 2010.  
 
Table 3: Frequency of messages in the online blog (January 2008-January 2011) 
 
However, I did a more fine grained classification since not all of the postings were 
related to discussions or had the purpose of discussing. Some were announcements, 
sharing of interesting news etc.. In the following charts, those postings that led to 
meaningful discussions were classified monthly. For this, any topic that provoked a 
discussion of at least four members were considered a meaningful topic and was 
recorded.  For each month, one can observe the average number of posts, number of 
total posts and the number of topics. By dividing the number of topics to the number of 
days in a month, one can see the frequency of new discussions in the online community. 
For instance in the month of May 2009, there was a new topic discussed every 2,73 
days, while during the month of October 2008, there was a new discussion every 0,88 
days, meaning every day there was more than one topic initiated for discussion.  
 
Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dev
2011 47
2010 94 266 401 141 172 171 75 53 44 151 133 78
2009 1183 486 540 371 298 369 199 148 127 185 230 158
2008 82 254 479 290 272 855 1595 1452 797
110 
 
Below, you can also see the frequency of the topics for each month between May 
2008 and December 2010, the time when my analysis ended. You can also observe that 
after May 2010, the online community became very much a dormant entity. 
 
Table 4: Frequency of topic initiation in the online blog for 2008 
 
From these tables, one can get a more accurate picture about the longevity of the 
discussions in the online community.  
 
Table 5: Frequency of topic initiation in the online blog for 2009 
2008 Average Every X days
May 4,81 53 11 2,73
June 9,94 169 17 1,76
July 11,63 128 11 2,73
August 7,23 94 13 2,31
September 21,84 415 21 1,43
October 14,94 508 34 0,88
November 11,51 426 37 0,81
December 12,38 260 21 1,43
TOTAL 2053 165
Number of 
posts
Number of
topics
2009 Average Total talks Every X days
January 10,97 417 38 0,79
February 9,86 148 15 2,00
March 10,85 228 21 1,43
April 9,42 132 14 2,14
May 9,45 104 11 2,73
June 11,64 198 17 1,76
July 7,66 46 6 5,00
August 20,8 104 5 6,00
September 16,28 114 7 4,29
October 21,28 149 7 4,29
November 17,66 106 6 5,00
December 13 52 4 7,50
TOTAL 1798 151
Number of
topics
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Table 6: Frequency of topic initiation in the online blog for 2010 
 
The difficulty with the frame analysis in this online community has been the 
diversity of topics discussed which leaves the researcher with a huge volume of 
unrelated comments and activities. For example the following classification of topics of 
2008 reveals what is being discussed is not always about women‟s issues. The majority 
of online communities in the literature of virtual ethnography deal with single issue 
communities, such as post-partum stress, drug addiction etc. When the community 
under study engages in discussions that are so diverse in scope, the researcher 
inevitably has to go beyond the issue content or issue positions to find patterns that will 
apply to the majority of topics under analysis. For this reason, the examples I give 
throughout the Findings section are about very diverse topics, which may cause 
problems of traceability for the reader. To prevent this, at I have provided the readers 
with background information as to the biggest controversies in the “Group History” 
chapter. 
In this study, I relied extensively on online textual material which provides the 
gist of my findings. I do not consider this as limited documentary evidence. This 
material is rich in content. However, to be able to substantiate my arguments in a more 
convincing fashion and to be able to clarify some of the points raised in online 
discussion, I opted for a multi-source, multi-method triangulation. This involves 
conducting interviews with prominent figures in the online community as well as 
supporting the claims raised in the thesis with documentary evidence from the 
declarations of the alliance and newspaper columns of some of the members, as well as 
2010 Average Total talks Every X days
January 0 0 0 0,00
February 10 90 9 3,33
March 16,4 164 10 3,00
April 9,5 19 2 15,00
May 0 0 0 0,00
June 9 36 4 7,50
July 9 1 1 30,00
August 0 0 0 0,00
September 0 0 0 0,00
October 15,33 46 3 10,00
November 7,33 22 3 10,00
December 0,00
TOTAL 378 32
Number of
topics
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join as participant observation to meetings where most prominent members of BSÇ 
were present. 
 
Figure 3: Number of discussions initiated in the online blog (2008-2010)
ns  
 
 
 
 
3.2.9. In-depth Interviews with Group Members 
 
 
There are two different sources for analyzing the outputs of group members. One 
is the in-depth interviews with the members; the other is the internal conversations with 
other group members. These two sources have very different dynamics and rationale. 
The internal deliberations of group members take place in the online community and 
they are mostly conversations on how to approach the issues of common concern, 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Number of discussions  
2008-2010 
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whether to make a campaign or not and how to craft a common narrative be it in the 
form of a public declaration or a demonstration slogan. The analyses of these 
conversations reveal the internal dynamics of frame articulation processes. They reveal 
who makes what kind of compromises for the alliance. They reveal which 
constituencies are catered by such frames.  
In-depth interviews on the other hand, reveal the reflections on the whole 
experience by the members themselves. They involve a very personal account as it 
conveys how the whole effort was perceived by members themselves. For this reason, it 
is an individual level of analysis. The study is on coalition building whereas one of the 
sources this research relies on is the individual level. For this reason, I consider in-
depth interviews as complementary tools for assessing how the dynamics of the 
coalition were perceived by its participants. The in-depth interviews help the researcher 
understand the dynamics of deliberation. Although I gave an account of some of the 
individual attributes of platform members in the Group History Chapter, this was be 
done for understanding what kind of civic backgrounds and networks are conducive to 
the formation of multi-issue coalitions. 
I used a semi-structured interview questionnaire that provided general guidance 
during the interviews, but I always kept a high degree of flexibility in posing my 
questions because the respondents were either remembering certain issues while 
forgetting others or they were fond of talking about some issues rather than others.  
 
 
 
3.2.10.  Textual Analysis of Declarations and Newspaper Articles  
 
 
Most of the members of this alliance have public visibility. They are leading 
female intellectuals, columnists, scholars and activists in Turkey. Almost all of them 
have used media outlets to express their view about politics and society. Some of the 
most heated discussions within the alliance were also triggered by newspaper articles 
written by members. For this reason, I will be quoting these articles whenever they are 
pertinent to my analysis. Analysis of such posts should be considered as an attempt to 
understand issues of common concern, rather than an analysis of particular members 
and their take on certain issues. 
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Secondly, I quoted the press releases and the declarations to give a sense of the 
public image of the alliance. The downside of using such declarations however is, it 
gives the impression that all of the members of the alliance are in total agreement with 
whatever is being published. As the conversations in the online community reveal, 
although effort is being made in the alliance to achieve the highest degree of consensus, 
there are always fractures and disagreements on the basis of differences in ideological 
positions or belief systems. This means there is a duality between the public face and 
the internal dynamics of the alliance. Declarations could and did come out without 
complete consensus and the analysis of internal dynamics revealed a more nuanced 
picture about the true nature of relations within the alliance. This duality proves the 
necessity of employing a multi-source, multi-method triangulation. Only in this way 
can one eliminate inconsistencies in findings of one source through double checking 
through other sources.  
 
 
 
3.2.11.  Participation to Meetings 
 
 
As I explained before, the meetings of the platform took place when the online 
discussions became deadlocked. There were calls made to have routine meetings, but 
this never truly materialized. Since those meetings took place before I started analyzing 
the alliance, I did not have the opportunity to participate to those heated discussions, 
although discussion notes were shared in the online community in a detailed fashion. I 
had the opportunity to participate to a few meetings after May 2010, but these were 
mostly on elaborating on what went wrong with the platform. The meetings after May 
2010 never had the same purposeful quality the meetings before that date had.  
However, I have participated to a discussion organized by Amargi on 7 April 2012 
where some of the most prominent members discussed what went wrong in the 
coalition and the underlying reasons for the fractures in the coalition.42 I also had the 
                                                          
 
42 http://www.amargi.org.tr/files/3.hafta_.jpg  
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chance to ask questions and clarifications to the platform members which I have made 
use of in the analysis section. 
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Chapter 4.   Framing Gender Relations: 
Building Consensus on the Basis of Questioning Male Privileges 
 
 
 
 
How do coalitions set their targets in the absence of a common, unifying identity? 
Is diversity necessarily an impediment in front of advancing common goals? These 
questions become important if we are to make sense of how this coalition furthers 
women‟s cause in Turkey despite the fact that it is made up of women with very diverse 
backgrounds.  
This chapter is dedicated to explaining the ways in which this coalition defines 
and formulates its gender related frames without necessarily asking for every member 
to show their allegiance to feminist principles. In other words this chapter will explain 
how members can construct a common reference point without holding identical 
viewpoints on gender. I consider this effort important due to the deep seated conviction 
among feminists that women‟s empowerment can only go through showing allegiance 
to feminism. This thesis argues this is not necessarily the case. In fact, we need more 
studies and analysis that shows women‟s movement can accommodate more diversity 
than it has been claimed by feminists.    
This coalition also provides us with an interesting test case to see whether it is 
possible for large collaborations to endure the splintering effects of identity politics and 
whether they have the necessary theoretical and practical richness to come up with a 
new synthesis across social movements. Both radical democracy and multicultural 
democracy theorists make a huge emphasis on promoting multicultural public forms but 
it remains yet to be seen whether and how such public spheres do actually function. 
When we apply this logic to our platform we see that this coalition exhibited immense 
diversity in opinions with respect to gender issues. However, it was still able to bring 
117 
 
members around common issues, common targets and was able to craft frames that 
served women‟s interests at the macro level. This observation is important as many 
critics think what divides women‟s movement in Turkey are precisely these diverging 
view points on gender relations (Ramazanoğlu, 2002; Aldıkaçtı Marshall, 2005, Aslan 
Akman, 2008).  
As can be recalled from the kick-off declaration explained in “Group History”, the 
coalition determined its targets in a diverse fashion. Starting with the prohibitions and 
oppressions of the state “as a field of contest for brave men”, the declaration also 
rejected the control of female bodies in the name of various ideologies and societal 
norms.43 This chapter will show how setting the strategic targets appropriately facilitate 
cooperation between members of the coalition who in reality have diverging viewpoints 
on gender relations. 
The important thing here is that members do not necessarily define themselves as 
feminists, in that sense there is no identity alignment. However, participants can still 
align their frames for the purpose of fighting various strategic adversaries. This will 
show coalitions can still accommodate diversity through framing if they can set their 
targets in a way that embraces the sensitivities of all the constituent members in the 
coalition. This also shows that there can be solidarity within the wider women‟s 
movement in Turkey despite deep ideological (left-right) and life-style (religious-
secular) differences. This runs contrary to previous observations which depict a more 
bleak picture about the solidarity of women who feel allegiance to different –isms in 
Turkey. 
Drawing bleak pictures on the incompatibility of certain values with women‟s 
empowerment has been a dominant theme in much feminist theorizing. This becomes 
more acute in the observations made by feminists about Muslim women‟s movement. 
This fact has been put forward by Kandiyoti (1987, p.324) in her previous studies 
where she protests the way Western observers oversimplify when they conclude that an 
                                                          
43 We, the women who are against all kinds of discrimination and injustice, reject 
all types of prohibitions and oppressions of the state as “a field of contest for brave 
men” which ignores our existence by relying on the understanding that the place of 
woman is by her husband's foot, which makes discrimination by the regulations of 
public morality, which aims at delimiting women's liberties. We, the women reject the 
control over our bodies in the name of secularism, republic, religion, tradition, custom, 
morality, honor or freedom.” We, the women are not suspicious of each other, we bet 
for one another!  
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autonomous women's movement and feminist consciousness in the Western sense is 
prohibited by an "Islamically" mystified consciousness or reluctance to identify with 
"foreign" values.  
As Kandiyoti (1987, p.317) says, "Concepts generated by Western feminists have 
rarely been applied to informed analyses of women in Islamic societies; conversely, the 
experiences of women under Islam have not been systematically used to critically 
evaluate feminist concepts." Kandiyoti (1987) further states that "there is a great deal of 
diversity and specificity in women's experiences in Islamic societies which vary with 
the nationalist histories and social policies of the countries in which women are 
located" (p. 320). 
The consequence of this mutual prejudice is that even those women who associate 
themselves with activism related to empowering women gain a critical distance to 
feminist concepts. Kandiyoti (1987) proposes that this problem would be especially 
more acute in former western colonies where feminism is associated with “white 
women‟s burden”.  
Although Turkey may be freed from such fears as it does not have a colonization 
history, it still suffers from similar pressures as the Kemalist project has attributes 
reminiscent of a white (wo)men‟s burden.  For this reason, for a long while when the 
issue was women‟s movement, it referred to the secular-Kemalist feminist movement in 
Turkey. This also has to do with the fact that scholars studying women‟s movement 
mostly came from a more secular background and believed in the merits of a more 
secular orientation towards women‟s issues. The divide between religious and secular 
world views and what it brings to the discussion on women‟s empowerment has only 
very recently started gaining importance (Göle, 2000; Aslan Akman, 2008; Çayır, 
2000). However, previous gender research in Turkey has either exclusively focused on 
just one group within the larger women‟s movement and treated the issue of 
emancipation of women from that group‟s perspective or tried to show the unbridgeable 
divides between secular feminist movement and religious women (Ramazanoğlu, 2002; 
Aldıkaçtı Marshall, 2005). Such studies although giving a very accurate depiction of the 
attitudes of different groups of women within the women‟s movement are unable to 
account for collaborations between them or the iterative process through which their 
interaction can feed and advance or modify the general assumptions of feminism. 
One difficulty stems from the fact that such encounters and deliberations are rare. 
For a long time, collaborations between different factions within the women‟s 
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movement have taken place for other campaigns that are not necessarily gender-related. 
For example, anti-military campaigns were fertile ground on which different women 
could cooperate. Such campaigns helped women draw similarities between the fates of 
women who are affected by war and violence. Peace coalitions became effective 
platforms where women activists with different political backgrounds started working 
together to oppose various military operations such as the war in Iraq, the war in South 
East of Turkey and the war in Gaza. To illustrate the significance of this experience, 
almost all of the women in the platform I am analyzing refer to BarıĢ Ġçin Kadın 
Platformu as the place where they had their first encounters with other groups of 
women. Such fora help women activists realize how war, violence and rising 
nationalism affect women in very different ways than men and how it limits their 
freedoms and defines their responsibilities as a citizen in a gendered fashion.  
Coming to this conclusion has not been very straightforward neither for feminist 
movement nor for veiled women. Many of the feminists admitted having a leftist 
Kemalist streak in their background for many years which relied on not questioning the 
encroachment of the state into people‟s liberties. This questioning has been a relatively 
recent phenomenon whose origins can be traced back to 1980s coup. Alliances with 
conscientious objectionists as well as veiled women are a result of this internal 
questioning. This transition is important in order to understand how feminist movement 
had a rapprochement with other movements. 
Veiled women on the other hand admitted during interviews they would not have 
had major problems with militarism if it was not for 28
th
 of February and its selective 
punishment of veiled women. They drew attention to the fact that there is not a healthy 
and objective criticism of state power among religious intellectuals. While many 
religious individuals still believe army is the “Peygamber ocağı”, even those who are 
critical of the army would not engage in the same level of criticism when it comes to 
police forces. By engaging in a more critical discussion with activists in peace 
coalitions and by drawing from their personal experiences, these women also arrived at 
similar conclusions with respect to the linkages between militarism-nationalism and 
patriarchy. 
Creating these inter-linkages is important not just for this particular coalition but 
for women‟s movement in general. As I have argued in the literature review section, one 
of the most important reasons why Turkey did not have an autonomous women‟s 
movement until 1980s has to do with the fact that most feminists and other women‟s 
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activists have not put a certain distance between the official state ideology and policy 
towards women and the aspirations of women‟s movement. In fact for a long time the 
two were deliberately fused in an attempt to prove whatever women need in Turkey has 
been given to them by the state on a silver tray. This subservience to national interests 
was the main reason why women‟s movement was weak and elitist. While feminists 
have started seeing the incompatibility of a statist agenda that successfully utilized 
militarism and nationalism, with their own liberation agenda thanks to the 1980 coup, 
veiled women observed how different women suffer asymmetrically from a militarist 
agenda with 28
th
 of February.    
Peace coalitions and similar experiences with the state (i.e. 1980 coup and 28
th
 of 
February) provided a rapprochement between different factions within the women‟s 
movement. They provided opportunities to reflect on similar experiences of different 
women. However, this rapprochement has not turned into concrete collaborations on 
gender issues. Other than the coalition I am analyzing, there have not been explicit 
attempts to align the gender perspectives of different groups of women activists. There 
have not been studies which question the possibility of such collaborations either. 
An exception is the study by Aldıkaçtı (2005) which compares the views of 
feminists with what she calls orthodox Islamists and reformist Islamists. The study 
stems from the need to account for the circumstances and contexts that encourage or 
prevent the coalition of women‟s groups. This need becomes especially significant 
when researching why feminist and some right wing/religious groups, who generate 
similar views on women's issues, have little or no alliance with each other. Aldıkaçtı 
(2005) argues that “overlooking the question of why there is little or no dialogue 
perpetuates the polarized views on women's issues rather than producing commonly 
accepted policies that can address women's issues effectively” (p. 105). 
In an attempt to delineate the standing of reformist Islamist women from that of 
orthodox Islamist women, she shows how veiling is used in an instrumental sense, as a 
facilitator of integration of Muslim women into public life by reformist Islamists. She 
also shows how reformist Islamists are in favor of paid work which she sees partly an 
attempt to adapt to the modernization process and a reaction to feminism. She thinks of 
such rationalizations as a selective receptiveness towards feminist views (Aldıkaçtı, 
2005, p.113). 
The novelty of reformist Islamists stems from the fact that they openly criticize 
the male dominated version of Koran and the distorted and unjust implications of this 
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version for women. Reformist women argue that because of this distortion, people 
misunderstood Islam as a backward religion that imprisons women in the home. 
Reformists emphasize that many traditional Muslim people believe that Islam 
commands women to stay at home, but, in reality, Islam does not restrict women to the 
home (Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p.115; AktaĢ, 1996). Their ideal version of Islam does not 
restrict them to a secondary role and there is no contradiction in being religious and 
standing up for their rights as women.  
As a group of women trying to find solutions to women‟s problems, reformist 
Islamists are quick to agree that women are indeed oppressed by men and feminist 
knowledge should be made use of in their quest for empowerment of women  
(Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p,116). However, their solutions should always be constructed within 
Islam. Only Islam can provide better lives for women (AktaĢ, 1991).  
For Aldıkaçtı the basic difference between reformist Islamists and feminists is that 
while the former prioritizes collective harmony, the latter values and highlights 
individual autonomy (Bulbeck, 1998, p.74). She gives the example of paid work where 
reformist women celebrate women‟s role in labor market but also define the limits of 
paid work within Islam which prioritizes benefiting one‟s community and family in 
making a decision to work outside the home. By doing this, Aldıkaçtı argues that 
reformists are selectively appropriating feminist ideas in a communal Islamic way of 
life. Serving society makes the individual decision to work community oriented. She 
believes reformists have a chance of changing attitudes in Islamic circles by modifying 
such feminist views to fit their agenda (Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p.116). 
However, she still thinks approaching issues within the frameworks of individual 
choice or communal harmony appears to push feminist and Islamist women to separate 
ends in Turkey. However, since reformist Islamist women have found a way to bridge 
individualism and community orientation by selectively appropriating feminist views, 
this factor alone is not enough to explain why meaningful dialogue between the two 
groups has not developed (Aldıkaçtı, 2005, p.117). 
Studies such as that of Aldıkaçtı have one particular downside. They do not adopt 
an iterative framework. They cannot show what happens if groups of women with 
different convictions actually come together and discuss concepts and matters important 
for women‟s movement in general. What kind of extensions and transformations such 
an open ended deliberation would bring is absent from such analysis. One difficulty 
stems from the fact that such encounters and deliberations are rare. Another difficulty is 
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that scholars are eager to scrutinize and criticize non-feminist explanations to gender 
issues with a secular-feminist bias. So even when there is a critical give and take 
between different groups of women, the effort is not to unearth the potentials and 
implications of this interaction but to assess how close they can perform to being a 
feminist coalition.  
The interesting observation related to gender work of this coalition is that, despite 
the fact that there is no consensus on taking “private as political” or on gender equality, 
women of different convictions are able to formulate frames that serve women‟s 
interests at the macro level. One such frame is on regulation of female bodies. By way 
of differentiating self-regulation (i.e. veiling) from male regulation of female bodies 
(i.e. harassment), the coalition is able to align the discourse of women who exert 
different levels and types of regulation on their bodies. While veiled women can be said 
to exert a more strict regulation on their bodies, non-veiled women can still align their 
discourse with them by way of differentiating self-regulation from male regulation. 
Another consensus emerges with respect to how male dominance operates through 
various ideologies to regulate not only the bodies but also the life choices of women. 
By showing how political ideologies are in reality male ideologies that work to the 
disadvantage of women, the coalition achieves a more critical re-reading of political 
tools of propaganda. Good examples are conservatism‟s upholding of female chastity as 
the foundation of family, or militarism‟s stress on women as the bearers of sons for the 
army etc.. These examples show that consensus does emerge from this coalition despite 
the fact that members are far from holding similar views on gender relations.  
How this maturity and transformation in the women‟s movement came about in 
Turkey deserves deeper reflection. In the literature review chapter, I have noted that 
feminism went through three distinct phases that helped it achieve a certain degree of 
reflexivity vis-à-vis other movements. While the first phase included a rigorous 
discussion of gender difference (and whether gender equity in the strictest sense is 
desirable), the second phase was focused on differences among women whereas in the 
last (current) phase, attention shifted towards “multiple intersecting identities” (Fraser, 
1997, p.175).  
Realization of both “differences among women” and “multiple intersecting 
identities” thought two important lessons for the movement: “there is no single 
women‟s condition” and “isolationism does not pay off”.  The first lesson came about 
as the marginals of the women‟s movement entered the scene of civil society. Fraser 
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largely attributes this to the work of lesbians and women of color (Fraser, 1997, p.178). 
Of course her depiction tells more about the American case. However, there are 
corollaries of such exclusions in other parts of the world as well. In the case of Turkey, 
this played out mostly in the form of exclusion of veiled women from women‟s 
movement for various reasons. One is the fact that veiled women during 1990s operated 
as party supporters rather than women‟s activists as depicted by YeĢim Arat for Welfare 
Party and later AKP. Religious women‟s most important disappointment with men and 
their increased commitment to women‟s cause came about after 28th of February where 
they were punished for their veil while religious men could still continue their public 
life. This is the time when gender inequality became a more poignant issue for veiled 
women. This theme came up in my interviews as well. Many of the veiled women I 
interviewed expressed their disappointment with their male counterparts in neglecting 
the asymmetrical prosecution of women from education and labor markets during that 
period.  
After this period, we have seen an increase in their public visibility and activism 
as exemplified in “CEDAW Shadow Report on Veil Ban as a Discrimination against 
Women”, “BaĢörtülü Aday Yoksa Oy da Yok” campaign or their joint activism with 
other women‟s NGOs for changes in Civil Code.  
Another reason why veiled women were priorly excluded from women‟s 
movement was the antagonism of state sponsored feminism towards religious 
ideologies. Kemalist feminism as well as many versions of materialist/socialist 
feminism thinks of religion as a form of male control on female bodies and a limitation 
on their public visibility. For this reason, for a long time there was great skepticism on 
the part of various wings of feminist movement towards religious women. Being 
religious made a person de facto an outcast in the women‟s movement. Liberal 
feminists were the only wing to embrace such women. By repressing differences among 
women, the movement also suppressed an account of different ways in which 
marginalization plays out for women of different ideological leanings, of different 
sexual orientations and ethnicities etc… 
What is more, women with intersecting identities had multiple allegiances to other 
movements and this also complicated the picture of women‟s struggle. Just in other 
parts of the world and in other social movements, feminism found cross-cutting 
commitments and shared problem areas with other movements. The reason for 
embracing diversity can also be attributed to political opportunity structures. Before the 
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coup of 1980, leftist women were not able to frame their struggle in a way that 
transcends their leftist activism. Operating in male circles exerted a degree of pressure 
on their thinking and claims. Following the coup, the women's movement which was a 
spin-off from leftist movements of the 1970s established its autonomy and acted as an 
initiator of more inclusive rights struggles due to changes in political opportunity 
structures.   The women of the post 1980s era were more capable of linking their 
marginality within the larger leftist or pro-liberties movements of the prior era with the 
current marginality of other segments of society such as the veiled women. Although 
we cannot say that the Kemalist or socialist wings of the feminist movement was as 
outspoken about this problem as some of the more radical wings of the women's 
movement, it is safe to say that a wing of women's movement was able to engage in 
issue linkage to an extent which other movements refrained from doing.  
This coalition exhibits the most advanced attempt at establishing cross-cutting 
commitments within the larger women‟s movement. The coalition attempted at crafting 
a united front for advancing women‟s cause all the while operating through a diverse 
and heterogeneous public. The major difficulty stemmed from adopting a rhetoric that 
was not necessarily feminist but that was still serving women‟s interests at the macro 
level.  
This debate is important because there are many feminists who claim women‟s 
cause can only be furthered if there is strict adherence to gender norms set by feminism. 
It is true that feminist movement had brought significant benefits to home crowds 
where it has been effective. However, in places where feminism had to collide with 
other parallel rights struggles or struggles that only marginally touch upon the gender 
cause, it can still reap significant benefits if it agrees to align its frames with those other 
movements. For example, for a long time the veil issue was the problem of veiled 
women who did not receive any support from feminist movement. Many feminists, who 
are mainly coming from very secular backgrounds, often thought of the veil as a 
restriction on female bodies and as a sign of backwardness. Hence, instead of being 
seen as a gender cause, for many it symbolized the subjugation of women. Only when 
women‟s movement starts seeing the veil ban as a restriction on women‟s education and 
employment, can we talk about a re-alignment of priorities of these two separate 
struggles. This coalition is a first attempt in that direction. Despite the fact that there are 
clear disagreements with respect to how gender relations are conceptualized, there are 
clear points of consensus which make joint action possible.     
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The remaining sections of this chapter have a dual purpose. While pointing out to 
the most important disagreements within the coalition with respect to gender equality, I 
will also try to illustrate which frame alignments give us reasons to argue that this 
coalition is a joining of separate women‟s struggles for the first time in Turkey. When I 
say that this coalition does not have a consensus on gender equality in the feminist 
sense what I mean is not all members of the platform are basically after the equality of 
men and women in every sphere of life or of the opinion that private matters which 
subjugate women in the domestic sphere should be dealt with the same vigor with 
public matters that concern women, such as right to education or work. These 
differences in opinion, although creating significant divisions within the group can still 
be reconciled by building consensus in other issue domains that I will try to illustrate in 
this chapter.  
Before getting into the specifics of frame alignments within the coalition 
pertaining to gender issues, I would like to point out to the different ways in which 
members express their personal awakening to women‟s cause or the processes through 
which they discovered women‟s alienation from male dominated public sphere. This 
awakening has usually been depicted by my interviewees as a coming to terms with 
how women are downplayed, exploited, talked about but never given proper worth or 
due consideration in heterogeneous civic and professional environments.  
Here is a quote by L.M who was previously a veiled woman and who had to 
remove her veil in order to continue working:  
 
   I was bitterly disappointed by these attitudes during the 28th of February. 
The fact that the whole burden was put only on the shoulders of Muslim 
women, it being a republican coup, seeing that it posed no danger to men, 
seeing them even increase their wealth….There was a dersane that I used to 
work for. I was doing an internship; I was not getting any money. I thought 
I would have a job ready for myself when I finished my internship. I 
thought I could work with my veil. They offered me such a small amount of 
money. Exploitation is involved here. The double standards such as “we 
would let you work with the veil but you should remove it while entering 
and cover up when you are leaving the office” were because they were 
scared. I was so depressed for two years over this. I was never considering 
unveiling. They put me under such pressure. They did not give me my 
money. That was the time when I saw the differences between men‟s world 
and women‟s world but I was not part of any initiative yet. When did this 
happen? Until the year 2006, I still had a bad image of feminists in my 
mind. My friends told me: “Girl, your only concern since high school has 
been women‟s issues but you still have not got involved in anything yet.” It 
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only occurred to me after these comments. I started reading feminist theory 
and became part of BSÇ (interview, 16.03.2011).44 
 
Another religious woman, D.E, who refuses to be identified with feminism, 
argues against the political system that objectifies veiled women and reduces them to a 
silent mass that the political authority can exploit whenever and however it wishes:  
 
   The declaration of BSÇ emerged like this: It was seen as a general need 
by women. People were talking about veiled women but they were talking 
about them as objects. The objectification really created a considerable 
pressure on us. From one side, people considered us to be the appendages of 
AKP, as did the party itself. These people come out and say things I would 
never consider saying. There is another type of pressure from the other side. 
Those people totally objectify you and regard you with deep prejudice. But 
we are not there to speak. We are being talked about but we are not part of 
the discussion. This declaration emerged out of those feelings of frustration. 
This is like a caricature, a person feels inevitably like the following: Who 
are you to tell me to say I can or cannot enter a university. Even people who 
support our cause have such a patronizing attitude. You should not consider 
yourself to be authorized to say such things. That‟s why I find this 
declaration very important (interview, 23.03.2011).45 
                                                          
44 28 ġubat sürecinde bu tutumlardan dolayı çok duvara tosladım. Bunun sadece 
Müslüman kadınların üzerine yıkılması, Cumhuriyetçi bir darbe olması ve erkeklerin 
çok rahat olması, hatta gelirini arttırması… Benim çalıĢtığım bir dershane vardı mesela, 
stajyerlik yapıyordum para almadan çalıĢıyordum. Çıkınca da iĢim hazır olur 
sanıyordum, baĢörtüsü ile çalıĢabileceğimi sanıyordum orada…Bana çok cüzi bir para 
teklif ettiler, burada sömürü giriyor iĢin içine ve baĢı kapalı çalıĢtırırız ama, okulda 
açık, dıĢarı çıkarınca kapalı olur Ģeklinde riyakarlıklara yatmaları aslında korktukları 
için…Ben o dönemde ciddi ciddi çok depresif iki yıl geçirdiğimi bilirim…Hiç de 
baĢımı açmayı düĢünmüyordum. Ama beni öyle bir baskının içine soktular benim 
alacaklarımı vermediler, o zamanda erkeklerin dünyası ve kadınların dünyası 
arasındaki farkı çok net gördüm ama yine de kurumsal bir yapının içinde bulunmadım. 
Ta ki ne zaman oldu, iĢte 2006 yılında, o zamanlar hala feministlerin benim gözümde 
kötü bir imajı var. ArkadaĢım bana dedi ki, “kızım senin liseden beri tek meselen kadın 
meselesi ve hala feministlere bulaĢmadın”. O zaman kafama dank etti, feminist kuramı 
falan da okumaya baĢladım, o zaman. O zaman BSÇ‟ye de dahil oldum. 
 
45 O da (BSÇ bildirisi) Ģöyle çıktı. Genel bir ihtiyaç olarak görülmüĢtü, hep 
baĢörtülüler konuĢuluyor ama hep nesneleĢtirilerek konuĢuluyordu. Oradaki 
nesneleĢtirme bizim üzerimizde çok ağır bir baskı hissettirdi ve bu her türlü, orada da 
aynı tür gerilimler var. Bir taraftan biz Ak Parti‟nin doğrudan uzantısı gibi görülüyoruz 
mesela, dolayısıyla Ak Parti de böyle görüyor zaten, bu insanlar çıkıp bizim adımıza 
konuĢuyor mesela. Benim aslında hiç söylemeyeceğim Ģeyleri söylüyorlar. Diğer 
tarafta bu sefer farklı bir baskı sistemi var, onlar tamamen seni nesneleĢtiriyor ve çok 
önyargılı bir Ģekilde yaklaĢıyorlar sana. Ama biz ortada yokuz, konuĢulan biziz ama biz 
ortada yokuz. Daha çok o hissiyattan ortaya çıktı. Zaten bildiriler Ģeysi oldu ya o 
dönemde, önce kronolojik sırasını hatırlamıyorum ama üniversiteye giremezler, sonra 
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C.E, expresses her disillusionment with the socialists‟ dismissal of gender equality 
as “women‟s problem” and only problematizing the exploitation of female labor in the 
formal labor market which is the tip of the iceberg for her:  
 
   There was no consideration for women‟s emancipation in socialist circles. 
They were calling it women‟s problem. As I said, I am a materialist feminist 
so I discovered two fundamental issues between men and women. One is 
the domestic exploitation of women‟s labor. Women are being exploited for 
their domestic work by their domestic male relatives. One is the boss, the 
other is a laborer. There is also sexual exploitation. If you call labor 
exploitation and sexual exploitation women‟s problem I would think you are 
retarded. I started as a socialist. Then I saw that socialists started with the 
maxim “women‟s problems”, and they refer only to the issues of women 
which occur in the public sphere, such as in a formal employment setting. 
However, only a small fragment of women are in the formal sector and 
receiving a formal wage for it. They work through the gears of capitalism 
and they are lucky women (interview, 05.08.2011).46 
 
These quotes attest to the fact that each member‟s disillusionment forced her to 
seek solidarity with other women who had discouraging experiences in male dominated 
circles. This does not mean that each member felt marginalized or disillusioned for 
exactly the same reason. Some of the women felt marginalized from an economic 
standpoint. The economic exploitation of well-educated veiled women by Islamic firms 
is a case in point. Others felt more marginalized from a political perspective. Some of 
the veiled women explain how they were excluded from political representation while 
                                                                                                                                                                          
girebilirler dendi ama bunu söyleyenler baĢkaları. Bir tarafta girebilir diyenler, bir 
tarafta giremez diyenler, bir tarafta Ģuraya kadar girebilir, Ģuraya kadar giremezler 
diyenler. Bu o kadar karikatürlük bir durum ki, insan ister istemez Ģunu hissediyor, “Ya 
siz kim oluyorsunuz, ne demek girebilirler ya da giremezler?”. Destekleyen insanların 
da böyle bir tutumu var, en baĢta bunu söyleme yetkisini kendinizde görmemelisiniz. 
En çok da bu noktada bildiriyi önemsiyorum. 
 
46 Sosyalist çevrelerde kadın kurtuluĢu gibi dertleri yoktu. Onlar kadın sorunu 
diyordu. Maddeci feministim dedim ya, ben kadınlarla erkekler arasında iki temel 
mesele olduğunu farkettim: Birincisi kadınların ev içi sömürüsü ve evin içinde akraba 
olan erkeklerle bir emek sömürüsü. Biri patron, biri iĢçi..biri iĢveren, diğeri sömürülen. 
Ġkinci Ģey, bir cinsel sömürü var. Yani emek sömürüsü ve cinsel sömürü olan yere 
kadın sorunu diyorsan orada aklından Ģüphe duyarım ben senin.  Ben sosyalist olarak 
iĢe baĢladım. Sonra baktım sosyalistler kadın sorunu diye iĢe baĢlıyor ve kadın sorunu 
derken de kadının kamusal alanda yani bir patronun iĢverenin iĢinde çalıĢan kadınların 
sorunlarından bahsediyorlar. Oysa, onun dıĢında, yani kadınların çok küçük bir bölümü 
dıĢarıda çalıĢıyor. Ve bir ücret karĢılığında çalıĢıyor. Ve kapitalist sistemin çarkları 
arasında çalıĢıyor. Ve bunlar Ģanslı kadınlar sahiden. 
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men who share similar views with them could easily become MPs. Leftist or socialist 
women were particularly sensitive to the lack of attention of their male comrades to 
women‟s exclusion from leadership positions in leftist civic organizations.  
This shows, while marginalizations are not necessarily of the same nature or of 
the same gravity, the mechanisms of exclusion function as an effective means to create 
an image of “unison of fate”. Here is what Z.A noted on this point:  
 
   All these women are marginalized in their own circles. They are at the 
outskirts of every group. As the outskirts converge toward each other, they 
understand each other. They were all psychologically beaten up in their own 
community. To claim your own womanhood in this country is to seek 
trouble (interview, 22.09.2010).47 
 
If marginalizations, no matter how different origins and natures they have, can 
still work as powerful tools of frame alignment in this coalition, they need more 
attention. This actually confirms the observations of Iris Young who believes that 
drawing on different types of marginalizations can add to the strength of a multicultural 
coalition.  
So our next question becomes: How do members of the platform draw on 
different experiences of marginalization to make their case about how different women 
suffer in very similar ways? For answering this question, we have to take a look at the 
original framing strategy in the platform. 
 
 
 
4.1.  Original Framing Strategy: Emphasis on Differences in Life-Style 
 
 
 
Platform‟s initial framing strategy was to show that women of different 
backgrounds can actively collaborate despite leading different life styles. While doing 
that, the intersecting identities with womanhood such as being veiled or not veiled, 
                                                          
47 Bu kadınların hepsi heryerin marjinalinde kalıyordu. Her grubun 
kıyısındaydılar. Kıyıdan kıyıya geldikleri için de birbirlerini anlıyorlardı.  Hepsi kendi 
camialarında dayak yemiĢ insanlardı. Bu ülkede kadınlık claim etmek baĢınıza beladır. 
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were not thought as impediments. On the contrary, the contrasts served as powerful 
tools to convey the message that despite discernable differences women of different 
backgrounds are able to fight together. The message conveyed was: Women need 
recognition and rights and our other differences and sub-identities are a testament to the 
fact that we all suffer in different ways for the same reason: being woman. The kick-off 
declaration specifically attacks the different ways in which veiled and non-veiled 
women were discriminated: 
 
   “We oppose the racist subjection of veiled women as Islamist robots by 
such adjectives as ignorant, bigoted, mischievous, and disingenuous, 
opportunist, and fuddy-duddy. We oppose the sexist consideration of non-
veiled women as if they are sexual commodities, exhibitionists, seducers. 
We know that the oppression and exploitation of women are facilitated by 
the divisions created among them.”48 
 
The original framing strategy employed within the platform was to highlight the 
contrasts between platform members. Assumed dualities between women, such as 
veiled/non-veiled, straight/homosexual was constantly evoked in joint declarations. 
What does using this duality (veiled/non-veiled) signify for the group? It signifies that 
differences do not necessarily lead to isolationism; there are causes that can channel the 
sentiments in the same directions. The underlying message is despite differences, 
women with different backgrounds essentially suffer from similar pressures although 
emanating from different sources or rationalizations, i.e. secularism, patriarchy, 
morality etc…In that sense differences are empowering rather than weakening.  
This runs contrary to claims of the first wave of women‟s movement which tried 
to construct a unitary and monolithic womanhood that draws on only some of the 
experiences of marginalization or only some life styles to the detriment of others. 
Unlike that time period, the subsequent waves of women‟s movement came to terms 
with internal diversity of the movement and invented ways to handle this diversity. 
                                                          
48 BaĢörtülü kadınların; cahil, yobaz, fesat, takiyyeci, fırsatçı, örümcek kafalı gibi 
sıfatlarla bir "islami robot" imajıyla değerlendirilerek, ırkçı yaklaĢımlarla Ģiddete maruz 
bırakılmalarına karĢı çıkıyoruz. BaĢörtüsüz kadınların; cinsel meta, teĢhirci ya da bir 
tahrik mekanizması gibi cinsiyetçi yaklaĢımlarla değerlendirilmesine karĢı çıkıyoruz. 
Kadınlar arasında yaratılan uçurumların kadınların ezilmesini ve sömürülmesini 
kolaylaĢtırdığını biliyoruz. 
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Following this line of endeavor, the framing strategy employed in this coalition is 
to use those differences and contrasts in an empowering way. The platform is aware of 
the fact that with this much diversity, committing to a unitary definition of womanhood 
would be counter-productive and unrealistic. Instead of asking for more or better 
distribution of rights to a generic “woman”, the platform asks for multiple ameliorations 
in various domains that will help improve the situation of different women. For this 
reason, this platform employs a strategy that comes closer to the achievements of the 
third wave of women‟s movement where differences within the movement are 
acknowledged, embraced and effectively utilized. 
To illustrate how this is done, let‟s continue with the analysis of the kick-off 
declaration. The last sentence of the following excerpt points out to different 
ideological or cultural justifications for regulating women‟s freedoms. There is also an 
emphasis on the fact that no matter how different the source of discrimination could be, 
it is women who suffer at the end of the day. Hence, there is a double emphasis here: 
one on the multiple forms of discrimination affecting different women, the other on the 
fact that the ultimate target of these different sorts of discriminations happen to be 
women, although we cannot talk about a generic womanhood. 
Hence, the initial framing strategy within the coalition is to emphasize that it is 
always women who suffer albeit for reasons that are multiple and diverse. In this way, 
there is also a rejection of one type of womanhood:   
 
   “We, the women who are against all kinds of discrimination and injustice, 
reject all types of prohibitions and oppressions of the state as “a field of 
contest for brave men” which ignores our existence by relying on the 
understanding that the place of woman is by her husband's foot, which 
makes discrimination by the regulations of public morality, which aims at 
delimiting women's liberties. We, the women reject the control over our 
bodies in the name of secularism, republic, religion, tradition, custom, 
morality, honor or freedom.”49 
 
                                                          
49 Biz her türlü ayrımcılığın ve adaletsizliğin karĢısında olan kadınlar, “kadının 
yeri kocasının dizinin dibi” anlayıĢıyla bizleri yok sayan, “genel ahlak” düzenlemesiyle 
ayrımcılık yapan, kadın özgürlüğüne sınırlar getirmek isteyen bir "er meydanı" olarak 
devletin kadınlara yönelik her türlü yasağını ve baskısını reddediyoruz. Biz kadınlar; 
birilerinin bedenimizi modernite, laiklik, cumhuriyet, din, gelenek, görenek, ahlak, 
namus ya da özgürlük adına denetlemesini istemiyoruz. 
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In fact, the more contrasting and puzzling this collective would seem to the 
outside world, the more powerful the message would be. This is the basic reason why in 
an attempt to highlight the contrasts between participants to joint demonstrations, some 
members suggested wearing wigs or covering their heads with rainbow colored veils. 
Here is what T.U said on this topic:  
 
   I don‟t know if the protest would be sufficiently visible if we all veiled 
ourselves. This is because there are already people among us who are 
veiling. How are we going to show that there are people among us who are 
normally not veiled but are veiling just for this protest? To protest, we need 
some contrasts I suppose. Maybe we could all wear wigs? Both those who 
use veil and those who do not. Maybe we all go to university with a wig 
from now on (online blog, 06.06.2008)?50 
 
O.P made the following suggestion:  
   What if everyone wore rainbow colored veils? That would represent the 
freedom of both veiled women and homosexuals. Do you think people 
would be able to recognize (online blog, 06.06.2008)?51 
 
Why would contrasts serve as powerful tools in conveying their messages? Why 
not just emphasize the womanhood or sisterhood as unifiers? As I argued above, trying 
to depict a picture of singular womanhood would be impractical for a coalition where 
womanhood is not understood in the same fashion or was not experienced in the same 
fashion. Highlighting contrasts has the advantage of claiming that not all women are the 
same yet still suffer from various societal or state induced pressures justifying joint 
action.  
By saying that despite their differences, marginalized groups get the same sort of 
treatment from the state or suffer from similar patriarchal pressures, the women are able 
to claim that it is not through their group specific bias that they find the state or societal 
norms unjust and discriminatory. Rather, it is through their evaluation of many other 
                                                          
50 “Hepimizin baĢörtüsü takması tek baĢına protestoyu yeterli kadar görünür kılar 
mı bilemedim? Çünkü zaten aramızda baĢörtüsü takanlar var, normalde takmayan 
birilerinin takmıĢ olduğunu nasıl anlatacağız? Protesto için sanki "kontrast" gerekiyor? 
Belki hepimiz peruk takabiliriz? BaĢını örtenler de örtmeyenler de. Hatta bundan sonra 
hepimiz üniversitelere perukla gideriz?” 
 
51 GökkuĢağı örtüler taksa herkes? Hem örtüyü hem de eĢcinsellerin özgürlüğünü 
temsil etse? AnlaĢılır mı ne dersiniz? 
 
132 
 
similar encounters and other life styles that they come to the conclusion that there is an 
objective injustice. The mis-treatment of other groups is a testimony to this. In an 
attempt to bridge differences that seemed divisive from the outside many members 
attested to the fact that they came closer to understanding each other‟s pain because 
they experienced a similar pain for a seemingly different reason which converges on 
their womanhood. A bisexual and veiled women may not find a job in the formal labor 
market for seemingly different reasons (one because of secularism, the other because of 
public morality), but in reality as women who are marginals to the defined norm hence 
experience similar pressures by society. 
This is very close to the argument of Iris Young in her account of how different 
discriminated groups suffer from neo-liberal restructuring in the USA in their own way. 
Bringing all these examples together would increase the force of the arguments of each 
group making up an anti-right coalition. 
ġ.T explained the purpose of underlining these distinctions succinctly:  
 
   I wanted us to emphasize the veiled/non veiled divide for a reason. 
Because the real problem emerges from the understanding that non-veiled 
women cannot understand what veiled women feel and that there are 
insurmountable barriers between the two. If we remove the distinction 
between “veiled and non-veiled” from the declaration, no one will know 
who is backing whom. They will most probably read it as if Islamists are 
supporting other Islamists. So in other words, we are objecting to this 
veiled/non-veiled division by backing one another despite that difference. 
We may not be rejecting this division verbally but through our action. I 
might not have been clear enough, but what I am trying to say is we are 
rejecting this dichotomy by way of emphasizing this difference and not by 
way of acting as if it does not exist (online blog, 24.09.2009).52 
 
 
                                                          
52 Ben baĢörtülü-baĢörtüsüz kadın vurgusunu özellikle yapalım istedim. Çünkü 
esas sorun, baĢörtüsüzlerin baĢörtülüleri anlayamayacağı, aralarında aĢılmaz duvarlar 
oldugu savından çıkmıyor mu? O ifadeyi kaldırırsaydık emin ol birçok insan kim kime 
sahip çıkıyor anlamayacak ve Ġslamcılar Ġslamcılara destek veriyor gibi okuyacak 
metni. Yani Ģu noktada baĢörtülü-baĢörtüsüz ayrımına olan itirazımızı o ayrıma 
RAĞMEN birbirimize sahip çıkarak yapıyoruz, öyle değil mi? Ayrımı söylemsel 
anlamda değil, fiili anlamda reddediyoruz. Anlatamadım gibi ama demek istediğim: biz 
bu ayrıma vurgu yapmak suretiyle ayrımı reddediyoruz, ayrım yokmuĢ gibi davranarak 
degil. 
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To the extent that such contrasts are used to legitimate the claims of members of 
BSÇ, they serve a meaningful purpose. But there are clear pitfalls in using such 
contrasting scenarios for the sustainability of the coalition. These messages are crafted 
to convince outside audiences that women can act in unison despite stark differences in 
life style and other intersecting identities. However, the slogans of the coalition and the 
messages conveyed to the outside world have implications for the internal workings of 
the coalition as well. One such implication is whether life style differences are indeed 
not an impediment in front of effective political cooperation when it comes to showing 
solidarity with coalition members in their other civic struggles. How the coalition deals 
with the exigencies of group diversity will be dealt in more detail in the coming 
chapter.  
Another implication is whether individuals do actually fit into rigid/schematized 
life style differences. In the following chapter, I will deal with the pitfalls of relying on 
rigid and schematized differences for the cohesiveness of the coalition. I will show how 
trying to focus on contrasts limits the ability of the platform to bring to light the eclectic 
nature of identity building for the activists of the coalition.   
In this chapter, I want to talk more about how consensus is achieved with respect 
to problem areas concerning women and the basic tenets of this consensus. This 
analysis will bring to light how coalitions can still strive for common objectives even in 
the absence of a common identity or identical ideological positions vis-à-vis a problem 
area. Hence, the main objective of this chapter is to show how common rationalizations 
and justifications are formulated in the area of women‟s issues where the coalition 
members admit not possessing a uniform identity, allegiance and outlook on gender 
issues.  
Before getting into the specifics of particular points of consensus, I will first 
illustrate the major points of disagreement with respect to gender issues and their 
implications for this coalition. Although the ultimate purpose of this chapter is to show 
how the coalition succeeded in frame alignment on women‟s interests amid diversity, a 
preliminary analysis of disagreements can still help the reader understand the contours 
within which the coalition members operate. 
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4.2. Basic Disagreements on Gender Issues 
 
 
 
This coalition is made up of women with very different views on gender relations. 
Solidarity on the basis of womanhood has never been enough to sort out such 
differences even among activists who identify themselves with feminism. In our case, 
this fact is complicated by ideological divisions. The religiously motivated members of 
the platform clearly articulated that their reference point (the Koran) establishes that 
men and women are designed differently from each other, their relations are designed 
accordingly and any regression out of this design will make both sexes unhappy. In the 
words of D.E:  
 
   There are points where Islam and feminism clash. Where am I to put all 
these clashes if I describe myself as a Muslim feminist? To begin with, 
feminism does not agree that male and female categories are biological. 
This is not the case in Islam. Islam accepts those categories. Ok, there is a 
fabricated part of this sexual difference, but it also admits there is a 
biological difference and from this point it determines the division of labor 
in the family. This division of labor can vary according to families, 
individuals, or  time but it cannot ignore those differences between the 
sexes. Hence I do not describe myself as a feminist but as a Muslim woman. 
But I felt a pressure at BSÇ.  It was as if I declared myself a feminist as 
soon as I entered the group (interview, 23.03.2011).53 
 
                                                          
53 Üstelik Feminizm ile Ġslam‟ın çatıĢtığı noktalar var. Ben kendimi Müslüman 
Feminist olarak tanımlarsam bu çatıĢmaları nereye koyacağım. En baĢta iĢte, kadın 
erkek kategorilerinin hiçbir Ģekilde biyolojik olduğunu kabul etmiyor. Bu Ġslam‟da 
böyle değildir. Bu kategorileri kabul ediyor, tamam bunun kurgusal bir kısmının da 
olduğunu kabul ediyor ama kurgusal olmayan biyolojik bir kısmı olduğunu da kabul 
ediyor ve bundan yola çıkarak aile içinde iĢbölümünü tahsil ediyor. Bu iĢbölümü belki 
kiĢilere göre değiĢebilir, ailelere göre değiĢebilir, zamana göre değiĢebilir ama sonuçta 
bu farkları görmezlikten gelmiyor. Dolayısıyla ben kendimi bir feminist olarak değil, 
Müslüman bir kadın olarak tanımlıyorum.  Ama BDÇ‟de yoğun bir Ģekilde hissettim. 
Sanki ben girdiğim anda feminist olduğumu deklare etmiĢim gibi bir algı oluĢmuĢ. 
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There are other religious women such as E.F, who do not see major contradictions 
between what feminism or socialism says or what Islam says and who think both of 
these ideologies can mutually accommodate each other:  
 
   I was not afraid. I was claiming to be a feminist in my circles (Islamist 
circles) as well. I came to such a point in life that I did not see any 
contradiction between Islam and feminism. The right of the subject (kul 
hakkı), equality in front of God, equal rights, and these all exist in my 
religion, so as in feminism. Then I looked at what feminism was saying in 
terms of gender relations. I did not see a difference between these two 
thoughts even then. The religious people are disturbed mostly by this: If you 
are Muslim, you do not need an additional etiquette. I don‟t find this right. 
There are lots of things happening around us and unless they clearly clash 
with Islam I do not see why we should not take inspiration from them 
(interview, 24.03.3011).54 
 
 
 
4.2.1.  Equality versus Hierarchy 
 
 
Feminism is known for its stress on gender equality. It goes without saying that 
there are different sorts of feminisms, some emphasizing formal equality and others 
accepting difference only on the grounds of equal treatment of sexes. However, the 
bottom line is that men and women are equal (which does not rule out difference).   
It would not be surprising to find out that those women with a more religious 
orientation tend not to believe in gender equality but "fıtrat". Here is how F.G, who 
describes herself as a Muslim woman, sees the conflict in opinion between feminists 
and Muslim women:  
                                                          
54 O dönemde çekinmedim, yeri gelinde Feminist olduğumu da söylüyordum, 
kendi camiamda daha çok. Öyle bir noktaya geldik ki…ya zaten, benim için Ġslamla 
çeliĢen bir yanı yok ki..Kul hakkı, Allah karĢısında eĢitlik, eĢit haklar, bunlar zaten 
dinde olan Ģeyler. Feminizm de bunları söylüyor. Öyle bakıyordum, sadece o 
(feminizm) kadın erkek tarafındakini ele alan bir tarafı vardı, cinsler arasındaki 
boyutunu, onda da bir farklılık görmüyordum.   
 
Onlar (dindarları kastediyor) Ģundan çok rahatsız oluyorlar: “Müslümandır baĢka 
bir tanımlamaya, etikete ihtiyacı yoktur Ģeklinde”. O bana çok doğru gelmiyor. Bence 
yaĢadığımız dünya, tamam Ġslam, orada bir sürü Ģey olup bitiyor ve ona karĢı baĢka 
fikirlerden yararlanmakta, ters düĢmediği sürece hiçbir Ģey görmüyorum. 
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   They (feminists) want Muslim women to act as if Islam is secondary when 
it comes to women‟s issues. Those who call themselves Islamist feminists 
argue they are doing it for feminist ideals. They take it from Islam as long as 
it is not contradictory and when it is, they reject those Koran verses. They 
come to the  point of rejecting the Koran. This is why I am not a feminist. 
Otherwise, there are so many things we have in common with the feminist 
movement. But I live for Islamic ideals. I cannot tame my Muslim identity 
to prioritize feminist ideals. For example, there is a definition of gender in 
Islam. Feminists, on the other hand, do not believe that differences between 
men and women are given. If I accept that, I will be rejecting the definition 
of woman in Islam, or the concept of family. Islamist associations prioritize 
family. Feminists see it as a prison. I do not see family as a prison that has 
to be demolished. They (feminists) do (interview, 10.03.2011).55 
 
The question on equality goes deeper than sex differences. What is at stake is not 
whether a sex has more power, but whether that sex is exercising that power justly. 
Here we come across a position where maintaining “justice” is more important than 
establishing complete equality. D.E argues the following: 
 
   They think women like us (referring to reformist Islamist women) have a 
lot of largesse. They think we shape religion according to what we think it 
should be. You are bending and folding, meaning you are pushing the limits 
of religion or going beyond the rules of religion. That is not what we are 
doing. That is because we always talk within the limits of justice. We do not 
say, “Everyone should be free”, or “Freedom deemed appropriate by 
religion will be distributed to every group in society”.  We also think every 
segment of society should live comfortably and justly but there is a 
difference between freedom and justice. The issue of veiling is not an issue 
of freedom. Ok, there is a ban but if we see it solely as a matter of freedom, 
then what we would say is: “Let people wear whatever they want to wear”. 
                                                          
55 Müslüman kadınlardan Ġslamı ikincil addedmeleri isteniyor Feminist camiada. 
Ġslamcı feminist olanlar, feminist idealler uğruna yapıyorum, diyor. UyuĢtuğu yerde 
Ġslam‟dan alıyor, uyuĢmadığı yerlerde Kuran ayetlerini reddettiler..Artık Kuran‟ı bile 
reddeden bir konuma geliyorlar…Ben bu sebepten feminist değilim. Yoksa feminist 
mücadele ile ortaklaĢtığımız çok alanlar oluyor. Yoksa onlarla çok paralel giden 
duruĢlarımız var. Ama ben Ġslami idealler uğruna yaĢıyorum. Müslüman kimliğimi 
yontamam feminist idealler uğruna. Mesela, “gender”in tanımı Ġslam‟da var. 
Feministler iĢe kadın ve erkek olarak yaratılmanın farklılığına inanmıyor, verili 
olmadığını kabul ediyorlar. Ben bunu kabul edersem, Ġslam‟daki kadın kavramını 
reddetmiĢ olurum ya da aile kavramı. Ġslami dernekler aileyi ön plana çıkarır. Seküler 
feministler aile bir hapishane diye yola çıkıyor. Halbuki Müslümanların düĢtüğü 
kumpas Ģu. Hâlbuki anne çocuk ve velilerden oluĢan aile, çekirdek aile. Müslümanlar, 
buna sahip çıkmaya çalıĢıyorlar. Halbuki çekirdek aile, hem kadının hem erkeğin hem 
de çocuğun hapishanesine dönüĢüyor. Ben ailenin yıkılması gereken bir kavram 
olmadığını düĢünüyorum. Onlar aileyi hapishane görüyor. 
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But that is an ambiguous term. How far do these freedoms go? Liberals say 
it goes as far as others‟ freedoms start.  This sounds problematic to me. 
Justice on the other hand is this: Everyone should stay wherever they 
deserve. There is a fundamental difference between a Muslim and a Jew and 
a Christian. You cannot equalize everyone by ignoring those differences. 
No, so what is justice? If a veiled woman is being oppressed for her veil, 
oppression meaning to displace someone from his/her place, for example I 
want to be at school but cannot be because of this oppression. I can demand 
justice at this point. What is this? It is the reinstatement of my right. It is 
nothing more than that. It is not something whose boundaries are 
ambiguous. I have this capacity with the notion of justice (interview, 
23.03.2011).56 
 
Replacing justice with equality has wider repercussions for rights struggles than 
just working on gender equality. If different groups in society, different ethnicities and 
different sexes cannot demand formal equality but only just treatment, what kind of a 
polity would that entail? This type of a polity has a potential to become neo-
traditionalist, where each group within society has a place within a hierarchy. If in a 
heterogeneous society, inter-group relations are to be evaluated from the perspective of 
a justice argument that does not rule out hierarchy, many arguments that accompany 
equality debate, such as equal rights and liberties become controversial.   
                                                          
56 GeniĢ mezhep diye bir kavram var ya, bizi öyle görüyorlar, özellikle dindar 
camiada.  Böyle aĢağılayıcı bir Ģey olmasının sebebi de dine kendini vakfediyorsun 
ama bu dini kuĢa çeviriyorsun. Eğiyorsun, büküyorsun. Orada eğip bükmekten kasıt Ģu: 
Dinin sınırlarını zorlamak, ve kuralları aĢmak, dıĢına çıkmak. Bizim böyle bir 
durumumuz yok. Neden? Biz sürekli adalet ekseninde konuĢuyoruz. Biz Ģunu 
söylemiyoruz çıkıp da: “Ya herkes özgür olsun!”.  Ama evet, dinin öngördüğü 
özgürlük toplumun her kesimine gidecek. Biz de toplumun her kesiminin rahat ve adil 
yaĢamasını istiyoruz ama adalet ile özgürlük arasına bir fark koyuyoruz. ġöyle, 
baĢörtüsü sorunu bir özgürlük problemi değildir. Tamam, bir yasak var ama biz bunu 
özgürlük meselesi olarak görürsek, Ģöyle düĢünülür o zaman: “Bırakın insanlar 
örtünsünler veya açılsınlar”.  Ama bu muğlak bir kavram. ġöyle bir Ģey değil özgürlük, 
ama nereye kadar, bunun sınırı nedir? ġöyle söylüyor liberaller, baĢkasının sınırlarının 
baĢladığı yer falan, bununla sınır çiziyor. Bu bana sorunlu geliyor. Adalet Ģöyle bir Ģey: 
Herkesin hakettiği yerde olması, hakettiği yerde durması diye bir laf var ya, 
feminizmde de vardır ya, kadınla erkek aynı değildir ama eĢittir, nedir bu? Bir 
Müslümanla Yahudi arasında, bir Müslümanla Hristiyan arasında dağlar kadar fark 
vardır, bu farkları görmezden gelerek, herkesi tek bir paydada eĢitleyebilir miyiz? 
Hayır, ama adalet nedir? BaĢörtüsüz bir insan bu sebepten zulme uğruyorsa, ki zulmün 
kelime anlamı birĢeyi yerinden etmektir, ben mesela okulda olmak istiyorum ama 
olamıyorum, bu engelden dolayı, bu bir zulümdür. Ben bu noktada adalet talep 
edebilirim. Nedir bu? Hakkın iadesidir. Bunun ötesinde bir Ģey değildir. Sınırları o 
kadar muğlak olmayan bir kavramdır. Makro siyasetten, mikro siyasete kadar bunu 
daraltıp geniĢletebilirim. Böyle bir imkanım var, adalet söz konusu olduğunda. 
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4.2.2.   Private versus Public Distinction 
 
 
Some of the most important gains for gender equality was achieved by rejecting 
the distinction between private and public. This was because most of the gender based 
inequalities in society emanated from the household and slowly found its way into the 
public space. Unless inequalities in the private sphere are addressed adequately, full 
gender equality is hard to achieve. 
The ideational thrust to bringing private into the public sphere does not 
exclusively originate from feminism however. Tackling this public vs. private 
dichotomy is important for sexual identity struggles as well. Hence any consensus on 
the merits of making private public would have implications for other types of rights 
struggles running parallel to gender struggle.  
In fact, the issue of homosexuality is a recurrent theme within the alliance. This 
issue usually comes up in the context of why some members of the coalition are not 
defending gay/lesbian rights to the extent that other members of the platform do. The 
conventional answer would be that since religion considers being gay as sinful there is 
no point in defending their rights. Of course, there has been a lot of argumentation 
along such religious lines. No matter how hard it would be for prominent religious 
women to go out in the public space and defend sexual liberties, the real problem with 
respect to homosexuality debate does not necessarily or solely lie in the sin/not sin 
divide. The argumentative distinction lies in the fact that making private (mahrem) 
public is not a legitimate strategy for the religious members.  
The major problem with respect to homosexuality debate is that the demands of 
gays are considered liberal and defending other groups‟ rights is also considered a 
liberal act. This is because a demand based on one‟s sexual preferences is not fit for 
being a political demand. In the words of I.K:  
Homosexuality is a sexual choice; it does not have to be public. It could be more 
private. But they (homosexuals) turn it into an existential issue (interview, 
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22.04.2011).57 
 
G.D, a socialist feminist interviewee, when asked about whether the desire for 
visibility in the public space is a liberal demand on the part of gays/lesbians says the 
following:  
 
   When others are asked as to their reason for not supporting gays, 
people say their (gay people‟s) demands are too liberal… 
 
Normally, yes it may sound like choosing whom you want to sleep with is 
a liberal demand. But if, in a country, you can be killed for doing that then 
it becomes a radical demand. So far it could not become an issue to be 
discussed within the boundaries of liberalism. For it to become a liberal 
demand, that right must have been earned and used so many times…A 
woman would get killed for sleeping with another woman. Did they 
(Islamists) put themselves into fire when these people were getting killed? 
If they did, they would be on top of my head (author‟s note: an expression 
indicating sign of respect). These are not liberal but radical demands. It 
could be a liberal demand for a European gay. Not here. How many men 
have you seen kissing each other here? Then it is not a liberal demand 
because there is an incredible pressure on these people. For me, marriage 
is something to be rejected. But I cannot say the same thing to a lesbian. 
This is because she does not have that right yet. First she has to earn that 
right, later I will object to her marriage as well. But she cannot even want 
that for herself. In reality, people make it seem as if sexual liberation is a 
very liberal thing. However, we cannot sleep with the person we want, we 
cannot do whatever we want and this is causing murders in this society. If 
you cannot see that, shame on you. If these rights were already being 
exercised countless times and new problems emerged after these practices, 
then it can become a liberal demand. But not for Turkey.  It is still a 
radical demand. To live with someone else without getting married, to be a 
single mum, or to have multiple partners are still radical demands 
(interview, 05.08.2011).58 
                                                          
57 EĢcinsellik bir cinsel tercihtir illa bir aleniyeti olması gerekmez. Biraz daha 
mahrem olabilir. Ama onlar bunu bir varoluĢ çabasına dönüĢtürebiliyor. 
 
58 Gey ve lezbiyenlere niye bir Ģey yapmıyorsunuz dendiğinde liberal talepler 
bunlar diyorlar. 
 
Normalde evet, birinin kiminle yatacağını seçmesi liberal bir talep olarak 
düĢünülebilir. Ama bir yerde bunu yaptığın için öldürülebiliyorsan bu radikal bir 
taleptir. O daha liberallik zeminine gelmemiĢtir. Onun liberallik zeminine gelmesi için 
o hakkın kazanılmıĢ defalarca kullanılmıĢ  ehheeey olması lazım. Türkiye‟de bir kadın 
bir kadınla yattığı zaman öldürürler onu..ġimdi bunlar geylere lezbiyenlere bir Ģey 
olduğunda kendilerini ateĢe attılar mı? Zaten o zaman baĢımın üstüne. Bunlar liberal 
değil gayet radikal taleplerdir. Avrupalı erkek için liberaldir. Burada değil. Sen kaç 
tane erkeğin öpüĢtüğünü gördün? Ha o zaman liberal değil. Çünkü sımsıkı bir baskı var 
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Most of religious figures in the alliance can go as far as arguing there should be 
no violence against homosexuals, giving stories from Koran as examples. Here is what 
K.L thinks on this matter:  
 
   We live in Turkey, which is a democracy. I cannot discriminate against 
these people. I can only say this: Just like seeing a man make love to a 
woman in public would disturb me, I don‟t mean kissing, I mean something 
more extravagant than that, seeing a man do that with another men would 
also disturb me. I don‟t want that. But gays want their identity to be visible. 
There is the example of Netherlands, Switzerland. The fall of societies who 
have become morally degenerated is fast. But if somebody is gay and living 
a life of this sort, what kind of a danger could it pose to me? 
 
During the time of Caliph Omer, the Caliph receives intelligence that a man 
is having a homosexual affair with someone. The Caliph goes to his house, 
breaks the door, smashing things inside saying things like “I will punish 
you, I will kill you!”. The other confesses that he had a homosexual affair 
but that took place in his privacy. He tells the Caliph that by breaking into 
his privacy the Caliph had committed a bigger crime than himself. The 
Caliph apologizes and leaves the house. I do not want people‟s interference 
into others‟ privacy (interview, 22.04.2011).59  
                                                                                                                                                                          
orada. Benim için evlilik reddedilmesi gereken birĢeydir. Buna karĢı olarak mücadele 
ederim. Evlilik karĢıtıyım. Ama bir lezbiyen geldiğinde ben ona aynı Ģeyi söyleyemem. 
Çünkü onun daha evlenmeye hakkı yok ki. Önce onun hakkı olsun sonra ben o evliliğe 
de karĢı çıkarım. Daha onu istiyemiyor bile ya. Aslında cinsel mücadelenin kendisi 
aslında çok liberal birĢeymiĢ gibi gösteriliyor. Ġyi de yani yatamıyoruz, odaya 
giremiyoruz, istediğimizi yapamıyoruz. Ve bu bir toplumda toplumsal katliamlara 
neden olan bir Ģey sen bunu göremiyorsan yazıklar olsun sana. Bu haklar eğer elde 
edilmiĢse kullanılıyorsa ve orada o kullanmadan sonra ortaya baĢka baĢka sorunlar 
çıkıyorsa o zaman liberaldir. Türkiye için liberal değildir. Hala radikaldir. Nikahsız 
birlikte olmak, bekar anne olmak bir kadının çok eĢli yaĢaması gibi talepler ya da hiç 
eĢli yaĢaması gibi, radikal taleplerdir. Türkiye‟de kadınların dayak yemeden yaĢama 
talebi bile radikal taleptir. Dolayısı ile ben buna radikal talep diyorum.”  
 
59 ġimdi burası Türkiye ve demokrasi var değil mi? Ben bu insanları öldüremem, 
dıĢlayamam. Tek bir Ģey diyebilirim. Nasıl ki bir kadın ile erkeğin sokakta seviĢmesi 
rahatsız ediyorsa,  öpüĢmek değil daha ileri boyutta kastediyorum, bir erkekle bir 
erkeğin, bir kadınla bir kadının da seviĢmesi beni rahatsız eder.  Ben bunu 
istemiyorum. Ama eĢcinseller de diyorlar ki “Hayır benim kimliğim görünür olacak”.  
Hollanda örneği var, Ġsviçre örneği var. Bu tip ahlaki anlamda yozlaĢan toplumların 
çöküĢleri hızlı oluyor. Ama bir insan eĢcinselse ve birlikte yaĢıyorlarsa, bunun benim 
için ne gibi bir tehlikesi olabilir ki?  
 
Bakın hz. Ömer zamanında, hz. Ömer bir istihbarat alıyor. Adamın biri eĢcinsel 
bir iliĢki yaĢıyor. Hz. Ömer eve gidiyor, kırıyor falan yani, içeri giriyor, “seni 
öldürücem, senin cezanı vericem”. Öbürü de diyor ki: “Ben yaĢıyordum ama kendi 
mahremimde yaĢıyordum. Sen benim mahremime izinsiz girerek, daha büyük bir 
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The crux of this debate is that civic activism based on sexuality (which is 
supposed to be kept private) is not only considered sinful but also unsuitable for doing 
rights‟ claims.  There is also an implicit understanding that what is being demanded by 
homosexuals is rather optional or arbitrary because it involves recognition of a sexual 
choice.  This difference related to public vs. private distinction is important not only 
because it limits, if not rules out, solidarity with respect to amelioration of the position 
of women in the domestic sphere, but also because it impedes solidarity with other 
rights struggles that rely on making private (and especially sexuality) a part of public 
discussion. Having said this, the stress on justice can still offer a remedy for some of 
the abuses taking place in the private sphere. If domestic violence is an area where all 
the members can collaborate, this proves that a problem taking place in the private 
realm can still be tackled through the justice principle that is upheld by some of the 
members who do not see themselves as feminists. However, the same does not hold for 
struggles based on sexual preferences since justice argument is used only when there is 
a threat to such people‟s lives.  
 
 
 
4.3.  Frame Alignments on Gender Relations 
 
 
 
We have observed that preferring justice to equality and maintaining a strict 
separation of public and private are two important reasons why the coalition cannot be 
said to adhere to gender equality or feminist concerns in the strictest sense. 
Despite above distinctions which prevent us from calling this alliance a strictly 
gender equality alliance, there are still convincing reasons to argue that this is a women 
empowering coalition. This is important to emphasize, since most feminist movements 
rely on the assumption that only if the premises of feminism are upheld can the 
situation of women be ameliorated. The following framing strategies will illustrate, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
günah iĢledin”. Hz. Ömer özür dileyerek çıkıyor evden. Bakın mahrem ayrı bir Ģey. 
Ġnsanların mahremlerine kimse müdahale etsin istemiyorum. 
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even when the principles upheld are not strictly based on gender equality, there is still 
room for women‟s empowerment. 
 
 
 
4.3.1. Framing Strategy I: Differentiating Self-regulation from Male Regulation 
 
 
The regulation of female body is a highly sensitive topic in Turkey. The reason 
for this sensitivity stems from differing perspectives on who holds the ultimate say on 
what a woman can or cannot do with her own body. The famous feminist slogan 
“Bedenim Benimdir (This body is mine)” does not function as an effective means to 
align differing perspectives on women‟s control over their bodies. This lack of 
disagreement is aggravated by differing perspectives over veiling. While it is seen as a 
lack of control over one‟s body by many feminists, for veiled women, it is one of the 
most self-conscious decisions about what to do with one‟s body. This disagreement 
makes joint action over certain other topics related to women‟s bodies highly unlikely.  
For instance, commodification of female bodies in the media and advertisement 
industry could potentially be a highly relevant discussion point for those who oppose 
marketing of female body according to male desires. However, just because this type of 
a criticism could open the doors for a more conservative interpretation of what a 
woman can do with her body, veiled and non-veiled women cannot have a proper 
discussion on this topic. The same applies to abortion. Although abortion can take place 
within a marriage setting, the fact that it also evokes a remedy for unwanted 
pregnancies in a pre-marital setting, hence intimately tied to what a woman would do 
with her own body, it again cannot be discussed for presumed differences in opinion on 
this topic. 
Hence, any rapprochement on this topic can be seen as revolutionary and an 
immense achievement from the perspective of women‟s movement in Turkey. 
Theorization on female body has to be done with extreme care because of the 
sensitivity and divisiveness of this topic in Turkey.   
Both veiling and wearing revealing clothes has been discussed within the coalition 
with all these reservations at the background. Initially, the basic tension between 
platform members stemmed from two factors: while being veiled is considered as male 
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regulation on female bodies from the perspective of non-veiled members, wearing 
revealing clothes is considered as another form of objectification by males according to 
more religious members.  
To start with the first point of tension, some members admitted having a 
judgemental attitude vis-a-vis veiled women before the creation of this coalition. 
However, they came to realize that there can be many different ways of rationalizing 
veiling. Veil is banned, because it is equated with promoting sharia. This means others‟ 
rationalizations of why people dress in certain ways can be seriously flawed and 
restrictive. Additionally, if veiling was clearly a sign of being “namuslu” then veiled 
women would not have been cooperative with non-veiled women.  
The platform starting from a perception that veiling is a form of male regulation, 
arrived at a compromise that embraces veiling as long as it is seen as a control exerted 
on one‟s body in the name of God. Here is what E.F thinks on this topic:  
 
   I was kind of skeptical about this remark in the declaration which said we 
do not want regulation on female bodies by various things, including 
religion. Well, why does a veiled woman cover up? Eventually, it is for 
religion. But later I rationalized it in my mind like this: I am differentiating 
my own regulation of my body from its regulation by an outside force 
which uses religion as a pretext. I told the group that I would agree if we 
were thinking in this fashion (interview, 24.03.2011).60 
 
This compromise shows the dynamics of frame alignment within the coalition. 
Members, as long as they can justify the basis of the coalition as rejection of restrictions 
imposed upon themselves from outside, rather than voluntary restrictions they impose 
upon themselves, are willing to carry out this coalition. This difference is important, as 
most of the religious practices involve a level of self-restriction. Hence, members have 
been able to achieve consensus when they are able to interpret objections to both 
veiling and wearing revealing clothes as regulations imposed upon women‟s bodies. 
This consensus comes up again and again in discussions. 
                                                          
60 Bu tabi Ģeye takmıĢtım ben, sonra baĢka birileri de takıldı, bedenimizi Ģunlar 
adına, tabi orada din de geçiyor ya, yani baĢörtülü bir kadın zaten bedenini ne adına 
örtüyor, din adına örtüyor zaten, bunu söyleyemeyiz gibi, düĢündüm ben. Ama sonra 
Ģey dedik, birilerinin bizi denetlemesi. Yani biz kendimizi inandığımız Ģey için 
denetleyebiliriz ama dıĢarıdan baĢka birilerinin bizi dini bahane ederek, din adına, onu 
kafamda öyle yumuĢattım. Gruba da yazdım, bu böyle düĢünülebilir, o zaman katılırım 
diye. 
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With respect to the issue of women who wear more revealing clothes compared to 
other platform members, initially the same type of prejudice is played out. Just as 
veiling was interpreted as a form of male regulation, wearing revealing clothes is also 
considered another form of objectification whose rules are dictated by men. In fact, 
initially some of the members became alienated from the platform since they sensed a 
judgmental attitude in terms of dress codes. In the words of H.I:   
 
In these discussions, in between the lines I sensed the hint that if you are not 
veiled, harassment is more likely. This disappointed me (online blog, 11.09.2008).61 
 
Veiled women on the other hand rejected accusations that they put a certain 
responsibility on women who dress in revealing ways. Their argument was that, unlike 
feminists who argue they have the sole possession of their bodies, they believe their 
bodies belong to God and hence they cannot do whatever they want with those bodies, 
including wearing revealing clothes. 
The response to this was that when the signatories signed the kick-off declaration 
of BSÇ they have already gone through an internal settlement (hesaplaĢma) with 
regards to their understanding of veil and that veil is no longer specifically associated 
with male hegemony. The same reasoning however is absent with respect to why a 
woman is considered an object of seduction when she is dressed in certain ways.  
Here, the discussion moves beyond veiling and into the display of body in the 
public space and the degree of it being decided by male hegemonic conventions. The 
same postulate on veil is being expected from veiled women when it comes to wearing 
as one wishes. The assumption that exists among veiled women and which is 
problematic is that “women by nature are an object of seduction which is related to the 
degree that they reveal their bodies”.  
There is an inevitable connection between revealing clothes and provoking desire 
for at least some of the members. This however is reproducing the hegemonic positions 
prevalent in society.  As the discussion came to a deadlock, some veiled women 
extended the discussion by saying that the real problem is not whether women wear 
revealing clothes or not. It is about the streets belonging to the gaze of men rather than 
                                                          
61 Bu tartıĢmalarda satır aralarında veya ima yolu ile "Açılırsanuz taciz edilmek 
kolaylaĢır" vurgusu hissettim. Bu beni hayal kırıklığına uğrattı. 
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women. Veiled women admitted getting intimidating looks by strangers when they 
walk in their neighborhoods unaccompanied by their husbands or elder males.  
This means the discussion is not only one that involves sexuality and how it is 
imposed on women‟s bodies in the public space by men. It is also about men possessing 
the right to look, control and patrol the public space, a privilege which works to the 
detriment of female bodies both in terms of dress codes and in terms of free mobility. 
The streets are the hegemonic space of men; the gaze is brutal rather than aroused. Here 
is what P.R thinks on the topic:  
 
   These harassing looks start from the following assumption: The streets are 
mine, you are a stranger, and if you want to wander in these streets you will 
have to put up with my gaze, my words, my visual examination of you from 
head to toe, everything. Sexual harassment is just one form of it. The man is 
saying: Go to your home or stay outside and be disturbed by my staring at 
you. What could be the reason we are not disturbed when we are 
accompanied by a men? The problem is an issue of hegemony. 
 
What I mean is, sexuality is part of the story but the real problem is the 
issue of authority in the streets. Even if the man likes you or not he will 
disturb you. This is not about falling for somebody, this is daring to disturb. 
Not every men stares at me because they find me likeable. I become able to 
be stared at and harassed by going out into the street. This is because I enter 
his territory. Hence he bullies me rather than harassing me (online blog, 
22.09.2008).62 
 
This extension to the debate is very telling. Although discussions started from a 
point where the responsibility is put on females about how to dress up, it slowly 
transformed into one where the problem is associated with male hegemony in the public 
sphere. The important caveat here was to emphasize neither veiled nor are non-veiled 
women exempt from the gaze of males. Hence, the male supremacy in the public sphere 
                                                          
62 Bence bu tacizkar bakıĢlar sadece ve sadece “Sokak benimdir, sen yabancısın, 
burda dolaĢacaksan benim bakıĢıma, laf atmama, seni ince ince incelememe, herĢeyime 
katlanacaksın” algısından çıkıyor. Cinsel arzuyla rahatsız etmek de bunun 
sonuçlarından biri sadece. “Ya evine dön, ya da benim hükmüm altındaki "sokak"ta bu 
Ģekilde rahatsız ol ve yine evine dön” diyor bu adam. Yanında bir erkekle çıktıysan 
sokağa rahatsız edememesi neden yoksa? Sorun bir iktidar sorunu. Sadece demek 
istemiĢtim ki, cinsellik var bu mevzunun içinde evet ama asıl mesele sokaktaki iktidar 
meselesi. Beğensin beğenmesin rahatsız ediyo adam seni. O zaman beğenmek değil de 
bi cüret söz konusu burda. Bana her bakan beni kadın olarak beğendiğinden bakmıyor. 
Ben sokağa çıkmakla yeterince bakılabilir ve taciz edilebilir oluyorum zaten. Onun 
egemenlik alanına girmiĢ oluyorum. O da zorbalıkla bakıyor, tahrikle değil. 
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operates irrespective of the dress codes of women. O.P says:  
 
   I really get disturbed when people think the patriarchal pressure operates 
only when it comes to the dress codes of unveiled women. The thinking that 
veiled women do not feel disturbed in the streets is just a myth. No one is 
shielded from masculine pressures by being veiled, neither on the streets nor 
in business life. There are other mechanisms at play in business life where 
men try to rule you (online blog, 23.05.2008).63 
 
For this reason both veiling and dressing up as one pleases can both be defended 
on the same grounds. The same member argues the following: 
 
   The slogans “Do not touch my body” or “State! Remove your hands from 
my body!” are more appropriate than “Do not touch my veil”. The veil is 
not my only concern. Because I think the voice that needs to be protested 
and silenced is the totalitarian voice that sees the female body as an object 
within the political arena, an object that can be regulated; talked about and 
prohibited. I am highly disturbed by being seen only as a veiled woman, 
why would I talk only in that tone? If what we want to do is be shocking 
(ezber bozan), let‟s talk about different situations together, let‟s talk about 
Gülcan Köse. Let‟s talk about things that will seem shocking for those who 
do not discuss these things (veiling and non-veiling) together (online blog, 
19.10.2008).64 
  
These quotes make it clear that women of the platform think of limitations on 
female choices about clothing as the output of the same type of patriarchy, regardless of 
which type of women it is exerted on. The regulation of female bodies works for 
                                                          
63 Ben bu konuĢmalarda, eril baskının sadece örtüsüz kadınları hedef aldığı 
söyleminden/imasından çok rahatsız oluyorum. Örtülü kadınların sokakta rahatsız 
edilmediği sadece bir mit. Örtülü olduğu için toplumda eril baskılardan korunmuĢ 
olmuyor kimse. Sokakta da bu böyle, iĢ yaĢamında da. Bu iĢ yaĢamında, yine 
erkeklerden gelen, seni yönetmeye, yola getirmeye çalıĢan baĢka mekanizmalar çıkıyor 
karĢına. 
 
64 Bedenime dokunma', 'Devlet elini bedenimden çek' teması bana cok daha sıcak 
geliyor, “Örtüme dokunma” demekten. Benim tek derdim baĢörtüsü değil. Çünkü iĢte, 
eni konu aynı totaliter ses, kadın bedenini siyaset arenasının nesnesine indiren, regüle 
edilebilir, hakkında konuĢulabilir, yasak konabilir gören ses asıl susturulması ve 
protesto edilmesi gereken diye görüyorum ben. Ben türbanlı kadına indirgenmekten 
rahatsızım zaten niye aynı tonda konuĢup bunu besleyeyim, üzerime yapıĢtırayım? 
Ezber bozmaksa yapılmak istenen, aynı ezberleri yanyana söyleyelim derim. Gülcan 
Köse'yi analım yanında. Beden-Örtme-Açma tartıĢmasında yanyana geldiğinde ezber 
bozacak Ģeylere bakalım. 
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different women in different ways with one crucial commonality: They are all 
manifestations of male control, and for this reason, these separate struggles need to be 
linked.  
The novelty of this alignment has to be underlined. This is the first open hearted 
attempt at arriving at a consensus on the source of regulation of female bodies that does 
not involve the state (i.e. the veil ban). Previous demonstrations of veiled women 
mostly attacked secular state policies for deciding in their place what they could wear. 
Feminist demonstrations, on the other hand, usually excluded the perspective of veiled 
women, because veiled women were assumed to have accepted this male regulation 
over their bodies from the beginning. For this reason, the discussions were deadlocked 
between two perspectives that were irreconcilable: state pressure on veiled women vs. 
rejection of conservative social pressures on non-veiled women‟s bodies. This 
discussion is the first attempt to show there is an alternative route between these two 
alternatives and that both types of women suffer from societal/patriarchal pressures in 
different shapes and degrees.    
 
 
 
4.3.2.  Framing Strategy II: Political Ideologies as a Form of Male Hegemony 
 
 
Another way in which the members of the coalition are able to align their frames 
on gender is their treatment of political ideologies which have currency in Turkey. For 
these women, most political ideologies serve masculine interests at a fundamental level 
and this is a solid basis on which consensus and frame alignment emerges.  
Of course, there are different rationalizations and reasons at play for why those 
ideologies should be opposed. In each case, members also expose their peculiar 
reasoning for their opposition which is intimately tied to their world view. For example, 
more religious members of the coalition stress how conservatism started catering to 
capitalism and enriched the new conservative elite. They also stress the selective 
appropriation of the fruits of modernity by men (going after conspicuous consumption 
or wealth creation but still subjugating women to domestic life) as a consequence of a 
very dysfunctional understanding of which values deserve to be preserved.  
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The take on conservatism in this platform is quite different from conventional 
understandings of the term. The women of the platform are critical of the fact that 
conservatism usually works to the advantage of men and is used for improving 
patriarchal advantages in society. Here is an excerpt from what a member wrote on 
conservatism for a newspaper: 
 
   “Long before today, the nuances between being conservative and having 
an Islamic morality were less clear. However, the conservatism of the 21
st
 
century is busy drawing a wonderful (!) consensus with capitalism, 
economic liberalism, and the status-quo, an attitude that makes the bosses 
the head and the workers the feet. All the implications of conservatism have 
been withdrawn except for one final castle. The final castle being, women, 
family, how the daughters will be raised and how gender relations will be 
regulated.  At this point that we have arrived, conservatism has become a 
very controversial topic. This is because while Turkish style liberal-
conservatism contains a few religious rituals it is just a bad combination. 
Let‟s take the economic side of liberalism, one that sanctifies the owners of 
capital, downgrades laborers, the social Darwinist, laissez-faire, laissez-
passer type of it, let‟s be afraid of anti-imperialism like crazy, let‟s ask for a 
reason for equality when the weak says “humans are equal”.  However, the 
cultural side of this conservatism so shabby! Let‟s forget the dimensions of 
liberalism that respects different life strategies, different ideas, ideas that 
may make those with high status and comfort unhappy,, even when these 
things are happening within our family and within our circles. Then let‟s 
take the side of conservatism that meddles into others‟ private lives, that 
judges women‟s religiosity, talent and intelligence positively only when 
they conform to the criteria of honor that applies only to women.”65 
                                                          
65 Özlü sözü bir yana bırakalım; muhtemeldir ki bundan çok uzun bir zaman önce 
muhafazakar olmakla, Ġslam ahlakı ile donanmıĢ olmak arasındaki nüanslar bugünküne 
oranla daha belirsizdi Fakat 21. yy.'ın muhafazakârlığı, kapitalizmle, ekonomik 
liberalizmle, statükoculukla, patronları baĢ, iĢçileri ayak sayan bir tasavvurla Ģahane 
konsensüsler yapıyor olmakla malul. Tüm düzenlemelerini geri çekildiği tek kaleye 
sığdırma çabası bundan. Tek kale; yani kadın, aile, kız çocuğunun nasıl yetiĢtirileceği, 
kadın-erkek iliĢkilerinin tek ve mutlak Ģekilde düzenlenmesi, vs..Gelinen noktada 
muhafazakârlık tartıĢmaya son derece açık bir Ģey.Çünkü 'Türk usulü liberal-
muhafazakârlık' dinî birtakım ritüelleri içermekle beraber, kötü bir kombinasyondan 
ibaret. Liberalliğin ekonomik yanını alalım, sermaye sahibini yücelten, emeği 
aĢağılayan, 'iyi olan kazansın' 'bırakınız yapsınlar' yanlarını alalım, anti-emperyalizm 
kelimesinden ödümüz kopsun, 'insanlar eĢittir' diyen 'zayıf'tan kendisini eĢitlemeye 
değer bulmamıza imkân sağlayacak bir 'gerekçe' isteyelim. Ama 'kültürel' yanı da çok 
bir salaĢ bu liberalizmin! Farklı hayat stratejilerine, farklı fikirlere, konfor ve statü 
sahiplerini mutsuz edebilecek açılımlara, seçimlere kendi ailemiz, çevremiz içinde 
olduğunda 'da' saygı duyma boyutunu, es geçelim liberalizmin. Sonra, 
muhafazakârlığın özel hayatları denetleyen/didikleyen yanını alalım, yine bilhassa 
kadının dindarlığını, zekâsını, yetenekleri dahil bütün hasletlerini sadece kadına özgü 
namus kriterlerinin süzgecinden/sınavından geçmesi kaydı Ģartıyla önemseyelim.  
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This above piece is striking in its clarity about how the current form of 
conservatism as practiced by the ruling party is in perfect conformity with capitalism 
but very old fashioned in its perception of societal conventions on family and women. 
The double-sidedness of such politics attracts fierce criticisms from platform members. 
The religious members highlight their disapproval of confounding religiosity with 
conservatism, which is nothing other than the preservation of the status-quo. The status-
quo is what is defended by the state apparatus and patriarchy whereas being religious is 
being pro-justice which is equated with being radical or revolutionary.  
Many of the veiled women in this alliance show a strong resistance to being 
associated with conservatism. In most of my interviews, even when I did not ask 
anything related to what they think on conservatism, veiled women were eager to 
explain why they cannot be called conservatives. Here is the comment of K.L on this 
topic:  
 
   A real Muslim cannot be from the right. A Muslim is a leftist. I am not 
talking about the meanings attached to it in Turkey; let‟s talk about the left 
generally. The left has always been anti-status quo, pro-freedom and 
revolutionary. The left does not confirm to customs, it rejuvenates, and it is 
for egalitarian distribution. Well, when I think of it, if I am a Muslim, I 
should be a leftist a hundred percent. When you look at the word right, right 
is pro status-quo, conservative. Conservation is just trying to maintain the 
current situation. You know what that is, that is to close your eyes to 
change. You will be grateful for what you have. I am a Muslim, I cannot be 
a rightist. I can never be a conservative (interview, 22.04.2011).66 
 
In many instances, what is associated with status-quo is Kemalism, hence who is 
more conservative is judged by who holds on to ancient privileges. A more theoretical 
stance on whether being religious necessarily implies being conservative, here is the 
take on by D.E:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
66 Ben diyorum ki, müslümandan sağcı olmaz. Müslüman solcudur, çünkü genel 
anlamda bakın Türkiye anlamlarını konuĢmuyorum. Genel anlamda sola baktığınız 
zaman, sol her zaman statükoya baĢkaldıran, özgürlükçü ve yenilikçi bir çizgidedir. 
Sol, genel teamülleri kabul etmez, yeniler kendini, eĢit paylaĢımdan yanadır. E, Ģimdi 
düĢünüyorum, ben Müslümansam sapına kadar solcuyum kardeĢim. Sağ kelimesine 
baktığınız zaman, sağ statükocudur, muhafazakârdır, muhafaza etmek var olan durumu 
muhafaza etmek, bu nedir biliyor musunuz? Yeniliğe gözünüzü kapatacaksınız. Olanla 
yetineceksiniz. Ben Müslümanım sağcı olamam, kardeĢim, muhafazakâr hiç olamam.  
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   Theoretically speaking, both capitalism and traditionalism can be serious 
problems. I always think there should be an alternative between these. I 
believe Islam also approaches it this way. Islam never says this: What is 
traditional is religious. The Koran never totally praises what is new or what 
is traditional. The past is not altogether bad, either. We can take positive 
examples from the past (interview, 23.03.2011).67 
 
The desire to disassociate religion from conservatism is a factor in all these 
accounts. I.K describes being labeled as one of the worst forms of violence. For her, 
being Islamist is different from both conservatism and fundamentalism:  
 
   It is AKP which created this association between being Muslim and 
conservatism. What is there to conserve? It is getting really complicated at 
this point. The issue of conservative democrat, well there are no democrats 
left, it is all conservatives. I have nothing to do with conservatism. None of 
the people like me can. This is because it is something that narrows our 
horizons. There is nothing worse than being defined categorically by others. 
It sounds awkward when people call me “dinci” or conservative. But it does 
not sound weird when they call me an Islamist (interview, 22.04.2011).68 
 
There are also many instances in which conservatism was defined in a way to 
include not just the ruling party, the religiously motivated, but also the Kemalists, the 
average citizen claiming to have a secular public persona. Conservatism is defined in a 
way to include anyone or group that resists what is different, unexpected or not 
mainstream. Here is what B.C thinks:  
 
 
                                                          
67 Teorik çerçevede iĢte, kapitalizm de bir sorundur, gelenek de ciddi bir sorundur. 
Ġkisinin ortasında bir alternatif olması gerektiğini düĢünürüm. Ġslamın da bu Ģekilde 
yaklaĢtığını düĢünüyorum.  Ġslam hiçbir zaman Ģunu söylemez: “Geleneksel olan her 
zaman dinidir”.  Kuran‟da hiçbir zaman ne tamamen yeni olan, ne de tamamen 
geleneksel olan övülmez de yerilmez de aynı Ģekilde. GeçmiĢ tamamen kötü değildir, 
geçmiĢten de iyi örnekler alınabilir. 
 
68 Müslümanların muhafazakâr olarak tanımlanması AKP ile gelen bir Ģey. 
Muhafaza etmek de, neyi muhafaza etmek? Bu noktada karmaĢık herĢey. Aslında 
muhafazakâr demokrat meselesi de, aslında demokratlık da kalmadı, sadece 
muhafazakâr var. Benim muhafazakârlıkla bir bağlantım olamaz. Benim gibi insanlar 
arasında da yok. Çünkü o bizi, ufkumuzu daraltan bir Ģey. Aslında tanımlanmaktan 
daha büyük bir Ģiddet yok.  Dinci denmesi bana ne kadar garip geliyorsa, muhafazakâr 
denmesi de garip geliyor. Ama mesela Ġslamcı denmesi garip gelmiyor. 
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   When we say conservatism, the first thing that comes to our mind is 
people who associate themselves with Islam and our ensuing prejudices 
about them. This is not what I intend to mean. For me, conservatism is to 
treat a person as non-existent because you cannot stand that person and 
meddling into his/her existence because of that. So in principle somebody 
who looks modern, secular and who claims to be a democrat may not 
restrain him/herself from saying a word when he/she sees a veiled woman. 
Alternatively, a religious person who knows how sinful it is to oppress 
others may interfere in the life of another person, when he thinks that person 
is off the track/derailed. The examples can be multiplied. I consider it very 
important to question what is considered norm/normal in different contexts 
and find a pool of values specific to each context (online blog, 
23.05.2008).69 
 
There is an important lesson in the above quote with regards to how to be 
successful in aligning different frames.  If activists can find commonalities between 
different forms of conservatisms in different contexts, a strategy can be developed 
against all forms of status-quo defenders, be it Kemalists or other types of conservatives 
(including religious conservatives). One suggestion is to talk about conservatism 
involved in the application of secularism in this country.  The implementation of 
secularism is conservative because it is restricting the liberties of not just one type of 
women (the religious) but also other outcasts which do not fit the official definition of 
an ideal female citizen. Here is what O.P thinks on the topic:  
 
   I support the definition of conservatism that relates to the pressures from 
the ultra-secular people. I also believe conservatism can marginalize not just 
veiled women but other women as well: Armenian women, lesbian women, 
Kurdish women…Why did I like the term ultra-secular? If you grow up in 
Turkey, even when you consider yourself religious, you are affiliated with 
secularism. Secularism is problematic when it is used not for protecting 
liberties but conscribing them. The type that is used to conscribe others‟ 
                                                          
69 Muhafazakârlık deyince genelde akla hemen dindar, kendini Ġslam'la 
özdeĢleĢtiren insanlar ve onlar üzerine geliĢtirdiğimiz önyargılar silsilesi geliyor ki, 
benim kastettiğim hiç böyle bir Ģey değil. Bence muhafazakârlık bir insanın baĢkasının 
varlığına tahammül edemediği için onu yok sayması, hatta bir adım öteye giderek onun 
varlığına müdahale etmesi.  Yani, son derece modern görünümlü, laik ve hatta 
demokrat olduğunu vurgulayan biri baĢörtülü (veya tesettürlü) birini gördüğünde 
kendini tutamadan karĢısına 'en azından' bir laf etmeden duramayabiliyor veya dindar 
olduğunu,  zulümle iliĢkisini kesinlikle günah olduğunu sürekli vurgulayan biri 
karĢısındakinin 'yoldan çıktığını' düĢündüğünde ona müdahale edebiliyor. Örnekleri 
çoğaltmak mümkün. Bu noktada, değiĢik bağlamlarda norm/normal olarak kabul 
edileni bulup sorgulamanın ve hatta bu sorgulamadan bir "değer havuzu" yapmanın 
oldukça önemli olduğunu düĢünüyorum. 
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liberties I call conservative secularism or ultra-secularism. We should 
emphasize the masculine nature of this conservative/ultra-secularism more 
(online blog, 23.05.2008).70 
 
The commonality in all these different types of conservatisms is evident. It is 
targeting women, no matter how different they may be from each other. As long as 
these different conservatisms are restricting life practices of different women, they are 
ideologies equally worthy to be fought against by this coalition. Another interviewee 
argues all the ideologies in currency in Turkey have a stake in the status-quo and they 
actually overlap on many fronts. Different conservatisms have a commonality when it 
comes to nationalism or raison d‟état. E.F says:  
 
   Conservatism is charged with very negative meanings for my generation. 
It is an ideology that is based on protecting the wealth, interests and status-
quo of rich men. For later generations it seems to have other meanings. The 
preservation of important values is a very amorphous term. Which values? 
According to what criteria? It is all so apparent that leftist conservatives and 
conservatives on the right overlap on the basis of having the same values 
(secularism, nationalism, Kemalism, sacred state etc…) or fight each other 
on the basis of the values of the people, the republic etc… As expressed 
elsewhere, sometimes only the women and the family remain to be 
preserved. In reality, what we (Muslims) and leftists claim to hold in high 
esteem such as the rights of the poor, the orphan, the oppressed, equality, 
justice, to avoid conspicuous consumption, ethical and moral values of this 
sort can never be in conformity with conservatism, capitalism or liberalism. 
These are values that will remain as our moral values as long as humans are 
valued as human beings. These are the basic tenets of both religion and 
Marxism. Long live the union of morality and Marxism then (online blog, 
08.08.2008)!71 
                                                          
70 Laiklerden (ya da benim deyimimle ultra laik) gelen baskıyla ilgili, 
muhafazakârlık tanımlamasına katılıyorum. Ve o muhafazakârlığın sadece örtülü 
kadınları değil daha bir çok kadını marjinalize ettiğini daha önce çok kere söyledik 
(ama kiminle?) Örnekler: Ermeni kadınlar, lezbiyen kadınlar, Kürt kadınlar. Ultra-laik 
kelimesini niye sevdim? Türkiye'de yetiĢmiĢsek, dindar da olsak laikliğe bulaĢıyoruz 
gibi geliyor. Laikliğin özgürlükleri korumak adına değil de sınırlamak adına 
kullanılması ile ilgili problemlerimiz var sadece. Sınırlamak adına kullanılmasına da 
muhafazakâr laiklik veya ultra laiklik demeyi tercih ediyorum. Bu sınırlayıcı 
muhafazakâr/ultra laikliğin eril kimliğine de değinebilir miyiz hazır çoğulluğundan 
bahsederken?” 
 
71 Muhafazakârlık, sanırım bizim kuĢak için, (yanılmıyosam aynı kuĢaktanız. 
50‟deyim ben) olumsuz çağrıĢımlarla yüklü. Mesela benim için servetinin, çıkarının, 
iĢine gelen mevcut durumun muhafazasının peĢinde olan bir takım kalantor adamların 
ideolojisi. Sonraki kuĢaklar için anladığım o ki, daha farklı anlamlar ihtiva ediyor. 
Değerli değerlerin muhafazası gibi. Böyle de olsa çok amorf bir kavram. Hangi 
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As the discussions reveal, conservatism is evaluated on three axes. One is its 
relationship to capitalism. Most members of the platform argued explicitly how 
conservatism serves the interests of capitalism. A very convincing example is with 
respect to the labor force participation patterns of veiled women. For veiled women, the 
commonsensical assumption that women may need the veil in order to find jobs easier 
in a male dominated environment is totally misplaced. Veiled women make it explicit 
how educated veiled women are exploited by Islamic firms. These women, since they 
cannot easily find employment in other venues, would settle for any salary offered and 
can easily be hired and fired at will. This example was also given by O.P as proof that 
male hegemony operates irrespective of one‟s dress codes:  
 
   It was months ago. People put forward the weird idea that women started 
veiling because they wanted to find jobs more easily. Someone should 
explain how Islamic firms crush the educated, highly qualified veiled 
women. Let me do it myself: According to such firms, the veiled women 
who are graduates of engineering/business/economics programs of good 
universities cannot find a job elsewhere. They can be employed for a low 
wage at the same position for years (online blog, 23.05.2008).72  
 
This strand of critique has a potential to align leftist progressive critiques of 
capitalism with Islamist leftism. Here is a quote by I.K, along this line:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
değerler? Kime, neye gore? ĠĢte ortada. Sağ muhafazakâr, sol muhafazakar aynı 
değerlerde birleĢiyor (laiklik, milliyetçilik, Kemalizm, kutsal devlet falan) veya 
kavgaya tutuĢabiliyor, halkın değerleri, cumhuriyetin değerleri diye. Y‟nin dediği gibi 
sadece aile ve kadın kalıyor bazan, muhafazaya değer. Oysa bizlerin, bizim Ġslam diye, 
sizin Marksizm diye sahip çıktığımız, muhafazasına veya dirilmesine çalıĢtığımız 
değerler, iĢte yoksulun, yetimin, mazlumun hakkı, eĢitlik, adalet, israf-lüks tüketimden 
kaçınmak, etik değerler veya ahlak gibi, her neyse, evet ne muhafazakârlıkla, ne 
kapitalizmle, ne liberallikle bağdaĢır. Aslında bunlar insan, insan olarak kaldıkça, 
insani değerler ve evet manevi değerler.  Her dinin temel ilkeleri ve Marksizmin de.  O 
halde sorunun cevabı, “YaĢasın maneviyat ve Marksizm birlikteliği!” 
 
72 Aylar önceydi, kadınların daha kolay iĢ bulmak icin örtünmeye baĢladığı gibi 
anlamakta güçlük çektiğim bir iddia ortaya atılmıĢtı yine. Türkiye'de özellikle kaliteli, 
eğitimli ve aynı zamanda örtülü kadınları, Ġslami kimliğiyle tanınan Ģirketlerin nasıl da 
ezdiğini anlatmak lazım. Hadi anlatayım: Türkiye'nin iyi üniversitelerinden 
mühendislik/iĢletme/ekonomi vb bölümlerinden mezun örtülü kadınlara bu Ģirketlerin 
bakıĢına göre, bu kadınlar zaten baĢka yerde iĢ bulamaz, düĢük maaĢla ve yıllarca aynı 
pozisyonda çalıĢtırabilirler.  
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   I did some readings on Marxism and Leninism in my university years. We 
decided to do some reading on Marxism as Muslim women. Imam 
Khomeini had created economic policies with a leftist discourse. He said the 
following: “In Sunni tradition, if you are earning your money in legitimate 
ways, you can earn as much as you want. Can you save though?” For 
Khomeini, this is not possible. Even if you earn money in the most 
legitimate way, some of your earnings can be taken away. Because you have 
to give zakat until it remedies the inequalities in society. For example, it is 
said that you have to give 1/40th of your property as zakat. However, 
Khomeini said that even when you give this much, if the inequalities persist, 
then you have to give more so that equality is finally achieved. This is not 
being against property.  You are just fine with giving three cents as zakat 
while your neighbor is sleeping on an empty stomach. What kind of 
philosophy is this? How are you going to be one of us with this philosophy? 
You will have to continue giving until that neighbor of yours also has a 
minimum level of decency in his life. Ali ġeriati also said things along this 
line. He analyzed the class society from an Islamic perspective really well. 
Let‟s look at Muslim‟s lives today. Look what a class society we have. 
Look how deep it is becoming. They patronize the poor girl at the textile 
sweatshop (overlokçu kız). It is as if they feel pity, but they want that girl to 
stay where she is. They live in mansions; go to shopping in Europe… This 
is a new bourgeoisie, intelligentsia. What kind of intellectualism is this? To 
exist by conquering and possessing more. What is being presented to us is 
just the wild urge to possess more (interview, 22.04.2011).73 
 
                                                          
73 Ben üniversite yıllarında Marksist okumalar yapmıĢtım, Lenin okumuĢtum. Son 
derece aĢinaydım.  B. A ile Müslüman kadınlar Marksist okumaları yapmaya karar 
verdi. Ġmam Homeyni tam bir sol söylemle ekonomi politikaları oluĢturmaya 
baĢlamıĢtır. O Ģöyle demiĢti:”Sünni gelenekte, eğer sen meĢru yoldan kazanıyorsan 
sonsuza kadar kazanabilirsin”. Biriktirebilir misin? Humeyni ise “Hayır, asla böyle bir 
Ģey yok”. Ne kadar helal yoldan da kazanırsan, belli bir kazançtan sonra senin 
kazandıklarına el konulabilir. Çünkü toplumda büyük bir eĢitsizlik varsa bu eĢitsizlik 
giderilene kadar zekât verilecektir. Mesela Ģöyle söylenir: Zekât verirsin, malının kırkta 
biri kadar. Tamam, ama bu zekat verildikten sonra hala toplumda eĢitlik kurulamamıĢsa 
Humeyni olacak “Tekrar” dedi. Yeter ki o eĢitlik tekrar sağlansın. Yani bu mülkiyet 
düĢmanlığı değil ama bu “KomĢun aç yatarken tok yatan bizden değildir”. Bu nasıl 
gerçekleĢecek? Peki, sen zekatını verdin, kafan rahat üç kuruĢ verdin diye. E bu nasıl 
felsefe? Nasıl komĢusu aç yatarken tok yatan bizden olacak? O komĢunun açlığı da 
giderilene kadar, o da asgari bir yaĢam standardında yaĢayana kadar sen vermeye 
devam edeceksin, mecbursun. Ali ġeriati de bu yönde inanılmaz Ģeyler yazdı. Bu sınıflı 
toplumu Ġslami açıdan çok iyi analiz etti. Müslümanların hayatına bakalım, hem de ne 
biçim sınıflı, hem de ne kadar giderek derinleĢiyor, overlokçu kızlar aĢağılaması. Güya 
acıyorlar ama bir yandan da birileri overlokçu kız olarak kalsın. Öte yandan o 
overlokçu kızın asla selam bile veremeyeceği asla biraraya gelemeyeceği villalarda 
yaĢayan, Avrupa‟da alıĢveriĢe giden bir kadın güruhu ve erkek guruhu türedi.  Bu da 
burjuva, ya da entelijensiya. Ne alaka, entellektüellik bu mudur? Sahip olarak ele 
geçirerek varolmak. Takdim edilen Ģey tamamen sıradan vahĢi sahip olma dürtülerine 
hitap eden bir Ģey.  
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The other nexus is between conservatism and Kemalism. For members, any 
ideology which is associated with preserving political and economic privileges of a 
segment of the population and which is exclusionary towards others who do not fit its 
standards is conservative. Kemalism fits this definition quite well as its principles of 
secularism usually worked to the detriment of a segment of the population, especially 
veiled women as they were the ones mostly excluded from education and labor market 
for this reason. 
How is the discussion on conservatism linked to gender issue however? If 
analyzed deeper, one realizes that conservatism which is portrayed as in perfect 
harmony with capitalism or Kemalism is seen as a “male ideology”. This means it 
works to the advantage of men and at the expense of women. How it works as a male 
ideology has been explained several times by members. With respect to how 
conservatism goes hand in hand with capitalism that benefits men, the article above was 
mentioning that conservative men in this country are quick to adapt to wealth 
accumulation and conspicuous consumption while they remain committed to limiting 
women to private sphere, hence restricting their capabilities. 
This shows religious members of the platform are as critical of domestic 
arrangements that disfavor women as any other member. Their commitment to 
motherhood and family does not negate the fact that the control of women in the private 
sphere and how they are exploited economically is an equally grave problem for them.  
In a similar fashion, Kemalist conservatism in its worst forms showed its effects 
on women, rather than men, especially after 28
th
 of February in the form of expulsion 
from higher education and public service. Kemalist ideology, according to these 
women, shows its negative effects asymmetrically on women rather than men. Given 
this resemblance, many of the religious women admit having a battle on two fronts, one 
with Kemalists, and the other with religious conservatives. 
The alignment with respect to the opposition to conservative ideologies proves 
solid ground on which the platform maintains solidarity. This also shows, as long as 
political ideologies are seen to benefit men rather than women, platform members are 
able to re-define and re-cast ideologies on the basis of their exclusionary implications 
for women in a similar fashion to their opposition to the regulation of public space and 
dress codes by males. 
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This finding resonates well with the arguments of Aldıkaçtı who argued that both 
reformist Islamist women and feminists have a potential to collaborate on the basis of 
empowering women. When one takes a look at the points of consensus with respect to 
conservatism, one sees that the main criticism is about how men use various ideologies 
to limit the capabilities of women, i.e. in the education and labor market. Hence 
improving the options of women in terms of making use of their capabilities emerges as 
the main theme on which there is agreement.   
The question of what women would want to do with these capabilities is an 
entirely different matter. Aldıkaçtı argued that the basic difference between reformist 
Islamists and feminists stems from how such improved capabilities are put to use, for 
collective purposes in the case of the former and for individual autonomy in the latter 
case. We cannot make a generalization about the motivations of different women in 
demanding such improvements in their lives. However, we can clearly argue that 
restrictions on both public visibility (i.e. patrolling of the streets by the male gaze, 
harassment) and integration into public life through education and labor markets is a 
common ground from which these women attack male hegemony. 
 
 
 
4.4.  Frame Alignment on Gender Relations: Recapitulation 
 
 
 
The usual depiction of the scene of women‟s activism in Turkey is one of 
ideological differences and identity divisions. Even those scholars who believe in the 
proximity in positions with respect to gender issues between different groups of women 
stress that allegiances to other identities are insurmountable barriers in front of 
women‟s solidarity.  
Due to this reason, for a long time, collaborations between different factions 
within the women‟s movement have taken place for other campaigns that are not 
necessarily gender-related. For example, anti-military campaigns and peace coalitions 
were fertile ground on which different women could cooperate. 
This platform proves an exception to this trend. Despite the fact that there is no 
consensus on taking “private as political” or on gender equality, women of different 
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convictions are able to formulate frames that serve gender interests at the macro level. 
The initial impulse for this rapprochement can be attributed to the disillusionment of 
women from their own social groups where they clearly observed how women and their 
interests always came secondary.   
Some of the members realized even at times when their social group was under 
intense pressure by the state (i.e. 28th of February) men suffer the consequences 
marginally while the main burden is on women‟s shoulders. Others came to the 
conclusion that even the most progressive male comrades (i.e. in leftist organizations) 
who want rights and freedoms for the marginals of society are rather mute or 
unsophisticated in their ideas when it comes to the rights of the women.  
While these parallel disillusionments can provide fertile ground to launch a 
common line of attack, the coalition still needed to acknowledge these diverse 
experiences of women. In an attempt to align their frames, we observe that women 
make use of their differences in an efficient manner. Differences in life style serve to 
show that women get the same treatment irrespective of what type of life they are 
leading.  
The members are not claiming all women are the same or that they are dealing 
with the same social/state-induced pressures in their day-to-day interactions. However, 
they are still able to show that at the end of the day, they suffer the same regulations on 
their body, employment choices, domestic decisions etc… 
What is common in the frames of the coalition is their ability to show how 
regulations on women‟s bodies and conduct, no matter how different reasons or 
ideologies they may be serving, ultimately benefit males. We have observed that in 
ongoing discussions, women are able to achieve a consensus at the theoretical level 
about the links between male regulation of female bodies; the economic regulation of 
female labor, how conservatism works through to control women‟s behavior both 
within the home and outside. 
By delineating one‟s desire to put restrictions on self (veiling) from restrictions 
imposed by males (patrolling the streets), veiled women are approaching non-veiled 
women in their desire to lift restrictions on female bodies. By way of showing how 
conservatism furthers men‟s financial interests while exploiting women‟s labor, at least 
some of the members have an alignment on the side of a more re-distributionist agenda. 
On a more general note, by way of showing how conservative ideologies are used to 
hold on to ancient privileges of a political regime, members of the coalition show how 
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women can never be conservatives as they never benefited from any privileges under 
any political era or regime.  
This analysis shows women of different backgrounds are able to bridge their 
differences when it comes to aligning against common targets that are disfavoring 
women. However, these targets are not set in stone. The platform, in order to cater to 
the needs of different groups of women, has moving targets. In one occasion the target 
can be as clear as a state policy that is limiting the choices of women: i.e. the veil ban. 
At other times, it can be the underlying patriarchy that is causing those state policies. 
The moving nature of the targets gives the coalition the flexibility to embrace the 
concerns and needs of different groups of women. This can be considered an explicit 
strategy to be able to accommodate the needs of different women.  
Whether joint criticism of conservatism or male hegemony can be translated into 
concrete campaigns in the future is an important question that remains unanswered in 
this thesis due to the short time span of the activism of this coalition.  For now, we do 
not know whether ideological re-alignment does necessarily imply joint activism. This 
means whether theoretical alignments would actually bring about a behavioral change 
that will ultimately show itself in concrete activism. There are indications that this is in 
fact possible. With respect to regulation of female bodies, both veiled and non-veiled 
women participated to a protest which was orchestrated against the police behavior to a 
woman who was accused of wearing improper clothing while fishing on Galata bridge.74  
This incident shows women do in fact protest regulation of female bodies by males 
irrespective of the degree to which they cover their bodies.  Another joint activism has 
taken place recently in the campaign of KA-DER prior to general elections where 
veiled women were shown as candidates for MP positions in KA-DER advertisements 
as well as for the campaign named “BaĢörtülü Aday Yoksa Oy da Yok”. Many of the 
activists of BSÇ have taken primary roles in both campaigns. These examples also 
show there is an alignment in activism that follows the alignment in frames on 
patriarchy and conservatism.    
The importance of identifying targets and opponents clearly for the sustainability 
of a coalition was mentioned in the literature review (Diani and Bison, 2004, p.285). 
This ability is also evident in this coalition as exemplified in the analysis of frame 
alignments on gender relations. However, what is more important for the purposes of 
                                                          
74 http://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/108135-kadinlar-galata-koprusunu-terk-etmedi 
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this study is to identify how the coalition deals with its internal diversity. The scholars 
who draw attention to the ability of coalitions to define their strategic adversaries also 
argue that the networks among actors mobilizing on a common goal take a purely 
contingent and instrumental shape (Diani and Bison, 2004). This proposition is true if 
coalitions exist solely for fighting strategic adversaries but not so much for discovering 
and valuing their own internal diversity. This distinction was mentioned when I talked 
about the transformation women‟s movement went through both in Turkey and abroad. 
When women‟s movement discovered the diversity within itself, it gradually turned 
inward to make sense of this internal diversity. This turning inward eventually helped it 
embrace other intersecting and parallel running rights struggles as these different 
struggles started being seen as complementary rather than rival.     
This turning inward signifies that important talk within a coalition is not 
necessarily or solely strategic talk but could be a more reflexive and critical talk. This 
proposition will become evident in the next chapter where I will talk about how framing 
internal diversity takes place within the coalition. The debate on internal diversity and 
how it is handled will also reveal whether all coalitions are ultimately interest groups 
who pit themselves against a strategic adversary in a unitary fashion or whether there 
are coalitions which promote more personalized and authentic forms of alignments 
which rely on valuing particularities of its constituent members.  
This analysis will also reveal whether coalitions can exist without the existence of 
a unitary identity and in the presence of discrete or intersecting identities through which 
the coalition has to craft its message through. The analysis has the potential to bear 
important results for the study of cross-movement mobilizations and multicultural 
democracy theories as well. Multicultural democracy theorists assert that if movements 
or coalitions draw on particular experiences of different groups, we will have a more 
nuanced perspective on the ways in which discrimination and oppression play out for 
different groups in society. However such theories usually fall short of explaining how 
a sense of we-ness or solidarity can be achieved amid diversity in the long run. The next 
chapter will be a discussion of this question in more detail.  
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Chapter 5.  Framing Group Diversity and Identity: 
Personalized Reciprocity as a Substitute for the Lack of a Common Identity 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter I have shown how coalition members were able to identify 
targets and opponents with respect to gender relations. Despite leading different life 
styles and suffering from diverse societal/state induced pressures, the coalition 
members were still able to align their frames with respect to their strategic adversaries. 
While doing this, they were able to capitalize on the fact that despite leading different 
life styles, they were still suffering as women in this country.  
Drawing on experiences of womanhood was the initial thrust behind the 
establishment of this coalition. However, this initial thrust gradually gave way to the 
more sensitive task of handling the inner diversity within the coalition.  This shows, at 
least in this coalition, the sole purpose of setting up this initiative was not just fighting 
various adversaries but also coming to terms with difference. This gradual shift in 
attention also conforms to the general pattern within women‟s movement where the 
movement started with defining a generic woman‟s interest but moved into embracing 
other intersecting and parallel running rights struggles as these different struggles 
started being seen as complementary rather than rival to women‟s movement. Lyndia 
Burns, Fraser and Young all point out to the advantages of paying attention to parallel 
running struggles as well as the internal diversity within women‟s movement. 
In line with this strand in the literature, this coalition also came to terms with and 
dealt with identity differences of its participants. This chapter will question how this 
task was handled, what type of problems emerged and elaborate on some of the 
available options for coalitions to overcome such pressures. The findings of this chapter 
have important repercussions for the analysis of coalitions in social movement research. 
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First of all, the findings will show that important talk within a coalition is not 
necessarily or solely strategic talk that is geared towards attacking adversaries but could 
be a more reflexive and critical talk that values and cherishes internal diversity. It will 
show that heterogeneous coalitions which promote more personalized and authentic 
forms of alignments and which rely on valuing particularities of its constituent 
members have a higher chance of surviving the pressures of conforming to a singular 
identity. 
As argued at the end of the previous chapter, this analysis has the potential to bear 
important results for the study of cross-movement mobilizations and multicultural 
democracy theories as well. Multicultural democracy theorists assert that if movements 
or coalitions draw on particular experiences of different groups, we will have a more 
nuanced perspective on the ways in which discrimination and oppression play out for 
different groups in society. However such theories usually fall short of explaining 
whether drawing on different experiences of groups within a coalition actually meets 
the needs for recognition of its constituent members. 
This chapter will be a discussion of this question in more detail. Negotiations that 
take place within the coalition with respect to how platform members try to create a 
sense of solidarity without undermining the distinct identities of members takes the 
center stage of my analysis. I will show that there are different types of reciprocity that 
can be used for this purpose and that they all have their advantages and drawbacks.  
The important question for this coalition and many similar coalitions that do not 
exhibit one single unifying identity is: What is the right type of reciprocity for 
maintaining a coalition of this sort? Different types of reciprocity reveal important cues 
as to the degree of interaction with other groups as well as the level of reflexivity and 
critical distance achieved vis-à-vis one‟s identity. 
The debate on whether identity politics has been divisive or potentially valuable 
for progressive social change has grown in importance especially with respect to new 
social movements in the last two decades. Prominent leftist critics of identity politics 
have long argued that, struggling for group specific rights has a divisive influence on 
achieving better living conditions for all (Hobsbawn, 1996; Gitlin, 1995). Such 
splintering of rights struggles detract attention away from the assault of neo-liberal 
ideology on the disadvantaged in general. By focusing on the particular group interest, 
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we lose track of the more macro processes at work that is harming a wider segment of 
society.75  
This has most to do with the fact that identity struggles are seen as narrow 
minded, selfish and parochial. Groups which are concerned with the promotion of their 
specific identity are incapable of going beyond their own identity boundaries and make 
rights claims for other groups, or envision a broader solution for similar identity 
struggles. 
In contrast to theorists who believe in the divisive influence of identity politics, 
theorists of multicultural democracy think citizens can engage issues across differences 
of identity while also articulating specific identity-based claims. Hence identity politics 
and inter-identity politics do not have to be mutually exclusive. To give an example, 
there can be “African-Americans in support of lesbian and gay rights, rejecting a false 
choice between pursuing essential group interests and upholding a generic common 
good (Lichterman, 1999, p.101).  
Iris Marion Young (2006) is among the pioneers of political theorists who believe 
that we do not have to transcend difference in order to forge a more unified and 
effective movement. Trying to maintain a workable coalition while preserving diversity 
is easier said than done. However, she thinks there are clear benefits in opting in this 
direction. Through a careful analysis of radical movements in the USA she draws the 
conclusion that such coalitions are indeed doable and workable. 
She attacks leftist critics such as Weinstein (1996) and Gitlin (1995) who think 
left has been impotent since 1960s because it has fragmented into gender, racial and 
ethnic groupings.  Scholars like Weinstein and Gitlin believe group based political 
enclaves have eroded the unified left‟s commitment to equality and its ability to 
organize Americans against capitalist greed and misery (Young, 2006, p.12). While 
admitting that in 1960s and 1970s, groups within the general leftist framework were too 
much focused on their specific experience of oppression and each struggled to have his 
                                                          
 
75 Secondly, liberals attack identity politics on the grounds that rights should be 
distributed in an identity-blind fashion if we are to claim that a state is treating its 
citizens in a neutral fashion. State is not a responsible agent for caring about any 
particular community, it has to treat its citizens individually in a dignified fashion and 
this should suffice. More communitarian political philosophers such as Charles Taylor 
and Michael Sandel try to explain why celebrating diversity of communities/groups and 
creating special policies for their needs are desirable.  
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version be taken more seriously by the others, this initial hardening of boundaries gave 
way to a more nuanced understanding on the matrix of disadvantage and oppression 
currently.  For her, in the current era, politics of identity is a misnomer and different 
groups within the larger Left have come to the maturity of recognizing the specificity of 
gender, race, and sexual oppression and modified their programs and analysis 
accordingly (Young, 2006, p.13). 
What Young (2006) finds problematic in leftist critics of identity politics is their 
assumption that that specificity of experience in public life is the expression of narrow 
and rigidly defined group interest. As such leftist critics usually problematize the neo-
liberal economic restructuring as their primary concern; they prefer a “people before 
profits” agenda as the ideal substitute for this divisive bickering between groups. 
Young‟s argument (2006) is that a powerful alternative route exists between 
group specific interests and difference-blind common good agendas. She thinks a 
coalition that draws on particular experiences and perspectives of different groups will 
endow us with an enlarged understanding of the depth of society‟s injustices and ways 
to address them (p.17). 
Young as well as other theorists of multicultural democracy (Fraser, 1997; Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2001) are also known as radical democracy theorists because they envision 
an indefinite expansion of democratic participation in social life beyond the bounds of 
the modern liberal state (Lichterman, 1999, p.135). They believe in the virtues of open-
ended critical conversations between identity groups. Multicultural democracy theorists 
also attribute great importance to Habermas‟ public sphere concept as it provides us 
with a generic explanation as to the social settings in which people debate issues and 
revise their positions. However, unlike the classic articulation of Habermas‟s public 
sphere concept they refine his theory to include multiple and fragmented spaces that are 
connected with each other at varying degrees.76 Lichterman (1999, p.104) calls such 
spaces as “forum”, that is interactional spaces allowing identity groups to discuss 
opinions freely, and for discussing critically the varied identities that activists claim. 
For him, a group contains a forum quality to the extent that “it values critically 
reflexive discussions about member‟s interests and collective identity, apart from 
                                                          
76 They also hear voices of diverse identity groups rather than generic citizen 
voice as explained by Habermas‟ original theory.  
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strategizing identity and interests to gain more members or influence. To the extent that 
a group is a forum, members converse and learn together as an end in itself.”  
As was mentioned in the literature review section, feminists discovered the merits 
of working with other groups when a range of past gains such as abortion rights, equal 
pay became under threat. Such examples stress the strategic aspect of joining other 
groups because isolationism does not pay off. However, communication with dissenting 
groups involves more than strategic talk about tactics (Lichterman, 1999; McAdam, 
1992) Historical work shows that social movements have been crucial sites for 
Americans to discuss new opinions and try out new identities (Fraser, 1992; Cohen and 
Arato, 1992).  
For instance, alliances within women‟s movement have emerged from a 
realization that there are intersectionalities and diversities within an identity category 
that rule out a single monolithic perspective on the interests of that particular group. 
Burns (2006, p.2) gives this example with respect to feminists who admitted the 
inadequacy of the assumptions of common oppression of all women. The type of 
oppression and the ways in which it is experienced can only make sense if we break 
down that particular womanhood into its proper ethnic, religious, age, sexual preference 
and even geography categories. With the acceptance that even the category of 
womanhood is not uniform, the movement has become more ready to embrace diversity 
and work through it.  
Young‟s thesis was that if we draw on particular experiences of different groups, 
we will have a more nuanced perspective on the ways in which discrimination and 
oppression play out for different groups in society. This will give strength to our 
arguments and to our struggle. However, what is missing from this theory is that 
coalitions do not come into existence just by drawing on different experiences of 
various groups within its ranks but they also want to nurture solidarity across avenues 
of difference.  
McCorkel and Rodriquez (2009) argue that solidarity is accomplished across two 
levels of identity work. The first one is collective identity level. They think shared 
definitions of collective identity are facilitated not only through reinforcing 
commonalities but also in drawing boundaries that mark an “us” from a “them” (p.360). 
Much of the movement literature explains how solidarity is enhanced through targeting 
political enemies and hostile institutions. This task was covered in the previous chapter. 
By showing how different women could still align against various targets, be it the state 
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as a field of contest for brave men or societal customs that limit the life choices of 
women, I showed how this boundary drawing against strategic adversaries was 
accomplished.  
The other level through which this solidarity is achieved is through engaging with 
the self. How participants align their own identity with the collective is the focus of 
analysis here. Members must modify their definition of the self to include the collective 
identity of the movement (Gamson, 1992, p.60). This does not mean that this collective 
identity determines 100 % who you are or the boundaries of your personality, but it 
should be able to say something about your aspirations, your attitude and perception 
about political issues. Movements provide a forum in which members experiment with 
new identities, reconstruct their biographies and relate to others who are differently 
situated (McCorkel and Rodriquez, 2009, p.361).  
This study is based on the premise that how the self is envisioned in a coalition 
carries important repercussions for how inclusive and how progressive that coalition is. 
In line with McCorkel, if social movements leave enough room for participants to 
experiment with who they are and what they are capable of becoming, this 
experimentation will create an opening for mutual recognition and progressive social 
action. Whether this experimentation was successfully carried out in this coalition will 
become the focal point of analysis in the coming pages. 
 
 
 
5.1.  Original framing Strategy: Differences in Life-style as a Strength of the 
Coalition 
 
 
 
As was explained in the previous chapter, the coalition members were able to 
utilize the differences among women as strength rather than a weakness. In other words, 
while determining their targets, the other intersecting identities such as being veiled or 
not, were not thought as impediments. They were in fact utilized in raising the point 
that women suffer in similar fashions despite having different intersecting identities. 
In fact, for the women of the coalition, presenting differences as insurmountable 
barriers to collaboration only serves to divide women‟s movement. By way of 
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emphasizing those differences, members wanted to convey the image that even under 
the assumption that there are clear contrasts in life style among women activists, they 
still suffer in a similar fashion from various societal/state-induced pressure. 
I argued that contrasts in life style can actually serve an important purpose for 
coalitions. By showing that despite discernable differences, marginalized groups are 
getting similar treatment from state and society; constituent members are able to draw 
important conclusions as to the nature of injustice as well as ways to attack it. If, for 
example, both lesbian women and veiled women are kept outside the labor force, then it 
is not so much the sexual orientation or religiosity of a woman that is the issue but 
rather how women, in their unique but parallel ways are discouraged from entering the 
labor market. A veiled woman may feel her expulsion is due to the interpretation of 
secularism in this country, a lesbian woman may blame public morality but they happen 
to be punished as a woman. This was the basic reason why both the kick-off declaration 
as well as ensuing discussions did not define a single target such the state or the veil 
ban but opted for designating moving targets such as public morality, secularism, 
patriarchy and conservatism. Although giving the impression that there is no clear sense 
of direction, the moving nature of their targets actually gives the coalition the flexibility 
needed to accommodate the interests of all the women taking part in this initiative.    
So far, I have pointed out to the ways in which differences in life style were used 
strategically to serve the interests of the coalition. This framing strategy was used 
mostly to convince outside audiences hence it represents the public face of the coalition 
in a persuasive way. However, there is also a downside in using contrasts 
instrumentally and not making them items for negotiation on their own. 
Differences in identity or contrasts in life style may not just be instruments for 
strategic cooperation but may start being perceived as markers of difference that have to 
be reconciled in order to secure the cohesive functioning of a coalition.  Members may 
feel the need to prove that life style differences or different life choices are not an 
impediment in front of effective collaboration. The consequence of this type of thinking 
is the following: Members may want to disprove the damaging effects of such 
differences for the coalition by constantly making requests to each other to engage in 
symbolic acts of reciprocity related to matters of life style/daily practice. Now let us 
analyze how this problem unfolds during the internal deliberations of the group on the 
basis of two discussion topics. Each discussion topic ends with an appraisal of the 
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nature of the problem involved and what it tells about the larger debate on creating 
intra-group cohesion. 
 
 
 
5.2.  Going Beyond Strategic Cooperation: Meeting at a Place Where Alcohol is 
Served 
 
 
 
I have argued that differences in life style were used instrumentally in the 
coalition in raising the point that women suffer from similar societal pressures despite 
leading different life styles. Veiled/non-veiled distinction was one such difference 
strategically used to show women suffer despite being different.  
In time however, a tendency emerged within the coalition whereby at least some 
of the members expected confirmation that their life-style was not used in an 
instrumental sense, that it was accepted as a legitimate life-style.  While initially 
contrasts were thought to add strength to the arguments of the coalition, in time they 
turned into highly schematized stories about the world views of members and life styles 
of members. 
Members had different demands with respect to showing that differences in life-
style did not cause fracture or tension within the coalition. The issue which gained a 
symbolic dimension within the coalition with respect to how well members 
accommodated each other‟s life styles was the debate over the meeting place of 
coalition members. Platform members usually meet in places where alcohol is not 
served so that veiled women can also come. When the issue of where to meet for the 
next meeting was being discussed; one platform member suggested meeting for iftar 
(breaking the fast). This was taken as a sign of least common denominator by some 
members. In the words of Y.Z: 
 
   If I am able to accompany my friends‟ fasting, it is not a weird request 
that those who do not consume alcohol participate to another event where 
alcohol is served. Isn‟t there a place where everybody drinks whatever they 
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want? Or are those places going to be forbidden for BSÇ (online blog, 
09.01.2009)?77 
For some of the members, being able to meet with women who consume alcohol 
was a testing mechanism to see whether individuals can accommodate identities 
different than one‟s own. The same interviewee argues the following: 
 
   It seems after having been part of the environments of my religious 
friends for so many years, I also developed certain expectations. This is not 
necessarily a religious issue. If this group is going to be a pluralist group, 
religion is just one dimension of it.78 
 
A more substantial criticism was made by A.B, who argued that the schism 
between religious women and women who drink alcohol is too reductionist and 
dichotomizing.  There are too many different preferences and life styles that cannot be 
reduced to this dichotomy. She concludes by saying that there are graver tasks such as 
fighting against patriarchy, state oppression etc… which would bear more significant 
results for the coalition:  
 
   At whom is this question “Would you join us for an event where alcohol 
is served?” directed? It is as if you are speaking from one window to 
another. Who lives behind those windows? Where does the willingness to 
accompany each other in a fasting or drinking event correspond to in our 
attempts to support one another? These events can only be friendly 
gatherings. Those who do not find it appropriate can refrain from 
participating and we can talk about this. But what is more fundamental is to 
unite when there is a threat to any one of our lifestyles by the state, by the 
community, neighborhood, and patriarchy because these are targeting us for 
the same reason: because of our womanhood (online blog, 09.01.2009).79   
                                                          
77 Ben iftarı oruç tutmama rağmen oruç tutan arkadaĢlarımla keyifle açıyorsam, 
rakı içmeyenlerin baĢka Ģey içerek baĢka bir sofra keyfine katılması örneği (ki 
tamamen bir örneklemeydi, istek ya da gereklilik değil) çok garip bir hayal olmaz diye 
düĢünüyorum. Herkesin istediğini içebileceği birçok mekân yok mu? Yoksa oralar BSÇ 
için yasak bölge mi olacak?  
 
78 Demek ki, bunca yıl inançlı ve dini ibadetlerini yerine getiren arkadaĢlarımın 
her türlü ortamına eĢlik ettikten sonra, ben de bazı beklentiler oluĢmuĢ. Bu bence hiç 
din meselesi filan da değil. Bu grup gerçek anlamda çoğulcu olacaksa, din bunun 
sadece bir boyutu. 
 
79 Ama farz-ı muhal rakı sofrası kursak gelir misiniz sorusu burada kime neden 
yöneltilmiĢtir? Sanki bir pencereden öbür pencereye sesleniyoruz. KarĢı pencerelerde 
kim yaĢıyor peki? Bir de düĢünüyorum, birbirimize sahip çıkma arayıĢlarımız içinde 
iftar yahut rakı sofrasını paylaĢmak nereye tekabül eder? Dediğim gibi bunlar en fazla 
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Here, we observe a desire to step back and concentrate on the strategic adversaries 
of the coalition and operate at a rather limited level of exchange, at the level of 
womanhood. As long as the women stay united against their adversaries, they do not 
have to celebrate the particularities of each woman in the platform. This is a more 
monolithic vision on collective activism that does not leave much room for talking 
about intra-group specificities and differences and what importance acknowledgement 
of those differences carries for the group.  
Despite her arguments, the symbolic meaning of the choice of the meeting place 
seems to be decisive for many of the women who consume alcohol. Whether veiled 
women could meet in places where other members can drink alcohol is seen as a level 
of maturity needed to claim this coalition has achieved a significant level of solidarity 
despite differences among members.  
Although initially the contrasts are used to imply that differences in life-style are 
not an impediment in front of women‟s solidarity, subsequent controversies illustrated 
that people‟s group affiliations would explain the limits of their recognition or approval 
of other groups in action.  
There are important drawbacks in assuming group affiliations always conscribe 
what an individual would or would not do. The biggest drawback of such a stance is 
that it over schematizes individual identity by attributing to it a totally collective 
character. This is a blow on the authenticity of the individual. In the words of the same 
interviewee (A.B): 
 
   We still could not escape this duality. Are there only women who fast and 
veil and women who know how to drink and who distance themselves from 
religious practices? Can there not be women who do not cover up but who 
fast, those who are confused about religious practices, religious but drinking 
alcohol, let‟s forget all of these can there not be women among us who 
really do not know when to stop drinking? We have excluded this group 
altogether. If we hold a meeting today they will be totally excluded. We talk 
about trying to understand each other but we are questioning whether we 
can reciprocate to others. We ignore different women, different life styles 
and our own experiences. Of course we had deep disappointments, but it is 
creating a deep disappointment in me when people say, “well, we tried with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
dostça paylaĢımlar olabilir, ters gelen katılmaz, hatta eleĢtirir, konuĢuruz. Ġyi olur. Ama 
esas olan birbirimizin hayat tarzına devlet, cemaat, mahalle, erkek baskı ve Ģiddeti 
yöneltildiğinde birbirimizin yanında durmak, çünkü bütün bunlar bizleri kadın olarak 
ortak bir yerden vuruyor, öyle değil mi?  
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religious women and it did not work”. Has no one become self-
representative in this group?80 
 
We have observed the problems inherent in presenting the life styles of group 
members as contrasting one another. This type of juxtaposition brings about a need to 
prove that there is reciprocity within the group despite contrasts in life style. The basis 
of the reciprocal act is to show life style differences are not an impediment in front of 
being approved for one‟s way of living. This type of reciprocity requires being 
respected because of one‟s differences, rather than being respected despite one‟s 
differences. There is a demand for approving one‟s way of being, by way of 
participating to his/her daily practices.  
This discussion brings forward an important problem inherent in a coalition that 
claims to bring different life-styles under a singular banner, which is womanhood in 
this case. Members may initially think the more fundamental task is to unite against 
threats to women. However, the heterogeneity of the coalition may bring about an 
equally important task such as handling internal diversity.  
In this coalition and in the handling of this particular issue, we observe the clash 
of two important perspectives: one perspective focuses on the strategic aspects of the 
coalition. As one excerpt from the above quote depicts succinctly “what is more 
fundamental is to unite when there is a threat to any one of ours lifestyle by the state, by 
the community, neighborhood, patriarchy because these are hitting the coalition 
members (us) for the same reason: because of their (our) womanhood.”   
Even when women know their life-style differences are irreconcilable, they may 
still think it is worthwhile to fight on the basis of women‟s interests. They may 
deliberately narrow down the issues on the basis of which they want to carry out their 
joint activism. This is arguably an efficient but a more minimalist definition of 
                                                          
80 Bu ikilik tahayyülünden çıkamadık gitti. Bu grupta sadece oruç tutan baĢörtülü 
dindarlar ve karĢısında da "adabıyla içen" inançsız/dini pratiklere mesafeli kadınlar mı 
var? Oruç tutan baĢını örtmeyen kadınlar, dini pratikler konusunda kafası karıĢık 
olanlar, dindar ve içen kadınlar, hadi bunları geçtim, adabı neyse öyle içemeyen 
kadınlar filan olamaz mı? (Bu son grubu tümden dıĢlamıĢ olduk, içkili toplantı 
yaparsak onlar gelemeyecekler). Hala birbirimizin dünyasını anlamaktan filan 
bahsediyoruz, ama zaten belki de birçoğumuzun yapageldiği Ģeyleri acaba yapar mıyız 
üzerinden konuĢuyoruz. Hala bir sürü kadını, bir sürü hayatı, bazen kendi 
deneyimlerimizi bile yok sayıyoruz. Tabii ki birçok hayal kırıklığı yaĢadık ama dindar 
kadınlarla denedik, olmadı yargısı da bende ciddi bir hayal kırıklığı oluĢturuyor. 
Herkes kendini temsil eder duruma gelemedi mi bu grupta? 
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cooperation in the sense that it only prioritizes the strategic aspects of the coalition: that 
of advancing women‟s concerns in the public sphere. 
As opposed to this minimalist definition that focuses on one specific identity at 
the expense of all the other identities, members of a heterogeneous coalition who have 
other intersecting identities,, who exhibit different life styles and who take part in other 
civic struggles may look for confirmation of these other identities as well. Hence, a 
more maximalist definition of coalition building would not just entail fighting for 
certain strategic interests which reduce the scope of the coalition to a singular identity. 
It would also include ways of cherishing and embracing various other identity struggles 
as well as ways of accommodating other life-styles. The important question in this 
debate is whether heterogeneous coalitions should always live up to this maximalist 
yardstick. 
Members of this platform were able to demonstrate together when a woman was 
detained by the police because she was fishing with “inappropriate clothing” on the 
Galata Bridge. There, they were embracing a life style politically for the sake of 
protecting the interests of women against conservatism and patriarchy. However, when 
the issue was socializing with those who drink alcohol, the same solidarity did not 
emerge as it did not signify a political solidarity for the amelioration of women‟s 
conditions.  
Hence, when members made calls to each other to endorse each other‟s life style, 
as long as this endorsement was not primarily serving women‟s interests, there was a 
reluctance to go along with this demand. The fact that such demands were repeatedly 
made and there were disagreements on this basis begs the following question: Do 
coalitions based on so much difference and heterogeneity can survive by only stressing 
common goals but not embracing specificities? 
I have argued elsewhere that coalitions like BSÇ are breeding grounds for 
multicultural democracy in that they manifest the possibility of collaborations across 
social groups and various identity groups. However, the nature of this solidarity also 
reveals the limitations and pitfalls of heterogeneous coalitions. We have observed on 
the basis of one example that endorsement of various other identity struggles or ways of 
living become a lesser priority in comparison to the strategic targets of a coalition. 
Depending on one‟s definition of what a multicultural democracy entails, this lack of 
endorsement of other identities may be interpreted as trivial or important. I will talk 
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about the implications of minimalist and maximalist definitions of solidarity within a 
coalition for multiculturalism at the end of this chapter.  
In the following rebuttal, I will analyze one other issue which takes the nature of 
solidarity from a different angle. Unlike this issue where the problem emerges because 
solidarity is defined on the basis of strategic interests (i.e. womanhood), in the 
following issue the controversy arises because there is pervasive identity-blindness and 
cooperation is reduced to basic human needs, such as “right to live”.  
 
 
 
5.3.  Identity Blind Cooperation or Recognition of Identity? Homosexuality as an 
(il)legitimate Identity Category 
 
 
 
In the previous rebuttal, we have observed that at least some of the coalition 
members want to go beyond strategic cooperation that reduces members to a singular 
identity and they want to see the endorsement of their life style and other identity 
concerns by the coalition. There is a tension between the strategic aims and the 
diversity of identity claims that exist within the coalition. 
The same tension emerged in another controversy. A conflict arose when an NGO 
that fights for the rights of veiled women and whose members are also part of this 
alliance, has published a statement protesting the ban on veil in universities. Another 
NGO that fights for the rights of gay/lesbians signed this declaration in support of the 
veil cause. The NGO that issued the statement was then put under intense pressure by 
some Islamist circles as the name of the gay/lesbian NGO appears on the declaration. 
The NGO finally gave up and kindly requested the removal of the name of this NGO, 
but opted for putting names of the individual signatories along with their institutional 
affiliations. The fact that some members of the coalition did not want to expose their 
links to gay/lesbian organizations provoked another round of quarrels within the 
alliance. 
In order to understand how members approach the issue of homosexuality and 
identity politics waged on the basis of homosexuality, I asked a series of questions to 
my respondents both lesbian and non-lesbian. For example all of the religious women I 
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interviewed, stressed the importance of not interfering with the private affairs as the 
only legitimate liberty space of homosexuals.  
However, by limiting liberties (which is seen exclusively as sexual liberties) to the 
private sphere, they run contrary to what most of the gay/lesbian activists are striving 
for: getting the fruits of institutional life such as employment, political representation, 
marriage etc... Here, an excerpt from the interview with I.K will be illustrative:  
 
   Just as sexist policies bother me, homosexuality is like this: How does feel 
when one brings one‟s privacy into the headlines? How do you know who I 
am? Maybe I am a homosexual too. There can be some among veiled 
women as well. However, this is her privacy (mahrem), very private…But if 
you come to the chair (kürsü) and talk about homosexuality that would 
irritate me. You could be a homosexual but you should talk about Turkey‟s 
problems. Talk about the Kurdish issue, talk about something else. I do not 
want to talk about the veil issue. I only talk about it because it is forbidden. 
But there is nothing that forbids your entry to the parliament. Veil is 
punished because it is visible. Men who think like me can enter the 
parliament. I will never talk about the veil issue once the ban is over. No 
one should produce politics out of homosexuality. This sounds like violence 
to me, to tell something so private out in the public (interview, 
22.04.2011).81 
 
The conflict emerges from the fact that some of such institutional rights such as 
employment or entering politics are seen fit for gays not because they are gay but 
despite the fact that they are gay. They are expected not to make their homosexuality an 
issue while profiting from the institutional rewards of being a citizen. Just as veiled 
MPs should not wage politics for the veiled, such should be the case for homosexuals.  
The knot here is with respect to whether to make private matters a part of public 
discussion. While veiling is a way to remove the private from the public eye, what gay 
                                                          
81 Cinsiyetçi politikalar beni ne kadar rahatsız ediyorsa, eĢcinsellik de Ģöyle bir 
Ģey, ya insanların bunları gündeme taĢıması nasıl bir duygu? Kalkıp da ben 
heteroseksüelim, belki ben de eĢcinselim nereden biliyorsun? .BaĢörtülü kadınlar 
arasında olabilir. Ama bu onun çok özeli gibi geliyor, çok mahrem. Ama kalkıp da sen 
kürsüde hep eĢcinsellik konuĢacaksın o da rahatsız eder. Sen eĢcinselsin, ama sen 
Türkiye için birĢeyler konuĢ, Kürt meselesini konuĢ, baĢka Ģey konuĢ. Ben baĢörtüsünü 
konuĢmak istemiyorum. Sırf yasak olduğu için konuĢuyorum. Ama senin parlamentoya 
girmene engelleyen bir Ģey yok. BaĢörtüsü görünür olduğu için yasaklanıyor. Benim 
gibi düĢünen erkekler giriyor. Ben bu baĢörtüsü yasakları kalktığı anda ben bu konuyu 
gündeme dahi getirmek istemiyorum. EĢcinsellik üzerinden giyim kuĢam üzerinden 
politika üretilmesin. O bana Ģiddet gibi geliyor, kendi mahrem hayatını, kendi özelini 
orada anlatmak. 
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movement is trying to do is to bring the private to the public eye. The doctrinal conflict 
is with respect to the desire to make sexuality part of public discussion which is not 
seen proper by this respondent. 
Let us pay attention to what H.I, one lesbian member of the platform thinks on 
this issue. The interviewee first refers to how she finds the particular reasoning of 
religious individuals very problematic. If we have to start with religious maxims, the 
right approach would be to think of gays as one of the creations of God just like any 
other creation. By virtue of being God‟s children they are also entitled to the rewards of 
life. Then taking a different turn, she provides her own reasoning which is more secular 
and feeds from rights theory. She talks about not narrowing the liberty space of others 
as her maxim:   
 
   I do not expect religious women to say that homosexuality is not a sin. 
Even if it is a sin, it is my sin. Do not limit my space, and that is enough for 
me. We can only talk through this scheme. If you are religious and if you 
want to be loyal to the scripture, you should be thinking in the following 
fashion: I (the lesbian) was created by God too. He must have created me 
because I had to exist. I did not come to this world to be a symbol of sinner. 
I think the yardstick should be not to narrow others‟ liberty space and not to 
harm others. In fact, I believe that those who harm others are autonomously 
being eliminated by society without the need for state punishment 
(interview, 02.10.2010).82 
 
For her, drawing the line at the threshold of victimhood does not cover all the 
instances of life where gays are being discriminated. Because the “victimhood” here has 
the criteria set at “physical violence”, it does not fulfill the demands made by gays:  
 
   I do not think they can think something beyond not giving harm (zulüm 
yapmak). Not harming others does not correspond to my reality. There are 
so many things that I do without being necessarily harmed. How are we 
going to arrange our relations in society for situations where the matter is 
not about being physically harmed? This stance does not say anything 
                                                          
82 Ben dindar kadınların eçcinsellik günah değil, demesini beklemiyorum. Günah 
da olsa benim günahım. Benim alanımı daraltmayın yeter. Böyle bir çerçeveden 
iletiĢim kurabiliriz ancak. Dindarsan ve metine sadık kalman gerekiyorsa Ģöyle 
düĢünmesi gerekir “Beni de (lezbiyen) Tanrı yarattı. Olması gerektiği için yaratmıĢtır.” 
Ben dünyaya günahkâr sembolü olmak için geldiğimi zannetmiyorum. Bence ölçüt 
baĢkalarının özgürlük alanını daraltmamak ve baĢkalarına zarar vermemektir. Ben 
zaten devlete ihtiyaç kalmadan otonomsal toplumsal yollarla baĢkalarına zarar 
verenlerin elimine olduğunu düĢünüyorum.  
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significant when it comes to these kinds of questions. I believe those who 
use the words such as oppressed (mazlum), oppression (zulüm) do think of 
themselves as more legitimate actors institutionally. I mean, they can benefit 
from the fruits of institutional life, for example, marriage. They never think 
everyone should be able to benefit from this arrangement. I believe our 
relationship is based on inequality due to this reason. I do not think they are 
bothered by the fact that we are not able to profit from the fruits of 
institutional life while they can (interview, 02.10.2010).83 
 
While both a very religious and a very liberal person may be critical about the 
killing of a homosexual, they may not agree on the desirability of bringing this 
particular identity to the public light even after various rounds of discussion. In 
discussing recognition of certain identities, we realize that that recognition can at 
certain instances go only as far as condemning physical violence (killing of 
homosexuals). The only type of reciprocity that can be expected in this relationship is a 
generic reciprocity that is identity blind. Being against violence does not mean 
gay/lesbian identity is recognized. Being “mazlum” on the other hand does not solve 
the institutional problems that gays encounter or erase their invisibility in public life.  
Hence while the problem in the previous issue was sticking to strategic interests 
(women‟s interests) at the expense of other life style concerns, in this issue the problem 
is taking and dealing with a particular identity struggle from an identity-blind 
perspective. In the following section, I will discuss the implications of these two 
perspectives for heterogeneous coalitions and an alternative route to deal with the 
shortcomings of these perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83 Oysaki zulüm yapmamanın dıĢına çıkabileceklerini sanmıyorum. Sadece 
“Zulüm görmek” benim gerçekliğimi ifade etmiyor ki. Benim zulüm görmeden 
yaptığım Ģeyler de var. Zulüm görmediğim durumlar da iliĢkilerimizi nasıl tanzim 
edeceğiz? Bununla ilgili hiçbir Ģey söylemiyor bu anlayıĢ. Ben mazlum, zulüm gibi 
kategorileri kullananların kurumsal olarak kendilerini daha meĢru hissettiklerini 
düĢünüyorum. Yani kurumsal hayatın meyvelerinden daha fazla yararlanabiliyorlar, 
mesela evlilik. Herkes gelsin, bunun parçası olsun diye düĢünmüyorlar. ĠliĢkimizin bu 
açıdan eĢitsiz olduğunu düĢünüyorum. KurumsallaĢmadan onların yararlanması, bizim 
yararlanamamamız onları ırgalamıyor gibi geliyor.  
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5.4.  Negotiating Identity and Reciprocity in Heterogeneous Groups 
 
 
 
Initially, objective contrasts in life-style served as a strength for the coalition. This 
is because despite contrasts in opinions and life-choices, women in this country were 
suffering from very similar reasons, be it the societal customs or state policies that 
punish women. This position comes closer to the arguments raised by Young who 
claims that politics of difference strengthens common causes if it can show how a 
similar problem is affecting groups differentially but in a parallel fashion.  
Following the same logic, this coalition also had to come to terms with internal 
differences all the while subordinating this task to a higher cause, women‟s interests. 
Despite the fact that women acknowledge their differences, they still want other 
differences to be secondary when the issue is about womanhood. An important caveat 
here is that fighting for womanhood does not necessarily mean those other identities 
were positively recognized. At first, they were more passively recognized in an attempt 
to unite women. However, in time, it became evident that this group is not solely 
engaged with strategies to convince outside audiences of women‟s rights.  
This runs contrary to some of the assumptions about coalition-building in civil 
society research. Coalitions are mostly seen as strategic alliances whose efficiency are 
measured with the rigor with which they oppose an adversary, the impact of their 
slogans and the effectiveness of their various campaign tactics. If we follow this 
criteria, the internal talk within a coalition for discovering internal diversity is a waste 
of time and an indication of undecidedness about coalitional goals.  
However, as argued by Fraser elsewhere (1997), in the case of feminist movement 
and many other identity movements, the realization of diversities and multiple 
intersecting identities marks a decisive shift in the purpose and functioning of such 
movements. This shift is marked by turning inward to make sense of this diversity. This 
is not necessarily an exclusive focus on a single identity but an attempt to see its 
interconnections with other identities. In that sense, what looks like turning inward 
eventually brings turning outward and forging connections with other identity claims. 
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For this reason, unlike scholars who stress only the strategic aspects of coalition 
building, I argue that a coalition whose members have come to terms with such 
diversity will inevitably go through an internal questioning of assumptions, goals and 
tactics. 
The coalition I am analyzing went through a very similar transformation as 
depicted by Fraser. Although the initial goal was to build a united front against 
adversaries that discriminated women, the coalition moved fast into an alliance that was 
more occupied with its inner diversity than the singularity of its target. This diversity 
was very evident from the start. The members knew from the start that they were trying 
something that was never done before. They were bringing together women who were 
thought to wage separate struggles. Hence, in contrast to women‟s movements 
elsewhere which failed because they claimed to speak for all women and for all times, 
this coalition knew from the start the intricacies of working through a diversity that was 
unbridgeable for many of their critics. There were two routes in front of the coalition to 
bridge differences. One would be to focus on strategic targets and treat every member 
on the basis of the unifying theme: womanhood. However, as a coalition that built itself 
on this diversity, a more plausible route was to show it was able to not only 
accommodate but also celebrate this diversity.  
Each member, both as the bearer of a certain identity and as a woman wanted her 
unique identity to be respected by others. This respect could take the shape of 
acceptance of life style, supporting others‟ campaigns or simply affirming the 
rightfulness of their demands. However, this mutual accommodation was not so 
straightforward for all members. There were life style choices or identities that were not 
initially given primary place in an attempt to set targets appropriately but which 
nevertheless came back to discussion with a vengeance.  For example, religiosity or 
sexual orientation which was treated as unimportant for the goals of the coalition later 
turned out to be quite divisive.  
As the group moved from being a strategic coalition into one that expected more 
reciprocity and mutual accommodation the nature of conversations changed. In fact, it 
became certain that the more important task as a specific instance of enclave 
deliberation was to have an internal deliberation on issues that divided different enclave 
women. For this reason, the over-reliance on contrasts in life style, which were 
strategically used as a sign of the singularity of women‟s goals irrespective of other 
differences, become a burden in the subsequent stages of activism. The members begin 
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to ask whether such contrasts in life preferences are an impediment in front of engaging 
in acts of reciprocity and whether objective differences in life-style preferences 
translate into substantive differences in political action. 
One other reason why contrasts in identity become a burden is the precarious 
nature of enclave deliberation. I have argued elsewhere that most of the members of this 
platform take pride in being part of diverse networks and operating through 
heterogeneous spheres. Some of the members have a more individualistic way of 
interpreting the issues raised in the coalition while others do express a group 
perspective. What makes this enclave deliberation precarious is precisely this 
connection. When women making part of this group feel restricted by a more dominant 
and more mainstream group perspective, they come into conflict with the objectives of 
this coalition.  
Despite the fact that this particular enclave holds a potential to transform relations 
between different identities, the enclave, at crucial junctures, is suppressed by the views 
of external groups. The relations of individual members with the outside world cause a 
regression from the advancements made by the group. Dominant public sphere 
interferes with the healthy functioning of this experiment. In trying to understand the 
most important quarrels within the platform it is important to keep in mind the effect of 
external world on internal deliberation. 
When we analyze those controversies more deeply, certain patterns emerge. The 
platform is oscillating between essentializing statements and identity-blind statements 
especially when it comes to discussing life styles or identities that are not evaluated 
positively at least by some of the members. 
What I mean by essentializing are those types of frames that focus exclusively on 
the womanhood component at the expense of other important identities. As was 
explained before, contrasts in identities were instrumentally used to prove that women 
support one another despite their other differences by virtue of being women.  
From the start, the platform was aware of the fact that with this much diversity, 
committing to a unitary definition of womanhood would be counter-productive and 
unrealistic. Instead of asking for more or better distribution of rights to a generic 
“woman”, the platform asks for ameliorations in various domains that will help improve 
the situation of different women on the overall. This being said, above discussion points 
reveal that despite the fact that womanhood was a common denominator, other 
intersecting identities ruled out a feasible identity alignment. The substitute for the lack 
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of identity alignment was the creation of strategic adversaries (patriarchal state or 
restrictive societal customs). Although such adversaries are in a way necessary for the 
creation and initial vitality of coalitions, they are on their own are not enough to 
maintain them.  
In this coalition, especially in cases where an identity concern was divisive or at 
least not desirable by some of the members, the platform reverted back to strategic 
goals of the coalition, which is sticking primarily to women‟s concerns. Reverting back 
to strategic goals of the coalition played out when the link between womanhood and the 
controversial identity concern was not clearly established.  
Another strategy employed when the identity in question was divisive was to 
adopt an identity-blind rhetoric. By way of arguing that every person deserves right to 
protection or right to work without necessarily making an identity (i.e. homosexuality 
in this case) part of the discussion, it is silently pushed to the corners of a right based 
discourse that centers on right to live and right to be freed from violence. 
This short analysis shows that individuals making up this coalition while working 
for their strategic goals can fall prey to both essentializing statements and also identity-
blindness. This makes it harder to reciprocate others in their identity quests or in being 
part of their everyday life. The danger in this is to miss the chance of achieving a sense 
of solidarity while still retaining those identity differences. Then what is the right way 
to reciprocate others while also knowing you have different identities?  
In the following section, I will depict different types of reciprocity and their 
implications for coalitions and multicultural democracy. At the end, I will propose my 
own version of reciprocity which I find most appropriate for heterogeneous coalitions.  
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5.5.  What Kind of Reciprocity Suits Heterogeneous Coalitions? 
 
 
 
5.5.1.  General Reciprocity:  
 
 
General reciprocity is to extend one‟s recognition and support without having any 
particular interaction with another group. This type of support can be extended even 
when there is not an effective public demand for it. This type of reciprocity is rather 
unilateral, in that it is based on certain pre-conceptions/pre-fixed positions. When there 
is not a significant give and take between civic groups, the type of recognition that one 
group will have about another will be largely based on such pre-conceptions. Since, the 
opinions of one about the other cannot easily be altered because of limited or no 
communication, this type of recognition is limited in scope.   
However, unilateral recognition does not always have to be negative. For example 
in the case of gay/lesbian members of the platform, we observe that despite the fact that 
gay/lesbian organizations had a pre-fixed opinion about how religious individuals 
would evaluate gay activism, this did not impede them from collaborating with those 
individuals in the past, albeit at a rather limited level. This does not mean that religious 
individuals recognize those identities as legitimate. However, since they consider gays 
as having the right to security just as any other human being, this limited recognition 
functions as the common ground on which their collective action is based. In the words 
of H.I:   
 
   We are two groups (referring to gays and religious groups) which have 
been put at opposing ends by others in society.  However, we have gone 
through enough experience in life to see that homophobia is not limited to 
religion. Homophobia is fed by so many different channels such as 
nationalism, patriarchy etc…To try to talk about this issue only from the 
prism of religion, can also serve to cover up the homophobia in other 
realms. For this reason, as members of KAOS GL and LGBTT community, 
we have always come together on such platforms, knowing each other‟s 
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opinions on religiosity and homosexuality. Both sides have shown the 
maturity to act on the basis of each other‟s boundaries. For this reason, we 
never tried to persuade each other or change each other‟s position. We came 
together on the basis of opposing violence and discrimination. I believe 
there are not that many groups in the world who have shown the same 
maturity that we did on this matter (online blog, 10.03.2010).84 
 
The same unilateral mechanism was at work with respect to the attitudes about 
veil by certain feminists: 
 
   I am against the headscarf. I see it as a means to regulate women‟s bodies. 
I consider it an injustice. But who am I to talk if a woman has decided to 
veil? From then onwards, I shall be on her side to defend her right to veil 
(interview with H.I, 02.10.2010).85 
 
Hence what is problematic with unilateral recognition is not that there is no 
recognition of another identity. The real problem is one recognizes the other through 
the lenses of one‟s identity and justify his/her conduct towards the other on the basis of 
this identity difference. This is another way of saying “I recognize you despite the fact 
that you are X or Y”.   
The implications of unilateral recognition seem to be far more reaching and 
important for the coalition. Recognition of this form means approaching others from the 
moral lenses of another identity. Additionally, since this moral angle is usually made 
invisible when identities are deliberated, the basis for acceptance can be portrayed as 
                                                          
84 ġimdiye kadar yan yana geldiğimiz her platformda karĢı karĢıya getirilmeye 
çalıĢılan iki kesimiz. Oysa homofobi meselesinin dinle sınırlı olmadığını bilebilecek 
kadar deneyim yaĢadık dünya üzerinde. Homofobi ataerkil, milliyetçi, militarist pek 
çok kanaldan besleniyor. Sorunu din çerçevesinden tartıĢmaya zorlamak, diğer 
alanlarda var olan homofobinin üstünü örtmeye de hizmet edebiliyor. Bu anlamda, 
Kaos GL bileĢenleri ve diğer LGBTT oluĢumlar olarak bizler çeĢitli vesilelerle yan 
yana geldiğimiz platformlarda din ve eĢcinsellik meselesi konusunda neler 
düĢündüğümüzü bilerek yan yana geldik. Bu konuda yürütülecek tartıĢmalarda her iki 
kesim de diğerinin sınırlarının farkında olma olgunluğunu gösterdi diye düĢünüyorum. 
Bu nedenle, birbirimizi ikna edip birbirimizi değiĢtirmeye çalıĢma yöntemini 
kullanmadık. Bir taraf diğer tarafı dönüĢmeye zorlamadı. Biz yan yana geliĢlerimizde 
kendi çerçevelerimizin farkında olarak ancak Ģiddet ve ayrımcılığa karĢı çıkma 
noktasında birleĢerek sürdürdük bir aradalığımızı. Türkiye‟de ve dünya üzerinde pek 
çok kesimin bu olgunluğa eriĢememiĢ olduğunun bilincindeyiz.” 
 
85 BaĢörtüsüne aslında karĢıyım. Kadın bedenini denetleme kaygısı olarak 
görüyorum. Adaletsizlik olduğunu düĢünüyorum. Ama örtüyorsa banane. O noktadan 
sonra onun hakkını savunmalıyız. 
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objective criteria whereas it is generally biased and depends on the supremacy of one 
type of comprehensive doctrine to the expense of another.  
Hence, general reciprocity poses a very interesting puzzle for politics of 
recognition. As exemplified in the dialogues with respect to the recognition of 
homosexuality, as the identity in question conjures certain negative connotations, the 
way to deal with this identity is to assume a certain identity blind yardstick on the basis 
of which to extend one‟s support: i.e. being oppressed (mazlum), freedom from 
violence etc….  
The same goes for veiling from the perspective of a secular liberal feminist. There 
can be a certain negative pre-conception about veiling in the mind of a secular liberal 
feminist as the quote above exemplifies. However, as part of this coalition, solidarity 
for veiled women can be justified on the basis of defending that person‟s right to choose 
her clothing.  
Hence, what we can deduce from these rationalizations is that what we call 
universalism, both from a religious or secular maxim, in essence may reflect an 
inability and unwillingness to come to terms with the particularities and rationalizations 
of other identity concerns. Hence, one‟s particular perspective when coming in contact 
with other‟s identity claims ends up producing a particularistic universalism that aims at 
transcending different moralities and rationalizations so that one is not held accountable 
for these moralities. Just as a secular feminist prefers not to question why one is veiling 
but continues her support on the basis of basic rights, a religious woman does not want 
to question the basis of gay activism but extends support on the basis of being on the 
side of “mazlum”.  
These universalisms, which are clearly the result of different maxims, religious or 
secular, are like an escape mechanism from carefully reflecting on the claims of 
different identities.  This is the main reason why declarations or actions that fit the 
framework of general reciprocity are usually identity-blind. One does not reciprocate on 
the basis of the value or specificity of a particular identity, one reciprocates on the basis 
of one‟s maxim that is universalized to encompass all the identity struggles.  
Frames that rely on general reciprocity will emphasize the basic right of every 
individual to be free from violence or to have access to basic rights without invoking 
his/her identity struggle. The terms used may be different for each group, while group 
A may call it “fight against discrimination of individuals”, group B may call it “to be on 
the side of mazlum”. However, the general message is that one does not have to affirm 
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other‟s group specificity or other‟s claims to recognition in order to defend for the 
fulfillment of basic rights of individuals affiliated with those groups.  
 
 
 
5.5.2.  Strategic Reciprocity  
 
 
Strategic reciprocity can best be illustrated by referring to a term invented by 
Spivak: “strategic essentialism”. What strategic essentialism refers to is a strategy 
whereby groups present themselves in a rather unitary fashion and bring forward their 
group identity in a simplified way to achieve certain goals. It is not that there are no 
differences within the group employing this strategy or there is no discussion of these 
differences, it is just strategically more advantageous to essentialize group identity in 
the short run to make rapid gains. 
Strategic essentialism has been taken up by feminist movement as a conscious 
strategy. Even in cases differences within the women‟s movement was obvious, in 
order to make certain rapid gains the movement consciously chose to accentuate 
similarity of fate among women rather than making an emphasis on differences. 
Making recourse to strategic reciprocity can be attributed to a similar motivation. 
In this type of reciprocity, group members want to be supported on the basis of one 
dominant identity. Basing activism and support on one dominant identity does not have 
to operate at the expense of other particular identities.  However, this may turn out to be 
the case in the majority of cases especially if the targets of the movement were initially 
set at supporting each other on the basis of this dominant identity concern. 
If we want to depict how a transition from general reciprocity to strategic 
reciprocity can take place, we could give the example of a coalition that fights domestic 
violence without naming the victims of domestic violence, “women”. This type of a 
coalition is based on solidarity between members who believe in the dignity of all 
human beings and their right to be freed from violence. When and if this coalition 
moves from naming the victims as a generic category, i.e. “victims of domestic 
violence” to a particular category “women who are victims of domestic violence”, the 
solidarity takes on a different flavor. Here, the reciprocity is based on the essential 
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interests of women as a category and remedies as well as adversaries have to be 
adjusted according to this naming, as it changes the priorities as well. 
Additionally, strategic reciprocity implies that the overarching aim of a coalition 
has supremacy over more particular concerns of its members. This is an 
acknowledgement of the fact that the ultimate aim of the coalition is to define a 
categorical gender interest to which women with other intersecting identities have to 
approximate. Having certain common targets is believed to be unifying enough for the 
immediate purposes of the movement. The danger here is that once a common gender 
interest is defined, it is harder to fit many multivalent female identities to this rigid 
framework. In other words, this type of a strategy does not leave much room for 
debating the specificities and particularities of group members and the value of 
diversity within the coalition. The strategy is based on ignoring that diversity and 
formulating a win-win situation for all members which makes the scope of the 
movement rather limited. If the group‟s sole purpose is to have an outside enemy that 
unifies them for their strategic purpose, this type of cooperation does not come close to 
a real heterogeneous enclave deliberation. The unique merit of operating in a 
heterogeneous enclave is to become sensitive to particularities and intersectionalities of 
identities and to reject monolithic and essentialist claims to representing identity 
interests. 
When we apply this knowledge to the coalition we get a complicated and 
contradictory picture. While the initial kick-off declaration was attentive to differences 
among women (i.e. veiled vs. non-veiled), these differences were strategically used to 
give the message that despite their differences women essentially suffer in similar ways 
and due to similar reasons. The reasons range from restrictive state policies (i.e. veil 
ban) to societal customs (morality, patriarchy etc.) , however women in this country,  
irrespective of their differences get their fair share from these limiting practices and 
policies.  
When the criteria is set at how women suffer in similar ways,  the basis of 
reciprocity shifts from their other identity concerns (i.e. being a lesbian, being religious 
etc..) and focuses on their womanhood.   Hence, the type of solidarity or reciprocity that 
is demanded is more focused on their womanhood than their other intersecting 
identities.  
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5.5.3.  Personalized Reciprocity  
 
 
We have seen that both general reciprocity and strategic reciprocity had their 
shortcomings for this coalition. General reciprocity is too undifferentiated and at times 
identity blind, reducing the members of the coalition to a group of individuals who are 
on the side of oppressed and who want freedom from violence irrespective of the nature 
of groups and their peculiarities. For a platform made up of diverse individuals with 
different life styles and reference points, this may seem like a plausible strategy but it 
has clear pitfalls when it comes to reciprocating each other. This is because at least for 
some of the members reciprocating is a sign of approval for individuals‟ life-styles. 
Strategic reciprocity on the other hand can become too standardizing. Although it 
is based on a conscious choice for the sake of achieving efficiency, it falls short of 
addressing the diversity of demands within the coalition. While the coalition is apt at 
representing its diversity to the outside audiences, it falls short of accommodating this 
diversity with the same rigor internally.  
As the discussions showed, there are differences between the discriminations 
faced by veiled women, Kurdish women, lesbian women, widows, women who stay 
unmarried in their entire life etc. To think, uniting under the banner of womanhood 
would solve all the issues related to reciprocating each other can be misleading.  
In fact, the platform argued against both types of reciprocity on different grounds. 
The limitations of a generalized reciprocity which is reduced to not causing physical 
harm were discussed in the case of treatment of homosexuals. Frames based on such 
general reciprocity do not answer the specificity of the needs of a lesbian as illustrated 
above. Strategic reciprocity, which is based on uniting when the issue is about 
womanhood, but ignoring or not reciprocating when the issue is tied to embracing a 
different life style other than one‟s own, was also found problematic. By way of 
reducing the basis of collaboration to just women‟s concerns, strategic reciprocity does 
not serve the interests of a coalition that exhibits diversity, particularity and 
heterogeneity. 
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One way in which members could live up to the diversity, particularity and 
heterogeneity of the coalition was to admit the possibility that individuals can construct 
their identities and live their life without making recourse to rigid and dichotomizing 
categories. In other words, members could show their capacity and willingness to 
accommodate diversity in their daily life. 
This was put very succinctly by L.M who felt really offended by the rigid and 
dichotomizing language of other members in the coalition:  
 
   I was really offended in one of the meetings of BSÇ. It was a meeting at 
AKDER. I really had a very bad moment. One woman said: “This is the first 
time I am sitting next to a gay person”. Even when it was said as a joke, it 
was offensive. Then I looked closely. There were literally groups forming 
already, seculars and Muslims. I turned to the lady and asked: “In whose 
name are you speaking? I have worked at the Ministry of Education and 
never worked with a veiled woman (the speaker was veiled at the time) For 
whom are you speaking? This coalition is for producing a new politics. We 
are already living together in this society. If you are talking in the name of 
Muslims, where do you get the authority to speak in the name of Muslims 
like me.”  Then she asked me “What term am I going to use then?” I said, 
“Why don‟t you say “I”?  Are you not on this platform as an individual? To 
speak in the name of everybody? “She responded: “Well if you do not 
consider yourself as one of us, eyvallah”. I was really furious and thought 
for a moment that these people came there to polish their names. Life is 
really not that divisive for me.  I do not have such rigid categories. OK, in 
certain situations I have my boundaries. Getting drunk at the age of 17, 
having my first sexual experience at the age of 18, these are not things I can 
know. OK, life styles are different but does that bother me? No. I am in a 
theatre group, my friends‟ lifestyle is so different in that group but we do 
things in common (interview, 16.03.2011).86 
                                                          
86 Ben BSÇ toplantılarının birinde çok rahatsız oldum. AKDER‟de yapılan bir 
toplantıydı. Benden hiç beklenmeyen bir Ģekilde sert bir çıkıĢ yaptım. …A.B dedi ki 
“ilk defa yanımda bir eĢcinselle beraber oturuyorum.” Espri gibi söylese de bana göre 
rahatsızlık vericiydi.  Sonra baktım gruplaĢılmıĢ, laikler ve müslümanlar diye iki grup 
oluĢmuĢ. “Siz kimin adına konuĢuyorsunuz?” dedim. “Ben 6 yıldır Milli Eğitim‟de 
çalıĢıyorum. Bir tane baĢı örtülü ile beraber çalıĢmadım. Kimin adına konuĢuyorsunuz? 
Burada amaç yeni bir politika üretmektir, yoksa biz zaten beraber yaĢıyoruz.  
Müslümanlar adına konuĢuyorsanız benim gibi Müslümanlar adına konuĢma hakkını 
kimden alıyorsunuz?” dedim.  “Ne diyeceğiz o zaman?” dedi. “Ben kelimesini 
kullansanız,  biz burada birey olarak bulunmuyor muyuz? Herkesin bizim adımıza 
konuĢabilmesi?” “ Sen” dedi, “kendini bizden sanmıyorsan, eyvallah” dedi. Orada 
herkesin kendi ismini parlatmak için bulunduğunu düĢündüm ve çok sinirlendim. 
Gerçekten de hayat benim için bu kadar da ayrıĢtırıcı değildir. O kadar ciddi kategoriler 
yok. Bazı durumlarda var. 17 yaĢında sarhoĢ olmak, 18 yaĢında cinselliği yaĢamak, bu 
benim bilebileceğim bir Ģey değil. Tamam hayat tarzı farklı, ama bu beni rahatsız 
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This tension between collective identity and individual authenticity lies at the 
heart of identity politics. A good appraisal of this has been done by Appiah (1996). 
Appiah (1996) asks the following question: If, the things that are most dear to me is my 
individual and authentic self, then why is all the talk about identities on the basis of sex, 
ethnicity, nationality, race and sexuality? What is the relation between the collective 
language and the individualist thrust of the concept of modern self? (p.162) 
He provides a preliminary answer in the following fashion: There is a link 
between an individual identity and a collective identity. Every individual‟s identity 
possesses two dimensions: a collective dimension which is the intersection of all traits 
of a collective identity and an individual dimension that does not make part of the 
collective dimension but that is morally and societally important, such as intellect, 
charm, ambition etc.. 
The importance of collective identities stems from the fact that they provide 
individuals with certain scenarios which they can put to use in crafting a life plan or 
telling the story of their lives. What identity politics has tried to do so far has been to 
brand these scenarios in a new light: to transform them from being bad scenarios (i.e. 
homosexuals as “faggots”) into good scenarios (i.e. “homosexuals as decent citizens 
just like anyone else”). With these new scenarios they try to move from “demanding 
respect despite being X” into “demanding respect because of being X”.  
However, Appiah (1996) is also aware of the dangers of relying too much on such 
scenarios. He considers an overreliance on them as a blow on the autonomy of the 
individual, and as replacing one type of tyranny (rejection of recognition of certain 
identities) with another (rejecting autonomy of the individual). His biggest claim is that 
politics of recognition necessitates that we take the color of a person‟s skin or his sexual 
body as political which makes it harder for those who want to treat those as personal 
dimensions of the self. By “personal” he does not mean “secret”, he rather means “not 
being overly schematized” (Appiah, 1996, p.175). 
This position brings us to the third form of reciprocity which I call personalized 
reciprocity. This typology comes very close to what other researchers call critical 
selves. Radical democracy and feminist theorists explain critical selves as those who are 
capable of mutuality of recognition, reflexivity, and responsiveness (Fraser and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ediyor mu?  Yooo. Tiyatro grubundayım, oradaki arkadaĢlarımın hayat tarzı çok farklı 
ama ortak iĢler yapıyoruz.  
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Honneth, 2003; Young, 1990).  There are important differences between coalitions 
based on strategic reciprocity and those based on personalized reciprocity in the ways 
they handle group specific diversity. 
Lichterman‟s (1999) study on two gay/lesbian organizations provide us with 
important insights into how groups can differ in the ways they promote or suppress 
identity differences. He calls the first organization QP, as a forum for personalized 
politics and the second group, NARA, as a community interest group. Although both 
coalitions included gay/lesbian members, the first one was set-up to advance the queer 
cause, while the second one is a coalition against the right.  
However, the way negotiations unfold is fundamentally different for these two 
organizations. For QP, the word “homosexual” is a negative category as it conjures up a 
privatized identity, insensitive to power differences within the LGBT community and 
un-attuned to diversity (Lichterman, 1999, p.115). For QP, to identify as queer was to 
place oneself in ambivalent and sometimes antagonistic relation to leaders who claimed 
to speak for a unitary gay community. Queers would relate multivalent to LGBT claims 
and be willing to criticize them from the standpoint of other identities. 
Unlike QP which posited itself as a group of radicalized individuals within the 
LGBT milieu, NARA identified itself as a generic LGBT or gay community. This has 
most to do with how NARA determined its strategic adversary as the Christian right 
and envisioned a bipolar World. Members taking part in this network were also 
expected to identify with this bi-polar identity. For this reason, from its inception, 
strategic talk about the community interest was more important than multivalent 
identity talk.  Community interest politics also gave NARA members a difficult basis 
for talking through identities critically. Critical, multivalent talk about identity would 
not harm solidarity in QP as it might in a group such as NARA whose solidarity 
depended on a unitary interest posed against an undifferentiated adversary (Lichterman, 
1999, p.120). 
For Lichterman (1999), personalized solidarity is not a contradiction in terms. It 
does not mean a license for selfish expressions of individuality. On the contrary, this 
type of togetherness can help people carry on critical discussion that might threaten 
solidarity in a group whose unity depends more on affirming a single communal 
interest. Participants in the first forum were able to enact a personalized form of 
togetherness and members referred to one another on the basis of individual 
authenticity as well as on the basis of LGBT membership (p.117). 
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Personalized reciprocity comes very close to this depiction of Lichterman.  This 
would mean the coalition values genuine individual exchanges between members as a 
source of political efficacy. The external face or external goals of the coalition do not 
erase the value of specificities and particularities inherent in being a heterogeneous 
group. 
Personalized reciprocity is easier to achieve when individuals reject rigid and 
stereotypical identity markers and claim their authentic individuality. Platform 
members from time to time used the card of authentic individuality. This is based on 
proving that the person is not bound by rigid identity markers. This represents a more 
accurate picture of those who want to treat the covering of their heads or their sexual 
orientation, personal dimensions of the self and not a reflection of an overly 
schematized identity. This type of a description is truer for those members who 
explicitly admitted they feel less group bound and more at ease in operating in 
heterogeneous settings. This for them is a sign of liberty and a necessity to preserve 
their autonomy. 
Authentic individuality can in principle suit enclave politics of this platform. This 
is because since enclaves are preserved areas for marginals who want to shield 
themselves from the suppression of the dominant public sphere, individuals who feel 
the pressure of overly schematized dominant identities that order them to behave in pre-
determined ways would feel at ease in such environments. Conforming to dominant 
identities is a non-issue in enclaves.87 
Given this detailed account, we know that neither the talk of general reciprocity 
which is based on the fact that we are all humans and deserve humanly respect, or 
                                                          
87 Authenticity dictates that a person‟s behaviour not be judged by the objective 
categories of sex, ethnicity,class etc.. she has been born into. The positive side of 
authenticity is that it does not assume pre-fixed dominant identities which is a state that 
is initially conducive to enclave building. However, there is another type of pressure in 
enclaves which could put individuals into another straight-jacket. Enclaves usually 
represent the extreme opposite of what the dominant public culture dictates. Hence, 
they also want to inculcate in individuals an overly schematized set of behaviours that 
is the complete opposite of that dominant identities have already inculcated. For doing 
this however, they exert a certain degree of pressure on their members to act in 
completely opposite ways to what dominant culture taught them to do. i.e one of the 
reasons why feminist enclaves do not want to admit male members to their ranks, or 
male participants to their events is because they want to reverse the patriarchal 
dominance in all spheres of all and go to another extreme for that purpose.  
 
190 
 
strategic reciprocity which is based on claims making on the basis of being woman do 
not suffice personalized reciprocity.  
A more cohesive type of reciprocity is only possible if recognition is admitted qua 
difference rather than qua sameness. A recognition that is extended on the basis of 
claiming we are all human beings is counter-productive for many of the identity 
struggles. What is wanted by such struggles is the admittance of equality of human 
beings while retaining their differences and the equal acknowledgement of such 
differences by others rather than an emphasis on the sameness of individuals. 
Then what could have worked in this coalition? Admitting intersectionalities 
would have certainly helped. By way of visualizing members in binary opposites to 
each other, the coalition omitted the possibility of crafting a unique language on 
identity differences that stressed hybridity and intersectionalities. 
 
Here is a possibility to envision an identity beyond binary opposites in the words 
of H.I:  
 
   There were two poles and we were having trouble finding a common 
language. If there was a category such as religious homosexuals, everything 
could be easier. We had to reduce everything to the category of 
“oppressed”. We should have been able to say humans can be different from 
one another and we can live with our differences. We are already living 
reality in this way but we cannot name it. When we say it out loud it 
becomes a problem (interview, 02.10.2010).88 
 
Here we see clearly the undesirability of both an identity-blind rhetoric 
(oppressed) and dichotomizing, essentializing rhetoric (religious vs. homosexual). 
Transformation of existing relations between different groups could be another 
route. What is meant by transformation? Here, I will make recourse to Nancy Fraser‟s 
arguments on transformative remedies. Nancy Fraser (1995) in her article called “From 
Redistribution to Recognition” makes a clear distinction between affirmative and 
transformative remedies for misrecognition. Nancy Fraser (1995) argues that there is a 
                                                          
88 Ġki kutup var gibiydi ve ortak dil geliĢtirmekte zorlanıyorduk. Dindar eĢcinseller 
diye bir kategori olsaydı daha kolay olurdu. Mazluma indirgemek zorunda kaldık. 
Hâlbuki insanlar farklı olabilirler ve farklılıklarımızla yaĢayabiliriz demeliydik. Zaten 
böyle yaĢıyoruz ama adını koyamıyoruz. Yüksek sesle söyleyince sorun oluyor. 
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fundamental flaw with current practices of affirmative remedies for cultural injustices, 
which have become the bread and butter of mainstream multiculturalism:  
 
   This type of remedies attempt to redress disrespect by revaluing unjustly 
devalued group identities, while leaving intact both the contents of those 
identities and the group differentiations that underline them. Transformative 
remedies, by contrast, are associated with deconstruction. They would 
redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational 
structure. By destabilizing existing group identities and differentiations, 
these remedies would not only raise the self-esteem of the members of 
currently disrespected groups, they would change everyone‟s sense of self 
(p.24). 
 
To make her point clearer, she compares gay politics which she associates with 
affirmative remedies and queer politics which she associates with transformative 
remedies. For her, gay identity politics treats homosexuality as a cultural positivity with 
its own substantive content much like an ethnicity. Queer politics, on the other hand, 
treats homosexuality as the constructed and devalued opposite of heterosexuality, they 
are the two faces of the same sexual fixity. For this reason, the transformative remedy 
inherent in queer politics is to deconstruct the homo-hetero dichotomy so as to 
destabilize all fixed sexual identities. The point here is not to dissolve all sexual 
difference in a single, universal human identity but rather to sustain a sexual field of 
multiple, de-binarized, fluid and ever shifting differences (Fraser, 1995, p.24). 
Once she establishes this distinction, it becomes certain why she considers 
transformative remedies as appropriate for the multicultural politics of this era. 
Whereas affirmative recognition remedies tend to promote existing group 
differentiations, transformative remedies open the possibility for future regroupings.  
The coalition I am analyzing has not engaged in a meaningful discussion on how 
to transform existing identities in a way that would permit future regroupings of the sort 
Fraser argues. Often times there were clashes within the platform because some of the 
members argued they see the differences between men and women as mostly 
biologically determined. This runs contrary to the assumptions of a transformative 
remedy that would start with questioning the very essence of identities. There were a 
few hints on how identities are constructs which can/should be altered. These remarks 
were mostly made with respect to how certain identities (particularly transgender 
identities) are forced to conform to pre-determined patterns of behavior as in the case of  
choosing women‟s only bathrooms. The discussion reveals that if female/male 
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categories were not that strictly imposed on people who want to make choices other 
than the ones made available to them, there could be different alternatives for self-
construction. The importance of transformative remedies becomes clearer at this point 
as they provide individuals who want to promote more hybrid and/or fluid forms of 
identity construction an important conduit. One of the important highlights in that 
conversation was that LGBT movement is seen as the only movement to bring an 
alternative definition of self-construction when it comes to manhood/womanhood. G.H 
argues: 
 
   I think we will be able to find a way out of our dichotomies such as 
womanhood and manhood thanks to LGBTT individuals. I would not want 
to go to men‟s toilet right now. But then again, I maintain my belief that 
these divisions will disappear and that we will all be renewed someday.  
Every human should have the freedom to define himself/herself in the 
fashion he/she feels. I would adjust my understanding of this person 
according to his/her self- definition (online blog, 04.10.2008).89 
 
Transformative remedies have a potential to re-define self-identity and allow for 
formations of new groupings which would potentially make this coalition and similar 
coalitions to become less identity-bound and more open to diversity.  
 
 
 
5.4.  Personalized Reciprocity as a Substitute for Common Identity 
 
 
 
I have started arguing in line with multicultural democracy theorists who believe 
in the possibility of civic engagement across identities as well as for particular 
identities. Identity politics and inter-identity politics do not have to be mutually 
                                                          
89 Sanırım bu kadınlık ya da erkeklik arasına sıkıĢmıĢlığımızı LGBT olan insanlar 
sayesinde aĢmanın yollarını bulucaz. Umarım.  Açıkçası ben de erkekler tuvaletine 
girmeyi istemem Ģu hayatta. Ama yine de günün birinde bu ayrımların ortadan 
kalkacağını ve yepyeni yesyeni olacağımıza olan inancımı sürdürüyorum. Bi de bi 
canlının kendini hissettiği gibi tanımlaması ve bunu istemesi onu  öyle anlamama kâfi.  
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exclusive. In other words, we do not have to transcend difference in order to forge an 
effective coalition. 
Conversations analyzed in this chapter reveal there is a tension between coalition 
building and identity talk. The ideal of multiculturalism is squeezed between 
essentialist community interest politics and identity-blind rhetoric. However, 
multicultural democracy theorists do not say much about how difference blind common 
agendas or group specific interests can be balanced in coalitions. While drawing on 
particular experiences and perspectives of different groups would surely empower a 
coalition, what happens in the absence of a common reference point is not answered by 
such theories. 
As I have argued previously, one could adopt a minimalist and maximalist 
definition of what a multicultural coalition should live up to. A minimalist definition of 
solidarity may reduce the targets of the coalition to a strategic cooperation across 
identity groups. A maximalist definition on the other hand, would look for confirmation 
that each and every life style or identity concern is respected and cherished. My 
analysis of this coalition reveals that even in cases when a coalition starts from a 
minimalist definition of solidarity it may want to elevate its standards to a maximalist 
definition of a multicultural coalition.  
I have started my analysis with examining how coalitions are built in the absence 
of a common identity. Despite the fact that womanhood was a common denominator, 
other intersecting identities ruled out a feasible identity alignment. The substitute for 
the lack of identity alignment was the creation of a series of strategic adversaries 
ranging from state to societal customs. Although such adversaries are in a way 
necessary for the creation of coalitions, they are on their own are not enough to 
maintain them. This chapter focused more on how intra-coalitional identities are 
negotiated within coalitions. Given the heterogeneous nature of the coalition, what are 
some of the possible ways in which the risk of disintegration and polarization can be 
thwarted? In what ways members can appeal to other identities all the while retaining 
their own?  
The findings of this chapter point towards an alternative to forging a common 
identity for maintaining a coalition. While commonality usually begs common identity 
which may be harder to realize, an engagement with the self can produce more 
productive outcomes in the face of diversity. Personalized reciprocity seems the only 
way to help coalition members show their respect to others‟ particularity all the while 
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retaining one‟s distinct identity. This would mean coalition values individual 
authenticity of members as a manifestation of the heterogeneous nature of the coalition 
which deserves being preserved rather than suppressed or ignored. This would also 
mean each member is ready to recognize other member in the terms of that other 
member rather than according to a pre-defined identity construct. Hence diversity in 
this type of a coalition is not something to be endured but something to be cherished. 
In the light of problems encountered in this coalition, I have come up with two 
ways to engage with the self in a more productive manner to achieve personalized 
reciprocity. One was to promote examples of hybrid/intersectional forms of identities as 
a manifestation of the possibility of building overlapping rights struggles. Admitting 
intersectionalities strengthens the fate of the coalition in the possibility of cooperation 
amid differences. The other was to promote more fluid forms of self-construction that 
relies on challenging established norms or dichotomies such as women/men and that 
aims at transforming them. This would destabilize existing identities and existing group 
differentiations which can provide openings for future regroupings.  
In theory, we can imagine a political community that subtly combines multivalent, 
critical identity talk with strategic coalition building talk. However, if personalized 
reciprocity does not gain widespread currency within such coalitions, it is harder to 
accommodate more fluid forms of identity construction and intersectionalities. The 
challenge of multicultural democracy for both activists and engaged citizens is to create 
political initiatives that are public spirited and also effective for a variety of groups. If a 
group‟s vision of ties with other groups is limited solely to an additive solidarity 
between communities with pre-constituted interests, then that group will fall short of 
the multicultural, democratic ideal. A multicultural democracy needs not only multiple 
forms of identity talk but flexible forms of solidarity that sustain both unities and 
particularities (Lichterman 1999, p.134). 
Building on these findings, the following chapter will ask a further question that is 
potentially more important for the cohesive functioning of civil society. How do 
coalition members envisage inter-group relations in society? What kind of 
argumentative extensions can enclaves bring to the debate on how social groups should 
approach each other? Multicultural democracy theorists argue that in a true democracy 
groups get inspired from each other by way of showing the similarities of their 
comparable grievances. An important refinement of that theory should include how 
groups envision their duties towards each other. If the ideal of radical democracy is an 
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expansion of the liberty space for all groups including the most marginal, this task 
cannot be limited to a change in state conduct, it has to include a change in social 
orientations of groups in civil society as well. By way of showing how social 
orientations of enclave members with respect to discrimination and disadvantage are 
modified in ongoing conversations, I will try to demonstrate the value of operating in 
heterogeneous publics for elevating the standards of civility. 
The analysis in the following chapter will center on how the social orientations of 
actors change in ongoing discussions towards a more self-critical and self-reflexive 
appraisal of the situatedness of identity and the structure of privilege in society.  
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Chapter 6.  Framing Inter-Group Relations and Civility 
Redefining Discrimination and Complicity in Heterogeneous Coalitions 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter I have tackled the question of how coalition members 
dealt with group diversity and how they negotiated the claims of different identities 
within the coalition. The task of handling diversity within the coalition was debated at a 
rather personal level in the sense that members of the coalition were individually 
reflecting on how to reciprocate each other to show they do accommodate other life 
styles and identities.   
This chapter takes this issue from a more macro perspective and asks the question 
of how inter-group relations are negotiated in heterogeneous coalitions. In the previous 
chapter I focused on how members of the coalition accommodate identities other than 
their own. Reciprocity was the mechanism through which this was demonstrated.  
Whereas the discussions with respect to handling diversity within the coalition 
involved an attempt to break down rigid group categories, negotiation of issues like 
discrimination and disadvantage re-establishes those group categories. This might seem 
like a contradiction. However, there are reasons for why group categories disappear and 
appear throughout discussions. This change in framing emerges according to the 
exigencies of the issue at hand. The way to sort out identity differences is to downplay 
rigid group constructs. That is why personalized reciprocity involves an attempt to 
break down rigid group categories and adopt more fluid forms of identity construction 
for individuals to accommodate other‟s lifestyles. 
The way to debate discrimination and disadvantage, on the other hand, is to admit 
the asymmetry of relations between groups. Trying to ignore group differences when 
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the issue is about discrimination/disadvantage would do no justice to those groups who 
have been disadvantaged historically.90  
Having provided the reasons why certain themes appear and disappear throughout 
the discussions, I would like to explain the particular merit of this coalition in changing 
the attitudes of its members about the nature of inter-group relations in society.  
Heterogeneous coalitions such as BSÇ provide us with an important opportunity 
to find out whether the way members view inter-group relations in society can be 
altered in ongoing discussions. This is because heterogeneous coalitions provide civil 
society actors with a unique chance to come in contact with groups which may hold an 
alternative explanation to their version of marginalization and discrimination in society.   
The analysis in this chapter will center on how the social orientations of the actors 
change in ongoing discussions towards a more self-critical and self-reflexive appraisal 
of the situatedness of identity and the structure of privilege in society. Here, I call this 
specific instance of reflexivity as civility. This is because if social actors can admit their 
own situatedness and the myriad of privileges they do/may acquire from the 
discriminations of other groups in society, their social orientations will become more 
altruistic and based on mutual care and respect.  
The quality of civil society depends very much on the social orientations of the 
social actors that inhabit its space. Although for a long time civil society was appraised 
in a generic sense as the institutions, organizations and groups that occupied the space 
between the state and the individual (Shaw, 1994; Chatterjee, 1990; Wickham, 1994), 
contemporary research is more attentive to and intrigued by the qualities of the actors 
that make up this space. The most important of such qualities can be named as civility, 
toleration and inter-personal/inter-group trust (Akman, 2012). The major problem with 
a more generic conception of civil society is that by solely focusing on the relationship 
between the state and civil society, we can ignore the equally significant task of 
discerning the social orientations of actors that have a direct effect on the quality of 
civil society (Akman, 2012). Having an abundance of civil society organizations and 
their relative autonomy from the state is no guarantee that we will end up with a 
democratic, egalitarian and tolerant polity. 
                                                          
90 This mentality is evident in many cases such as ignoring the racial bases of 
socio-economic inequality in the US and claiming it is all a matter of educational 
differences as well as differences in work ethics.   
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In fact, there are growing numbers of studies that note the challenges of having a 
genuine civil society in the absence of civil social actors (Fiorina, 1999; Kopecky, 
2003; Bieber, 2003; Muddle, 2003; Casquete, 2005; Foley and Edwards, 1996). They 
propose to confront conceptually as well as politically the problem posed by 
associations that promote hate, bigotry, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia 
(Chambers and Kopstein, 2001, p.839-840). 
For this reason, the social orientations of actors should have an important place in 
the discussions on the quality of civil society. Ayhan (2012) describes social 
orientations of actors as society‟s non-repressive engagement with other actors (p.17). 
Civil society is not a sum of engagements and interactions of social actors, but more 
specifically it is a result of their specifically non-violent, non-repressive and self-
limiting interactions (Ayhan, 2012, p.17). The yardstick here is that these engagements 
should stop short of being violent. 
This yardstick, which is refraining from physical harm, is rather straightforward 
and easy to measure. However, there can be more nuanced ways to measure how “civil” 
social actors are. What is the process through which they acquire that civility? How and 
why do groups differ in their tolerance and self-limitation? Are there higher forms of 
altruism and benevolence that indicate more refined versions of civility? These 
questions all need answers in civil society research.  
There is a strand in empirical political sociology that tries to find out which 
groups have higher or lower levels of civility. The way civility is defined in these 
studies is rather legalistic in that it is based on whether a group is willing to grant civil 
liberties to its unpopular groups. For example, past research on American civil society 
reveals that conservative Protestants are less willing than most Americans to grant civil 
liberties to unpopular groups such as gays/lesbians (Reimer and Park, 2000). 
Explanations for this incivility ranged from a strict adherence to Biblical literalism 
(Wilcox and Jelen, 1990), belief in a cosmic conflict between good and evil (Ellison 
and Musick, 1993), distrust of human nature (Tamney and Johnson, 1997), separation 
from the world (Green, 1994, p.35). Institutional effects such as hierarchical structure 
and internal pressures toward conformity are also mentioned (Wald et. al, 1989; Welch 
et. al, 1993). 
Such accounts of civility take groups and their civil attitudes as given which are 
usually a function of an essential trait of that group. These accounts are deprived from a 
relational view of social life. 
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To arrive at a more nuanced perspective on this relational aspect, which is 
fundamental for my conceptualization of civility, I will make recourse to Young‟s 
conception of difference. Young (1996, p.157) argues that historically, in group based 
oppression and conflict, difference is conceived as otherness and exclusion by 
hegemonic groups. This conception of otherness relies on logic of identity that 
essentialises and substantializes group natures. 
Her version for difference is very different than otherness. In her words:  
 
   A third ideal of a single polity with differentiated groups recognizing one 
another‟s specificity and experience requires a conception of difference 
expressing a relational rather than substantial logic. Groups should be 
understood not entirely as other, but as overlapping, as constituted in 
relation to one another and thus as shifting their attributes and needs in 
accordance with what relations are salient. This relational conception of 
difference as contextual, helps make more apparent both the necessity and 
possibility of political togetherness (Young, 1996, p.157). 
 
A primary virtue of this altered conception of difference is that from it we can 
derive a social and political ideal of togetherness in difference. Young (1996) calls this 
the ideal of a heterogeneous public (p.161). How does Young‟s conception of 
difference help us in arriving at a more refined understanding of civility? What 
difference would that make if social actors became cognizant of relationality?  
Let‟s try to give answers following Young‟s logic. If social actors see social 
relations based not on opposition but relationality, they would be in a better position to 
come to terms with the distribution of privilege and discrimination in society. In other 
words, if they know that the fate of one group is not independent of another‟s but 
involves a negotiation and bargaining on the distribution of status and cultural value 
than they would be in a better position to acknowledge their own responsibility or stake 
in this negotiation. This is arguably a finer grained and demanding conceptualization of 
civility. In this conceptualization, civility does not only involve whether a group 
approves another group‟s acquisition of civil liberties (as in the case of Conservative 
Protestants‟ attitude). This is because extension of rights is more of a matter between 
the state and that particular group. However, what civility requires is an understanding 
on the part of a relatively privileged group of its own standing in that society and the 
likely effects of that position on other groups in society. 
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Following Young, I argue that civility can be enhanced meaningfully when this 
relational aspect is grasped. The value of heterogeneous publics is important precisely 
due to this reason. In the absence of countervailing rhetoric, it is very hard for a group 
to discover its own situatedness and privilege. For this reason, spheres where diverse 
actors can talk with each other gain extra importance. 
At this point, I would like to make a distinction between heterogeneous coalitions 
which are made up of more mainstream groups and those that are made up of enclaves. 
Dominant groups in society may have less motivation to come to terms with how their 
privileges are translated into more marginal groups‟ disadvantage.  
A recent study by McCorkel and Rodriquez (2009) shows the difficulties inherent 
in attempting self-critical appraisal of this relationality. In that study, the researchers 
analyze a pro-black abolitionist NGO which is lobbying for lifting of death penalty as it 
is seen as a vehicle to punish underprivileged black crime suspects. The primary 
concern of the researchers is to observe the behavior of members which are not directly 
implicated in the problem, the white volunteers and how they navigate within the group. 
They want to see whether the white participants of the movement do develop critical 
selves which they define as:  
 
   a critical awareness and reflexivity regarding how one is situated relative 
to others in the movement and beyond, and a willingness to work toward 
redistributing power and valuing cultural forms in ways that honor and 
respect the political ideology and demands of the status-based movements 
of which they are a part (McCorkel and Rodriquez, 2009, p.362). 
 
Their principal concern was to see to what extent the white members were able to 
recognize themselves as socially situated and supporting the political claims and 
interests of African Americans. For the researchers, developing a critical self involves 
more than signing a petition or showing up at a solidarity event. The white activists 
should be able to work together with Afro-Americans to challenge racial privilege and 
redistribute social power. This involves disrupting or challenging the broader social 
arrangements that advantage them (McCorkel and Rodriquez, 2009, p.363). 
According to this study, civility can only be achieved if groups or individuals 
develop a critical awareness of their social location relative to others. The opposite of 
this is pervasive identity blind ideologies which refuse to acknowledge how this 
relativity takes place and whom it benefits.  
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McCorkel and Rodriquez (2009) find out that, in the end their respondent did not 
develop a critical self so much as they developed a strategic self-one that facilitated 
access to black political and cultural spaces but that did not ultimately serve to 
undermine the structural advantages of whiteness (p.380). The authors think the 
dominant cultural codes invoking colorblindness erode the possibilities for mutual 
recognition and respect by denying the significance of race and white privilege. For 
example, whites in their study made recourse to colorblindness when they strategically 
drew on anti-racist rather than pro-black rhetoric when doing organizing work in the 
white community.  
What is common in Young‟s and McCorkel and Rodriquez‟s thesis is that not 
admitting this relational aspect of group positions and group difference eventually 
undermines underprivileged groups‟ quest for redistribution of power and value in the 
cultural sphere.(as well as the economic field, as economic disadvantage most of the 
times goes hand in hand with cultural disadvantage). 
The implication of this relational view for civility is significant. According to this 
perspective, the essence of civility is tied to admitting the ways in which marginal 
groups‟ misfortune goes hand in hand with privileged groups‟ advantages. Being 
indifferent and identity blind to the distribution of power and privilege in society 
translates into dominant groups‟ insensitivity to marginal groups‟ claims and 
grievances.  
This is arguably a more elevated form of civility. We have started with a 
definition of civility that is based on not causing harm and arrived at one which is based 
on not being misguidedly neutral or indifferent (Akman, 2012). This trajectory needs 
explanation. What explains the variation in attitudes on civility? My argument 
throughout the thesis will be that if groups do not hold a relational perspective, they 
would only stop at the level of no harm principle. However, if they come to admit how 
groups differentially benefit from structures of power and how this indirectly implicates 
them in the misfortune of marginal groups, then they will adopt a more hands-on 
definition of civility.  
Having said this, one should be cognizant of the fact that it is hard to expect from 
mainstream groups in society to hold this level of maturity when it comes to admitting 
their own privileges and how they are better off in relative and absolute terms compared 
to other groups. Relationality has a better chance of being grasped in heterogeneous 
enclaves rather than more mainstream coalitions.  
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This is because enclaves, by virtue of having been marginalized by more 
dominant groups in society possess an ability to envision social relations in more 
asymmetric terms. The awareness of their own marginalization gives them the ability to 
depict with rigor how disadvantage and privilege are two sides of the same coin. Hence, 
adopting this relational aspect is more possible in cases where the group in question 
already had its share of this asymmetry in its interactions with dominant groups.  
Hence, we have to differentiate the civility that comes with the reflexivity of 
dominant groups about the asymmetry of their relations with enclaves and the 
horizontal civility that enclaves may acquire in evaluating the position of groups which 
are closer to their own status in society. In most cases, what will play out is this second 
type of civility as enclaves are more apt at discovering how marginalized groups‟ 
position is determined. Hence, enclaves would be in a better position to testify to that 
group‟s marginalization by a dominant group as well as how it is positioned vis-à-vis 
other marginals.  
In the light of this introductory conversation on how we define civility in this 
thesis, the following conversation will gain a better perspective. At the last section, we 
discuss the importance of an extended understanding of civility both for group members 
and the society at large and how generalizable our conclusions are. 
 
 
 
6.1.   Framing Dynamics Within the Coalition with Respect to Civility 
 
 
 
Initially, the underlying motive for the coalition was to craft a language that 
speaks about multiple forms of discrimination in society and that aims to manifest a 
joint opposition to these discriminations. When a group of activists want to join forces, 
they need a common enemy to begin with. For example, they can start from debating 
about how state policies have put them at a disadvantageous in similar ways. However, 
while attacking common targets such as a particular state policy or institution, 
members, as they are coming from very different activist backgrounds, also start 
discussing how they see groups in society and how these groups fare against each other. 
When they try to formulate arguments making use of inter-group solidarity against 
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common enemies, complicity of certain groups in the discrimination of other groups 
becomes an unexpectedly pressing issue.  
This chapter deals with the question of how frames are modified if discrimination 
and disadvantage are defined in a way that involves a re-evaluation of the relationship 
between groups in society.91  
The following steps summarize the initiation and changes in frames as a result of 
rebuttals. The conversations related to discrimination do not follow a specific timeline 
or order, they are rather fragmented and some framing strategies come about around the 
same time as others. The presentation was made in this fashion in order to facilitate 
reading and to bring a more holistic picture about all the options raised within the 
coalition with regards to how to respond to inter-group discrimination. 
The alliance made recourse to various strategies on framing discrimination with 
varying results. These different strategies are not put as definitive or uniform for all 
members, they should rather be seen as attempts that yielded different results. It is the 
results of those strategies that seems more fruitful to analyses as they show the limits or 
the potentials of this coalition and similar coalitions in the future. 
 
i. Initial Framing Strategy: Solidarity of marginal groups against common 
oppressions  
ii. Rebuttal: Complicity of some groups in the discrimination of others 
iii. Alternative Framing strategy: Re-defining privileged and under-
privileged groups 
iv. Modified Framing strategy: Being Apologetic for discrimination 
v. Discussion:  How is the Criteria for Civility Determined in 
Heterogeneous Enclaves? 
 
 
 
                                                          
91 As argued elsewhere, some coalition members openly confessed their allegiance 
to certain groups, while others held a more individualistic stance. In the following 
conversations, the argumentators may act like they are part of a group or they may act 
like neutral observers who are simply making observations. In either case, the point of 
interest is not whether a person feels part of a group or not but how she envisages the 
inter-group relations in society to be. 
 
204 
 
 
 
 
6.2.  Initial Framing Strategy: Solidarity of Marginal Groups Against Common 
Oppressions 
 
 
 
The initial framing strategy of the platform was based on highlighting how 
marginal groups get similar treatment both from state and society. Despite being 
depicted as very different from each other in terms of where they stand ideologically, 
all marginals are restricted or suppressed either by societal customs or state policies in a 
similar fashion. This resembles the framing strategy whereby contrasts were used 
effectively to prove that women suffer in similar ways despite being very different from 
each other. 
 
Here is a remark by T.U that illustrates this framing strategy succinctly:  
 
   Even though they might be perceived as groups, institutions very far from 
each other DTP, Lambda and YouTube have one thing in common: They 
are marginal compared to the pre-defined Turkish identity. (Pre-defined 
identity being nationalist but pro-western, pro-state, father of the family, 
part of productive labor force) Any group who does not fit this definition is 
a candidate for marginalization (online blog, 23.06.2008).92 
 
As can be seen from this excerpt, the fate of one group is tied to that of another 
group. The basic commonality of groups mentioned in this declaration is that they all 
suffer in similar fashions for being marginals to the pre-defined dominant identity. For 
this reason, it seems all the more compelling to act together as it would be a rejection of 
the positions assigned to enclaves. Here is what A.C thinks on this topic:  
                                                          
92 Bugün Türkiye‟de de „kapatılma‟ tehdidi ile karĢı karĢıya olan ve hatta 
kapatılanları da bu fikre atıfta bulunarak tartıĢmak mümkün! Her ne kadar 
birbirlerinden çok uzak gruplar/kurumlar gibi algılansalar da; AKP, DTP, Lambda ve 
Youtube‟un önemli bir ortak noktası mevcut: TanımlanmıĢ ortalama Türk kimliğine 
göre „marjinal‟ kalıyorlar. (TanımlanmıĢ kimlik: Milliyetçi ama batıcı, devlet ahlâklı, 
üretime katkısı olan aile babası Ģeklinde özetlenebilir.) Bu tanımın sınırlı çerçevesi 
içinde yer almayan herkes marjinalleĢmeye aday görülüyor. 
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   I think it would a very good idea if we did something regarding the 
headscarf issue with Lambda. They are trying to position us somewhere on 
a spectrum. Veiling and homosexuality, bisexuality, transgender identities 
are two poles of their spectrum. If these two poles could do something, if we 
could do something for these two, it would be highly effective (online blog, 
06.06.2008).93 
 
Another plausible strategy was to show how different marginals were restricted by 
the state. For F.G, the willingness to use state to signify their own marginality initially 
seemed like a plausible strategy considering the wide diversity of groups which were 
made part of the discussion:  
 
   We are a mosaic made up of Sunnis, Alevis, Kurds and Armenians which 
the state oppressed in an equal distance. We would be closer to resolving 
our issues with the state if we started evaluating our own oppression through 
others‟ oppression  (online blog, 07.09.2008).94 
 
This type of framing strategy relies on an understanding of groups as 
symmetrically opposed to the state. The following comment comes very close to what 
Young refers to as an ideal multicultural coalition. Young (2006) was arguing that the 
way to fight the assault of a common enemy requires a coalition that draws on 
particular experiences of each and every group making up the coalition so that we can 
construct an enlarged understanding of the depth of society‟s injustices and ways to 
address them. (p.17). Here is what D.E says which echoes Young‟s claims:  
 
   The conclusion to be made from this (declaration?) should have been “we 
are experiencing different types of oppression with our different identities” 
instead of “we are all oppressed, we are all the same”. Why should the fact 
that what make us come closer to each other is the different oppressions we 
experience with different identities, sound complicated? I wish we could 
have lived in a very mature society where everyone could share others‟ 
                                                          
93 Hele Lambda ile beraber baĢörtüsü icin bir Ģeyler yapmak bence çok iyi bir 
fikir. Bizi bir spektrumda bir yerlere koymaya çalıĢıyorlar. BaĢörtüsü ve eĢcinsellik, 
biseksüellik, travestilik bu bizi koymaya çalıĢtıkları spektrumun iki ucu.  Bu iki uç 
birlikte bir Ģey yaparsa, bu ikisi için beraber bir Ģey yaparsak çok iyi olur 
kanaatindeyim. 
 
94 Devletin eĢit (ya da eĢit değilse de belirli) mesafede durarak mağdur ettiği, 
birbirine de eĢit mesafede duran bir Sünni, Alevi, Kürt, Ermeni mozağiğinden 
oluĢuyoruz biz ve birbirimizin mağduriyetini diğeri üzerinden anlarsak da devletle 
sorunumuzu çözmeye daha çok yaklaĢacağız” 
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agonies without suffering from similar agonies. But what we call humans 
are like this, only those who fall from the roof understand others who fall 
from the roof. The question of “Who pushed you from the roof” however 
can only be discussed when we come together and touch each other‟s hearts 
and talk (online blog, 09.09.2008).95  
 
 
 
6.3.  Rebuttal: Complicity of Some Groups in the Discrimination of Others 
 
 
 
The above framing strategy, although useful in the short-run, proves rather limited 
in resolving problems inherent in a coalition that involves groups whose self-evaluation 
is not independent of how they evaluate other groups in society. Any collective effort 
that involves multiple groups within its ranks would start drawing comparisons of 
social injustices experienced by the constituent groups of the coalition. However, such 
comparisons can be hampered by the historical baggage that groups carry with their 
identities. The prior identity construction might be based on confrontations with the 
groups that are one‟s proponent‟s at this moment. It might become impossible to 
compare what one group suffered with that of the other, if the suffering historically is 
so much implicated in the power relations between these groups. For this reason, any 
type of claim or identity construction that relies on an approval from these other groups 
should take into perspective how one‟s identity fares against others historically.  
This issue can be most vividly illustrated with the case of a newspaper article:96 
 
                                                          
95 Ancak buradan çıkacak sonuç, „Hepimiz mağduruz, hepimiz biriz‟ gibi bir 
sonuçtan ziyade, hepimiz farklı farklı kimliklerde farklı farklı zulümleri yaĢıyoruz 
Ģeklinde olmalıydı. Ve zaten tam da bu farklı farklı kimliklerde yaĢadığımız farklı 
farklı zulümlerin bizi birbirimizi anlamaya iten sebep olması neden bu kadar kafa 
karıĢtırıcı bir Ģey olsun ki? KeĢke kendisini aĢmıĢ, kemale ermiĢ bir toplumda 
yaĢasaydık da birbirimizi benzer acıları yaĢamadan anlayabilseydik. Ama galiba insan 
biraz da böyle bir varlık, damdan düĢenin halinden en çok damdan düĢen anlıyor yine. 
“Seni kim itti?” sorusu ise ancak bir araya gelip, birbirimizin acılarına dokunabildikten 
sonra, biraz dertleĢtikten sonra ortaya çıkıyor. 
 
96 http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/?i=138046 
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   “It is always said that we should look at history to understand the current 
situation. I want you to look at the present time to understand the past of 
Turkish-Armenian relations. 
 
We are facing a mentality which can say to the veiled women, who make up 
70 % of the female population in this country, “Go to Saudi Arabia”, at a 
time when everybody says or does is under close scrutiny thanks to 
globalization. 
 
I really do not understand how people still remain skeptical about the 
possibility of a forced evacuation of Armenians when there was no one to 
put pressure on states for their wrongdoings. 
 
While the two mentalities may seem quite apart from each other historically, 
they are overlapping on the same soul-less plain, still hurting, oppressing 
and causing pain. The name of the oppressed can be Agop at one instance, 
or AyĢe in another instance but the name of the oppressor remains the 
same.”97 
 
This article is heavily criticized in the platform on the basis of forgetting the real 
power dynamics between communities that interacted with Armenians in the early 20th 
century. To be more explicit, while Kurds have to consider their role in killings and 
deportations of Armenians and confiscation of Armenian property, Sunni Muslims 
cannot dismiss the complicity of the ruling elite (who were Sunnis) while Armenians 
were deported or executed. For this reason, when such comparisons are made, any 
claims related to being a disadvantaged group in the present tense ends up bumping into 
                                                          
97 Hani hep "bugünü anlamak için geçmiĢe bakmak gerek" denir ya, ben de size 
Türk-Ermeni iliĢkilerinin geçmiĢini anlayabilmek için tam tersini, yani geçmiĢi 
anlamak için bugüne bakmanızı önermek istiyorum. 
 
KüreselleĢme sayesinde yaĢadığımız Ģu geçici diyardaki herkes az çok birbirinden 
haberdarken, iktidar sahiplerinin hemen her hareketi uluslararası camia tarafından 
gözlem altındayken, bu ülkenin kadın nüfusunun yüzde yetmiĢini oluĢturan baĢörtülü 
kadın vatandaĢlarına "Ġran'a git, Arabistan'a git" diyebilen bir zihniyetle karĢı 
karĢıyayız. 
 
 Bu zihniyetin bundan uzun yıllar önce, iktidarını denetleyip hesap sorabilecek 
kimse yokken nüfusun yaklaĢık yüzde onunu oluĢturan Ermeni vatandaĢlarımızı bir 
yerlere 'göç etmeye' zorlaması nasıl olur da hâlâ bu kadar kuĢkuyla karĢılanır 
anlamakta zorlanıyorum. 
 
Her ne kadar bu iki zihniyet birbirinden tarihsel olarak uzak görünse de aynı 
vicdan yoksunu düzlemin koordinatlarında birleĢiyorlar ve hâlâ zulüm ediyor, can 
yakıyor, yaralıyorlar. Anlayacağınız mazlumluk halinin adı kimi zaman Agop kimi 
zaman AyĢe olsa da, zalimin adı her zaman ve kim olursa olsun Zalim.  
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claims of complicity in the past tense.  In trying to align frames, the historicity of 
relations should always be dealt with either by acknowledging the complicity of one‟s 
group in the discrimination of other groups or by simply focusing on the moment.  
To re-phrase this finding, one framing strategy that proves counter-productive is 
the attempt to support one‟s claims by way of drawing analogies or comparisons 
between groups which have not been so cooperative with each other historically. 
Finding commonalities on the basis of having endured similar types of oppressions by 
the state does not always create the sympathies needed to claim there is a successful 
frame alignment. This shows successful frames can only emerge if there is an 
acknowledgement of power relations involved in inter-group relations. Especially an 
acknowledgement of which groups historically profited from state privileges is needed 
in order to start a working conversation with different groups in society. 
The major deadlock occurs when analogies drawn between groups do not 
represent what has taken place in history. Whereas ideally a successful frame bridging 
would rely on assuming there are symmetries between groups and that their agonies are 
comparable, an over-reliance on identities tilts the emphasis more towards the historical 
asymmetries of power between different groups.  
When frames serve to cover up the historical relations between groups, they 
become more counter-productive. What minorities would want the most is the 
acknowledgement of the nature of inter-group relations and the naming of culpable 
parties rather than the simplistic assumption such as “Have not we all suffered in one 
way or another?” Any attempt to equate groups on the basis of their different ways of 
suffering does not get a positive reaction from group members. Because of fluidity of 
historical minority/majority positions or oppressor/oppressed categories, frames that 
lump groups under any one of those groups are tackled critically.  
Leftists seem more critical of alliances and coalitions that conflate different 
ideological traditions for reasons of having a similar target. Here is what C.D, who 
identified herself as a socialist feminist says:  
 
   There was a demonstration called: We are against coup d‟états. There is 
Menderes on one side, Deniz GezmiĢ on other side. Can there be a political 
union like this? Can there be a political current of this sort? Menderes 
should flow to Deniz…What kind of mentality is this? Who are you 
fooling? What kinds of democrats are these? These are the kitties of AKP 
but more dangerous than AKP. This is because they call you to socialist 
revolution. What kind of socialism is this? Were the fates of Adnan 
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Menderes and Deniz GezmiĢ the same? They were both executed. But look 
closely at who executed whom and why. The people who executed Deniz 
GezmiĢ were people like Menderes who had been ruling this country at the 
time. They tried to capture the state. How can you call them the same? You 
cannot account for 12th of September if you call them the same thing. You 
are creating an ideological sewage and then call it being a democrat. We are 
not so stupid as to not understand that (interview, 05.08.2011).98 
 
This observation is important for this study. There are similar tendencies within 
this platform where different factions by virtue of having received similar treatment 
from the state are lumped into the same category of discriminated. However, this proves 
counter-productive as it covers up the historical relations between those groups. 
What we learn from this discussion is that when dealing with discrimination 
against a group, the platform does not solely consider the issue as a matter of how state 
has treated a group. The issue is turned into an inter-group issue.99 
What could be some of the reasons why groups are also implicitly held 
responsible for some of the blame? Is it because, they push for such an agenda or policy 
adoption by the state? Is it because, by virtue of enjoying freedoms and public goods 
others are not able to enjoy, they should feel guilty about this? Is it because, their 
                                                          
98 Mesela bir tane eylem vardı. Darbelere karĢıyız. Bir tarafta Menderes var bir 
tarafta Deniz GezmiĢ.  Böyle bir siyasi birlik olur mu? Böyle bir siyasi akım olur mu? 
Menderesçiler Denizlere aksın? Böyle bir akıl olur mu? Sen kimi kandırıyorsun? Böyle 
bir demokratlık olabilir mi? Bunlar AKP‟nin yavruları. Bunların AKP‟den daha 
tehlikeli yanı insanı sosyalist devrime çağırıyorlar. Böyle bir sosyalistlik olur mu? 
Deniz GezmiĢ ve Adnan Menderes‟in kaderi aynı mı? Ġkisi de idam edildi. Ġyi de kim 
kimi idam etti, niye etti bir bak hele. Deniz GezmiĢ‟i idam edenler Menderes gibi 
olanlardı, bu ülkenin iktidarında olanlardı. Devleti ele geçirmeye çalıĢtılar. Nasıl bu 
ikisine aynı dersin? Aynı dersen 12 Eylül‟den hesap soramazsın. Sen bilinç bulanıklığı, 
ideolojik bir lağım yaratıyorsun o lağımı da bize demokratlık diye satıyorsun. O kadar 
da aptalız yani. 
 
99 At this point, one may pose the question of whether not all discriminations 
involve an inter-group aspect. This is not always the case. If one takes the case of veil 
ban, this is a direct discrimination of the state against its veiled citizens on the grounds 
of implementing secular principles. However, one cannot see the same level of 
discrimination to veiled women in society. With the exception of a minority of fiercely 
critical secularists, society is either indifferent or approving veiled women. The 
discrimination cannot be depicted so much in inter-group terms. However, the same 
situation does not hold when questions related to relations with certain minorities, i.e 
Kurds or homosexuals come into play. Dominant public sphere may be as 
discriminatory as the state vis-a-vis such minorities. 
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privileged treatment gives them an asymmetric power which they can always make use 
of to the detriment of disadvantaged groups? 
Discrimination can be used by other groups in a conscious manner to improve that 
group‟s life chances. (i.e. Kurds, in the case of confiscation of Armenian property) It 
could also be that state behavior and individual behavior are two complementary 
constructs that are not mutually exclusive or that do not exhibit conflicting rationale at 
all times. After all it is those same individuals who assume political positions. This is 
especially prominent in the discourse of feminists who claim that state is a patriarchal 
institution since it is men who fill most of the influential positions in state institutions. 
These themes all come up in subsequent discussions on complicity and how it is 
negotiated.  
Moving attention away from state policies and towards inter-group relations 
causes mixed results. While some members question the assumptions behind culpability 
as misplaced, others think this gives them an opportunity to come to terms with the 
depth and complexity of inter-group injustices.  
 
 
 
6.4.  Modified Framing Strategy: Re-defining Privileged and Under-privileged 
Groups 
 
 
 
One result of putting the burden of just treatment of groups on to other groups in 
society is that members try to distance themselves from the “privileged group” 
category. The privileged group can mean different things to different members. For 
some, this is being Sunni. These are usually less religious members of the platform. For 
others, it is being a Kemalist Sunni, which refers to those citizens who are willing to 
practice their religion in the private sphere. In trying to shift the blame from a group 
unto another, each member finds a further cleavage that can be appealing to others in 
convincing them that they are equally an outcast.  
What is central to these attempts to find further cleavages is the strong conviction 
that there is a certain life style that was promoted by the state since its establishment, an 
equivalent of WASP in America, which some members call “Kemalist Sunni”. These 
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are the citizens who fit the norms of “appropriate Turkish citizen” the best and 
consequentially they are the ones to enjoy the fruits of state recognition in the form of 
easier access to political, economic and cultural rights. Here is what D.E thinks on this 
topic:  
 
   Relations of authority may exhibit diversity; however it is evidently 
Kemalism which is able to melt all the identities in its own pot. Just as what 
Kurds or Sunnis did in the case of Armenian issue can be a problem, the 
same is true for other groups in their approach to the veil ban. For this 
reason, what has to be done is to pin down the source of authority for all 
these different oppressions and hold it accountable for it.  It is Kemalism 
which is producing these problems. It is this ideology which made people 
fight with each other. Neither of Muslims, Sunnis, Alevis, Kurds or 
Armenians can be pure enough under its influence. We can distinguish the 
real Muslim, real Armenian, Alevi or leftist by checking whether it has 
isolated itself from Kemalism (online blog, 09.09.2008).100   
 
Hence, when there is a criticism of Sunnis, one of the tendencies is to associate 
the ills of being a Sunni majority with Kemalism. Mainstream Sunnism is associated 
with Kemalism and responsibility is left on to this type of mainstream Sunnism. P.R 
says:   
 
   What is to be questioned is this nation state identity. This means 
questioning the majority. These days whenever I hear the word majority, I 
think of Turkish Kemalism. The type of Sunni Muslim who only practices 
his/her belief at home is part of this identity and it has to be questioned. The 
fact that the majority of this country is Muslim is disturbing me, because it 
is just one type of Muslim. The headscarf ban is also marginalizing us 
against this created norm. Our problem is not being able to adapt to the 
mainstream Islam (online blog, 07.09.2008).101 
                                                          
100 Ayrıca iktidar iliĢkileri toplumsal anlamda çeĢitlilik arzetse de, bugün bu 
ülkede iktidar olanın bütün kimlikleri kendi potasında istediği Ģekilde eritme 
kabiliyetine haiz Kemalizm olduğu aĢikar. Ermeni meselesinde Kürtlerin, Sünnilerin 
yaptıkları nasıl zulümse, baĢörtüsü meselesinde de aynı Ģey baĢkaları için söz konusu 
olabilmekte. Bu yüzden öncelikle bütün bu zulümlerin kaynağı olan iktidarı tespit 
etmek, onunla hesaplaĢmak gerekiyor. Bütün bu sorunları üreten Kemalizmin kendisi. 
Bu ülkede insanların iliklerine kadar iĢlemis olan ve herkesi birbirine düĢüren bu 
ideoloji. Ve onun etkisinden ne Müslümanlar, ne Sünniler, ne Aleviler, ne Kürtler, ne 
de Ermeniler ari değiller. Bu anlamda gerçek Müslüman‟ı, Ermeni‟yi, Alevi‟yi, 
solcuyu vs. Kemalizm‟den ne kadar arınmıĢ olduğuna bakarak ayırt edebiliriz bence. 
 
101 Bu aralar çoğunluk lafını her duyduğumda altında TC Kemalizmi aramaya 
baĢladım farkında olmadan. Yaratılan Sünni Müslüman ama dinini sadece evinde 
yaĢayan kimlik de bunun bir parçası ve bunu da sorgulamak gerekiyor. “Çoğunluk 
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This message does not resonate very well with other group members who want to 
see the complicity of each group in other group‟s suffering. Forgiveness goes through 
acknowledgement of complicity for at least some of the coalition members. For the 
following commentator, the dominant behavior among a group cannot solely be 
attributed to how it is aligned with the state. The same interviewee argues:  
 
   I always thought about the Sunni pressure in this country in the following 
fashion: Issues such as the veil ban or Kurdish question are problems 
emanating from the state and finding their way to the larger public. So, the 
source of the problem is artificial. There is no correspondence with how the 
public feels about these issues. It is the high politics that is dividing the 
citizens into artificial categories which is responsible for these problems. 
Like the veiled/non-veiled dichotomy. And the solution will be found in 
state circles. It depends on the consensus between politicians. However, the 
pressure of Sunni Islam is different. No one is pushing the public to exert its 
ethical attitude in this fashion. This is an internalized ethics. The people are 
behaving in the way they deem appropriate. For this reason, we have to 
distinguish between state pressure and societal pressure and read the 
differences carefully. The Sunni pressure is being used and supported by the 
state at times or being suppressed or disapproved of at other times. This is 
actually a very complicated and difficult battle compared to the one we have 
with the state. We have to get engaged in a process with the public that 
needs a lot of labor. We have to do this without hurting the sensitivities of 
the public. We can tell the state that it should change, but it is harder to say 
to the society: Hey, public change your rules (online blog, 09.09.2008)!102    
                                                                                                                                                                          
Müslüman‟dır” söyleminin altında aslında “Çoğunluk belli bir tarz Müslümandır” 
yattığı için bu bile rahatsız ediyor beni bir Müslüman olarak. Zaten baĢörtüsü yasağı 
bağlamında toplumdaki normal bir pratiğin marjinalleĢtirilmesi devreye giriyor, Yani o 
"istenilen, çoğunluk olduğu iddia edilen Müslüman tipi" kapsamına da girememek" ki 
A.B‟nin iĢaret ettiği de bu. 
 
102 Sünni Ġslam baskısı konusunda da ben hep Ģöyle düĢünmüĢümdür: Mesela bir 
baĢörtüsü sorunu, bir Kürt sorunu devletten halka doğru giden sorunlar. Dolayısıyla 
sorunun yapay temelleri var. Halk arasında bir karĢılığı yok. Hatta devletten halka 
geçen ve halkı da olmadığı çizgilerle zoraki ayıran siyasetler sorunlu burda. BaĢörtülü 
baĢörtüsüz ayrımı gibi. Ve çözümü devlet masalarında. Siyasilerin karĢılıklı 
anlaĢmalarına dayalı falan. Ama Sünni Ġslam baskısı biraz daha farklı. Kimse doğrudan 
zorlamıyor halkı sen toplumda etik anlayıĢını Ģu Ģekilde kur diye. Bu artık oturmuĢ bir 
değer olmuĢ. O inandığı Ģekilde davranıyor sadece. O yüzden devlet 
baskısıyla, toplumsal baskı arasında fark var ve bunları okurken de o Ģekilde okumak 
gerekiyor. Sünni baskı da devlet tarafından zaman zaman kullanılan desteklenen, 
zaman zamansa bastırılan sevilmeyen birĢey olabiliyor. Bence bu devletle verdiğimiz 
mücadeleye göre çok daha karmaĢık ve mücadele edilmesi zor bir durum. Toplumun 
kendisiyle çok emek isteyen bir sürece girmek ve bir de toplumun hassasiyetleri olduğu 
için onu incitip kırmadan yapmak gerekiyor. Devlete değiĢtir dediğimiz gibi halka da 
"bu kuralını değiĢtir ey halk" denmiyor.  
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All these formulations have a point in common. There is a fair amount of criticism 
of the dominance of Sunnism in this country, the way it is practiced and it is projected 
on to other minorities. For this reason, how Sunnism is assessed within the coalition 
gains a bigger importance for the success of frame alignments. 
What this section tells us is that in the minds of alliance members there is a need 
for acknowledging the groups they belong to are not on an equal footing with each 
other, some have suffered both at the hands of the state and at the hands of other groups. 
For this reason any framing that tries to establish symmetry between groups attracts 
criticism. Here is what A.B thinks:  
 
   I find the category “Muslim” very problematic. I always said this. We all 
know it but never pay attention to it. In Turkey, no one has ever been 
tortured for being a Sunni Muslim. For this reason, when we are to talk 
about Muslims, let us not forget to refine what we mean in social, cultural 
and political terms and not generalize with a generic term such as 
“Muslims”. 
 
Sunni Muslims in this country should really come to terms with how 
hegemonic they are. There are no hierarchies of oppression. However if you 
start speaking, “we the Muslims”, you will be covering up the nature of this 
hegemony in a dangerous manner. This argument is very fashionable among 
Sunni Muslims and AKP has based its popularity on this narrative as well 
(online blog, 07.09.2011).103 
 
Here we observe a tension between two conflicting rationales. While there is an 
urge to associate privilege with one type of citizen (a Kemalist Turkish Sunni), which 
makes all the other groups in society outcasts on a par with each other in terms of 
marginalization, the counter-trend within the platform  is to acknowledge that there are 
binary dichotomies which divide groups into different camps depending on the criteria. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
103 Ġkincisi, "Müslüman" kategorisini çok sorunlu buluyorum, hep söyledim yine 
söylüyorum. Aslında hepimizin de bildiği birĢey bu ama yine de pek dikkat etmiyoruz. 
Türkiye‟de hiç kimse "Sünni Müslüman" olduğu için eziyet görmemiĢtir” desem 
abartmıĢ olur muyum bilmiyorum. Orada daha sosyal, kültürel ve siyasal tespitlerle 
konuĢmak ve Müslümanlar diye genellememek gerekir sanırm. 
 
Halbuki Türkiye‟deki Sünni Müslümanların ne kadar hegemonik olduklarını 
farketmeye ciddi Ģekilde ihtiyaçları var.  Mağduriyetler arası hiyerarĢi yok ama “biz 
Müslümanlar” diye bir mağdur kitleden bahsedersek bu hegemonyanın üstünü çok 
tehlikeli biçimde örtmüĢ oluruz ki bu anlatı Sünni Müslümanlar arasında çok satıyor, 
AKP de kendi iktidarını bunun üzerinden sürekli güçlendiriyor.  
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Whereas Sunnis might claim disadvantage when it comes to the comparison with 
Kemalist Sunnis (which refers to those individuals who only practice their religiosity in 
the private sphere), they are advantaged when it comes to their comparison with Alevis, 
Kurds or Armenians. There are examples of such relative advantage throughout 
discussions. Hence bracketing such ethnic, cultural and sectarian differences when 
talking about identities do not pay off in the coalition.  
What does this tell us about the limits of multicultural coalitions? Young was 
optimistic about the potentials of such coalitions provided that they can represent 
different ways in which distinct groups are harmed by state policies, be it neo-liberal 
restructuring as in her case studies, or as in the case of discriminatory state policies vis-
à-vis different minorities in Turkey. However, what we observe in this case is that, 
coalitions may turn inward as well as work outward and question the different ways in 
which each is implicated in the fate of another. While doing this, each group is 
evaluated from the prism of one particular dichotomy. In the case of comparison with 
Kurds, Kemalists and religious Sunnis are on a par with each other in terms of 
complicity, while in the case of Alevis, it is mostly the religious Sunnis which are under 
attack. Instead of underlining the fluidity and intersectionality of positions, each 
discussion brings another division line according to which each group‟s historical track-
record is evaluated.  
On the one hand, this is a useful exercise. While one group claims to have 
suffered in one instance, in another instance it sits in the place of a culpable party. In 
this fashion, reflexivity on the situatedness of positions (depending on the criteria of a 
binary comparison) is achieved. This also shows, despite claims to common fate, there 
are historical circumstances and experiences which makes groups culpable on the basis 
of having profited from another groups‟ plight, intentionally or unintentionally. 
This shows multicultural coalitions can be fluid arrangements at best. Depending 
on the topic, groups may shift positions and take on different responsibilities. This also 
shows identities are negotiated in a flux. They are not fixed and rigidly situated 
compared to each other. The positive side of such initiatives is that they help achieve a 
fuller account of the relativity of group positions and help groups avoid making 
essentializing statements about victimhood or oppression. The downside on the other 
hand is that there is a possibility for such coalitions to descend into a competition of 
“who oppressed whom?” where the objective of understanding different experiences of 
identity categories is ignored. 
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6.5.  Modified Framing Strategy: Being Apologetic for Discrimination 
 
 
 
Because frames started evolving from a more state-centered point into one where 
inter-group relations are questioned, the ensuing framing strategy has a more apologetic 
tone. Having an apologetic tone could mean feeling guilt or feeling conscious about the 
responsibility one has by virtue of being privileged.104 
This could be manifested in the form of formally apologizing to minorities or in 
the form of rejecting certain privileges bestowed on oneself by virtue of being a Turkish 
citizen. With regards to the formal apology, it is important to analyze what it signifies 
for the group.  Many of those who see this strategy as fruitful argue that confronting 
one‟s history is something we owe to those who had been discriminated. R.S argues:  
 
   I don‟t see myself exempt from apologizing. Not until long ago, when I 
was a kid especially, I used to think the word “Armenian” was a swear 
word. I did not know that what was meant by the term was a public. After I 
have read and observed more, I started coming to terms with this truth. We 
all have to come to terms with our past; otherwise we would not do much 
good to those people who are still carrying that past on their shoulders. For 
this reason, I consider an apology as a courageous attempt to come to terms 
with one‟s past (online blog, 22.12.2008).105  
 
One does not become an individual totally devoid of privileges, if she or he has 
not suffered what the minorities have suffered historically. This is because by virtue of 
                                                          
104 How privilege is defined will become more certain at the last modified framing 
strategy. 
 
105 Özür dileyecek kiĢiler biz miyiz değil miyiz, tartıĢması üzerine düĢününce, 
özür dileme fikrinden uzak görmüyorum kendimi. Çünkü Ermeni kelimesini küçük 
sanılmayacak bir yaĢıma kadar küfür zannederdim. Kastedilenin bir halk olduğunu 
bilmezdim. Sonradan bilgim, görgüm artınca yavaĢ yavaĢ öğrenmeye baĢladım 
geçmiĢi. Hepimiz tarihle yüzleĢecek, o tarihi günümüzde sırtında taĢıyarak yaĢayan 
insanların yüklerini hafifletecek pek bir Ģey yapmıĢ olamayız. Bu nedenle bu özür 
dileme tavrı, aslında yüzleĢme konusunda atılmıĢ cesur bir adım diye düĢünüyorum. 
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not being part of the disadvantaged, that person does start life quite ahead of others 
which makes the argument that one should not feel personally responsible for the 
wrong-doings of the past an obsolete argument. M.N argues:   
 
I believe that every man in this society is benefiting from male dominance 
intentionally or unintentionally. I also believe the people of this country 
have benefited from the rent and privileges emanating from the elimination 
of Armenians, directly or indirectly: materially or psychologically. We have 
moved to a more privileged position even if we have not asked for it. I also 
believe if we are not Kurds or Alevis, we happen to be the part of a more 
privileged situation economically, politically, ideologically and 
psychologically (online blog, 22.12.2008).106    
 
There are also those such as ġ.T, who believe an apology can still serve its 
purpose by forcing each individual to confront the founding rationale of the state, to 
take the individual responsibility to reflect on the implications of the founding ideology 
of the state which is a contemporary duty, not a duty of the past:  
 
   I believe there is a momentum not to be missed here. This is the 
possibility to come to terms with ourselves. I am talking about the 
possibility to oust the obsession with identities, the implicit and explicit 
racism starting from ourselves right now. Collective responsibility has never 
taken root in this country. Responsibility has always been shifted on to 
others. However, once a crime has been committed there is no turning back 
the clock. That is the disastrous part. I believe the way to heal the past is not 
to bring some people to their knees but to feel responsible for one‟s past. 
The apology that comes with this feeling of responsibility means we take 
the blame of the past onto ourselves. 
 
I am not apologizing from Armenians. I am not apologizing as a Turk 
either. I do not believe identities, roots can create a real source of solidarity, 
and they can only act as a substitute for solidarity. The condition for living 
together on the same political plane is to take the blame of a genocide that 
constitutes the implicit condition, the covert basis of the political plane that 
is affecting us all. I am apologizing not because i am responsible for the past 
                                                          
106 Ben inanıyorum ki, bu toplumda her erkek erkek egemenliğinden 
yararlanmaktadır kendi istenci dıĢında bile olsa.Yine inanıyorum ki bu toplumda 
Ermeni olmayan herkes bir buçuk milyon Ermeninin yani o zamanki ülke nüfusunun 
onda birinin ortadan kaldırılmıĢ olmasından ortaya çıkan ranttan ve ayrıcalıktan 
doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak yararlanmıĢtır. Maddi ya da manevi. Ġstese de istemese de 
daha avantajlı bir yere geçmiĢtir görece. Yine inanıyorum ki, Kürt değilsek, Alevi 
değilsek, onlara göre üstün ve egemen sayılan bir ekonomik, politik, ideolojik ve 
psikolojik durumun parçasıyızdır, istemesek de. 
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but because i am responsible for the current political basis (online blog, 
22.12.2008).107 
 
The justifications provided above, if read very carefully, have different rationales. 
The first two reasons have a certain awareness of one‟s identity and what having that 
particular identity brought to oneself in the form of better treatment and privileges. The 
last justification on the other hand, instead of identification with a certain background 
and having to make an apology from the perspective of that background considers an 
apology as a foundational principle on which a healthy political union can be based.  
It is an important discussion whether demand or provision of apologies is based 
on having very rigidly defined identities. One could argue that if there was not a strong 
attachment to identities, there might not have been a demand for an apology. The same 
goes for the provision of it. It could be all the more irrelevant to apologize if one does 
not feel deeply attached to a group which is held culpable. It may become harder to 
admit certain wrong-doings if such wrong doings are turned into one‟s constitutive 
traits, the things that makes that person himself/herself. 
Despite this fact, there had been a lot of confessions in the platform with respect 
to not having been sensitive enough to past injustices to other groups in society. Some 
of these confessions were about not understanding the plight of Kurds properly, that of 
ignoring the existence of Muslim sects other than Sunnis, that of ignoring the 
implications of 28th of February for veiled women etc. These should be seen as sincere 
                                                          
107 Burada yakalanması ve korunması gereken bir ivme olduğunu düĢünüyorum. O 
da kendimizle yüzleĢme olasılığıdır. Burada hemen Ģimdi kendimizden baĢlayarak bu 
toplumsallığı, bu köken takıntısını, bu kimlikleri, bu açık veya örtük ırkçılığı 
sorgulayarak değiĢtirme imkanından bahsediyorum. Kollektif sorumluluk bu 
topraklarda asla yeĢermemiĢ bir düĢünce. Sorumluluk hep ötelenen, baĢkalarına 
atfedilendir. Oysa suç bir kez iĢlendi mi, zamanı geri almak mümkün olmuyor. Feci 
olan da bu. GeçmiĢi onarmaya baĢlamanın, birilerini diz çökertmekle değil, ona karĢı 
kendini sorumlu hissetmeye baĢlamakla gerçekleĢeceğine inanıyorum.Sorumluluk 
hissinin bir özürle ifade bulması, geçmiĢin suçlarının kendi üzerimize alınması 
anlamına geliyor. 
 
Ben Ermenilerden özur dilemiyorum, bir Türk olarak da özür dilemiyorum. 
Kimlik ve kökenlerin gerçek bir dayanıĢma (= ortak aidiyet) iliĢkisi yaratamayacağını 
düĢünmüyorum (olsa olsa "dayanıĢma-ikamesi" yaratabilirler). Hepimizi etkileyen bir 
siyasal alanda birlikte yaĢamaya devam etme kosulu, o siyasal alanın temelini, örtük 
Ģartını, zımni kaidesini oluĢturan bir soykırımın sorumluluğunu üzerimize almaktır. 
Ben dün değil, bugün bundan sorumlu olduğum için özür diliyorum. 
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attempts to come to terms with, albeit late, what other groups might have gone through 
in Turkey. Here is what G.H thinks:  
 
   If I did not spend time on relations of hegemony, I would not have come 
close to understanding the situation of veiled women. However I did 
nothing for them during 28th of February period. We had no interaction at 
the time. We did not pass that exam really well. We did nothing against 
those pressures. Then I started thinking harder after the Konca KuriĢ 
incident (interview, 14.03.2011).108 
 
One other symbolic gesture that is seen as a compensation for the discrimination 
of minorities is lifting the Turkish Oath. The Turkish Oath, despite having the potential 
to signify a civic citizenship is seen as a sign of a certain prerogative. Emphasizing 
one‟s Turkishness is seen as an insult on groups who suffered from various 
discriminations.  
The Turkish Oath could, in principle, be considered as the symbol of the covenant 
between the state and its citizens. If the language of the Oath made less reference to 
being a Turk, it could also be considered as a declaration that inculcates civic virtues in 
children in their formative years. In other words, if the Oath could be used in a way that 
would downplay nationality and accentuate dutiful citizenship, it would do more good 
than harm. Here is a quote by S.ġ along this line:  
 
   The text (referring to the Turkish Oath) was written to give us an identity. 
You need such things as a kid. The kid looks for a meaning as to who he/she 
is. They look for an identity beyond individual character.  Elders, through 
an oath written as if it is from the kid‟s mouth, invite the kid to claim this 
identity. The Oath has been a successful tool in the creation of Turkish 
identity. The image of a kid, who is righteous, respectful to elders, 
compassionate to youngsters, loving the nation, is not a bad image at all. I 
would like to do whatever I can for this nation. I was educated through the 
taxes of this nation. I feel I owe some things. I try to respect the cultures 
which lived and live here, even when it is not that easy to do it. I really find 
it hard to love this country sometimes. I think what is disturbing is to attach 
all the good personal qualities to Turkishness. If we change the oath in the 
following fashion, there would be no trouble: I am a human, I am righteous, 
Hardworking, My Law…..My soul is a gift to humanity…Here it is, totally 
                                                          
108 Ġktidar meselelerine kafa yormasaydım baĢörtülü kadınların halini 
anlayamazdım. Ama onlar için 28 ġubat‟ta hiçbirĢey yapmadım. Hiç iliĢkimiz olmadı. 
O sınavı çok iyi vermemiĢtik. Baskılara karĢı hiçbirĢey yapmadık. Sonra Konca KuriĢ 
sayesinde düĢünmeye baĢladım. 
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universal situation, no nationalism involved. It can be valid for anywhere in 
the world (online blog, 10.12.2008).109 
 
The real concern is not the oath itself, but how to craft a new concept of 
citizenship that guarantees that those elements of the Turkish state who do not feel as 
the constituent elements because of historical reasons (i.e. minority status) come to feel 
that they are treated as equal citizens. The same interviewee argues the following:  
 
   I would like to do whatever it takes to remove the discomfort of those who 
have a hard time naming themselves with this name (Turkish), currently or 
in the past. If we are the foundational element, we have a responsibility to 
others. The others, are those who do not think they were given equal status 
and who think they have been faulted historically. Even if we do not have 
racial purity, this responsibility to others can be conceptualized as the ability 
to create a political environment where for those who consider themselves 
ethnically and culturally pure can feel their differences will not be 
assimilated but will be given equal weight under the banner of a human 
identity. How can we live as equal citizens? How can I regain and revalue a 
name (Turkishness) all the while not closing my eyes to the oppressions it 
committed? How can I make my existence a gift to humanity? These are all 
constitutional problems and we need a new concept of citizenship. This is 
really not that easy. We need to walk a longer distance and we need more 
courage (online blog, 10.12.2008).110 
                                                          
109 Metin bizi vatandaĢ olarak kimliklendirmek için yazılmıĢ bir metindi. 
Çocukken böyle Ģeylere ihtiyaç var. Çocuk kim olduğunu arıyor. KiĢisel karakterinin 
ötesinde bir kimlik arıyor. ĠĢte andımızda da, büyükler onu, onun ağzından yazılmıĢ bir 
Ģiirle bir kimliği üstlenmeye çağırmaktadırlar.  Andımız Türk kimliğinin kuruluĢunda 
baĢarılı ve esaslı bir araç olmuĢtur. Doğru, çalıĢkan, büyüklerini sayan, küçüklerini 
seven, yurdunu ve milletini özünden çok seven birisi imgesi bugün de fena gelmiyor 
bana. Mesela ben Türkiye için elimden gelen iyi bir Ģey varsa yapmak isterim. Bu 
milletin vergisiyle okudum. Kendimi borçlu hissediyorum herĢeyden önce. Üstünde 
yaĢayan kültürlere saygı duymaya çalıĢıyorum, bu her zaman kolay olmasa da. Zaman 
zaman bu ülkeyi sevmek için bir sebeb bulmakta çok zorlansam da. Sanırım rahatsız 
edici olan tüm iyi sıfatların "Türk" olmaya raptedilmiĢ olması. Meselâ Ģöyle değiĢtirsek 
andımızı: Ġnsanım, doğruyum, çalıĢkanım, yasam, varlığım insanlığa armağan olsun. 
ĠĢte tamamen evrensel bir durum, milliyetçi bir tarafı da kalmamıĢ oluyor. Dünyanın 
her yerinde okunabilir oluyor. 
 
110 Kendisini geçmiĢte veya Ģimdi bu adla anmakta zorlananların rahatsızlıklarını 
gidermek için ne gerekiyorsa yapmak isterim. Madem ayrıcalıklı kurucu öge biziz, bir 
sorumluluğumuz var ötekilere karĢı. Öteki: KuruluĢta bizimle eĢ statüye sahip 
olmadığını düĢünen, tarihsel haksızlıklara uğramıĢ olanlar. Bizim bir etnik saflığımız 
olmasa da, kendilerini etnik ve kültürel olarak saf sayanlar için Anadolu ozanlarının 
düĢündükleri gibi "insan" kimliğinde tüm farklılıkların asimile olmadan eĢit olacakları 
bir ortamı siyaseten varetmeye çalıĢmak biçiminde düĢünülebilir bu sorumluluk. Yoksa 
burayı yoketmek, bölmek, emperyal güçlere açmak filan değil istediğimiz. Nasıl eĢit 
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At the opposing end of the debate, there are those such as U.Y who believe that 
the Turkish oath symbolizes all the prerequisites of having a strong Turkish state that 
caused so much trouble for minorities in this country. If Turkish citizens are requested 
to apologize for their state‟s behavior in the past then the Oath has no function of 
unifying those citizens anymore:  
 
   Don‟t get me wrong, I have no problems with living in a Republic. 
However the exigencies of becoming a state have been carried out without 
hesitation in this Republic. Sometimes this has taken the form of extinction 
of an ethnicity; at other times people‟s religion or language has been 
prohibited. If all these necessities are now called oppressions and I am held 
accountable for it, then I should be against the militarism that is the real 
villain behind all this. If people are holding me accountable for crimes I 
have not committed, then the motto of “How happy is the one who says "I 
am Turk" is no longer a unifying motto for me (online blog, 10.12.2008).111 
 
Proposal to lift the Turkish Oath follows a similar pattern to the proposal to 
apologize from minorities. There is a desire to make those identities which feel 
discriminated, feel equally constituent elements of the Republic. This is very different 
from a demand of recognition which is based on being different and authentic. A stress 
on common good would require every citizen to be proud of being equals and to limit 
one‟s political demand to this equal treatment. To the extent that demand for 
recognition is based on signifying a distinction or a difference, the Turkish Oath would 
not resonate well with such demands.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
vatandaĢlar olarak yaĢayabiliriz? Ben bir zamanlar seçilmiĢ bir adı, zulme ve gerçeklere 
gözlerimi kapamadan nasıl yeniden kazanabilirim, anlamlandırabilirim? Yani varlığımı 
insanlığın varlığına nasıl armağan edebilirim? ġimdi bunlar siyasi anayasal sorular 
aslında, belki de yeni bir vatandaĢlık anlayıĢı kurmamız gerek. Hiç kolay değil elbette, 
daha çok yol, daha çok cesaret lazım. 
 
111 YanlıĢ anlaĢılmasın Cumhuriyet‟le bir sorunum yok ama Cumhuriyet 
sonrasının yeni kurulan bir devletinde devlet olmanın gereklilikleri her daim yerine 
getirilmiĢtir. Bu yeri gelmiĢ bir etnisitenin yok sayılması olmuĢ, yeri gelmiĢ bir inancın 
veya dilin yasaklanması ile olmuĢ ve ben Ģimdi bu gerekliliklerin zulüm halinin özrünü 
dilemek zorunda bırakılıyorsam o zaman bunlara sebep olan her türlü militarizmin 
karĢısındayım demektir.  ĠĢlemediğim suçların özrü benden soruluyorsa “Ne Mutlu 
Türküm Diyene” artık masum bir birleĢtirici unsur olmaktan çıkıyor. 
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The tension in both proposals is similar. One view sees relations between 
identities as a zero-sum game where assimilated identities insist on being compensated 
for discrimination either in the form of an apology or the symbolic removal of signs of 
distinction for being a Turk. The other view claims to hold a “universalist” stance that 
takes criticisms of the disadvantaged seriously but not necessarily to make their case a 
basis from which to negate universal citizenship but from which to build a more 
inclusive conception of citizenship, one that acknowledges past injustices. 
Depending on one‟s perspective one could opt for more recognition of difference 
or for more inclusion into the mainstream. These turn out to have very different 
implications for both rights claims and policy making. Does the symbolic removal of 
distinctions for one group, or a formal apology serve to bracket the differences and co-
opt marginalized groups into the mainstream? Or does it confirm the possibility of 
recognition of diverse identities and their positive value for public life. From the flow 
of discussions, we observe that there is no automatic connection between attestation of 
past discrimination and a positive evaluation of the worth of an identity at present. This 
debate is important for understanding whether civility necessarily translates into 
positive recognition of identities. I will come back to this debate at the end of this 
chapter and elaborate on its significance for politics of recognition. 
 
 
 
6.6.  How is the Criteria for Civility Determined in Heterogeneous Enclaves? 
 
 
 
What I want to do in this section is to discuss why an analysis of this sequence is 
important, what it reveals about the more fundamental questions with respect to civility 
and recognition in particular and civil society in general. I will first start with the 
discussion of the nature of more specific questions raised in the coalition. Gradually I 
will extend my analysis into more general and deeper implications of my observations 
of the group dynamics.  
As the sequence of conversations make clear, although being disadvantaged or 
discriminated was thought to be solely a matter of state conduct, eventually inter-group 
comparisons played a bigger role in discussions. The desire to show how inter-group 
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relations have played out asymmetrically and to the detriment of some groups became 
the primary theme in discussions. Starting from a state centric definition of complicity 
and fairness, the group ended up acknowledging the importance of inter-group 
relations.   
Discussions centered on defining complicity in relational terms, which is to say 
that whether a group is complicit in the misfortune of another group is decided by 
looking at how privileges are distributed in society. Of course, there was also an evident 
counter-trend in the coalition that tried to promote inter-group solidarity by juxtaposing 
all groups against dominant state ideology and the mainstream citizen proto-type 
promoted by the state. However, this attempt was counteracted by the claim that this 
type of we against the state attitude masks how groups are positioned vis-a-vis each 
other. 
Another important realization within the platform is that, if we are to talk about 
any type of political togetherness in Turkey, those relations have to be reconfigured in a 
way that will be seen just and inclusive by the historically disadvantaged groups in 
society. 
How do these discussions tie to civility? By way of admitting that true 
responsibility of a group resides not only in condemning physical violence against 
minorities but also in admitting that the group directly or indirectly benefits from all the 
arrangements in society that work to the detriment of that minority, the group achieves 
a more sophisticated version of civility.  
 
 
 
6.7.  How can Complicity be Conceptualized by Civil Society Actors? 
 
 
 
What the sequence of the discussion reveals about the group is that there is a deep 
concern about how to define complicity. As argued in the beginning of this chapter, the 
group started out claiming inter-group solidarity but gradually descended into quarrels 
over who has what type of responsibility in the suffering of other groups. It was pointed 
out both in the methodology section as well as the beginning of this chapter that 
discussants of the platform feel varying degrees of allegiance to the groups they are 
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speaking about. One could argue that to the extent that one feels a strong allegiance to a 
group it could become harder to admit complicity of that group. However, the following 
observations are made regardless of who makes claims, more group attached ones or 
more individualistic ones. This is because, the discussion gains a momentum and 
character of its own despite different levels of attachment discussants feel towards the 
groups in question. This also shows the dialogical nature of the discussions have a 
transformative power over the content of arguments with or without group allegiance.  
To illustrate the gradual upgrading of arguments employed by group members, I 
will start with an echelon that shows different levels of attribution of responsibility to 
groups in society. These different levels of attribution of responsibility will be 
evaluated with respect to what type of potential extensions they provide to group 
members in negotiating culpability. This will also show the argumentative evolution of 
the group in a vivid fashion. The levels make use of historical victims in Turkish 
history: Armenians, Alevis and Kurds. These victims were not chosen arbitrarily. They 
refer to the victims most heavily utilized in discussions of the platform.  
 
Level I: Denial of complicity:  I (or my group) have lived with 
Armenians/Alevis/Kurds side by side without major problems or discriminations on any 
of those groups. 
 
This type of frame has never been used by platform members. Everybody agrees 
these groups have suffered/were discriminated in one way or another. There is no denial 
of discrimination or victimhood of these groups. 
 
Level II: State as the culpable party: The Armenians/Alevis/Kurds of this 
country have all suffered in the hands of the state 
 
The discussions of the group actually start at this level. However by defining the 
state as the only culpable party, the need for evaluation of historical inter-group 
relations becomes impossible. This is an easy and incomplete account of how 
discrimination and victimhood operate in societies.  
If the platform stayed at this level and did not gradually move into discussing the 
complicity of social actors, we could have easily argued that the platform had no 
transformative role and that it stayed rather strategic, in the sense of just aiming the 
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state, than fulfill a more substantive role of defining culpability and complicity in inter-
group terms.         
 
Level III: Complicity of other groups in society: Armenians/Alevis/Kurds not 
only suffered in the hands of the state but also had to endure physical and psychological 
harm in the hands of dominant/privileged groups in society.  
 
This type of argument admits that wide-scale discrimination of a group of people 
is not possible without the tacit or active consent of other groups in society. The nature 
of this consent is crucial. It could be that the privileged groups intentionally caused 
physical harm (i.e. inter-group ethnic cleansing) or explicitly profited from the victim‟s 
plight (re-allocation of wealth and property of the victim). It could even be the case that 
the group caused indirect harm by fueling a political climate that is based on negative 
perceptions of the victim. 
It is of extreme importance what is considered harmful: physical harm, indirect 
privileges or discriminatory attitudes. The following scale flows from immediate and 
observable harm to more subtle forms of discrimination. The definition of moral 
responsibility changes according to the definition of complicity. In the following levels 
of argumentation, the reader will find different versions to the question:  Am I 
responsible for what happened to the victim?  
 
Level IV:  No, I am not responsible because: I have not caused physical harm 
and I have not concretely profited from the plight of the victim 
 
This argument might be based on the perception that to be held accountable for 
what happens to a group in society, one must have obtained an objectively definable 
gain by the victim‟s loss. It becomes evident that the criteria for complicity in this case 
are rather concrete or physical. This is a more limited, albeit justifiable account of what 
harm constitutes. 
Some of the platform members belong to this level of argumentation in that they 
see themselves equally marginalized and prosecuted. Hence, they are equals in terms of 
receiving harm. The usual line of self-defense is having suffered similar types of 
discriminations. Such individuals justify their own position by saying they demand the 
same type of retribution from the state. 
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Another line of defense for some discussants is that the culpability of a group 
should be determined by analyzing how much it was aligned with nation state ideology. 
If a group has historically been in the category of non-favored groups there is no point 
in accusing that group.   
The types of arguments provided in support of non-culpability of platform 
members all point toward an understanding that sees harm as physical harm.  
 
Level V: Yes, I am responsible because…. 
 
There are various lines of arguments in support of why an individual might 
consider herself responsible for the victimhood of another: 
 
i. I become part of this complicity and profit from this situation:  
 
This reasoning assumes that even when a person does not openly cause harm to 
another group, by not taking any pre-emptive measures within her own capacity to 
protect the marginalized group, the person profits from whatever the victim is deprived 
of. This could be an increase in wealth/property of a group to the detriment of the 
victim. i.e. the handover of the property of minorities to Turkish citizens after their 
departure. 
This type of reasoning emerges within the coalition after extended rounds of 
discussion. This type of attribution of responsibility is different than the previous case 
in that it does not look for inflicting physical harm to be qualified for responsible. The 
yardstick for holding accountable is a lot more subtle. The persons in this category hold 
themselves accountable for what they have not done instead of what they have done. As 
can be observed, the standard for being just is more demanding. 
 
ii. because without knowing I reproduced the same prejudices in my 
actions and in my speech. 
 
Another line of thought that holds individuals accountable even when they do not 
cause physical harm is the case where the person in question is reproducing the same 
pattern of prejudices and biases in society in her actions and in her speech therefore 
unintentionally contributing to the negative atmosphere towards the victim. This type of 
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accountability stems from the inability to whole-heartedly admit one‟s own submission 
to dominant belief sets in society that work against the survival and well-being of a 
disadvantaged group. 
There were members who used this reasoning to hold themselves accountable. 
They admitted their failure to weed out the biased and pejorative overtones about the 
minorities in their own discourse. Here again, we observe a move away from causing 
physical violence to victims to causing psychological harm through language.  
 
iii. because by being silent I do not become part of a political future 
which acknowledges the equality of groups 
 
This type of reasoning is different than the previous ones in that the primary 
responsibility on the part of individuals is to have a vision on citizenship that is 
inclusive and that accommodates the wishes of all groups in society. For this reason, 
any indifference on the part of a citizen about the political demands of others is 
considered insensitive. The terms for the negotiation of a more inclusive political 
regime should be decided by the free interaction of citizens belonging to different 
groups who evaluate each other from a point of equality.  
Hence culpability in this instance is the failure to abide by the principle of 
equality in evaluating the positions and demands of disadvantaged groups. This is a 
future oriented discourse about responsibility and carries great potential for re-
structuring relations between groups on the basis of equality.  
There are group members who take this point of view about responsibility. This is 
the most upgraded and refined version of taking responsibility for the faults of the past. 
However, unlike the previous levels which force a re-evaluation of past positions, this 
level makes an attempt to forge a political future based on the equality of demands of 
groups. A failure to acknowledge this equality results in discrimination of 
disadvantaged groups. For this reason, failure is the indifference to what others are 
engaged in terms of rights struggles.   
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6.8.  Grading Civility in Heterogeneous Coalitions 
 
 
 
What is the purpose in classifying different frames on complicity? What use do 
we derive from having an echelon or grading that begins with no culpability and that 
gradually makes its way into more subtle forms of accountability?   
 
This type of grading is important for our purposes since it sets standard/criteria for 
what is called civility. In the words of Akman (2010): 
 
   Because the notion of civility is so central to the alternative perspective on 
civil society, it may be desirable to try to explain and elaborate what is 
meant by it…(As a strategy) let us begin with a strategy of trying to pin 
down what is meant by civility by trying to specify its opposite: Incivility. 
Perhaps, in some respects, this will be a less contentious procedure by 
which we can at least hope to eliminate certain types of phenomena and to 
delineate the proverbial “bottom line” in terms of civil conduct that is 
conducive to a truly civil society. Such an indirect (and in some ways, 
minimalist) procedure may turn out to be a more practical way of 
comprehending civility than trying to determine the lofty standards of 
civility directly and maximalistically (p.1). 
 
The same strategy has been used in this dialogical construction of complicity. The 
conversations give way to definitions of different ways in which a social actor can be 
called “uncivil”. Each level has a different proposition as to what constitutes incivility. 
The potentials each definition carries for civil society is different. Whereas we have 
started from a point where incivility is strictly tied to having caused harm, which is 
“malicious incivility”, as the debate has progressed we have arrived at accounts where 
incivility is portrayed as having a “misguided neutrality” or “indifference”. Failure to 
act to stop harm or not condoning but witnessing harm being done is a form of 
complicity for at least some of the group members. The following statement by U.Y 
illustrates how staying neutral and the failure to act is considered shameful for some 
members of the platform:  
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   As a self-criticism, a Kurdish friend of mine said that Muslims shout and 
mourn when the issue is Palestine but when it comes to Kurdish issue they 
are just mute. He was right. Cursing Jews, defending Palestine did not cause 
any harm to the system that was the foundation stone. However, to speak of 
the Kurdish issue is to plug a bullet to the heels of nationalist-conservative-
Muslim identity which is an integral part of this political system.  It is still 
partially like that. The elimination of nationalism from Muslim identities 
does not go very far back in time and the Kurdish issue is still being 
evaluated through such comparisons (online blog, 07.09.2011).112 
 
This confession says a lot about what constitutes civility. This is the type of 
reflexivity McCorkel and Rodriquez (2009) were talking about in their discussing on 
developing a critical awareness of one‟s location in society. To be critical about 
discrimination could mean taking a critical stance against one‟s own identity. The 
integrity of that identity might have been formulated in juxtaposition to the 
marginalized identity and it takes great courage to speak against discrimination in that 
instance. 
The following quote also employs a rather pro-active or preventive attitude vis-à-
vis harm caused by others. The criteria for civility in this instance is not only 
condemning the violence against victims but also taking personal steps to assure their 
life is not in danger.113 
 
   “At a time when Sunni Muslims are held responsible for an oppression 
(The arson of Madımak) that is beyond human comprehension and while I 
was revolting against those accusations, (in a state of shock) I was not 
responsible enough to define and re-examine the nature of that oppression. 
That fire has touched me and hurt me too. If there was a chance of going 
back to the 2nd of July, I would have wanted to stand by the doors of 
Madimak Hotel and make myself a human shield. I dream of a country 
where no one is taken away from their beloved ones in an unjust and 
untimely manner. I want a country that embraces life not death. I mourn for 
                                                          
112 Bir özeleĢtiri olarak, Kürt bir arkadaĢım, Müslümanların konu Filistin olunca 
bağırıp çağırdıklarını ama yanı baĢlarındaki Kürt sorununa gözlerini kulaklarını 
kapattığını söylemiĢtir. Haklı idi, zira Filistin‟i savunmak Yahudilere istediğin kadar 
küfretmek "temel bir taĢ" olarak görünen içinden yaĢanılan sisteme bir zarar 
vermemekte idi, Ama Kürt sorununu dile getirmek bizzat sistemin bir vazgeçilmezi 
olarak görünen "milliyetçi-muhafazakar-Müslüman" kimliğin kendini topuğundan 
vurması demekti. Ki kısmen hala öyledir maalesef. Müslümanların milliyetçi çizgiden 
kendilerini arındırmalarının tarihi çok geriye gitmese de bugün de Kürt sorunu dile 
getirilirken aynı Ģekilde bir kıyas üzerinden gidiliyor. 
 
113 http://sivasyasindabulusankadinlar.blogspot.com/ 
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the victims of Sivas, their families and beloved ones on the 17th 
commemoration.114 
 
What does this elevated form of civility imply for the group? What kind of 
potential does it carry for civic actors in particular and for the flourishing of civil 
society in general?  
The particular value of a heightened standard of civility is great when there is 
significant polarization in society and the inter-group trust is on the decline. Such 
confessionalism as exemplified in the dialogues carries the potential to break the ice 
between previously hostile groups. However, precisely due to living in a polarized 
society, an upgraded form of civility is all the more difficult to achieve. Polarization 
between groups means that taking on the blame will look concessionary and appeasing 
by one‟s own group.   
Deliberation between heterogeneous enclaves becomes more important at this 
point. If enclaves, which position themselves in juxtaposition to dominant and more 
mainstream groups in society, take up this task and initiate a conversation with other 
enclaves in society they may start a precedent for elevating the standard of civility for 
the larger public.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
114 Sünni Müslümanların, boyutları insan havsalasına sığmayan bir zulmün 
sorumlusu olarak gösterildiği bir dönemde; bu yüzden karĢılaĢtığım suçlamalara isyan 
ederken, bir tür Ģok hali içinde o zulmü tanımlamakta ve sorgulamakta yeteri kadar 
sorumlu davranamadım. O yangın bana da değdi, dağladı beni. Eğer bugün 2 
Temmuz‟a dönebilme imkanım olsaydı, Madımak otelinin kapısında durup bedenimle 
bir duvar olmak isterdim. ġimdi bütün varlığımla bir daha hiçbir zulmetin kitleleri esir 
edemediği, kimsenin sevdiklerinden zamansız ve haksız koparılamadığı bir ülke hayal 
ediyorum. Ölümü değil, hayatı kucaklayan bir ülke! 17. Yılında Sivas mazlumlarını 
anıyor, ailelerinin ve sevenlerinin acısını paylaĢıyoruz. 
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6.9.  The Value of Heterogeneous Enclaves for Elevating the Standards of Civility 
 
 
 
Groups in civil society literature are evaluated as to the degree of trust they show 
to others, the degree of altruism they have, tolerance to others etc…However, such 
accounts are lop-sided if the degree of deliberation of such groups with other groups are 
not taken into account. Although political theory gives special importance to 
deliberative democracy, the empirical findings for what exchanges between people with 
competing views brings to the quality of democracy or civil society has been lacking 
(Sunstein,2000:p.73)
Sunstein‟s work (2000) on why groups go to extremes is an exception. Sunstein‟s 
primary occupation is with the phenomenon of group polarization and the role of 
deliberation in the public sphere on the potential of groups to go to extremes. Sunstein‟s 
approach to enclave deliberation is particularly important for the purposes of this study. 
Sunstein sees (2000) “enclave deliberation as simultaneously a potential danger to 
social stability, a source of social fragmentation and a safeguard against social injustice 
and unreasonableness” (p.75). The reason why enclave deliberation is seen as a threat is 
because social homogeneity which is a prominent trait of enclaves is quite damaging to 
good deliberation. He argues and empirically proves that when people are hearing 
echoes of their own voices, the consequence is further polarization. 
However, there is also a very convincing reason for why enclaves are very 
important for the functioning of democracy. “Participants in heterogeneous groups tend 
to give least weight to the views of low status members.” These low status members are 
precisely those groups which produce enclave deliberation as a remedy for the 
suppression of their voices: women, minorities, poor people etc…Enclave deliberation 
is the only way to make their voice heard.  
Different theorists have different names for such spaces. Nancy Fraser calls them 
sub-altern counter-public spaces and Mansbridge refers to them as enclaves of 
resistance. Both theorists see immense value in promoting the healthy functioning of 
such places because they help disadvantaged groups develop their arguments in a 
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sheltered fashion before they enter the public stage of contestation. Secondly, such 
spaces promote political activism in a more rigorous way.  
For these reasons, enclave deliberation is both an asset and a liability. They are in 
the words of Sunstein (2000) “breeding grounds both for the development of unjustly 
suppressed views and for unjustified extremism, indeed fanaticism” (p.76). So if 
enclaves are to make any meaningful contribution to public debate their voices should 
be shielded from the voices in the dominant public sphere but their tendency to go to 
other extremes should also be thwarted. 
I have argued throughout this chapter that enclaves can make a meaningful impact 
on how inter-group relations are perceived in civil society.  But how do enclaves ensure 
the critical awareness and reflexivity needed to perceive how one group is situated 
relative to others in society? How can they create a willingness to redistribute power 
and cultural value?  
We have seen in the numerous accounts of theorists of deliberation that enclaves 
are the trenches of resistance to dominant public sphere and its power-blind and 
identity-blind rhetoric about citizenship and rights. By showing how society operates 
through excluding some of its members from structures of deliberation and by creating 
a false sense of formal equality in public debate it shows how certain groups‟ voices are 
marginalized. Dominant public sphere is not the right place to show how one groups‟ 
disadvantage turns into another‟s advantage. It is also not the right place to attempt a re-
valuation of cultural forms despised by dominant groups. By virtue of being under the 
control of more privileged segments of society, this sphere operates according to the 
logic of dominant group perspective. It operates mostly with an identity blind rhetoric 
refusing to acknowledge how relativity of social positions benefit some and harm 
others. 
For this reason, enclaves are the only spheres where situatedness of groups can be 
unearthed. However, due to the extremist nature of enclaves, this situatedness will most 
likely be binary, hence lop-sided. If enclaves only stay in their circle, they can reinforce 
each other in their mutual folly and self-righteousness. It will rely on the juxtaposition 
of one marginal group to the dominant group. However, if different enclaves get to talk 
with each other, the network/matrix of relations of different groups and their position 
vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis dominant groups gains a better perspective. For this 
reason, it is of extreme importance to structure public debate in a way that will not wall 
off enclaves from hearing other‟s point of view.   
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BSÇ provided us with a setting to test whether these claims about enclaves hold 
true. Although it is hard to make generalizations from one case study, it gives us an 
indication about the merits of enclave politics. BSÇ is a coalition of different enclave 
women who had different experiences of marginalization. It provides a shielded space 
for representatives of different enclave women to develop their arguments without the 
encroachment of dominant public sphere. It also helps them engage in a deliberation 
that rules out the possibility that any perspective gains an extreme version. 
A counter-public is usually envisaged to be a marginal group that positions itself 
against the state or a hegemonic group. However, what we have witnessed in this 
alliance is that different enclaves are constantly comparing each other on the basis of 
what they have endured. This is due to the fact that the alliance is a coalition of 
different factions which prevents the group to descend into what Klempt calls “one-
sided information space”. By virtue of working as a coalition of enclaves, the alliance 
has to arrive at consensus only through contestation. However, since the group is 
insulated from outside pressure and male presence, it has its own inner logic that does 
not necessarily follow what public arena of deliberation dictates. For this reason, it is a 
partially contestatory space. 
What difference does that make? What changes when a group evolves from being 
a one-sided information space into partially contestatory? The groups making part of 
the coalition have to move away from a conceptualization of their politics that 
juxtaposes state and their own group, and start questioning every relation  in society. By 
keeping the definition of “groups with privileges” and “discriminated groups” flexible, 
it helps the alliance achieve a more balanced perspective on discrimination and a more 
elevated standard for civility. 
Such an alliance also alters our conceptualization of a counter-public. A sounder 
definition of a counter-public should not only talk about the dominant group vs. 
discriminated group dichotomy but should also question every dyad in society. This can 
only be achieved in a partially contestatory scheme such as that of BSÇ. This is actually 
what has happened in BSÇ. When individuals from diverse backgrounds started to 
discuss with each other repeatedly on one particular issue, the requirements of civility 
increased to the point of condemning indifference.   
A more general finding on the basis of this case study would be that “what civility 
requires changes according which groups interact with other groups”. If enclaves have 
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more chance to interact they may come up with a more sophisticated definition of 
civility that takes into account the viewpoints of marginal groups in the public sphere.  
Once this interaction is secured, it becomes easier for groups to develop a critical 
awareness of their social location relative to others. It is the argument of this thesis that 
civility can only be achieved if groups or individuals develop a critical awareness of 
their social location relative to others. Admitting this relational aspect of group 
positions and group privileges is the first prerequisite for redistributing power and value 
in the cultural as well as the economic sphere. The essence of civility is tied to 
admitting the ways in which marginal groups‟ misfortune goes hand in hand with 
privileged groups‟ advantages. Being indifferent and identity blind to the distribution of 
power and privilege in society translates into dominant groups‟ insensitivity to marginal 
groups‟ claims and grievances.  
When we take the issue of complicity in the internal conversations of this 
platform, we observe that through ongoing discussions, the platform moved from a 
“inflict no physical harm to the victim” attitude to a “to remain silent is to be 
responsible” type of thinking. In other words, “misguided indifference” is as grave as 
inflicting physical harm. Of course, we cannot say with full force that this has become 
the norm for every participant but we can clearly observe a tilt in that direction. The 
reason why “to remain neutral” or “being indifferent” becomes a sign of incivility is 
because this indifference is seen as a sign of the fact that a group is unaware of its 
privileges and its social location relative to more marginalized groups. It refers to not 
knowing that one‟s neutrality or indifference may be serving the maintenance of 
cultural codes and social practices that undervalue marginal groups. Lacking that self-
reflexivity, would not serve the interests of marginalized groups which are looking for a 
re-valuation of their practices and existence. A form of civility that only forbids 
physical violence is not a way to fulfill those demands.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
234 
 
 
 
 
6.10.  What are the Implications for Civil Society Literature? 
 
 
 
I have started this chapter by arguing that the quality of civil society depends very 
much on the social orientations of the social actors that inhabit its space. However, 
what we call civility has very different meanings according to scholars. Some call it 
having conciliatory attitudes vis-a-vis unwanted groups, i.e. approving the extension of 
same rights and freedoms one enjoys. Others think it can be limited to not harming 
other groups physically.  
What is missing in those accounts is how groups form their ideas about other 
groups. The norm for civility is usually assumed to be pre-formed even before 
encountering those groups in question. It is also very much related to belief-sets or 
ideological inclinations of groups. The degree to which one can exhibit civility is pre-
given according to the content of one‟s belief or ideology.  
The argument of this chapter is that what civility requires changes according to 
the degree to which groups interact with other groups. Those that had more chance to 
interact feel more responsible when it comes to civility. The reason for this is that 
interaction with other groups helps groups achieve a relational perspective that is 
important for understanding the distribution of privileges and disadvantages. 
Reflexive/critical perspective needed to understand how one group‟s fortune can 
translate into another‟s misfortune can most easily be acquired in an environment where 
heterogeneous publics can talk and debate about their experiences. Those experiences 
will reveal the incomplete accounts of relatively more privileged segments about their 
treatment of other groups. These accounts are not necessarily based on misleading 
others or falsifying what has taken place. However, due to being at an advantaged 
position, it may be harder for more privileged groups to acknowledge their true relation 
to another group.  
Another argument of this thesis is that if groups do not hold a relational 
perspective, their conception of civility would only stop at the level of no harm 
principle. However, if they come to admit how groups differentially benefit from 
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structures of power and how this indirectly implicates them in the misfortune of 
marginal groups, then they will adopt a more hands-on definition of civility. As 
explained previously, “no harm” principle is an identity-blind principle. It begs a non-
violent, non-repressive understanding of inter-group relations irrespective of the content 
of the identities of those groups in question.  However when “indifference” and 
“neutrality” in the face of discrimination of certain groups are considered equally grave 
as physical harm, we arrive at an identity-conscious definition of civility. This is 
because, indifference and neutrality become most disturbing when those who are 
indifferent/neutral have something to gain from this indifference. The discussion with 
respect to the confiscation of Armenian property is a case in point. There indifference 
means the groups in question are both indifferent and gaining (materially) from this 
situation.  
Hence arriving from an identity-blind perspective to a reflexive/critical 
perspective on the implications of having a neutral stance requires adopting a relational 
perspective on inter-group relations. Having argued that heterogeneous publics is the 
right realm to acquire a relational perspective because one will be better exposed to 
different perspectives on privilege and marginalization, I have to make clear why 
enclaves create a unique environment for acquiring a relational perspective. 
Enclaves are positioned in opposition to dominant public sphere. Dominant public 
sphere (or mainstream civil society) is usually where the most privileged segments of 
society can air their concerns. It is also the space which operates according to a rather 
exclusionary logic, where the discourse of rights are aired in an identity-blind manner 
which in reality reflects one type of world view at the expense of another. A good 
example would be the recent health care reform and the criticisms aired by Republican 
candidates in the run up to elections. Most of the candidates think of health care reform 
as an encroachment on freedoms. However, freedoms are expressed in an identity blind 
manner which makes it sound as if everybody‟s freedom is at stake. In reality, it refers 
to the freedom of just a segment of the population which is well-off enough to choose 
its own private health care provider. Here, unless enclaves such as black single mothers, 
immigrants or unemployed talk, the debate turns into one between freedom lovers and 
those which are for a leviathan  state. If we apply this logic to our debate on civility, 
unless enclaves talk, there would be no way of knowing whether a difference blind 
conceptualization of discrimination and harm can really serve the interests of more 
marginalized groups or expose their take on what harm actually constitutes.    
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Of course, the important question here is whether the standard developed in this 
particular enclave interaction can be generalized to other groups. In the absence of 
wide-spread approval for such a standard, the call for ending indifference and neutrality 
in the face of discrimination of others may fall on deaf ears.  If we consider the fact that 
enclaves usually do not have wide chances of interacting with more mainstream groups 
in society, this specific group‟s interaction may be rather experimental than 
generalizable. If such encounters only happen between rather secluded groups who seek 
support to their rather marginalized thesis, this type of interaction may be interpreted as 
doomed to remain at the sidelines of civic interaction. 
However, as was mentioned in the literature review, we should not think of 
enclaves/counter-publics as necessarily spaces of withdrawal. As Fraser (1997) argued, 
such spaces do militate against separatism in the long run, because they have a publicist 
agenda. This is because, no matter how limited a  counter-publics‟ potential sphere of 
influence in the larger public sphere,  members still understand themselves as part of a 
larger public at large that they will occasionally want to influence. While their enclave 
will function as spaces of withdrawal, from time to time they will use those enclaves as 
bases for agitational activities to shape public opinion (p.82). Then the problem is not 
about having separate agendas, it is about how to convince the wider public sphere 
about the implications of this agenda.  
 
 
 
6.11.  What are the Implications for Politics of Recognition and Multiculturalism? 
 
 
 
The assumption behind a more fine-grained notion of civility- one that condemns 
indifference and neutrality- is that if we want to go beyond “no harm” principle, we 
should have an identity-conscious reflection on inter-group relations and how one 
identity is positioned next to the other. A related question to this notion of civility is 
whether it translates into a positive recognition, which is valuing identities in and of 
themselves. 
There are several questions to be answered to make the necessary connections 
between civility and recognition. One is whether the type of relational perspective 
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adopted in this platform that relies on redistributing privilege and status means all 
identities are recognized as richness and cherished in that fashion.  
The second question is; what are the conditions under which the adoption of this 
relational perspective and redistribution of power and status can serve the ideals of a 
multicultural democracy? Young was arguing that having an enlarged understanding of 
society‟s injustices requires drawing on particular experiences of different groups 
which is the only way to serve the ideals of multicultural democracy. Whether this 
contributes to a redistribution of power and status and to a positive recognition of 
identities is an entirely different matter. We have to grapple with these points more 
clearly if we want to give a convincing answer. 
The puzzle posed by the relational perspective is the following: we do not know 
whether the remedies proposed for a more egalitarian distribution of power and status 
means cherishing the value of each and every group or whether it implies a more 
egalitarian yet uniform society. Some of the members talk about how they envision a 
uniform citizenship that values citizens of this country not on the basis of their identity 
but on the basis of their humanhood.115 This does not perfectly correspond to a politics 
of difference and positive recognition of identities.  
Hence for a type of civility to translate into positive recognition, the underlying 
motif should not be exclusively homogenization of groups‟ status but valuing the 
cultural significance of each and every group in society. If a coalition‟s aim is 
homogenization then it does not serve multicultural democracy. Multicultural coalitions 
are based on the claim that there can be multiple intersecting identities which have 
                                                          
115 Ben Ermenilerden özür dilemiyorum, bir Türk olarak da özür dilemiyorum. 
Kimlik ve kökenlerin gerçek bir dayanıĢma (= ortak aidiyet) iliĢkisi yaratamayacağını 
düĢünüyorum (olsa olsa "dayanıĢma-ikamesi" yaratabilirler). Sanırım rahatsız edici 
olan tüm iyi sıfatların "Türk" olmaya raptedilmiĢ olması. Meselâ Ģöyle değiĢtirsek 
andımızı: Ġnsanım, doğruyum, çalıĢkanım, yasam....varlığım insanlığa armağan olsun... 
ĠĢte tamamen evrensel bir durum, milliyetçi bir tarafı da kalmamıĢ oluyor. Dünyanın 
her yerinde okunabilir oluyor. 
 
"insan" kimliğinde tüm farklılıkların asimile olmadan eĢit olacakları bir ortamı 
siyaseten varetmeye çalıĢmak biçiminde düĢünülebilir bu sorumluluk. Ben bir zamanlar 
seçilmiĢ bir adı, zulme ve gerçeklere gözlerimi kapamadan nasıl yeniden kazanabilirim, 
anlamlandırabilirim? Yani varlığımı insanlığın varlığına nasıl armağan 
edebilirim?ġimdi bunlar siyasi anayasal sorular aslında, belki de yeni bir vatandaĢlık 
anlayıĢı kurmamız gerek. Hiç kolay değil elbette, daha çok yol, daha çok cesaret 
lazım.” 
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similar demands and positions vis-à-vis hegemonic groups. This intersectionality may 
align their demands. However, if the coalition turns into a falsely homogenizing entity 
then it does not serve politics of difference. 
So even in the presence of a very refined version of civility (one that 
acknowledges the importance of not being indifferent to injustices against another 
group) this does not necessarily translate into valuing identities in and of themselves. 
The end result could still be a homogenizing coalition.  
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Chapter 7.  Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Women‟s movement in Turkey, for a long time, was only preoccupied with the 
emancipation of women only from a particular world view that could be seen as elitist 
and exclusionary, especially by the outcasts of women‟s movement, i.e. the veiled 
women, Kurdish women. Just as in the first phase of feminist movement in the West, 
which was after a generic formal equality between the sexes but which was not 
cognizant of the internal diversity of the movement, the women‟s movement in Turkey 
was dominated by similar views. Coming to terms with different life styles and with 
different vulnerabilities was a very recent phenomenon for feminist movement. In that 
sense, we can expect a trend of turning inward and soul searching by the movement in 
an attempt to come to grips with this diversity and ways to address it.  
This dissertation is based on the internal deliberations of a coalition that had a 
potential to accomplish this ambitious task. Unlike the feminist activism of the previous 
era, what BSÇ tried to accomplish was to become as inclusive and as attentive to 
different types of marginalization of women as possible. In that sense it is the first 
attempt to create a more diverse women‟s movement that is not necessarily under the 
monopoly of feminism. This is easier said than done. Coalitions, irrespective of the 
reasons why they were set up, have important tasks to accomplish if they want to 
become effective and sustainable. The initial task is to come up with a substitute for the 
lack of a common identity. The reason why the coalition was set up usually gives us a 
hint as to what this substitute would be. This usually takes the form of a common 
adversary. Secondly, coalitions also have to deal with their internal diversity. Common 
adversaries are instrumental in setting up coalitions, but in the absence of mechanisms 
to handle internal diversity, they would not be longer lasting. Third task is to inculcate a 
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certain perspective on inter-group relations in society, so the coalition members exhibit 
similar social orientations in their dealings with other groups in society. 
My analyses have centered on these three important tasks. Each task became the 
focus of one analysis chapter. However, the analyses of these tasks have repercussions 
beyond whether this coalition has accomplished them or not. The findings and 
observations related to those tasks are tied to larger debates on politics of recognition, 
women‟s empowerment, multicultural democracy and civility. For this reason, they 
should not be narrowly read as accomplishments of this or any particular coalition but 
as antecedents of larger debates on civil society and identity politics.   
In this conclusion part, I would like to summarize the key findings of each task 
explored in this thesis. To recap, I will talk about the general significance of these 
findings for civil society literature. 
 
 
 
7.1.   Framing Gender Relations 
 
 
 
One chapter centered on how women positioned themselves against various 
strategic adversaries, be it the “state as a field of contest for brave men” or “the 
patriarchal society/masculine values”. The interesting puzzle posed by conversations 
with respect to womanhood is that although participants did not use identical narratives 
with respect to gender issues they were able to optimize the women empowering 
rhetoric.  
The narratives used by members to depict gender relations reveal different 
rationalizations at play. One perspective holds that public/private distinction is desirable 
and that justice is something other than equality. Another perspective is based on the 
view that public/private distinction should be abolished and that justice requires gender 
equality. 
These are very fundamental differences in world view. The major difference stems 
from the fact that some members of the platform think gender is determined by God, so 
there is an essence to womanhood. If this essence dictates those sexes are different and 
hence unequal in certain respects, this should be accepted. A natural corollary to this 
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debate is: What is important in relations between men and women is not equality but 
justice. Whether being just entails accepting certain hierarchies in society and 
constructing one‟s understanding of justice on the basis of these hierarchies is not 
thoroughly debated but there are hints in that direction. 
Another distinction is with respect to views on public/private dichotomy. At least 
some of the members of the platform are disturbed by confounding these two realms as 
they consider the private realm as a place that should be kept out of public scrutiny. 
However, such exclusion, as was debated by feminists for many decades now, sweeps 
the debate on sexuality of women as well as sexual orientations of individuals under the 
carpet of privacy. Many inequalities emanating from this distinction continue to show 
their face in the public realm without being scrutinized. In this coalition, it works more 
to the detriment of the struggles of gays/lesbians as their activism is thought to have an 
inappropriate basis.   
One could think that such stark differences would make a coalition based on 
women‟s rights highly unlikely.  Given such differences, how is it that frames of these 
contrasting perspectives can actually become congruent? The congruence is most easily 
achieved when the issue is about regulating women‟s public presence/visibility or 
women‟s life choices especially if they are related to limiting women‟s capabilities (i.e. 
education and work). These matters can in fact be discussed without necessarily 
evoking (or selectively evoking) public/private distinction or the equality vs. justice 
debate. 
For instance, in the case of regulation of female bodies, members were able to 
arrive at a consensus about how the public space is regulated by the male gaze, 
regardless of one‟s dress style. The women arrived at this compromise partially because 
improving one‟s capability as a woman is intimately related to being publicly visible. 
Without having a public persona, one‟s life chances (having an education or finding a 
job) is quite limited. This finding is in conformity with Aldıkaçtı‟s claim (2005) that 
reformist Islamist women do want to profit from the fruits of modernity and think of 
veil as a facilitator rather than an inhibitor for achieving this. She also thinks they 
selectively appropriate concepts of modernization for this purpose. 
At this particular consensus on the regulation of female bodies, veiling, instead of 
being seen as a form of male regulation on female bodies came to be seen as a form of 
self-restraint on one‟s body. Likewise, not veiling or (a more extreme version of it such 
as) wearing revealing clothes is not seen as a reason justifying male harassment. Male 
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regulation of female bodies is taking place regardless of one‟s degree of dressing up, 
which means each and every woman qua woman is under the same threat. It is an 
extremely limiting act as it discourages women‟s participation to public life.  
In a similar vein, in the discussion on conservatism, the major criticism is 
selective appropriation of fruits of modernity by men (becoming richer, conspicuous 
consumption etc.), while furthering the control on the life choices of women. Both 
Kemalism and religious conservatism are seen on par with each other on this scale, as 
they do not exert their authority on men and their life choices but they do that about 
what women can or cannot do.  
All these points of consensus reveal a deep dissatisfaction among women about 
the type of choices made available to them by the state and society so far. It is true that 
the linkages between the domestic and public realm are not (deliberately) very clearly 
made. However, the dissatisfaction with widely accepted societal customs is clear.  
What this discussion reveals is that if the discussion can be turned into one where 
the concern is more about improving the public presence and increased capability/life 
choices (work, education) of women, in ongoing discussions members develop frames 
that are critical about male control of public life.   
This is an accomplishment given that different wings of the women‟s movement 
have long been thought to have irreconcilable positions with respect to gender. This 
also has long-term implications as to whether such cooperation can be improved and 
extended into other issue domains. Examples such as KADER‟s campaign on 
increasing the number of female politicians that utilizes images of veiled women is a 
testament to the future directions this collaboration can take.   
One limitation of this study has been that there were not enough incidents to show 
whether the consensus on gender relations actually led to any concrete campaigns. The 
kick-off declaration was a declaration of support to the struggle of veiled women. The 
other declaration called “Ruhumuzu Öldürmeyin”116 was against male harassment. It 
would have been easier to show how frame alignments actually lead to concrete 
cooperation had the coalition lived longer.  
Another limitation of this study with respect to gender is that it aims to define a 
minimalist standard for consensus building within women‟s movement. What I mean by 
a minimalist standard is that it aims to bring forward the least common denominator for 
                                                          
116 You can check Declarations in “Group History” 
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all the women taking part in the coalition. This is an inevitable tendency given that 
members are far from holding very identical viewpoints on gender relations. However, 
the downside of sticking to this minimalist consensus is that it leaves the question of 
which groups would suffer from this arrangement. For example, the particular downside 
of the consensus that emerged from this coalition is that, as long as public/private 
distinction is upheld by some while downgraded by others, those groups that make 
demands based on sexual orientation will not have a meaningful dialogue with women‟s 
movement. This is because sexuality is thought to be private and not a matter of public 
discussion for those who believe in the virtues of public/private distinction.  
Progressive feminism is known for its alliances with other rights struggles. In 
Turkey, there are many women activists who think true emancipation of women can 
only be accomplished if sexuality is not regulated in a heterosexual and misogynist 
framework. For this reason, such feminists have been in a strong alliance with 
gay/lesbian cause. Given the disagreement on private/public distinction, it becomes 
difficult to maintain a coalition that embraces sexual orientation as a legitimate 
battleground for women‟s emancipation. 
Further research on alliances within women‟s movement can also take up these 
aspects of collaboration with other liberation struggles such as with gay/lesbian 
movement and try to unearth points of convergence and divergence and the possible 
effects of this type of solidarity with these other struggles for women‟s movement. 
 
 
 
7.2.   Framing Group Diversity and Identity 
 
 
 
As was explained in the literature review, scholars usually stress the instrumental 
and strategic nature of coalition building. After all, why would civic actors who did not 
have meaningful prior contact with each other decide to undertake joint action? In 
contrast to such theorization and in line with a strand in multiculturalism, I argued 
throughout this thesis that what happens within coalitions can never be solely reduced 
to a strategic calculation on the part of participants for higher impact and effectiveness. 
While these are equally important, coalitions provide participants with a unique 
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opportunity to test their own claims to social justice and inter-group relations. 
Coalitions provide them with the opportunity to see themselves through the lens of 
others, who are different than one‟s own social circle.  
The ensuing question to this claim is: if coalitions evolve from being strategic 
alliances into sites of self-reflection what kind of expectations emerge? If raison d‟etre 
of the coalition is not limited to an additive solidarity in the face of a common 
adversary but becomes more about an affirmation of different identities represented in 
the coalition what kind of possibilities and problems emerge? These questions were 
answered in this second chapter on group diversity.   
In a nutshell, the second chapter focuses on how identity claims are aired within 
the platform. After all, the coalition is made up of women with different identity claims 
at times opposing each other and at other times intersecting with each other. Whether 
identity differences are bridgeable and how such differences are reconciled is the focal 
point of my analysis.  
Such encounters within coalitional settings are like laboratory settings. They are a 
replica of what takes place in the broader social context. In that sense, they provide us 
with invaluable insights into the mechanisms of mutual recognition. The most 
important finding emerging from this analysis is that coalitions which exhibit great 
diversity cannot be based on just common interests. It is true that initially this coalition 
based its foundation on the needs of women. Both male hegemony and patriarchal state 
were questioned and tackled from unique and innovative angles.  
However, as inner deliberations continued, it became apparent that some members 
expected a more explicit affirmation of their life-style and identity by other members. 
The difficulty with this type of expectation is manifold. First, the major drawback 
emanates from the fact that life style differences are thought to be dichotomous and 
divisive by many in the coalition. This has to do with members‟ inclination to think 
there are packages of life style preferences that individuals conform to and there are no 
“in between” cases where individuals can borrow from these different packages to 
shape their own life styles. Some members reacted to this assumption by saying this 
type of an attitude rules out the reality of many different combinations of life style 
choices both within the coalition and in daily life. 
Secondly, even if members could think of individuals as having more hybrid 
personalities, not every member was agreeing with the idea that each and every identity 
in the coalition has to be cherished. For some, cherishing the distinct identities of 
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constituent members of the coalition is optional and secondary to the goal of showing 
the unique but parallel ways in which women are discriminated. At this particular 
instance, it is important to distinguish between the external goals of coalition building 
and the unique expectations that come with encounters between different life-styles. 
Multicultural democracy is usually portrayed as promising because it is based on 
political initiatives that are public spirited and also effective for a variety of groups. 
However, if effectiveness is defined solely as an additive solidarity that does not 
question how individuals approach each other, then we fall short of defining what 
multiculturalism encompasses in the true sense. Expectations from this kind of 
solidarity go beyond showing parallel discriminations and extend into accommodating 
particularities of citizens. These particularities are not to be depicted solely as 
opportunities for joint action but also acceptance/affirmation and re-valuation of 
diversity.    
Of course not all coalitions come into being with such a high yardstick. Some 
coalitions may have a more limited scope and members have lower expectations from 
each other. In order to depict what types of coalitions emerge in the public sphere and 
the particular expectations that come with these types, I developed a classification of 
forms of reciprocity expected in a coalition. These forms are indicative of the type of 
coalition at hand. 
There could be coalitions that are identity blind. In such coalitions reciprocating 
other members is based not on their identities and their particular expectations on the 
basis of those identities but is based more on a certain moral imperative, religious or 
secular.  I called this type of reciprocity as “general reciprocity”. Examples include 
peace coalitions where members seek freedom from violence for various groups or 
nations. Here, the identity of members is irrelevant for the objective of condemning 
violence. 
Alternatively, there could be coalitions that rely on an essential identity such as 
womanhood and that reduce coalition members to this singular trait. Hence 
reciprocating others in the coalition is reduced to their interests as women. I called this 
type of reciprocity as strategic reciprocity.  
If the coalition is one that values the diversity and particularity of its members and 
if at least some of the members want to be acknowledged for their authenticity, then 
neither general reciprocity nor strategic reciprocity would be enough. At that instance, 
personalized reciprocity comes into the picture.   
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For this to happen, members should develop an understanding that relies on not 
taking individuals solely as group members but as unique individuals with propensities 
to engage in fluid forms of identity construction. Personalized reciprocity can be 
acquired via two routes: one would be to admit the possibility of intersectional 
identities that would rule out pitting identities against each other. Admitting 
intersectionality entails an ability to envision cohabitation of different identity traits 
within the same individual. If this fact is admitted, there are fewer grounds to rule out 
reciprocating others who are presumably different from oneself but who in essence may 
combine similar traits with others in personal identity construction.  The other route is 
to leave the liberty of experimenting with different identities to individuals and not 
impose rigid group identities. If for example, individuals are given the liberty to define 
their womanhood or manhood according to their own vantage point, then there is no 
gender relation to be defined or ameliorated. If categories such as “woman” and “man” 
are deconstructed and gender relations are defined in a way to accommodate more fluid 
definitions of sex and sexual orientation by individuals, most of the antagonisms 
between groups emanating from dichotomous life preferences would be resolved. This 
is because these life choices are not assumed to exhaust social reality. This route is 
rather revolutionary and harder to realize as it topples our stereotypical assumptions 
about identity groups altogether.  
The particular problem in this coalition was passing from strategic reciprocity 
(and to a lesser extent, general reciprocity) to personalized reciprocity. Members were 
acknowledging the fact that what brought them together were their similar types of 
marginalization as women. However, as soon as other identity concens of members 
were brought into the picture and the social or political acceptance of these identities 
were made part of the negotiation, the coalition started disintegrating. Members were 
not able to reciprocate each other at a personal level that acknowledges the depth and 
diversity of demands made by other members. Individuals were thought of belonging to 
identifiable and dichotomous identity groups (i.e. gays vs. believers, as if homosexuals 
are de facto non-believers or drinkers vs. religious individuals, as if none of the 
religious individuals can be drinkers). Individuals were not promoted in their efforts to 
define their unique and intersectional identities.  
What multicultural democracy theorists should tackle is exactly this particular 
dilemma. How can coalitions that start with rather singular goals move into cherishing 
multivalent identities and concerns of their constituent members? I gave a few 
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directions through which this impasse can be removed. However, the basic limitation of 
my study is that, I do not have the means to depict how the activism of the coalition 
would have played out if personalized forms of reciprocity are adopted. Whereas I am 
able to point out to the basic limitations of general and strategic reciprocity for this 
coalition, I could not do the same thing for personalized reciprocity as this type of 
reciprocity was my prescription rather than what actually took place in the coalition.  
Further studies that focus on heterogeneous coalitions of this sort can verify 
whether personalized forms of reciprocity would actually be a workable and efficient 
way to handle diversity within a coalition.       
 
 
 
7.3.  Framing Inter-group Relations and Civility 
 
 
 
The last chapter centered on how members interpreted inter-group relations in 
society. This evaluation is important due to several reasons. Firstly, this is a group that 
brings together various different elements within the women‟s movement. Given this 
fact, this coalition is fertile ground to test assumptions about how multicultural 
democracy would play out with groups having different grievances. Multicultural 
citizenship requires a willingness to believe that when people are acting citizens, they 
care about, or should care about the fates of diverse identity groups at the same time 
(Lichteman, 1999, p.134). 
Caring about the fates of other identity groups reveals important information as to 
the social orientations of actors in a given polity. Most research considers this type of 
self-reflexivity as an important indication of the quality of civil society in a given 
polity. Theoretically, we could have a very vibrant civil society with numerous NGOs 
and very assertive social movements but without much self-reflexivity about how these 
different groups and movements are positioned vis-à-vis each other, we could end up 
with an environment where relations between social actors are defined by bitterness or 
enmity. 
We have to move away from a conception of civil society that juxtaposes state and 
society into one that evaluates the vibrancy of civil society on the basis of how reflexive 
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groups become as to their relation with other groups. In my research, I called this 
specific instance of reflexivity as civility. This is because if social actors can admit their 
own situatedness and the privileges they do/may acquire from the discriminations of 
other groups in society, their social orientations will become more altruistic and based 
on mutual care and respect.  
Civility has been conceptualized in the literature on civil society in different ways. 
Akman (2012) describes social orientations of actors as society‟s non-repressive 
engagement with others (p.17). He thinks civil society is not a sum of engagements and 
interactions of social actors, but more specifically it is a result of their specifically non-
violent, non-repressive and self-limiting interactions.  
However, there are grades to what self-limiting interactions of groups could mean. 
A minimalist conception of civility would only require groups to stay away from 
harming others. A more maximalist definition would require them to be more attentive 
to injustices and discriminations that prevail in society and to take action when 
necessary. This definition goes beyond not doing something harmful in that it takes 
neutrality as non-sufficient criteria for civility. This is a more pro-active definition of 
civility.  
What does arriving at this form of civility require of groups? I argued throughout 
my analysis that this requires groups to have a relational understanding of group 
difference. If groups can be understood as constituted in relation to another, they would 
be in a better position to come to terms with the distribution of privilege and 
discrimination in society.  
In other words, if they know that the fate of one group is not independent of 
another‟s but involves a negotiation and bargaining on the distribution of status and 
cultural value than they would be in a better position to acknowledge their own 
responsibility or stake in this negotiation. I also argued that having a relational view of 
social groups has important implications for civility. According to this framework, the 
essence of civility is tied to admitting the ways in which one groups‟ misfortune goes 
hand in hand with another groups‟ advantages. Being indifferent and identity blind to 
the distribution of power and not admitting this relational aspect of group positions and 
group difference eventually undermines underprivileged groups‟ quest for redistribution 
of power and value in the cultural sphere. 
I also argued throughout the analyses that arriving at a more elevated standard of 
civility, one that starts from not harming others and that arrives at not being neutral or 
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indifferent to others‟ misfortune would only take place in heterogeneous publics. This is 
because, if there is no countervailing rhetoric to dominant discourses in society it is 
extremely hard for groups to discover how they are implicated in other groups‟ fortunes 
or misfortunes. Only in the presence of spheres that bring together diverse actors can 
groups come to understand this implication. Deliberation between heterogeneous 
enclaves becomes more important at this point. If enclaves, which position themselves 
in juxtaposition to dominant and more mainstream groups in society, take up this task 
and initiate a conversation with other enclaves in society they may start a precedent for 
elevating the standard of civility for the larger public. 
This platform provided me with a suitable setting to test these claims. In ongoing 
conversations, I was able to observe how group positions shift and how concepts such 
as complicity, responsibility and privilege were conceptualized in more comprehensive 
and nuanced ways. The conversations started from a rather simplistic assumption that 
all marginal groups get a similar treatment from the state. This is a traditional way of 
doing social activism that relies solely on pitting groups against the state. However, as 
discussions progressed, the historical and current positions of groups vis-a-vis each 
other started gaining importance. This also pushed members to consider how they might 
have been implicated in power relations without necessarily having thought about the 
consequences of their own indifference for furthering discrimination of certain 
marginals. This brought members from a position where incivility is associated with 
giving actual harm to groups to one where incivility is not being aware of the 
consequences of one‟s neutrality and indifference. 
Starting from a state centric definition of injustice and discrimination, members 
arrived at an understanding of how groups are positioned vis-à-vis each other in a 
society based on an unequal distribution of privileges. Throughout ongoing discussions, 
they achieved a more fine-grained and critical appraisal of their own situatedness and 
their own complicity in the misfortune of others. The criteria for civility increased 
through deliberation in a heterogeneous public that includes different enclaves. 
The findings of this chapter are quite significant and promising for theorists on 
deliberation as well as for understanding norms of engagement in civil society. This 
chapter shows how deliberation produces more informed opinions on inter-group 
relations and sources of discrimination and disadvantage provided that there is a 
heterogeneous public that gives room for enclaves to present their opinions. This in turn 
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has a potential to alter the social orientations of actors that is an important input for a 
cohesive civil society. 
 
 
 
7.4.  Significance of the Work 
 
 
 
On the basis of one coalition building experience I have tried to answer important 
questions related to how groups and individuals handle diversity in heterogeneous 
environments. This question is important not only for civil society activists who already 
happen to have diverse networks and who operate through heterogeneous publics. The 
question has also practical relevance for the larger public because no society is immune 
from animosities and tensions that may arise from inter-group relations. In this sense, 
although the coalition is novel for bringing together separate actors of the women‟s 
movement scene in Turkey for the first time, it also has a value for discussions related 
to politics of difference and multiculturalism. This is the main reason I did not intend to 
confine the accomplishments of this coalition solely to what it had been able to 
accomplish for women‟s empowerment.  
  Having said that, the primary merit of this kind of a coalition for women‟s 
movement is that it proves ideological cleavages can be sorted out when it comes to 
protecting women‟s interests. Scholars for a long time argued that differences in 
opinion on gender relations are too wide in Turkey to make a unified women‟s 
movement possible (Ramazanoğlu, 2002; Aldıkaçtı Marshall, 2005; Aslan Akman, 
2008). However, women of this coalition do align their frames on the basis of 
improving women‟s visibility in the public space as well as their capabilities (education, 
work). This is not to deny the fact that there is significant variation in attitudes related 
to gender equality, public versus private distinction and sexuality. Nevertheless, there 
are grounds on which solidarity can be based especially with respect to selective 
appropriation of fruits of modernity by men. Women can align their frames on the basis 
of improving the capabilities of women in the public space. This is an important finding 
in the sense that if different factions within the women‟s movement want to make 
advancements in the situation of women, this is a handle that can be efficiently utilized.  
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Having stated the importance of this coalition for women‟s movement in Turkey, I 
underline the second and equally important reason why this and similar coalitions have 
an important function for civil society. By bringing heterogeneous publics together, they 
have a potential to change social orientations of actors on many matters ranging from 
recognition of identities to the distribution of (dis)advantages among groups in society. 
Individuals have a tendency to stay in their own circle and debate with like-minded 
others. Bringing them in contact with individuals with an alternative definition of inter-
group relations would have a destabilizing effect whose outcome can potentially be 
positive if the deliberating individuals‟/groups‟ initial position is based on mutual 
respect. Being enclaves could be a potential reason why such groups would listen to 
each other. As groups positioned at the sidelines of mainstream public sphere, such 
groups can modify each other‟s claims to discrimination and disadvantage by showing 
how each and every group is implicated in the fate of the other.  
Such encounters have a potential to produce more responsible and progressive 
rhetoric. Of course, it would be a far-fetched claim to say every enclave has a potential 
to adopt such progressive rhetoric. There are enclaves which are extremist and whose 
rhetoric could only get worse if put in contact with other marginals of society. In our 
case however enclaves feel equally vulnerable and need each other‟s support to advance 
their claims. Hence, they are more inclined to have a reconciliatory attitude vis-à-vis 
each other.  
The importance of this talk between enclaves resides in the fact that as marginals 
tell their grievances more, the relationality of positions are discovered. Groups come to 
comprehend that no group‟s position in society is disassociated from other groups‟ 
position. Hence demands to justice and fairness necessarily involve a reconfiguration of 
privileges. This means no group can act as if it is not associated with the 
discriminations inflicted on another group.  This understanding, as argued in the thesis, 
has a potential to elevate the standards of civility; that is the non-repressive engagement 
of groups with each other.   
Contrary to what might be expected, the biggest disagreements and controversies 
in the coalition did not arise from differences in opinion on gender or inter-group 
relations. Although, controversies on these topics were plenty, there were still grounds 
on which frames could be aligned by drawing similarities on the basis of similar forms 
of marginalization. The most divisive issues turned out to be those which involved 
attesting different life style concerns of members.  
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The expectations revolved around how members living a particular life style 
would behave if they are put in contact with other members‟ life styles or political 
demands. Whether solidarity involves joint political acts or whether it also entails 
cherishing the multivalent identities of coalition members remained an unresolved 
issue. The existence of this problem for the coalition is very telling about how difficult 
it is to make multiculturalism work on the ground. Despite bringing diverse groups of 
women together and framing their joint concerns as women, the coalition still fell short 
of endorsing the particular identities of its members. Participating to daily performances 
of other members or showing solidarity with their political demands with them were 
seen at least by some of the members as ways to cherish the pluralism of the coalition. 
These themes came up both in the discussion on socializing with those who consume 
alcohol as well as showing solidarity with homosexuals.  
Whether heterogeneous coalitions should stick to a minimalist definition of 
solidarity (general or strategic reciprocity) or whether they should prove their ability to 
embrace the particular identities of their members remains an unresolved issue. This is 
also a puzzle that should be elaborated further by multicultural democracy theorists.  
Multicultural democracy is usually portrayed as promising because it is based on 
political initiatives that are public spirited and also effective for a variety of groups. 
However, this coalition shows that even in cases where concerns of women with 
different backgrounds are taken into account, other intersecting identities equally beg 
recognition or at least due consideration.  What multicultural democracy theorists 
should tackle is exactly this particular demand. Do we fall short of the ideals of 
multicultural democracy if this demand is not met? What would coalitions gain or lose 
if they try to accomplish that? And how can coalitions that start with various strategic 
goals move into cherishing multivalent identities of their constituent members?  
The existence of such questions shows there is a minimalist and maximalist 
definition of what multicultural democracy entails. A minimalist definition of it would 
suffice with citizens having a general reciprocity vis-à-vis fellow citizens or strategic 
reciprocity on the basis of defending certain over-arching identity interests (i.e. gender), 
whereas a maximalist definition would be attentive to all the other intersecting 
identities as well as the un-fixed/fluid nature of identities as exemplified in personalized 
reciprocity. 
This coalition could have been longer lasting if the maximalist definition was 
upheld. While some members argued general or strategic reciprocity could have been 
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enough, others openly looked for a type of solidarity at the scale of cherishing the 
diversity of identities within the coalition. Further studies should question whether 
multicultural democracy can only be furthered with such a maximalist agenda 
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8.   Appendix 
Interview Dates and Pseudonyms Used 
Pseudonym Interview Date 
A.D              01.June.10 
Z.A              22.September.10 
A.E              25.September.10 
A.F              25.September.10 
H.I              02.October.10 
B.D              04.October.10 
ġ.T              14.October.10 
F.G              10.March.11 
G.H              14.March.11 
L.M              16.March.11 
D.E              23.March.11 
E.F              24.March.11 
B.C              29.March.11 
I.K              22.April.11 
K.L              22.April.11 
B.E              26.April.11 
A.B              16.May.11 
B.F              25.May.11 
C.D              05.August.11 
O.P              23.May.2012 
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